Monthly Archives: November 2016

Psychological and Ideological Aspects of Human Cloning: A Transition to a Transhumanist Psychology

Nestor Micheli Morales

Social Science Department New York City College of Technology The City University of New York

Abstract

The prospect of replication of human beings through genetic manipulation has engendered one of the most controversial debates about reproduction in our society. Ideology is clearly influencing the direction of research and legislation on human cloning, which may present one of the greatest existential challenges to the meaning of creation. In this article, I argue that,in view of the possibility that human cloning and other emerging technologies could enhance physical and cognitive abilities, there is a need for a different way of thinking about life, new technologies and creation. New scientific discoveries require a shift in the way psychology takes responsibility to help individuals and society. Today, psychology needs to follow the progress that humans are taking toward a transhuman stage of development as a transition to a later posthuman stage.

Introduction

Science and technology are advancing so fast that society has difficulties in keeping pace with the complexities that new developments bring. Human reproductive techniques have progressed rapidly in the past three decades, and other new techniques such as cloning have been introduced (Kirkman, 2001; Roberts, 1998; Williamson, 1999b).

Speculations about the idea of cloning emerged in the early 1960s, and ideas of human cloning in particular were discussed in the 1970s, followed by some innovations in nuclear transfer in the early 1980s.Human cloning represents asexual reproduction, and the critics of human cloning often assume that the result of cloning is not a unique individual. This has led to condemnations of human cloning from the politicians side and to fear, ignorance, and clonophobia from the publics side (Pence, 1998b).

The cloning debate has also been reinforced with ethical, religious, scientific, moral, medical, and political issues, since human cloning became a more plausible prospect in the late 1990s (Baird, 1999; Fiddler, Pergament, and Pergament, 1999; Fung, 2000; Madigan, 1998; Shannon, 1998; Shapiro, 1999; Vastag, 2001; Wills, 1998).

Emotional responses have dominated the debate on human cloning, and although emotions can sometimes be justified, many times they can be caused by prejudice. Gregory E. Pence (1998b) maintains that physicians, bioethicists, and scientists have done poorly in helping to reduce the publics fears and misconceptions. For several years, research on cloning has been placed at the center of interest and debate among scientists of different disciplines. Albee (2002),for example, argues that there is increasing political pressure on science and scientists in respect of issues such as cloning and genetic engineering, whose implications are important and gradually affect major national and political decisions.

The critics of human cloning, however, argue that there are many unaddressed problems, among them the implications of the harm issue (Kassirer and Rosenthal, 1998). Other important concerns are related to family, such as family interactions (in the case of a cloned family member), adults rights to procreative liberty, childrens rights to privacy and equality, and commercial surrogacy. These are only a few of the areas of concern that can be related to human cloning.Some reports have also indicated that it is important to study the possible psychological and emotional state of individuals produced by cloning, the social aspects of their families, and the possible effects on society (Presidents Council, 2002).

In this paper, I argue that an individual created through the application of human cloning techniques, or other similar techniques,or any other type of genetic manipulation, will not show the donors characteristics to the extent of compromising uniqueness. The creation of genetically identical individual/s will never lead to the replication of the donors experiences. In addition, human experiences are not independent of space and time, and,since every human clone, or multiple clones, of an individual will be born in a unique context, cloned human beings experiences will be unique in each case. Therefore, cloned individuals will be able to develop their own identities, their own personalities, and the uniqueness of any other human being. Furthermore, advances in biotechnology will offer human beings the possibility of enhancing their physical and cognitive abilities, as well as extending their life spans. These changes will not be able to take place without similar advances in the social sciences.

I also argue that a different approach to psychology is necessary to accompany the profound changes in society, and in the concept of human nature,that these biotechnological advances will bring. A new and different approach is imperative, in order to help human beings with new challenges and with the new mental processes they can be expected to face during a transition from a transhuman stage, which is already taking place on our planet, toward a future posthuman stage that appears to be inevitable.

Criticism of human cloning

In regard to criticism of human cloning, Lipschutz (1999) has suggested that the debate should not be labeled with a question about whether cloning is wrong, but rather with the question, When is cloning wrong? Some of the objections to human cloning that have been presented are to the effect that it would have compromising effects on the welfare of the child (Burley and Harris, 1999; Yanagimachi, 2001). Burley and Harris (1999) describe the different forms of harm that, according to the critics of human cloning, a cloned child could suffer. The three types of harm they consider are:

1. Clones will be harmed by the prejudicial attitudes people may have towards them.

2. Clones will be harmed by the expectations and demands from parents or genotype donors.

3. Clones will be harmed by their own awareness of their origins.

In addition, Burley and Harris argue that the above objections to human cloning, based on child welfare, are misleading. They do not question the motivation of the objections, but consider that these formulations of the anti-cloning position do not provide a convincing argument. They do not deny that cloned individuals might indeed suffer some welfare deficits. However, they suggest, these deficits are not sufficient to warrant state interference with the choices of people who wish to clone their genes.

From a standpoint very critical of human cloning, presented in testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission on March 14, 1997, Leon R. Kass has questioned whether human procreation will remain human and whether children are going to be made rather than begotten. He suggests that offensive, grotesque, revolting, repugnant, and repulsive are the words most commonly heard in the street, and from intellectuals, believers, atheists, humanists, and scientists, regarding the prospect of human cloning (Kass 1997, 2002; Kass and Wilson, 1998).

Even though opposition to reproductive cloning is shared by many, the supporters of cloning have pointed out that the arguments presented by Kass are an emotional response to a new technology, and they do not provide a sufficient analysis of the risks, and the technologys benefits (Caplan 2002/2003; Kimberly, 2002; Reynolds, 2001; Rosen, 2003).In addition, according to Caplan, the arguments against cloning, endorsed by Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama and others, are presented as if their authors hold the moral high ground in the public debate. Caplan suggests that these arguments are mostly based on pseudoscience, ideology, and plain fear mongering, which are then used to manipulate public opinion.

The implication of the harm issue in human cloning

The implications of the harm issue, as presented by the critics of human cloning, have played an important role in moulding the attitudes of the public. According to Kass, these implications have also played an important role for the policy makers and the researchers themselves (Kass, 1997; Kass and Wilson, 1998).Certainly, harm to offspring needs to be assessed before evaluating the choice of whether to clone in a specific instance, and in evaluating these choices the expected burdens and benefits need to be weighed against each other (Roberts, 1998).

There are numerous implications and consequences of advanced technologies such as human cloning and genetic engineering (Satava, 2002). For instance, what are the implications for individuals behavior? What will the societal implications be, and what fundamental ethical principles will be challenged? There are also many unanswered questions related to human cloning, such as possible psychological harm to children, and attitudes toward cloned children (Burley and Harris, 1999; Pence, 1998a). Other aspects linked to the harm issue are identity formation, gender identity, and other topics related to developmental psychology (Annas, 1998; Gonnella and Hojat, 2001).

According to Pence (1998b), cloning can be associated with both physical and psychological harm, and the physical harm can be related to genetic harm to the child. Other scholars, among the critics of cloning, also argue that human cloning could create serious psychological issues, which might include identity and individuality issues, as well as other aspects related to how we define ourselves (Annas, 1998; Andrews, 2000; Baird, 1999; Evers, 1999; Fung, 2000; Kass, 1997, Kass and Wilson, 1998; McGee, 2000a; Williamson, 1999a; Wills, 1998).

Unresolved social and psychological aspects of human cloning

According to McGee (2001), society needs to resolve many questions about human cloning, such as those relating to its social, reproductive, therapeutic, and ethical aspects. For example, concerning social aspects, cloning might challenge the social responsibility of parenthood and the nature of the family (Andrews, 1999). Children produced by cloning might have psychological problems of identity and individuality (Presidents Council, 2002).

Many have speculated that human clones would lack the necessary traits for true independence from progenitors. McGee (2001) questions whether a clone could feel that her/his progenitor, who genetically would be its monozygotic twin, might become an appropriate parent. Baird (1999) argues that there would be social consequences from human cloning and questions how to organize and provide financial resources and services for cloned people. So far, there are no developed plans about how to place cloned individuals in society.Broader societal interests also need to be taken into account in designing policies for human cloning, and it would be misleading to view decisions about cloning solely as matters of individual choice. Many aspects of human cloning may bring uncertainties about how the relationship between parent and child will develop. The childs interest should be considered an important factor in human reproductive cloning (Biological uncertainties, 2001).

Problems related to the concept of uniqueness

Opponents of human cloning have stated that it is problematic because it would deny the cloned person his or her uniqueness and identity. Some of the possible psychological problems that cloned individuals might experience are related to these (Annas, 1998; Baird, 1999; Evers, 1999; Fung, 2000; Kass and Wilson, 1998; McGee, 2000b; Williamson, 1999a; Wills, 1998). Baird (1999) and Robertson (1998b) conclude that it is not known whether cloned humans will have psychological problems; however, Baird mentions some issues related to possible psychological/social harm:

1. In individuals originating from transfer of an adults nucleus, the knowledge that one is the result of cloning may diminish ones sense of uniqueness.

2. Individuals originating from embryo splitting carried in the same pregnancy, such as twins or triplets, may have problems in defining expectations of themselves and for their future, because they know there is another genetically identical individual.

3. Individuals originating from embryo splitting, where embryos are frozen and implanted at different times or in different women, may have to deal with the knowledge that they have not originated from an undirected combination of two particular genomes (instead, someone has determined who they are genetically).

This position maintains that many adopted children or children born with donor insemination have a need to know about their biological origins. Critics of human cloning argue that cloned children may not have the sense of coming from a maternal and paternal line with attributes coming from both parents, and may not feel that they are unique individuals. In that case, clones will have a psychological need to have a personal history and a sense of self. The first person born through nuclear transfer cloning would have to deal not only with being a genetic copy of another person, but with the fact of being a person who did not come from the joining of egg cell and sperm.

An opposing view to the critics of human cloning is presented by Madigan (1998), who states that a person who has been cloned will not be a simple replica of another human being but a unique person. According to Madigan, a human clone is an identical twin delayed in time. She is a much younger identical twin, reared in a different environment, at a completely different time and with the benefits of not being treated in the same way. The basic fear of cloning is in regards to the nature of a newly created person. Specifically, the fear is that human cloning will be the creation of an identical copy of a particular person; however, this does not have to be so.

Although human clones may have the same nuclear genes as others, as in the case with monozygotic or identical twins, there is no evidence or reason to believe they will not be unique individuals with their own personalities and philosophies of life (Evers, 1999; Madigan, 1998; McConville, 2001; Pence, 1998a; Shannon, 1998; Strong, 2005a; Wills, 1998).Taking into consideration the extensive research on twin studies, especially on monozygotic twins, there is evidence to support the idea that personality differences, identity development and the uniqueness of human clones, created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or by any other type of genetic manipulation, will be shaped by the interaction between genetic and environmental factors.

Some answers related to human cloning, the concept of uniqueness, and twin studies

In regard to the concept of uniqueness, several authors (Elliott, 1998; Jamieson, 1998; Resnik, 2001) emphasize that people with the same genes, such as monozygotic twins, who are supposed to be genetically identical, are not the same people. The same can be said about cloned human beings, who will have physiological differences, as well as different behavioral traits. This led Shermer (1999) to question why moralists are not crying for legislation against twinning, when nature has already done the cloning, and the result is called identical twins. In addition, some authors such as Pence (1998a) indicate that a cloned person would not be an exact copy of an adult human being.Although the gene structure would be very similar, at the molecular level there will be many differences.Moreover, Pence (1998a) and Strong (2005b) point out that the brain cannot be cloned or duplicated, and most importantly, the experiences of a human being cannot be replicated at all by cloning. Many of these wrong ideas, such as those to do with the duplication of the mind, are captured from pure science fiction, poorly informed politicians, and irresponsible journalism.

In the field of psychology, we have no evidence that it is possible to replicate individual human experience in exact detail. Many studies on monozygotic twins (Baker, Mazzeo and Kendler, 2007; Button, et al., 2007; Brent and Melhem, 2008; Eley, et al., 2007; Ge, et al. 2007; Hicks, et al., 2007) indicate that, even when they share a high correlation in terms of intelligence, personality features, and mental disorders, these correlation values are not equal, their behaviors and cognitive functions are not identical, and the twins are different in terms of individual experiences (Bouchard, 1997). The majority of the studies provide evidence of moderate heritability, non-shared environmental influences, and modest shared environmental influences (Asbury, et al., 2008; Hansson, et al., 2008; Harlaar, et al., 2008; Kato and Pedersen, 2005; Kovas and Plomin, 2007; Saudino, 2005; Simberg, et al., 2009; Su, et al., 2005). The experiences of identical twins are individual, unique,and always different, even when they have been reared together, with the same mother, the same father, and in the same environment.

In general terms, there are two kinds of environmental effects to be considered: family effects that are usually shared by siblings, and make them prone to be similar; and nonshared environmental effects. Nonshared environmental effects are the type of environmental influences that affect individuals, and in this case monozygotic twins, in a unique fashion. In spite of the fact that monozygotic twins, like potential human clones, are genetically identical, and although they will typically share the same family environment, these identical twins or potential human clones do not have identical personalities. They are not able to experience or interpret an event in exactly the same manner, even though they are genetically identical. Radical differences between identical twins are caused by nonshared environmental effects.

Nonshared environmental effects are found in most studies of monozygotic twins to be more significant than shared environmental effects. Based on the available evidence, we can conclude that the experiences of monozygotic twins, or the experiences of potential human clones,can be more similar than average. However, there is no evidence in the field of psychology that the experiences of monozygotic twins, or the experiences of future human beings created through genetic manipulation, can be identical or that they can be replicated. Since most of a human beings personality and identity development is built on experiences of life events, monozygotic twins and potential human beings created through any type of genetic manipulation will have the uniqueness of any other human being.

Furthermore, kinship research that compares identical twins with fraternal twins in regards to the contribution of heredity and environment on complex human characteristics, such as intelligence and personality development, also show no significant results that could be used to support the idea that complex human characteristics would be exactly replicated when using genetic manipulation to create human clones. For example, research based on kinship studies supports only a moderate influence of heredity. Twin studies show that the correlations between the scores of monozygotic twins are higher than the scores of fraternal twins in terms of intelligence, personality characteristics, mental disorders, and disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence (Kas, et al., 2007; Kato and Pedersen, 2005; Kovas and Plomin, 2007; Polderman, et al., 2007; Scarr, 1997; Van Hulle, Lemery-Chalfant, and Goldsmith, 2007; Wade, Gillespie, and Martin, 2007). However, even when the studies show that the correlations between the scores of monozygotic twins are high, they also show that the scores are not identical correlations, and that gene-environment interaction and nonshared environmental influences are important to explain these differences, which will lead those twins to become unique individuals.

Identity and human cloning

Among the critics of human cloning, Baird (1999) claims that human cloning presents a threat to our concepts of human identity and individuality. Baird argues that when a child of a particular genetic constitution is deliberately made, it is easier to consider the child as a product rather than a gift of providence. Kass (1997) also writes about some of the psychological consequences that a cloned human might experience in her/his life in society. He states that cloning will create serious issues of identity and individuality. According to Kass, a person who has been cloned may experience serious concerns about her or his identity, not only because of identical appearance to another human being, but because her identical twin might be her father or mother. In addition, Kass suggests that people in society will be prone to compare the performances of a cloned person with the performances of her alter ego.

However, according to Caplan (2002/2003),the arguments against cloning endorsed by Kass and other critics of human cloning are presented as if they possess the moral high ground in the public debate. Caplan argues that the arguments of Kass and others are, instead, mostly based on pseudoscience, ideology, and plain fear mongering, which are used to manipulate public opinion. Evers (1999) has also criticized the opponents of human cloning, and maintains that the concept of identity is ambiguous. Accordingly, the statement that cloning produces identical individuals is not meaningful, unless the concept is clarified.

Identity is defined as an organized conception of the self, in which the person can define his or her own values, goals, and beliefs. It is the immediate perception of ones selfsameness and continuity in time, with the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize ones sameness and continuity (Erikson, 1959). Identity is also defined as a clearly expressed theory of oneself as someone who can act on the basis of reason, can explain her or his own behavior and own actions, and take responsibility for these actions (Moshman, 1999). Identity is reached through a series of stages in life (Marcia, 1966, 1980), and each of these is experienced differently by each individual during development and throughout the entire lifespan (Erikson, 1950, 1968).

Identity is also the result of a continuous enriching process in which our entire personality acquires those individual characteristics that differentiate us from others.

The idea that creating another human being with exactly the same genotype would mean creating another human being with the same identity, and the same personality, is fundamentally wrong. At this point, the latter is impossible for us as human mortals. Furthermore, in the hypothetical case that scientists one day could create multiple human beings with exactly the same genotype, the creation of these genetically identical individuals would not lead to the production of individuals with the same identity and personality. The creation or production of human beings with the same personality, and without uniqueness, will not be possible, at least based on all the evidence from research on human beings with identical or nearly identical DNA.

Furthermore, even if two or more human beings could acquire the same brain structures through genetic manipulation, this would not provide a basis for them to develop identical personalities. Even the same brain in those human beings would never allow them to have the same experiences, since events are always experienced in relationship to time and space. Experiences, of course, are also related to perception. However, the perception of time and space is for us human beings, in this universe, a subjective individual experience. Even if space and time are not the ultimate structure of the objective world, they are necessary parts of a framework within which we organize our experiences.

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Psychological and Ideological Aspects of Human Cloning