Daily Archives: February 12, 2016

What is Nihilism? | CounterOrder.com

Posted: February 12, 2016 at 6:45 am

Nihilism Defined

A common, but misleading, description of nihilism is the 'belief in nothing'. Instead, a far more useful one would substitute 'faith' for 'belief' where faith is defined as the "firm belief in something for which there is no proof." A universal definition of nihilism could then well be the rejection of that which requires faith for salvation or actualization and would span to include anything from theology to secular ideology. Within nihilism faith and similar values are discarded because they've no verifiable objective substance, they are invalid serving only as yet another exploitable lie never producing any strategically beneficial outcome. Faith is an imperative hazard to group and individual because it compels suspension of reason, critical analysis and common sense. Nietzsche once said that faith means not wanting to know. Faith is 'don't let those pesky facts get in the way of our political plan or our mystically ordained path to heaven'; faith is 'do what I tell you because I said so'. All things that can't be disproved need faith, utopia needs faith, idealism needs faith, and spiritual salvation needs faith. Abolish faith!

NIHILISM IS SANITY IN AN INSANE SOCIETY

The second element nihilism rejects is the belief in final purpose, that the universe is built upon non-random events and that everything is structured towards an eventual conclusive revelation. This is called teleology and it's the fatal flaw plaguing the whole rainbow of false solutions from Marxism to Buddhism and everything in between. Teleology compels obedience towards the fulfillment of "destiny" or "progress" or similar such grandiose goals. Teleology is used by despots and utopian dreamers alike as a coercive motivation leading only to yet another apocryphal apocalypse; the real way to lead humanity by the nose tell them it's all part of the big plan so play along, or else! It may even seem reasonable but there is not now and never has been any evidence the universe operates teleologically there is no final purpose. This is the simple beauty nihilism has that no other idea-set does. By breaking free from the tethers of teleology one is empowered in outlook and outcome because for the first time it's possible to find answers without proceeding from pre-existing perceptions. We're finally free to find out what's really out there and not just the partial evidence to support original pretext and faulty notions only making a hell on earth in the process. So abolish teleology too!

Nihilism is primarily skepticism coupled with reduction, but in practical reality it takes on more than one facet which often leads to a confusion of definitions. In the most general sense nihilism has two major classifications, the first is passive and usually goes by the term existential or 'social' nihilism and the second is active and is termed 'political' nihilism.

Existential nihilism is a passive world view which revolves around such topics as suffering and futility, and even has connections to Eastern mysticism like Buddhism. In a more direct sense existential 'social' nihilism is manifest within the sense of isolation, futility, angst, and the hopelessness of existence increasingly prevalent within the modern digital world, an effect referred to as the 'downward spiral'. A direct way to describe it might be 'detachment from everything'.

Words used to describe political nihilism include active, revolutionary, destructive, and even creative. Political nihilism is dictionary defined as the realization "that conditions in the social organization are so bad as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility." It deals with authority and social structures rather than simply the introspective, personal emotions of existential nihilism.

Political nihilism is especially a world-view that's rational, logical, empirical, scientific and devoid of pointless, extraneous emotion. It's the logical psyche that distills everything down into what is known, what can be known and what can't be known. It's the realization that all values are ultimately relativistic and in some ways the simplicity of nihilism is its own complexity.

An estimable and succinct definition of a (political) nihilist comes from Ivan Turgenev's 1861 novel Fathers And Sons, "A nihilist is a person who does not bow down to any authority, who does not accept any principle on faith, however much that principle may be revered."

So the two classes of nihilism overlap but the CounterOrder is mostly about this second stage of 'political' nihilism for reasons of brevity, because the existential angle when not stillborn generally leads to political nihilism anyway, because nihilism isn't something to just talk about it's something you live, and finally because political nihilism has real world history and experience as you will read in a moment concerning the Russian revolutionaries in Historical Nihilism below. Ultimately however, the nihilistic direction one travels depends on what the individual wishes to make out of life.

To negate and circumvent the paradoxes and internal contradictions inherent within existential nihilism is the course of the 'political' nihilism you're reading.

Nihilism is the destruction of idle philosophy, the negation of idealism, the negation of mythology, and the destruction of perplexity along with the disingenuous despots that profit from it as the monopolist interpreters of artificial confusion. Therefore, Nihilism's definitions are:

1) When conditions in the social organization are so unhealthy as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility.

2) A doctrine of skepticism coupled with reduction that refutes faith, teleology, arbitrary morality, sacred values and principles, heresy, blasphemy, and similar beliefs while maintaining that existing political, social, and economic institutions based on these beliefs must be destroyed.

3) A methodology for a biologically-based existence that rejects arbitrary morality in favor of cause and effect and inviolate forces, predicated upon that which is objectively self-evident and without need of belief, within a sustainable mental and physical environment that promotes independent thinking and critical expression.

Historical Nihilism

The first nihilists were likely the Greek Sophists who lived about 2,500 years ago. They used oratorical skills and argumentative discourse to challenge the values upon which everyday beliefs rested. The Greek sophists, such as Gorgias, represented the beginning of philosophy and the first conflict between the traditional mystical belief system and a rational, skeptical view of the natural world. It was as basic as the difference between a worldview based on emotion and one on thought. Because the sophists challenged established beliefs they were often condemned by public authorities and critics as moral corrupters or worse.

One of the earliest nihilistic writers of the modern era was the Dane Soren Aabye Kierkegaard who lived from 1813 to 1855. Kierkegaard was a truly unique but also enigmatic philosopher who established the foundation of the philosophy later termed existentialism. Kierkegaard's existentialism was in many ways a negation of the ruling Hegelian philosophy, views deeply rooted in Kierkegaard's Lutheran Protestantism that reflected the ideals of the subjectivity of truth and the nature of life as a uniquely individual pursuit. To be brutally
succinct existentialism posits that existence is based on experience and this experience is a uniquely individualized sensation, in other words my reality is not your reality. Modern quantum physical 'philosophy' returned to this theme of solipsism during the late 20th century using empirical mathematics.

The Russian Nihilists Political nihilism goes back at least to Russia during the last half of the 1800s as a revolutionary movement with the stated goal of overthrowing the despotic authority of the Czar.

In Russia, nihilism became identified with a loosely organized revolutionary movement (C.1860-1917) that rejected the authority of the state, church, and family. ... The movement advocated a social arrangement based on rationalism and materialism as the sole source of knowledge and individual freedom as the highest goal. By rejecting man's spiritual essence in favor of a solely materialistic one, nihilists denounced God and religious authority as antithetical to freedom. From: The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

By modern standards the Nihilists attempts at revolution were inconsistent and mostly ineffective lobbing low quality munitions at the Czar and his family and even getting themselves blown up in the process. But what they lacked in equipment and tactics they made up for with vision, ideas, and an unparalleled intensity.

The nihilists enjoyed shocking their parents by calling for an end to the old moral system, advocating, for instance, the extermination of everybody in Russia over the age of 25. In the 1860's many of these young intellectuals went to Switzerland, where the proper Swiss bourgeoisie were scandalized at the men with their hair cut long and the girls with their hair cut short, at their loud voices and insolent behaviour. [1]

The mark left by the Russian Nihilists was not in ephemeral political change but rather a revolution of ideas and attitudes, one that still resonates today. "The earnest young men and women [Nihilists] of the 1860's wanted to cut through every polite veneer, to get rid of all conventional sham, to get to the bottom of things." [4]

Anarchism Both modern Nihilists and anarchists can trace roots to the intensepersonality of Mikhael Bakunin in the 19th century who succinctly reflected the nihilist sentiment with his famous statement: "Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and eternally creative source of all." Anarchism and nihilism are often confused, but looking deeper we can see that they view events from a different perspective. For example the anarchist says that 'no one has the authority to tell another what to do'. But the nihilist replies that if the one giving orders has a gun and the other not, then what do rights or authority matter? Indeed, what benefit is constitution at the moment of any criminal event?

The abuse and exploitation of power by illegitimate authority is as old as history because human behavior is primarily selfish and will usually take advantage of the situation as much as allowed. Right or wrong, authority and power remain. Nevertheless it's also true that the demand for fair treatment and equal opportunity are just as timeless. Human social development is a story of the constant struggle between the two forces. In this struggle the only healthy and functional structure remains one of robust checks and balances.

Anarchists are typically idealists that believe in subjective concepts such as peace, legal justice, and especially the universal noble nature of all individuals (at least under the proper social conditions). These myths can serve a constructive function, but all too often dogmatic attachment only serves to lead us astray. It's critical that we criticize and reconsider even what we value most.

The Nihilist realizes that history is abused and misconstrued through the formation of artificial lines and erroneous connections between disparate events, only to substantiate preconceived interpretations of reality, the classic teleological myth.

We draw an imaginary thread through the ages to chart the course we judge to be the 'correct' one. All wrong views are ignored. This approach was dubbed the 'Whig' theory of history by Herbert Butterfield. The name derived from those past historians who treated history as a record of events that culminated in the political system dear to their own hearts: the liberal democracy. [2]

It's an understandable product of human evolution to not only detect patterns but also get carried away and concoct them as well.

Human nature sees things that aren't really there, just think of optical illusions or Rorschach ink-blot tests. Much of life is nothing interpreted as something. This is because dealing with the yawning absence necessitates the concoction of a something to grasp the nothing, thereby ignoring the perilous obvious by manufacturing a more malleable artificial myth. Yet the attitude of a Nihilist is contradictory to this because they aim to view human character as it actually is and understand purpose within context.

Objective Reality & Freewill

It's remarkable how even a modicum of logic and scientific philosophy demonstrates the difficulty of defining what is real and the rules to describe it. Like a sandpit the more one struggles the tougher it gets. So an important value to question is objective reality. The closest match might be scientific laws which are merely consistent principles and the most powerful ones are just statistical constructs.

This struggle to define objective reality implies a lack of objective truth, but really this philosophical assumption leads to neither clarity nor accurate interpretations. Even a state of total chaos has statistical uniformities. Consensus can be found and in fact it's remarkably prevalent. Commonality can be found and built upon at many levels but absolutes are less meaningful here than consistency; ultimate reality is fuzzy because it's a product of probabilities. The key is to utilize the solid and avoid the ambiguous, bet on the likely and not the unlikely.

Existence is largely defined by perception because reality is contextual. If you perceive yourself to be weak and without willpower then you will find life is such. Conversely, if you perceive that you have the power to change things in your life, so it will be. In the same way we tend to find what we expect just as physicists contemplate how a photon can be both a wave and a particle. This essence doesnt mean that practical reality is an illusion, rather it is multi-dimensional.

The random and statistical qualities of nature are critical forces because they negate the credibility of teleology, that purposeful predestination that undermines freewill. So one actually has the option to passively accept the socio-historically established concoction of absolutes, truth and moral laws, the objective reality which can be nothing but myth. Or you can accept real for what it is and assume the healthier role of active participant constantly defining existence through perception and intelligence. In this way defining existence is predicated upon life, conscious awareness of sensory input combined with critical interpretation of what that input means. And the more highly developed the consciousness or the greater the intelligence the more effective and meaningful is existence.

Passivity is a myth. We are all intricately enmeshed within a dynamic system that doesn't just demand but comp
els active decision-making.

Hence the difference between passive 'social' and active 'political' nihilism is that one accepts whatever happens within futility and pointlessness while the other destroys/creates meaning and value. Which path a person takes is a personal decision within the limits of ability, and that means one does have choice; existence is not predetermined or fatally ordained. However, default answers and the compulsion of conformity shouldn't be overlooked. Reality is contextual.

Beyond Good and Evil

Religious believers and philosophers alike frequently ask the question, does evil exist?, as if they need to be continually reassured that it does and we agree with them. Many are completely convinced that evil is everywhere, yet the same people are equally sure of luck, fate, and mysterious malevolent powers out to defeat all their noble efforts. But all these imaginary influences are simply projections of a selfish ego. In fact, there is no natural evil, and no malicious intent exists within any forces of the universe.

An old Russian proverb states, "There is no evil, but that it brings some good, revealing that even in standard Manichean theology every god has a devil and every good requires an evil to shadow it. Even to define evil as wholly immoral acts we still have to specify which set of moral of standards were using as rule book. Is it the Bible? The Talmud? The I Ching?! Obviously, evil is a variable, yet nonetheless consistent elements of healthy and unhealthy can still be discerned within the boundaries of a species due to the shared genetic material. Actions and events that benefit the growth and well-being of the species, and the individuals within it, are colloquially, but consistently, termed good and the opposite as evil. For instance the chicken, as well as the human owner, considers the fox evil because he sneaks in to commit murder, yet the fox doesnt consider his species' carnivorous actions to be evil but rather entirely good because they mean food and survival. This analogy also reminds us that we can go much farther with symbiosis and cooperation than with warfare.

For intelligent creatures good and evil are unnecessary categories, theyre loaded terms that intentionally obscure actual forces and events while impeding our ability to accurately comprehend both. We shouldnt view life and existence as a conflict between good and evil; to do so is both foolish and self-defeating because it requires us to declare war on ourselves, our instincts, and even unavoidable natural laws!

Nihilism is a consequence of the personal realization that values previously assumed inviolate are wholly false and unworkable, and the ultimate esteem with which these morals have been uplifted leads to a catastrophic withdrawal to the opposite extreme when the deception is recognized. And while an acceptance of nihilism immediately returns a perspective of utter futility for life and universal existence, this perspective is not the final resolution. As Nietzsche once wrote in The Will to Power, "Nihilism represents a pathological transition phase..." Existence is not futile simply because the edifice of modern morality is inherently dysfunctional. Actually existence has even more purpose now because a proper perspective has been attained and a reason is finally clear the complete destruction of the debasing, theologically derived moral order. Thus the nihilist is at base a creator of the highest magnitude and a survivor of the most intense metaphysical struggle of all time. The nihilist undergoes a personal evolution and has proven themselves the mental superiors to the herd and mob, they have proven their will and 'license' for continued existence and have successfully escaped from the circus of values. Once the transvaluation of values is complete an entirely new and sane perspective can be achieved.

A Little Perspective

Everybody has an answer, but not just any answer, the answer. If you think about it it's truly amazing the sheer number of people that have the officially authorized monopoly on truth. This fact alone highlights the dissonance of absolute values and the misguided nature of idealism. What quantitative value would you place on your life? A life insurance corporation could concoct an exact dollar amount. But even that figure may be inflated, the chemical compounds that make up your body are only worth a few cents. But isn't life more valuable than gold, oil or other commodities? Think again.

Human arrogance conveniently assumes itself the apex of evolution yet in reality the corporeal being is merely a disposable vehicle for the reproduction of genetic material, not the other way around! Perhaps the most profound realization of the 20th century remains mostly unknown for it is the genes that are the master and not the individual human created by them. This helps explain why many human cravings are harmful to the self but profitable to the genes, and the prevalence of certain self-destructive behaviors. And remarkably this is the true solution to the classic existential dilemma, why life is just death or as John Lennon once put it, "Why in the world are we here? Surely not to live in pain and fear," yet apparently we are! The human body isn't programmed for pain-free longevity, just long enough to reproduce physically and to perpetuate learned skills, which is why doctors will never run out of business. The biological boss may be too small to see but it's far too powerful to ignore.

If human value could be measured outside the skewed perspective of the collective ego it might look something like this; if only one individual existed on planet Earth they would be the most important human. If two people existed their individual significance would be divided in half (1/2). If six thousand million people existed on Earth what would the individual significance of each one be? A simple equation shows the value as the fractional percentage of the whole population plus any incidental, conjectural additives from education, training, intelligence etc. Presupposing this Marxian values system of universal equality the formula for individual human value is:

It's clear that overpopulation dramatically diminishes the value of human life. So, is it any wonder religion is so popular and why human nature so desperately seeks meaning and purpose even in the most ridiculous places? Why do so many people hide behind money fooling only themselves into thinking that wealth gives them significance? Isn't it painfully obvious why society invents artificial concepts of justice, morality, and ethics? The brutality and utter irrationality of the animal world is just outside the rusty gates of our crumbling civilization. But isn't it comforting to know that as long as we're inside we have the warming sensation of fairness, equality and justice for all (that can afford it anyway)?

Self-delusion seems to be a defining quality of human behavior. Lies maintain our flimsy order, we find consolation in myths like 'what we do has significance' and 'God punishes the wicked'. The constant avalanche of empirical evidence to the contrary simply gets relegated to the third class bureau of irrational philosophers.

Hypocrisy can flourish when goodness is defined not only as kind and altruistic behavior, but as sticking to the rules and obligations of the faith. [3]

Our 'leaders' wage war in the name of peace and establish democracy with an iron fist. Our traditional values are warped; they reflect fantasy not reality. Our values are so removed from actual substance that fantasy becomes real
ity and truth becomes error. This is the primary difficulty in conveying the meaning of nihilism because all morally loaded concepts are biased against a lucid description of the nihilistic viewpoint. Nietzsche was addressing this issue when he wrote the title and the book Beyond Good and Evil. But it's not just a series of lies it's a debasing and wholly aberrant structure. The problem is so deep that even the words to define it must be replaced with a new lexicon.

Nuclear power remains a beautiful analogy for the era we live in, a struggling existence bounded between torment and ecstasy, every day living all shades in between. We can ultimately accomplish whatever we can imagine while moving forward with curiosity and courage, yet we still battle the drag of fear and cowardice.

We walk the edge of a sword in this process of human development, aware that we can cure the illnesses of millions, or vaporize them with a bomb, and nothing outside of our planet (until we leave it) is going to care whether we do one or the other.

Nihilism challenges the assumptions supporting common values such as 'equality'; 'pity', 'justice', but also terms of conclusion about human existence. Existential values, terms such as 'meaningless', 'pointless' and 'futile', are flawed because their definitions stem from the moral values that have hitherto been rejected. We have to criticize justice when events demonstrate that in court it's not whether one is guilty or not, but how persuasive their lawyer is, or how thoroughly the judge and jury have been rhetorically manipulated! 'Justice' is the confusing legalese that your high-priced barrister can spew in the courtroom like an oil slick in front of a pursuing vehicle. The rich go free while the poor go to prison. Justice has been perverted beyond recognition, ironically through a dogmatic belief in its sanctity and immutability. It's clearly time to question the root assumptions.

The Pitfalls of Artificial Law

It may seem peculiar how terms like 'moral', 'liberal' and 'conservative' are used in conversation. People will tell you they're moral individuals but they don't say moral according to who or what even though every culture and religious order has different standards. They'll tell you they're liberal and one is supposed to assume they mean it politically instead of liberal users of peyote or stamps on heavy envelopes. 'Progress' is another favorite; progress is good but as in the spread of cancer? Or maybe they mean the spread of Wal-Mart's to every town in the world with at least 5,000 people?

But the consistent message people are trying to convey in conversation is their own subtle deviation from the political and social norm and from the ambient morality which is to say from the definitions and standards processed, packaged and pumped into them by media, government and church authorities. Since all these concepts are unable to be empirically codified they assume elastic values that are easily warped to serve despots and unhealthy outcome, which is why Nietzsche wisely stated:

"Morality is the best of all devices for leading mankind by the nose."

But moral laws aren't the only kind that can be warped to serve disingenuous ends. The greater the personal wealth and property one controls or possesses the more laws are needed to protect that wealth. Conversely, the less one owns the fewer laws are needed for protecting it. At a point of total poverty, where one has nothing but the self, they would only feel the need for laws against killing i.e. 'thou shalt not murder'. In other words the degree of law desired is directly proportional to the wealth in possession. Laws protect that vested power and the people owning it by providing consistent codified support for the control and distribution of that wealth. But even though the stated desire for legality is universal the interpretation of that legality is not, clearly varying between haves and have-nots, a schism fervently exploited by Marxists. Enter the lawyers who are mercenaries paid to reinterpret the law to favor the client. Since the rich have the money to buy the most powerful lawyers and since the establishment of precedent is defined through epic court battles, common law is gradually skewed in favor of those rich patrons. Hence the emergence of a class-bifurcated, sanctimonious justice system and the erosion of legal fairness. Scientific research shows that in a police lineup witnesses' who choose an incorrect person are just as confident as ones that choose the correct one because human memory fills in the blanks with assumptions. Furthermore juries are just as credulous of false or inaccurate testimony as legitimate because all that really matters is strength of conviction. The criminal justice system warps science and the witness to its own ends because the only thing that matters in this setting is which side you are on prosecution or defense.

Laws are employed to shield the incompetent and mitigate the influence of the capable. For example, a cop with a gun can be a greater danger than a 'criminal' because they have an official sanction to kill; their murder is backed by the concept of law. The government and legal institutions have no higher morality than the 'criminal' does; they are prone to heinous conduct just as, if not worse than the criminal is, without impartial oversight. One party can act with impunity; the other will be executed. So what of "rights"? Nihilism views rights as irrelevant because it's the underlying structures of morality and the roots of truth, myth and collective delusions that dictate significance. Morality and ethics are artificial byproducts of culture and through hypocrisy and abuse are warped into becoming illusory forces.

Some argue that money is a proxy for achievement, but this is false. Money is aggregated amongst the already wealthy. Nor does our capitalist society promote achievement through the educational establishment, the mythical system of western mandarinism perpetuated by certain members of the intelligentsia . The true nature of the system is based more on connections and wealth than merit. The true nature of the system is based more on connections and wealth than merit. The number of slots to get on this escalator to social achievement is limited, and those already powerful get to choose who gets those slots. It has never been truer than today, the rich get richer while the poor get poorer.

Systemic Self-Destruction

Nihilism is an awareness that destruction is at least as important as construction, even more so when institutions have outlived their usefulness to become corrupt and unhealthy. Idealist crusades fail because they never remove the vestiges of the past order. Think of it biologically, would Homo sapiens have evolved out of the Mesozoic era, or would they have just been dino-snacks? We're here because of a previous mass extinction! The old order didn't mutate, it was catastrophically destroyed because that's the only way radical, meaningful change can occur. Revolutions fail because the willpower to enact the necessary severity of change is lacking. Actually it's not just willpower it's the total vision that's usually lacking. Some call Karl Marx a revolutionary but Marxism isn't genuine revolution it's just rearranging the artificial order. Every ideology on the books is merely a convenient way to re-order the present situation; they just shuffle the same old cards and the people end up worse off than before! Nihilism
plays a completely new game, but the old game of lies and myths always self-destructs eventually. These are the cycles of history, the recycling of flawed ideologies and our era is a prime example.

Nihilism is the organic logical response to artificial chaos, the intentional chaos manufactured by government, religion, and mass-media.

Every political ideology has been discredited as an affront to freedom and well-being. From capitalism to communism the blindly faithful never test and verify theory before implementation, so the fatal flaw is always the same actualization; its the predictable literalization of faith and myth. Besides producing voluminous hypocrisy and tyranny the byproduct of sham ideologies and fractional logic includes extensive pollution of both the human mind and the Earth's ecosystem. Think of the billions of dollars spent to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons all to have them rust and leak in storage bunkers from Tooele to Tomsk-7. Millions toiling to produce ultra-deadly nerve gas and radioactive waste with a four and a half billion year half-life. Nihilists know who to 'thank'- and who to stop from doing it again.

Religion

Independent theologies and decentralized organizations have replaced the Church/State monopoly. With the loss of government support (money) the Church has revealed its true nature as the giant predatory profit-motivated scam that it is. The theological monopoly has been broken and now any faith is just as valid as any other is. History will rate the separation of Church and State as one of the most critical pivots of the modern era. The secondary effect of this is that the national population doesn't know which faith to choose, and although religion can't be eliminated it can be easily replaced. Now all the addicts to God will have to make do with a pluralistic methadone.

Education

Every election season has its battle over education in some form or another. These conflicts only become more heated as relative values polarize amidst social disintegration and the concomitant increase of media attention on school violence. But this incessant emphasis on 'education' has little to do with training skills in socialization or adaptability and everything to do with myth indoctrination! This is why religious groups fight like hell for separate private or home schooling. Instead of learning critical reasoning skills useful for all applications education has been turned into a process for molding and warping young when they're most impressionable in order to serve corporate demands, and not the needs of society and the intellectual development of the individual. Given the stunning uselessness of most school material within practical life, it seems difficult to explain the education scam otherwise, except perhaps as hollow tradition or keeping the kids off the streets for a few hours each day. Employers and authority powers all look for those stamped and notarized pieces of paper to effortlessly determine the gullibility and exploitability of a person, how quickly they'll latch on to authorized opinions and follow orders without questions, or at least that's how a cynic would posit degrees and diplomas are really being used.

Monarchy

Those inveterate despots and prostitutes for the Church, one of mankind's long lasting afflictions, the monarchy has finally been eliminated and relegated to a proper place in the dusty archives of history. Unfortunately the new master, the mass media, has simply replaced much of monarchic authority.

Nationalism

The nation no longer has any real meaning except as a vestigial tool to drag the public into fratricidal conflicts or generate enthusiastic rivalry for sporting events. The citizenry get the pain without the benefits of nationalism anymore because leaders fail to protect their citizens from external threats. Money, immigrants, religion, drugs and disease all cross political boundaries with impunity, ironically usually unmolested by nationalist politicians. The facile irony only masks the hypocrisy of the domestic leadership that parrots nationalist rhetoric yet acts in favor of international moneyed interests; they talk local but act global. The super-rich arent restricted by nationalism, they and their money can move anywhere they want and play one country against another for greater profits. Nationalism is just like religion, it's a means of exploiting the poor and ignorant with faith and blind obedience.

Never let government shrink-wrap your mind with their flag.

Patriotism follows the same pattern of obsolescence because anymore it has been hijacked to mean obedience to the suicidal dictates of corrupt authority. As long as the domestic death-toll can be kept to a minimum war is good and noble because it generates employment and corporate profits.

Traditional faith in the military establishment has become equally foolish. The creation of the professional military composed of volunteers drastically alters the equation, elevating imperialism and executive authority over the needs of the greater public. The worlds of the military and the civilian used to be intricately related. Now the two are rapidly spinning in opposite directions. Mistrust, ignorance, and incompetence have created a re-evaluation of the mission of the military and even its very necessity.

Mass Media

The character of the mass media is finally being viewed as the imperative threat to collective health that it really is. Democracy is a sham when the primary media filters and manipulates the vast majority of information voters need to accurately judge candidates and issues, while making a fortune broadcasting specious and vitriolic campaign advertisements. Not only do the same companies own the networks, but they're owned by the same people, and the trend towards consolidation and mergers continues unabated.

This highlights a few elements of the decaying superstructure but to stop at that would be a fatal flaw Marx's mistake. It's an unfortunate fault of simplistic human nature to first target the visible elements. But to merely attack the visible superstructure of capitalism, church and politicians is doomed without reaching the "demons" in the public consciousness. Don't make the mistake of anarchism, reach and dissolve the myths and the lies, the foolish ideas and the self-destructive notions, as well as the people that preach it. The relativistic moral codes of "good" is this and "bad" is that, they're cynically reinvented by self-righteous leaderships to achieve misguided, mystical goals. And the intangible, non-verifiable goals make the sweetest bait because no one can claim otherwise! If you want to change a belief you must first change an environment because what the masses believe is formed by what they hear and see around them.

"The great revolutions are those of manners and thought. Changing the name of a government does not transform the mentality of a people." Gustave Le Bon

The strategic success of revolution is predicated upon reaching these roots. How? Use the acidic dissolution of delusion. Ridicule the ridiculous; highlight absurdity, contradiction and irony. Make fun of the foolish and faithful alike but more importantly the notions they use and discredit delusion by every means available. Propagate the replacement and fill the vacuum left by the discredited myths. Fill it with facts built from the boundaries of the known and the unknown in order to deal with the present and not some fictional afterlife. Counteract religious
modes convince the public that natural behavior and instinct are normal again. Work to build havens from mass-media and pop-cultural influences allowing anyone the freedom of independent thought and introspection unfettered by the corporate sponsored, brand positioned homogenized opinions doled out like drug-laced candy.

We tend to think of revolution to mean violent armed conflict such as in a civil war but a revolution can be entirely peaceful and non-violent, for a revolution is really just a radical, fundamental shift in individual and collective viewpoint.

So when does the revolution start? It already has! Act accordingly in what you do and what you say. There's no half measure and no fence to sit on, everyone is a participant in this omnipresent psychological war because it has no front-line or boundaries. Every mind is a battlefield and every person with above room temperature body warmth and IQ is a combatant. Now's the time to decide which side to be on.

A Brief History of Power

Within crude authority structures power is transmitted via violence, or at least the threat of violence. In less primitive authority systems power is primarily transmitted through mechanisms of money: bribes, kickbacks, and the various forms of financial corruption. Within more advanced authority structures power is mostly wielded through mechanisms of belief: faith, popular assumptions, and myths. This is why within the modern system of coercion through belief media control is so critical to authority because that's the means of manipulating the range of acceptable thoughts within the public mind.

So, just as power through violence and fear has become obsolete and strategically ineffective, coercion through belief is now becoming an obsolescent method of control. This development is largely due to advanced communications technology spreading practical ideas and information, along with the universal application of standardized and scientifically-based education. Eventually, with struggle, we will supplant the use of force and coercion with structures of social organization that are not based on whim or belief but built from impartial testing and verification, in other words, methods and ideas that actually function as intended in practice. When statement, intent and effect are matched then political and social hypocrisy are eliminated.

Despite the remarkable progression of human development we can still find examples of the various structures of power in different locations throughout our contemporary world. And when establishment authority loses legitimacy, through ineptitude and corruption or other reasons, they frequently resort to more crude forms of coercion in order to cement their hold on power. In this regard it's wise to remember that even within a political system based purely on power and force, the subjugated have every natural and inalienable right to resist and overthrow those in power over them. Of course whether theyre able to or not is another matter, but the point is that an authority system based on power, whether stated as such or covered behind layers of hypocrisy and rhetoric, is one thats inherently unstable and where violence begets greater violence in cyclical fashion. At best this can be described as asymmetrical development.

Power, Sex, Revolution

Every monolithic establishment seems impossible to change when were trapped within it, yet the revolution always seems inevitable in retrospect. Contrary to the view of the irrational pessimists human society does grow and develop, and even human nature evolves too. We're not doomed to repeat the past unless we fail to learn from it.

Vertical authority structures have been frequent features of the past 6,000 years of male-dominated human history. However, to believe that power and force are the only ways to structure a society is both profoundly foolish and historically myopic, even as such beliefs serve as convenient justification for contemporary abuses. The Paleolithic to the Neolithic era, around 6,000 to 60,000 years-ago and beyond, was the reverse featuring successful civilizations structured around women. And now in the 21st century, with the development of increasingly advanced reproductive technology like bio-engineered sperm, the human species has moved into a completely unprecedented and astonishing realm: a third sexual age that has effectively rendered the male sex biologically redundant.

The symbols and images of early human civilizations were almost exclusively of women, sometimes abstract and highly stylized. More recently these symbols were replaced by men while at the same time slavery and violence suddenly became commonplace.

It is thought that the Cucuteni would sacrifice whole cities every 60-80 years by intentionally burning thousands of their houses. They would then move and create another new settlement. [5]

Structured authority predicated upon force leaves much to be desired, most notably the stifling of human potential amid the upheaval of violence and brutality, both physical and psychological. Over millennia of accumulated experience, through wars and revolutions, and stepping-stone criticism by enlightened thinkers, the human species has devised means of structuring social authority, resources and power that strives towards more equitable formations that are therefore more stable and flexible, empowering greater numbers. This system in modern form revolves around concepts of equally distributed freedoms, rights of varying definition, and widespread expectations of fair treatment and open opportunity; symmetrical development. The concept of rules being equally applied to everyone, the ruler and ruled, and the realization that neither is inherently superior to the other, is a development as remarkable as it is revolutionary in human history.

The Russian Nihilists were a part of this process of human development, fighting to overthrow abusive and despotic authority and to build a society based on scientifically rational treatment for everyone. This kind of struggle doesnt come easy, it requires persistence and stamina, and especially a sober awareness of potential and pitfall, separating myth from facts. We dont have to exist under fear, torture and abuse. Freedom, peace, and cooperation are just as valid physical dimension within the virtually limitless realm of our universe, even superior because they confer unambiguous benefits to the vast majority involved within society; but well never arrive there using faith and hope, guided by belief and fictional saviors. Together we have the potential to achieve anything with a vision and persistence. The question is: will we try?

280 Million Years of Nihilism

It's a characteristic of the human mind to turn simplicity into subjective complexity and to construe difficulty from life where none exists. Today the archetypal question for philosophers is "why are we here?" Ask a human and a serious response will probably involve complex reasoning involving mystical deities or introspective analysis. But before we leave the final answer with humanity I think we need a second opinion.

Some 280 million years ago the first amphibians began life outside water. These Labryinthodonts named for their infolded tooth enamel typically had large triangular heads and wide, flat bodies that looked like giant road-kill without th
e tread marks. Tetrapods like these crawled around on land eating worms, maybe a few bugs but basically whatever they could catch and digest. Not much to look at or admire yet they gave rise to all other land vertebrates, reptiles, birds, and yes eventually even literate humans.

If we could ask the same of a Permian tetrapod what mysterious, and enlightening answers would they provide? Perhaps something like "I don't understand the question, I just want to avoid death."

Odd isn't it that they never had any goal or god, no soul or hope of an afterlife indeed they lacked any purpose beyond the brief struggle for life and yet millions of years later here we are reading this because of it, because they existed and evolved? We as humans exist in the same physical universe, subject to the same rules of physics and biology, the same need for sea-water salinity body fluid, the same protein and amino acids ... Decades of scientific inquiry and careful research all to reach the inescapable conclusion that the point is there is no point. The joke is on us because we turned the absurdly simple into the dangerously complex.

The answer to "why are we here?" is no different for human, Labryinthodont or jellyfish, because we live in the same world subject to the same physical limitations and end up in the same place after death. Well, some leave better fossils than others. Now we see why fear of death is such a natural instinct and why religion exerts so much concerted effort to contradict that instinct.

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Nihilist | Define Nihilist at Dictionary.com

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Historical Examples

A nihilist on a war footing would be considered Quaker-like in his symptoms.

I have already mentioned it as often given by a nihilist to one whom he believes may be one with him.

All the wildest phases of nihilist opinion in the sixties were already raging in Russia in the forties.

Concerning the woman for whose sake he became a nihilist, he never spoke.

And by this I do not mean to compare the nihilist writers with licentious ones, nor to convey any stigma by my words.

This nihilist leader is a woman, and her name is Zara de Echeveria.

Mr. Smith has been arrested as a nihilist, and the morning papers will announce that he has started on his journey to Siberia.

"Saberevski knew me to be a nihilist, and warned me against it that day," she said to me.

She knew how the nihilist societies all over the world were connected with each other.

British Dictionary definitions for nihilist Expand

a complete denial of all established authority and institutions

(philosophy) an extreme form of scepticism that systematically rejects all values, belief in existence, the possibility of communication, etc

a revolutionary doctrine of destruction for its own sake

the practice or promulgation of terrorism

Derived Forms

nihilist, noun, adjectivenihilistic, adjective

Word Origin

C19: from Latin nihil nothing + -ism, on the model of German Nihilismus

(in tsarist Russia) any of several revolutionary doctrines that upheld terrorism

Word Origin and History for nihilist Expand

1836 in the religious or philosophical sense, from French nihiliste, from Latin nihil (see nihilism). In the Russian political sense, it is recorded from 1871. Related: Nihilistic.

1817, "the doctrine of negation" (in reference to religion or morals), from German Nihilismus, from Latin nihil "nothing at all" (see nil), coined by German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). In philosophy, an extreme form of skepticism (1836). The political sense was first used by German journalist Joseph von Grres (1776-1848). Turgenev used the Russian form of the word (nigilizm) in "Fathers and Children" (1862) and claimed to have invented it. With a capital N-, it refers to the Russian revolutionary anarchism of the period 1860-1917, supposedly so called because "nothing" that then existed found favor in their eyes.

nihilist in Medicine Expand

nihilism nihilism (n'-lz'm, n'-) n.

The belief that destruction of existing political or social institutions is necessary for future improvement.

A delusion, experienced in some mental disorders, that the world or one's mind, body, or self does not exist.

nihilist in Culture Expand

An approach to philosophy that holds that human life is meaningless and that all religions, laws, moral codes, and political systems are thoroughly empty and false. The term is from the Latin nihil, meaning nothing.

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CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nihilism – New Advent

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The term was first used by Turgeniev in his novel, "Fathers and Sons" (in "Russkij Vestnik", Feb., 1862): a Nihilist is one who bows to no authority and accepts no doctrine, however widespread, that is not supported by proof.

The nihilist theory was formulated by Cernysevskij in his novel "Cto delat" (What shall be done, 1862-64), which forecasts a new social order constructed on the ruins of the old. But essentially, Nihilism was a reaction against the abuses of Russian absolutism; it originated with the first secret political society in Russia founded by Pestel (1817), and its first effort was the military revolt of the Decembrists (14 Dec., 1825). Nicholas I crushed the uprising, sent its leaders to the scaffold and one hundred and sixteen participants to Siberia. The spread (1830) of certain philosophical doctrines (Hegel, Saint Simon , Fourier ) brought numerous recruits to Nihilism, especially in the universities; and, in many of the cities, societies were organized to combat absolutism and introduce constitutional government.

Its apostles were Alexander Herzen (1812-70) and Michael Bakunin (1814-76), both of noble birth. The former, arrested (1832) as a partisan of liberal ideas, was imprisoned for eight months, deported, pardoned (1840), resided in Moscow till 1847 when he migrated to London and there founded (1857) the weekly periodical , "Kolokol" (Bell), and later "The Polar Star". The "Kolokol" published Russian political secrets and denunciations of the Government; and, in spite of the police, made its way into Russia to spread revolutionary ideas. Herzen, inspired by Hegel and Feurbach, proclaimed the destruction of the existing order; but he did not advocate violent measures. Hence his younger followers wearied of him; and on the other hand his defense of the Poles during the insurrection of 1863 alienated many of his Russian sympathizers. The "Kolokol" went out of existence in 1868 and Herzen died two years later. Bakunin was extreme in his revolutionary theories. In the first number of "L'Alliance Internationale de la Dmocratie Socialiste" founded by him in 1869, he openly professed Atheism and called for the abolition of marriage, property, and of all social and religious institutions. His advice, given in his "Revolutionary Catechism", was: "Be severe to yourself and severe to others. Suppress the sentiments of relationship , friendship, love, and gratitude. Have only one pleasure, one joy, one reward the triumph of the revolution. Night and day, have only one thought, the destruction of everything without pity. Be ready to die and ready to kill any one who opposes the triumph of your revolt." Bakunin thus opened the way to nihilistic terrorism.

It began with the formation (1861-62) of secret societies, the members of which devoted their lives and fortunes to the dissemination of revolutionary ideas. Many of these agitators, educated at Zurich, Switzerland, returned to Russia and gave Nihilism the support of trained intelligence . Prominent among them were Sergius Necaev, master of a parochial school in St. Petersburg, who was in constant communication with nihilist centers in various cities, and Sergius Kovalin who established thirteen associations in Cernigor. These societies took their names from their founders the Malikovcy, Lavrists, Bakunists, etc. They enrolled seminarists , university students, and young women. Among the working men the propaganda was conducted in part through free schools. The promoters engaged in humble trades as weavers, blacksmiths, and carpenters, and in their shops inculcated nihilist doctrine. The peasantry was reached by writings, speeches, schools, and personal intercourse. Even the nobles shared in this work, e.g., Prince Peter Krapotkin , who, under the pseudonym of Borodin, held conferences with workingmen. As secondary centres, taverns and shops served as meeting places, depositories of prohibited books, and, in case of need, as places of refuge. Though without a central organization the movement spread throughout Russia, notably in the region of the Volga and in that of the Dnieper where it gained adherents among the Cossacks. The women in particular displayed energy and self sacrifice in their zeal for the cause. Many were highly cultured and some belonged to the nobility or higher classes, e.g., Natalia Armfeld, Barbara Batiukova, Sofia von Herzfeld, Sofia Perovakaja. They co-operated more especially through the schools.

The propaganda of the press was at first conducted from foreign parts: London, Geneva, Zurich. In this latter city there were two printing offices, established in 1873, where the students published the works of Lavrov and of Bakunin. The first secret printing office in Russia, founded at St. Petersburg in 1861, published four numbers of the Velikoruss. At the same time there came to Russia, from London, copies of the "Proclamation to the New Generation " (Kmolodomu pokolkniju) and "Young Russia" (Molodaja Rosija), which was published in the following year. In 1862, another secret printing office, established at Moscow, published the recital of the revolt of 14 December, 1825, written by Ogarev. In 1862, another secret press at St. Petersburg published revolutionary proclamations for officers of the army; and in 1863, there were published in the same city a few copies of the daily Papers, "Svoboda" (Liberty) and "Zemlja i Volja" (The Earth and Liberty); the latter continued to be published in 1878 and 1879, under the editorship, at first, of Marco Natanson, and later of the student, Alexander Mihailov, one of the ablest organizers of Nihilism. In 1866, a student of Kazan, Elpidin, published two numbers of the "Podpolnoe Slovo", which was succeeded by the daily paper, the "Sovremennost" (The Contemporary), and later, by the "Narodnoe Delo" (The National Interest), which was published (1868-70), to disseminate the ideas of Bakunin. Two numbers of the "Narodnaja Rasprava" (The Tribunal of Reason) were published in 1870, at St. Petersburg and at Moscow. In 1873, appeared the "Vpred" (Forward!), one of the most esteemed periodicals of Nihilism, having salient socialistic tendencies. A volume of it appeared each year. In 1875-76, there was connected with the "Vpred", a small bi-monthly supplement, which was under the direction of Lavrov until 1876, when it passed under the editorship of Smironv, and went out of existence in the same year. It attacked theological and religious ideas, proclaiming the equality of rights, freedom of association, and justice for the proletariat. At Geneva , in 1875 and 1876, the "Rabotnik" (The Workman ) was published, which was edited in the style of the people; the "Nabat" (The Tocsin) appeared in 1875, directed by Thacev; the "Narodnaja Volja" (The Will of the People), in 1879, and the "Cernyi Peredel", in 1880, were published in St. Petersburg. There was no fixed date for any of these papers, and their contents consisted, more especially, of proclamations, of letters from revolutionists, and at times, of sentences of the Executive Committees . These printing offices also produced books and pamphlets and Russian translations of the works of Las
salle, Marx, Proudhon, and Bchner. A government stenographer, Myskin , in 1870, established a printing office, through which several of Lassalle's works were published; while many pamphlets were published by the Zemlja i Volja Committee and by the Free Russian Printing Office. Some of the pamphlets were published under titles like those of the books for children, for example, "Deduska Egor" (Grandfather Egor), Mitiuska", Stories for the Workingmen , and others, in which the exploitation of the people was deplored, and the immunity of capitalists assailed. Again, some publications were printed in popular, as well as in cultured, language; and, in order to allure the peasants these pamphlets appeared at times, under such titles as "The Satiate and the Hungry"; "How Our Country Is No Longer Ours". But all this propaganda, which required considerable energy and sacrifice, did not produce satisfactory results. Nihilism did not penetrate the masses; its enthusiastic apostles committed acts of imprudence that drew upon them the ferocious reprisals of the Government; the peasants had not faith in the preachings of those teachers, whom, at times, they regarded as government spies, and whom, at times, they denounced . The books and pamphlets that were distributed among the country people often fell into the hands of the cinovniki (government employees), or of the popes. Very few of the peasants knew how to read. Accordingly, Nihilism had true adherents only among students of the universities and higher schools, and among the middle classes. The peasants and workmen did not understand its ideals of destruction and of social revolution.

Propagation of ideas was soon followed by violence: 4 April, 1866, Tsar Alexander II narrowly escaped the shot fired by Demetrius Karakozov, and in consequence took severe measures (rescript of 23 May, 1866) against the revolution, making the universities and the press objects of special vigilance. To avoid detection and spying, the Nihilists formed a Central Executive Committee whose sentences of death were executed by "punishers". Sub-committees of from five to ten members were also organized and statutes (12 articles) drawn up. The applicant for admission was required to consecrate his life to the cause, sever ties of family and friendship, and observe absolute secrecy. Disobedience to the head of the association was punishable with death. The Government, in turn, enacted stringent laws against secret societies and brought hundreds before the tribunals. A notable instance was the trial, at St. Petersburg in October, 1877, of 193 persons: 94 went free, 36 were sent to Siberia ; the others received light sentences . One of the accused, Myskin by name, who in addressing the judges had characterized the procedure as "an abominable comedy", was condemned to ten years of penal servitude. Another sensational trial (April, 1878) was that of Vera Sassulio, who had attempted to murder General Frepov, chief of police of St. Petersburg . Her acquittal was frantically applauded and she found a refuge in Switzerland. Among the deeds of violence committed by Nihilists may be mentioned the assassination of General Mezencev (4 Aug., 1878) and Prince Krapotkin (1879). These events were followed by new repressive measures on the part of the Government and by numerous executions. The Nihilists, however, continued their work, held a congress at Lipeck in 1879, and (26 Aug.) condemned Alexander II to death. An attempt to wreck the train on which the Tsar was returning to St. Petersburg proved abortive. Another attack on his life was made by Halturin, 5 Feb., 1880. He was slain on 1 March 1881, by a bomb, thrown by Grineveckij. Six conspirators, among them Sofia Perovskaja, were tried and executed. On 14 March, the Zemlja i Volja society issued a proclamation inciting the peasants to rise , while the Executive Committee wrote to Alexander III denouncing the abuses of the bureaucracy and demanding political amnesty, national representation, and civil liberty.

The reign of Alexander III was guided by the dictates of a reaction, due in great measure to the counsels of Constantine Pobedonoscev, procurator general of the Holy Synod. And Nihilism, which seemed to reach its apogee in the death of Alexander II, saw its eclipse. Its theories were too radical to gain proselytes among the people. Its assaults were repeated; on 20 March, 1882, General Strelnikov was assassinated at Odessa; and Colonel Sudezkin on the 28th of December, 1883; in 1887, an attempt against the life of the tsar was unsuccessful; in 1890, a conspiracy against the tsar was discovered at Paris; but these crimes were the work of the revolution in Russia, rather than of the Nihilists. The crimes that reddened the soil of Russia with blood in constitutional times are due to the revolution of 1905-07. But the Nihilism, that, as a doctrinal system, proclaimed the destruction of the old Russia, to establish the foundations of a new Russia, may be said to have disappeared; it became fused with Anarchism and Socialism , and therefore, the history of the crimes that were multiplied from 1905 on are a chapter in the history of political upheavals in Russia, and not in the history of Nihilism.

APA citation. Palmieri, A. (1911). Nihilism. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11074a.htm

MLA citation. Palmieri, Aurelio. "Nihilism." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11074a.htm>.

Transcription. This article was transcribed for New Advent by Bob Mathewson.

Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

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Ethics Updates – Ethical Egoism

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MultiMedia Resources on Ethical Egoism

Lawrence M. Hinman: Video and PowerPoint Resources

Classical Sources

One of the classical sources for a statement of psychological egoism is Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651); it is available on the web at gopher://gopher.vt.edu:10010/02/98/1. For a contemporary reinterpretation of Hobbes which partially challenges the belief that he was a psychological egoist, see Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), especially Chapter Two. Bernard Gerts "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism," in Hobbes' Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, edited by Bernard Baumrin (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969), pp. 107-26, introduced the term "tautological egoism;" Gert argues against reading Hobbes solely as a psychological egoist. For a vigorous defense of Hobbes place in English philosophy, see David Gauthier, "Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist," in his Moral Dealing. Contract, Ethics, and Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 11-23.

Short Introductions to Egoism

There are several good, short introductions to egoism. See Kurt Baier, "Egoism," A Companion to Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 197-204; Richard Campbell, "Egoism," Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence C. Becker (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992) Vol. I, pp. 294-297; and.Elliott Sober, "Psychological Egoism," The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

Internet Resources

There are several egoism resources on the world wide web: The most extensive set of resources is to be found at the Egoist Archive ( http://www.nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/ ); the Max Stirner Web site (http://www.nonserviam.com/stirner/ ) also contains helpful resources on Max Stirner, one of the earliest German egoists; the Objectivism and Ayn Rand site (http://www.vix.com/objectivism/ ) contains information about Ayn Rand; LibertyOnline (http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/) is also an excellent resource. For a continually updated list of resources on ethical egoism, see the Ethical Egoism (http://ethics.acusd.edu/theories/Egoism/index.html) page of my Ethics Updates. For an excellent assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of psychological egoism, see Hugh LaFollette, "The Truth in Psychological Egoism," (http://www.etsu.edu/philos/faculty/hugh/egoism.htm)

Sociobiology and Altruism

See Edward O. Wilsons On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), which is directed toward a nonscientific audience, and his Sociobiology: A New Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), which provides a more technical statement of the issues; more recently, Robert Wrights The Moral Animal: Why We are the Way We Are (New York Vintage Books, 1994) has furthered the case for evolutionary psychology. The literature generated by sociobiology is vast, but for two good anthologies of critical evaluations, see The Sociobiology Debate, edited by Arthur Caplan (New York: Harper and Row, 1978) and Sociobiology Examined, edited by Ashley Montagu (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and my own article, "The Ambiguity and Limits of a Sociobiological Ethic," International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, 1 (March, 1983), pp. 79-89. For a discussion of the relevance of sociobiology to egoism, see Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle (New York: New American Library, 1982) and Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, pp. 56 ff. For a short overview, see Alan Gibbard, "Sociobiology," A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 597-610.

Defense of the Possibility of Altruism

For a defense of the possibility of altruism, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). On the rationality of altruism, see Kristen R. Monroe, Michael C. Barton, and Ute Klingemann, "Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe," Ethics, Vol. 101 (October, 1990), pp. 103-122. For an overview of the psychological literature, see Dennis Krebs, "Psychological Approaches to Altruism: An Evaluation." Ethics, 92 (1982), 447-58. For a further discussion of the villagers of Le Chambon, see the chapter on Virtue Ethics below and the bibliographical essay for that chapter. Also see the essays in the issue on altruism of Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1993) and the issue on self-interest, Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1997).

Reviews on Ethical Egoism Literature

For a review of the literature on ethical egoism, see Tibor Machan, "Recent Work on Ethical Egoism," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January, 1979), pp. 1-15. Alasdair MacIntyres "Egoism and Altruism" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. II, pp. 462-66 contains a perceptive overview of work in this area. Also see Edward Regis, Jr., "What Is Ethical Egoism?" Ethics, Vol. 91 (October, 1980), pp. 50-62, for a careful consideration of the various meanings of ethical egoism. There are two excellent anthologies of articles on ethical egoism: David Gauthier, ed., Morality and Rational Self-interest (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Ronald. D. Milos Egoism and Altruism (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1973). For a review and analysis of attempts to reconcile egoism and traditional accounts of morality, see Gregory S. Kavka, "The Reconciliation Project," Morality, Reason and Truth. New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), pp. 297-319

Critiques

Among the major critiques of ethical egoism are Christine Korsgaard, "The Myth of Egoism," The Lindley Lectures (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999); C. D. Broad, "Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives," reprinted in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald Milo (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1973), pp. 88-100;. David Gauthier, "Morality and Advantage," Philosophical Review, Vol. 76 (1967), pp. 460-75, reprinted in his Morality and Rational Self-interest; and his "The Impossibility of Rational Egoism," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71 (1974), pp. 439-56 and his "The Incompleat Egoist," in his Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 234-73; James Rachels, "Two Arguments Against Ethical Egoism," Philosophia, Vol. 4 (1974), pp. 297-314; Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35 (1978), pp. 111-18; Warren Quinn, "Egoism as an Ethical System," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71 (1974), pp. 456-72; Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), and his "Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Compatibility," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 24 (1973), pp. 357-68; and Richard Brandt, "Rationality, Egoism, and Morality," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69 (1972), pp. 681-97. For an excellent collection of critical essays on self-interest from a wide range of disciplines, see Beyond Self-interest, edited by Jane J. Mansbridge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

Jesse Kalins articles provide a tightly-argued defense of the ethical egoists position. See his "On Ethical Egoism," American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph 1 (1969), pp. 26-41;. "Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5 (1975), pp. 323-56; and "In Defense of Egoism," in Morality and Rational Self-interest, edited by David Gauthier (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970). The game metaphor in Kalins argument is discussed in Sidney Trivus, "On Playing the Game," The Personalist, Vol. 59 (1978), pp. 82-84. Edward. Regis, Jr., "Ethical Egoism and Moral Responsibility," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1979), pp. 45-52, defends a version of nonmaximizing ethical egoism that escapes some of the standard criticisms that ethical egoism permits behavior that commonsense morality would prohibit. More recently, see the defense of ethical egoism in John Van Ingen, Why Be Moral? The Egoistic Challenge (New York: Lang, 1994).

Much of the discussion of ethical egoism has appeared in a journal called The Personalist (which is now published under the name Pacific Philosophical Quarterly); see the articles by Emmons, (1969); Brandon (1970); Emmons (1971); Skorpen (1969); Murphy (1971); Nozick (1971); Hospers (1973); Den Uyl (1975); Dwyer (1975); Carlson (1976); Burrill (1976); Sanders (1976); Benditt (1976); Sanders (1977).

Moral Sensitivity

On the issue of ethical egoism and moral sensitivity, see Anthony Duff, "Psychopathy and Moral Understanding," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1977), pp. 189-200; Chong Kim Chong, "Ethical Egoism and the Moral Point of View," Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 26 (1992), pp. 23-36; and Daniel Putnam, "Egoism and Virtue," ibid. For general comments on the issue of moral sensitivity, see Larry May, "Insensitivity and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 26 (1992), pp. 7-22 For a consideration of egoism and friendship, see R. D. Ashmore, Jr., "Friendship and the Problem of Egoism," The Thomist, Vol. 41 (1977), pp. 105-30. On the role of altruism in friendship, see Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) and Jeffrey Blustein, Care and Commitment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For an argument that the dichotomous categories of altruism and self-interest do not fit friendship, see John Hardwig, "In Search of an Ethic of Interpersonal Relations," Person to Person, edited by George Graham and Hugh LaFollette (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), pp. 63-81.

Ethical Egoism and Libertarianism

Much contemporary work about ethical egoism is inspired by libertarianism. Ayn Rands novels, such as Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead, provide a powerful literary expression of the ethical egoists standpoint; her explicit statement of the egoists standpoint is to be found in her The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: Signet, 1964). For a libertarian approach that is particularly sensitive to the issue of egoism and rights, see Eric Mack, "How to Derive Ethical Egoism," The Personalist, Vol. 52 (1971), pp. 735-43; "Egoism and Rights," The Personalist, Vol. 54 (1973), pp. 5-33; .and "Egoism and Rights Revisited," The Personalist, Vol. 58 (1977), pp. 282-88. Also see Tibor Machan, Individuals and Their Rights (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1989).

Citations

The quotation from Ayn Rand at the beginning of this chapter comes from her novel Atlas Shrugged, pp. 984, 993. The citation from Kavka is from his Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, p. 66.

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IV. Ethical Egoism

The rough idea behind ethical egoism is that the right thing to do is to look out for your own self-interest.We are morally required only to make ourselves as happy as possible.We have no moral obligations to others. Ayn Rand seems to endorse this idea in the following passages:

"By the grace of reality and the nature of life, man -- every man -- is an end in himself, he exists for his own sake, and the achievement of his own happiness is his highest moral purpose" (Pojman, p. 74).

"Accept the fact that the achievement of your happiness is the only moral purpose of your life, and that happiness -- not pain or mindless self-indulgence -- is the proof of your moral integrity ... " (Pojman, 77).

Let's make these rough thoughts more clear; let's formulate a criterion of moral rightness based on Rand's ideas.

A. Formulating Ethical Egoism (EEh)

- Alternative: the alternatives that some agent has at some time are the actions that are open to the agent at that time; they are her "options"; two actions are alternatives to one another when an agent can do either one of them, but not both of them. - Consequences: the consequences of a given act are the things that would happen "as a result" of the act, if it were performed. Note that some subsequent event is a consequence of an act whether it is near in space and time or far away; whether it is something that the agent of the act could reasonably anticipate or not; whether it involves the agent of the act or some distant stranger.

Our version of egoism is going to be a form of consequentialism. A normative theory is a form of consequentialism insofar as it implies that facts about the consequences determine the normative status of acts.

(This leaves open just what it is about the consequences that determine an act's normative status.Our version of egoism will say that it is the pleasure and pain that befall the agent of the act that are relevant.So we need to say a few words about pleasure and pain.)

Some assumptions about pleasure and pain: - they are feelings, or sensations - each episode of pleasure or pain has an intensity and a duration; these factors determine the amountof pleasure or pain in the episode - the hedon is the unit of measurement of pleasure; the number of hedons in an episode of pleasure is determined by the intensity and duration of the episode of pleasure - the dolor is the unit of measurement of pain; the number of dolors in an episode of pleasure is determined by the intensity and duration of the episode of pain - Pleasures and pains are "commensurable"; that is, if some pleasure contains the same number of hedons as some pain contains dolors, then we can say that there is an much pleasure in the episode of pleasure as there is pain in the episode of pain.(This assumption will enable us to add and subtract pleasure and pains, like the assets and liabilities on an accountant's balance sheet.)

We can now define hedonic agent utility as the total number of hedons of pleasure that the agent of the act would feel as a consequence of the act if it were performed, minus the total number of dolors of pain that the agent of the act would feel as a consequence of the act if it were performed.

In more rough terms, to the hedonic agent utility of some alternative is how good the alternative would be for the agent, pleasure-pain-wise.

The last concept is that of maximizing: we say that an act maximizes hedonic agent utility when no alternative to that act has a higher hedonic agent utility than it has.

Finally, we can state the theory, EEh (Ethical Egoism, of a hedonistic sort):

EEh: An act is morally right if and only if it maximizes hedonic agent utility.

So this theory is saying that an act is right when there is nothing else the agent could do on that occasion that would lead to a consequence that would be better for him in terms of pleasure and pain.

B. Common Misconceptions about Egoism

1. Immediate Gratification

Egoism is not the doctrine that we should indulge in as much pleasure we can in the short run, without a care for what happens to us in the long run.And EEh does not imply this because, in order to calculate the hedonic agent utility of an action, you need to figure in all the pleasure and pains that would result, no matter how down the line in the future.

2. No Altruism

Egoism also does not imply that we should never act altruistically. Rather, it implies that we may act for the benefit of others so long as that act also maximizes our own hedonic utility. (See Feldman p. 83 for further discussion.)

3. Psychological Egoism

EEh is a doctrine in ethics, a theory about what we morally ought to do. However, there is another doctrine -- a doctrine in psychology -- that sometimes goes by the name of "egoism". This other doctrine, "Psychological Egoism," is a view about how human beings happen to be set up, psychologically speaking. It is not a view at all about what we morally ought to do. Psychological Egoism says that we human beings in fact always pursue our own well-being. That is, we always choose the act that we think will be best for us. We are motivated only by the desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain.

C. Arguments for EEh

1. Closet Utilitarian Argument

The Closet Utilitarian Argument (from Feldman, p. 86) (1) If people act in such a way as to maximize their own self-interest, then humanity will be better off as a whole. (2) People ought to act in whatever way will lead to the betterment of humanity as a whole. (3) Therefore, people ought to act in such a way as to maximize their own self-interest; in other words, egoism is true.

Criticism of premise (1): - Feldman's case of the selfish art lover (pp. 85-86). - The "Tragedy of the Commons"; the "Prisoner's Dilemma"

Criticism of premise (2): - See Feldman, p. 87.

D. Arguments Against EEh

1. Moore's; Baier's; The Promulgation Argument

(see Feldman, Ch. 6)

2. Feldman's Refutation of EEh

Feldman's Refutation of EEh 1. If EEh is true, then it is morally right for the man to steal the money from the pension fund. 2. It is not right for the man to steal the money from the pension fund. 3. Therefore, EEh is not true.

Imagine a treasurer of large pension fund. He is entrusted with keeping track of and investing the retirement savings of all the workers at a company. He discovers, however, that it would be possible for him to steal all the money in the fund and get away with it, leaving all the workers who worked hard to save their money out of luck. Suppose he does this and succeeds, escaping to a South Sea Island to live out the rest of his days indulging in idle pleasure (at the expense of the workers he screwed back home).

Egoism implies that the fact that this action screws over the workers back home is irrelevant. All that is relevant is whether this action is most in the interests of the treasurer. Well, to see exactly what EEh will have to say about this case, we should fill in the details. Here are the treasurer's alternatives:

The man's alternativeshedonic agent utility a1: steal the money+10,000 a2: leave the money where it is-3

Let's say these are his two main alternatives at the time. EEh implies that it would be morally acceptable for this guy to steal the money. Why? -- because this act maximizes hedonic agent utility.That is, if he were to perform it, he would get a greater balance of pleasure over pain than he would get if he were to do any of his alternatives.

So we get premise 1:

1. If EEh is true, then it is morally right for the man to steal the money from the pension fund.

But this is clearly not right. EEh is mistaken in this verdict. This act is cruel and selfish. It is utterly immoral. Most everyone, I take it, would be prepared to condemn this man for his actions; and we would think it would be appropriate to punish for his ruthless deeds. So we get premise 2:

2. It is not right for the man to steal the money from the pension fund.

From these two premises, this follows:

3. Therefore, EEh is not true.

This argument is valid: the conclusion follows logically from the premises. The first premise is clearly true. I also think the second premise is true. I think people behave immorally when they do this. Maybe Ayn Rand is willing to accept this consequence. I myself cannot.Can you?

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Nihilist | Define Nihilist at Dictionary.com

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Historical Examples

A nihilist on a war footing would be considered Quaker-like in his symptoms.

I have already mentioned it as often given by a nihilist to one whom he believes may be one with him.

All the wildest phases of nihilist opinion in the sixties were already raging in Russia in the forties.

Concerning the woman for whose sake he became a nihilist, he never spoke.

And by this I do not mean to compare the nihilist writers with licentious ones, nor to convey any stigma by my words.

This nihilist leader is a woman, and her name is Zara de Echeveria.

Mr. Smith has been arrested as a nihilist, and the morning papers will announce that he has started on his journey to Siberia.

"Saberevski knew me to be a nihilist, and warned me against it that day," she said to me.

She knew how the nihilist societies all over the world were connected with each other.

British Dictionary definitions for nihilist Expand

a complete denial of all established authority and institutions

(philosophy) an extreme form of scepticism that systematically rejects all values, belief in existence, the possibility of communication, etc

a revolutionary doctrine of destruction for its own sake

the practice or promulgation of terrorism

Derived Forms

nihilist, noun, adjectivenihilistic, adjective

Word Origin

C19: from Latin nihil nothing + -ism, on the model of German Nihilismus

(in tsarist Russia) any of several revolutionary doctrines that upheld terrorism

Word Origin and History for nihilist Expand

1836 in the religious or philosophical sense, from French nihiliste, from Latin nihil (see nihilism). In the Russian political sense, it is recorded from 1871. Related: Nihilistic.

1817, "the doctrine of negation" (in reference to religion or morals), from German Nihilismus, from Latin nihil "nothing at all" (see nil), coined by German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). In philosophy, an extreme form of skepticism (1836). The political sense was first used by German journalist Joseph von Grres (1776-1848). Turgenev used the Russian form of the word (nigilizm) in "Fathers and Children" (1862) and claimed to have invented it. With a capital N-, it refers to the Russian revolutionary anarchism of the period 1860-1917, supposedly so called because "nothing" that then existed found favor in their eyes.

nihilist in Medicine Expand

nihilism nihilism (n'-lz'm, n'-) n.

The belief that destruction of existing political or social institutions is necessary for future improvement.

A delusion, experienced in some mental disorders, that the world or one's mind, body, or self does not exist.

nihilist in Culture Expand

An approach to philosophy that holds that human life is meaningless and that all religions, laws, moral codes, and political systems are thoroughly empty and false. The term is from the Latin nihil, meaning nothing.

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Continental Rationalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw the heyday of metaphysical system-building, but the expression continental rationalism primarily connotes rather a set of epistemological views. By contrast to British empiricism, which traces all knowledge to sensory experience, these views emphasize a reliance on reason (ratio in Latin, hence rationalism), the resources of which are taken to be sufficient in some sense for what we know. Thus, a signature doctrine of rationalism is the doctrine of innate ideas, according to which the mind has built into it not just the structure of knowledge but even its content. Nonetheless, among the philosophers comprising the extension of the expression, metaphysical issues, particularly the ontology of substance, occupy the central place. Certainly, this is true of Leibniz and Spinoza, but also of Malebranche and other Cartesians, and even of Descartes when properly understood.

If there seems to be a gap between the connotation of the term and its denotation, this can be overcome somewhat by thinking of it in terms of Plato's divided line, which establishes a parallel between objects known and the means by which they are known. In fact, the order of objects, the ordo essendi ranging in importance down from the Good to other forms, to individual things, and to images, and the order of knowing, the ordo cognoscendi, ranging from intuition of various sorts down to sensory experience, is itself to be found in various versions among the later rationalists. The important point, in any case, is that, for the continental rationalists as for Plato, the epistemological distinctions are grounded in ontological distinctions. Or, to put it terms that reflect rationalist thinking on a number of issues, there is only a distinction of reason between the two orders. The orders of being and knowing are not really distinct; they differ only in our ways of thinking about them.

There is a good explanation of the close connection seen by the rationalists between the epistemological and ontological orders, one that also accounts for their notable reliance on reason. It derives from their answer to what Leibniz called the grand metaphysical question: why is there something rather than nothing at all? There is something because there must be something; there cannot be nothing (and this way of putting it shows the ultimate debt of the rationalists to a tradition that goes back to Parmenides). Reality, or at least some part of it has necessary existence, and that necessity is something like logical necessity. With this answer, a whole philosophical outlook falls into place. First of all, any significant role for sensory experience falls away, since what exists can be known a priori by logic alone. Causal connections tend to be viewed as logical connections; a principle of sufficient reason falls out which tends to be read as a matter of logical deduction. One result is that there is an impulse toward monism: if the ultimate cause must exist, then that for which it is the sufficient reason must also exist, and just how the two can be distinguished becomes problematic (again, the Parmenidean antecedent is clear).

This outlook was not articulated as such by any rationalist except, perhaps, Spinozaindeed most were concerned to avoid such consequences of their views. But the outlook does capture the intuitions behind the metaphysical systems they elaborated. And it certainly draws the contrast between them and the empiricists, who tended toward tychism, the view that the world is largely, or even entirely, a product of chance. On the empiricist account, the universe consists of many independent individuals, which, if they are connected, are so only accidentally, reducing causation to nothing more than a matter of constant conjunction. (This physical, metaphysical and logical atomism is in the tradition of Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius). Under such circumstances, only experience of the world can provide knowledge of it.

While such a juxtaposition of rationalism with empiricism may be useful as an interpretive tool, it should be borne in mind that such schematic outlooks are constructions in retrospect. British philosophers in the relevant historical period were far less disconnected from the continent than they are today. (Recall Passmore's report in this regard of the newspaper announcement of fog on the English channel: continent isolated.) In the period presently under consideration, philosophical crossings from Britain were frequent and fruitful. In particular, Locke, Berkeley and Hume all crossed the Channel. In contrast, the rationalists stayed on the continent, both literally and figuratively.

The early modern period of philosophy, including continental rationalism, is generally, and correctly, supposed to have been driven by the new science to a radical departure from the Aristotelianism of the late medieval or renaissance period immediately preceding it. The mechanization and mathematization of the world demanded by the inertial physics of a moving Earth led to a revolutionary philosophy better described, at least in its rationalist version, as Platonic, or even Pythagorean. Even so, Aristotelian concepts and terminology persisted. Both were appropriated and deployed to deal with the new problems. The principal Aristotelian concept taken over by the rationalists was the concept of substance.

Aristotle's term ousia is usually translated as substance. What exactly Aristotle meant by the term is a thorny matter, much debated in the literature. His account of substance in the Categories holds individual things, which he terms proper substances, to be paradigmatic of substance. On this account, substance is best understood by analogy with a grammatical subjectit takes a predicate, and is not predicable of anything further. Thus, while animal is predicable of horse, and horse of Bucephalus, Bucephalus stands by himself, impredicable of, and hence, numerically different from anything else. Much of Aristotle's account in the Metaphysicswritten years laterseems to accord with this. However, Metaphysics (1017b1026) complicates the story. Aristotle there describes four uses of the term. He concludes by reducing these to two broad senses(1) substance as hypokeimenon, the ultimate substratum, which is not predicated of anything further; and (2) substance as formthat which makes each thing the kind of thing that it is. Indications within the text suggest that, by the time that he was giving the lectures that are collected in the Metaphysics, Aristotle regarded not individual things but the matter of which these individual things are formed, as the ultimate subject of predication. On this conception, there is some sense in which Bucephalus is himself predicable of matter. Thus, while the substance of the Categories serves as a principle of individuation, the substance of the Metaphysics is more complicated, serving both to individuate Bucephalus and Seabiscuit and to capture the connection or sameness that holds between them.

That substance should be called upon to account for both difference and sameness in the world indicates an inherent tension in the concept. Certainly, the two senses of the term substance were in tension during the seventeenth century. The momentum of rationalist argument was to resolve the tension by folding the first sense into the second: there is no real differentiation in the world, only the appearance of difference. Seventeenth century rationalists assigned to substance three roles of connection. Substance was taken (1) to connect attributes as attributes of the same thing at a time (a given shape and a given size as the shape and size of the same thing), (2) to connect them over time (the later shape and size, perhaps different from the earlier, as nonetheless the shape and size of the very same thing), and (3) to connect them as somehow related to the thing as a certain kind of thing (for the Cartesians, shape and size would indicate the thing to be of the kind extended). However, Spinoza alone among the continental rationalists fully embraced the conception of substance as a fundamental connection between things. The other members of the movement struggled to retain a notion of substance as individuator, but did so with varying degrees of success.

The rationalism of the most famous of the rationalists is problematic on two counts. First, Descartes is known as the father of modern philosophy precisely because he initiated the so-called epistemological turn that is with us still. Since Descartes, philosophy has been especially concerned with the theory of knowledge, both in itself and as it affects other areas of philosophy. Ethics, for example, has often been concerned with how the good might be known rather than with what the good might be. With his fundamental objective of achieving certainty for his beliefs, Descartes has thus been principally responsible for the incomplete characterization of rationalism as not just etymologically but essentially connected to the claims of reason. While Descartes certainly sought to justify the claims of reason and relied upon them, even for him there are corresponding ontological views that are no less important to his system.

The second problematic aspect of Descartes's rationalism is more difficult to resolve. Descartes was a radical voluntarist who thought that all truth, including what we take to be necessary truth, depends on the will of God. Care needs to be taken in how this view is expressed, for Descartes did not hold simply that what we take to be necessary in fact is contingent. He held that actually necessary truth depends on God's unconstrained will, such that even propositions that are logically contradictory might simultaneously be true. Reason itself thus seems no longer reliable, and experience would seem to be the only way of determining which of the worlds even beyond logic such a powerful and unconstrained God has created. Not many of the rationalists, even among the Cartesians, followed Descartes in this radical voluntarism, and some in recent times have seen the view as ultimately incoherent. Even so, Descartes seems to have taken the view as the basis at least of his physics, and perhaps of his whole system. Indeed, on some accounts, it was this doctrine of created truth that enabled Descartes to frame the most radical doubt hitherto conceived, when in the Meditations he entertained the possibility that he was always deceived by a mendacious deity, even when considering what appeared to him most obviously true, to wit, the existence of the simplest things that are the subjects of arithmetic and geometry. (Against this view, Margaret Wilson, 105114, observes that, in Meditation 1, God need only have the power to deceive me about the eternal truths, not to create them.) While a doubt (and a doctrine) this radical might lead one to despair of ever achieving sure knowledge, for Descartes, it was the catalyst for his discovery of the cogito, and with it, his first indubitable truththe truth of his own existence.

At every stage of Descartes's argument in the Meditations, there are ontological implications: the mind's independence of sensory perceptions (perceptions whose reliability is ultimately upset by the possibility that he is dreaming), the literally unimaginable sort of thing that a physical object such as a piece of wax must be, the existence of a veracious God, who provides a guarantee for the reliability of reason, and finally the existence of a physical world consisting of extended things. Arnauld immediately suggested to Descartes that his argument contained a circle: we can rely on reason only if we know that God exists, but we know that God exists only by relying on reason. Thus, Descartes has established the certainty only of his own existence, but nothing beyond that. Descartes thought that he had a response to this criticism, but whether he did, and how cogent it is as a rebuttal, have been perennial questions of debate among Descartes scholars. One way to understand Descartes's procedure is that while he does not claim to prove even that he exists, he does claim to show that it is unreasonable to think otherwise. That is, he shows that the argument of the skeptic fails because the consistent application of reason leads to the view not that reason is unreliable, but precisely the opposite. The skeptic might be right, but he is unreasonable. Descartes thus emerges at least as a bootstrap rationalist, in a way that mirrors the non-absolute status of his necessary truths. The rationalist connection between the orders of being and knowing is thus preserved.

But what sense can be made of the doctrine of created truth? By what kind of causality did God create the eternal (necessary) truths? In response to this very question Descartes replied that God did so in just the way that He created everything else, that He is the total and efficient cause not only of the existence of created things, but also of their essence. The eternal truths are just this essence of created things. As before, Descartes did not elaborate his answer, but, once again, he provided enough elsewhere for us to do so. It is clear that for Descartes, as for many other theologically orthodox thinkers, the existence of things results from an unconstrained exercise of God's omnipotent will to create ex nihilo. What Descartes might be saying, then, is that an eternal truth or essence is also something that is created ex nihilo. The eternal truths might thus be instances of what Descartes called substance.

In the Principles, Descartes defined substance as a thing that exists such that its existence does not depend on any other thing. He immediately added that, strictly speaking, the term applies only to God, who, as uncreated, alone depends on nothing else to exist. However, he allowed that in an extended sense it applies to things that depend only on God's creation and continuing conservation. These created substances are really distinct from other substances insofar as they are conceivable apart from each other. They do not require a subject of inherence, and are thus ontologically, if not causally, independent. These created substances are distinguished from other things, such as qualities, which not only depend on God causally, but also depend ontologically on other things, ultimately on created substances, as subjects of inherence. In this sense, a created substance for Descartes is like the hypokeimenon of Aristotle, playing both its roles, as individuator and bearer of qualities. However, with his definition of the real distinction, he built in an unintended tendency toward monisma tendency that Spinoza exploited. For Descartes, one thing is really distinct from another just in case it can be conceived apart from that other. But, if this test of independence is applied to causal relations, it produces the result that there is but one substance, God.

What types of things counted as created substances for Descartes? Clearly, he takes an individual mind to be a created substance. If a mind did not have this status, then Descartes's argument for its immortality, that it can be conceived apart from all else except God, and a fortiori from the body, would collapse. Beyond minds, however, an ambiguity appears. Although there are texts in which Descartes speaks of individual things like a piece of wax as substances, there are others that indicate that there is but a single extended substance, of which individual things are the modes. At a minimum, there is an asymmetry in his treatment of minds and material things, perhaps reflecting the tension between a hypokeimenon, accounting for difference, and the other sense of ousia, accounting for sameness. To say that Peter and Paul are substances is to say that their minds are numerically distinct; but to say that a piece of wax and piece of wood are substances might be to say that they are both extended things.

However many instances of each kind there might be, there is a dualism of two kinds of substance, according to Descartes: thinking things, or minds, and extended things, or bodies. This dualism generated two well-known problems, resolved by Descartes with only partial success. His polite critic, Elisabeth of Bohemia, wanted to know how in voluntary action the will, which is a property of the unextended mind, could have an effect on the body, given that, according to Descartes's mechanistic physics, a material thing can be affected only by what is in contact with it. Descartes replied with a rather mysterious account of how the mind and body formed a unique kind of composite.

Descartes's effort to resolve a second difficulty is more promising, and also exemplifies the rationalistic character of his thought. The problem is to show how the mind can know something such as a material thing that is different in kind from it, given a long-standing principle that only like can know like. He rejected this essentially Aristotelian principle, but still had to give an account of such knowledge. From scholastic sources, Descartes was able to construct a theory of ideas according to which to know something is to have an idea of it, the idea being the very thing known in so far as it is known. He saw the term idea as ambiguous: taken materially, it has formal reality, as a mode of the mind; taken in another sense, it has objective reality, as the thing represented. But there is no real distinction between these realities, only a rational distinction. They are really the same thing considered differently. A welcome epistemological upshot of this rationalist gambit is that Descartes has no skeptical problems generated by ideas standing as a tertium quid between the knower and what is known.

This result is indicated by Descartes's use of the term, picked up and emphasized by Malebranche, according to which there are no false ideas; every idea in this sense is materially true in that it has an object, and that is the object it appears to have. This conception of an idea is the basis for Descartes of what has been called the transparency of mind: I cannot be mistaken that I am thinking about what I am thinking about. Malebranche (whose entire philosophy was colored by his struggles with Descartes's theory of ideas), in fact, later erected such incorrigible intentionality into the fundamental principle of his epistemology. Meanwhile, Descartes's view that material or formal reality and objective reality are only rationally distinct might be taken to mean that minds are intrinsically intentional. A mind just is the sort of thing whose states are about something else. Arnauld extended this thesis, which adumbrates later thinkers such as Brentano, to include all mental phenomena, even sensations.

The battle between the Cartesians and their opponents in the latter half of the seventeenth century was one of the great struggles in the history of philosophy, but it was one in which the lines were not clearly drawn. For, although those in the Cartesian camp claimed the banner of Descartes, there were as many differences among them as between them and their opponents. Perhaps the most important difference among them hinged on whether or not they accepted Descartes's doctrine of created truth. Desgabets and his student Rgis were the most important among the few who did accept the doctrine. Along with their acceptance of the doctrine, however, came nascent tendencies toward empiricism. On the other hand, Malebranche, the most notable among the Cartesians who rejected the doctrine of created truth, developed a philosophical system with a purer rationalistic character than Descartes's own. Descartes had advised his followers to follow not him but their own reason. Malebranche, like other heterodox Cartesians, justified his differences from Descartes as the result of following this injunction. On his view, his rejection of the doctrine of created truth followed from his commitment to other, deeper views in Descartes. He thus represented himself as more Cartesian than Descartes himself.

The philosophy of Malebranche is sometimes portrayed as a synthesis of Descartes and Augustine, but a more precise way to put this relation is that Malebranche used Augustine to rectify shortcomings he perceived in the philosophy of Descartes. Chief among these was Descartes's theory of ideas, which, according to Malebranche, not only fails to reflect human beings' proper dependence on God, and, moreover, leads inevitably to skepticism. Initially, Malebranche thought that he agreed with Descartes's theory, but in the long debate over the nature of ideas he had with Arnauld, who held a close version of Descartes's theory, Malebranche came to see a need for a different account.

Not implausibly, Arnauld took Descartes's claim about the ambiguity of the term idea to mean that idea, or perception, refers to one and the same thing, a thing which stands in two different relations. Insofar as it is related to what is known, it is called an idea; insofar as it is related to the mind, it is called a perception. This (act of) perception he took to be related to the mind as a mode of it. It is at this point that Malebranche detected the threat of skepticism. What we know, indeed what we know in the most important instances of knowledge, is universal, necessary, and infinite, as in the case of certain mathematical knowledge. But nothing that is the mode of a particular, contingent and finite mind can be universal, necessary or infinite. If ideas were modes of the mind, then we would not have such knowledge; but since we do have such knowledge, ideas must be something else. Malebranche argued that the only being in which such ideas could exist is God. Following Augustine, he took ideas to be the exemplars in the mind of God after which He creates the world. This construal had the additional advantage for Malebranche of guarding against skepticism because, although idea and object are no longer identical, they are nonetheless necessarily connected as exemplar and exemplum. Even so, it remained true for Malebranche that, when we look at a material thing, what we in fact see is not that thing but its idea. This is the core of his view of vision of all things in God, which he welcomed as an indication of human beings' dependence on the deity. The immediate vehicle whereby we have such knowledge is a particular, contingent, and finite mode of the mind; but the universal, necessary, and infinite object of that mode can exist only in some other kind of being. How are these ideas known to the mind if they are not in it, at least not as modes of it? Although ideas are not innate to the mind, for that would make them modes of it, they are nonetheless always present to it. In seeking to know, whether we realize it or not, we are consulting Reason, which Malebranche identifies with the second person of the Trinity, the logos of neo-Platonic theology. Our effort to know is a natural prayer that Reason always answers. Malebranche was thus a majuscule rationalist.

As for individual substances, Malebranche clearly thought that every material thing and every mind is a substance in the sense of a hypokeimenon. But when pressed late in his life to show how this status for them comported with the rest of his system, how they could be anything but modes of a single substance, in short how he avoided the drift into Spinozistic monism, he was in fact hard pressed. In the Search After Truth, Malebranche clearly committed himself to the view that everything is either a substance or a mode. In addition, he accepted Descartes's criterion for a substance that it be conceivable apart from everything else. However, he maintained that any given portion of extension is conceivable apart from the rest of extension and is thus a substance. (Descartes did not think this, otherwise void space would be possible for him.) Since extension is conceptually divisible to infinity, Malebranche is committed to an infinite number of extended substances. Apart from the whole of extension, moreover, every substance contains an infinite number of substances, of (each of) which it is a mode. It is also a part of an infinite number of substances, which are modes of it. The explanatory value of the concept of substance would seem to have been lost with such results as these. Malebranche's view seems to be a degenerate version of Descartes's texts to the effect, surprising but coherent, that there is but one material substance, res extensa, whose modes are particular material things. Here the effect is to reverse the Aristotelian logic of substance. To say of x, a particular thing, that it is extended E, is to say not that a substance x has a property E, but that x is a mode of res extensa.

These difficulties in accounting for substance on Malebranche's part seem to derive from his Platonism. As a Platonist, he was interested less in substance as the hypokeimenon, which accounts for difference, than in its other sense of ousia, which accounts for sameness. Thus, Malebranche's skid to Spinozism is greased even when he talks about mind, the essence of which is thoughtnot this or that thought, but substantial thought, thought capable of all sorts of modifications or thoughts. Since the same substantial thought is had by all possessed of a mind, Malebranche's view smacks even of the single intellectual soul for all men of the Latin Averroists. In this sense too, then, his heterodoxy as a Cartesian is part and parcel with his deep commitment to rationalism, and in particular with his rationalistic reduction of phenomenal difference to real sameness.

The final rationalistic aspect of Malebranche's thought that deserves attention here is his theory of causation. For Malebranche, a cause is that between which and whose effect there is a necessary connection. On his view, the causal connection that is characterized by this kind of necessity is that between God's will and its effects. Thus, for Malebranche, only God has causal efficacy. What we take to be real causesfor example the motion of a billiard ball that collides with another that then begins to moveare in fact only occasional causes, the occasions for the operation of the only real cause. Given Malebranche's combined rationalistic and theological commitments, none of this is surprising. The surprise, or at least irony, comes when Malebranche's arguments that natural causeseven and especially human volitionscannot be real causes cross the channel and are deployed by Hume. The radical empiricist account of causation that Hume gave in terms of constant conjunction is just Malebranche's rationalist occasionalism without the role assigned to God. For Hume, Malebranche's occasional causes are the only causes.

The centrality of substance for the continental rationalists is further borne out by the importance of that concept for Spinoza, especially within his Ethics. Spinoza devoted the entire first part of that work to a consideration of substance, or, as he also termed it Deus sive Natura (God, in other words, Nature). The remaining parts trace the consequences of his conception of substance for epistemology, psychology, physics, and ethics. While Spinoza's account of substance is quite rightly regarded as a development and working-out of Descartes's metaphysics, there are also (as with Descartes and Malebranche) considerable, and important, differences between the two. What is important for our present purposes, however, is that, (as with Malebranche) Spinoza's departures from Descartes are almost always the manifestation of a form of rationalism purer than Descartes's own. Most radically, Spinoza replaced Descartes's substance pluralism with a monistic account modelled on Cartesian extended substance. Just as, in some places, Descartes treats bodies are mere modes of a single extended substance, so, for Spinoza, all individualsboth bodies and mindsare modes of a single substance.

Spinoza arrived at this position by way of a decidedly un-Cartesian account of attributes. While Descartes held that two substances of the same type can share the same principal attribute, Spinoza rejected this. Any two substances, argued Spinoza, must be distinguished either by their attributes (Spinoza dropped the modifier principal.) or by their modes. But, since modes are themselves both ontologically and causally dependent on the substances of which they are affections, they cannot be the individuating principle for them. Thus, it must be the attributes themselves that individuate substances (and not just types of substances, as Descartes argued). Similarly, while Descartes held that each substance is characterized by one and only one principal attribute, Spinoza invoked the principle of plenitude to show that substance must have infinite attributes. Based on a variation of the ontological argument, he maintained that substance is pure, utterly unlimited being. It must therefore, he argued, possess infinite attributes, in the dual sense of possessing unlimited attributes and of possessing all attributes. Since substance is characterized by infinite attributes, and since no two substances can share a single attribute, there can be only one substance.

Spinoza's one substance is at the farthest possible remove from Aristotle's proper substances. Whereas, for Aristotle, individual things such as Bucephalus, are paradigmatic substances, Spinoza denies their substantiality. But does this mean that, unlike Aristotelian proper substances, which are not predicable of anything else, Spinoza's finite modes are predicable of substance? Scholars are divided on this point. Curley has argued that Spinoza retains the conception of the substance-mode distinction as a distinction between independent and dependent being, but rejects the view that the substance-mode distinction correlates to the distinction between a subject of predication and its predicate. Bennett, however, argues that Spinoza does indeed regard finite modes as predicable of substance, or, as he puts it, as adjectival on the world. Bennett characterizes Spinoza's account of substance as a field metaphysic in which individual things are simply clusters of qualities within regions of space. Just as a blush is merely a confluence of properties on a region of a face, so the faceindeed, the person whose face it isis a confluence of properties on a region of substance.

Whether or not Spinoza rejected the predicability of finite modes, it is clear that he did not regard them as either causally or conceptually independent in the way that is requisite for substance. For Spinoza, substance is in itself and is conceived through itself, whereas a mode is in something else and is conceived through something else. The in itself/in something else aspect of these two definitions captures Descartes's conception of causal independence, while the conceived through itself/through something else aspect refers to Descartes's conceivability-apart criterion for ontological independence. Descartes, it will be recalled, regarded divine substance as both causally and ontologically independent, but created substances as ontologically, but not causally, independent, since they depend on God's creative (and conservative) power for their existence. It is in this sense that, for Descartes, the term substance is used equivocally for God and created substances. Spinoza, however, denied that substance is an equivocal term. In so doing, he eliminated two asymmetries in Descartes's metaphysicsthat between divine and created substance, and that between extended and thinking substance. For Spinoza, finite minds are not themselves substances, but rather modes of thinking substance. That is, for Spinoza, at the most fundamental level, all minds reduce to the thinking substance of which they are affections.

Spinoza's account of the eternal verities marks a similar rationalistic advance over Descartes's metaphysics. For Spinoza, God is just substance simpliciter. He lacks volition and personality; his only characteristics are pure being, infinity, necessity and activity. While Spinoza agreed with Descartes that God is the cause of all things, he regarded him not as a transeunt cause, creating the universe from the outside through an act of will, but as an immanent cause, from whom the universe unfolds out of his own necessity. For Spinoza, all things therefore follow by logical (and not merely causal) necessity from God's eternal and infinite nature. In this sense, not only mathematical truths but indeed such apparently contingent facts as Caesar's having crossed the Rubicon are necessary truths for Spinoza. The difference between them is not the necessity of the truths themselves but rather the route that we take to arrive at them. While mathematical truths, for instance, are deducible by reason alone, Spinoza recognized that the finitude of human understanding prevents, or at least impedes, our similarly deducing empirical facts about the world. In contrast with the empiricists, who regard cause and effect as mere constant conjunction, for Spinoza, the relationship between cause and effect has the force of a logical entailment; empirical facts are themselves necessary truths. The universe is thus, in principle at least, perfectly intelligible to reason.

For Spinoza, as for Descartes, the metaphysical commitment to substance underwrote a rationalist epistemology that strongly privileges reason and intuition over sensation and imagination. The distinctive character of Spinoza's epistemological rationalism is rooted in his principle that the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things. For Descartes, the mind and the body are, though intimately connected, radically heterogeneous. How it is that the mind comes to know things about the physical world therefore remains, despite his best efforts, a somewhat murky business. By rejecting the substantiality of both minds and bodies, and by regarding them both as modes of a single substance, Spinoza obviated this difficulty. For Spinoza, the mind and the body are the very same thing conceived in two different ways. Persistent clusters of qualities in space are bodies. The ideasor, in Descartes's terminology, the objective realityof these bodies are minds. Just as a single body has a corresponding objective reality, so collections of bodies characterized by various relations also have a corresponding objective reality with isomorphic parts and relations. Since there is no gap between minds and bodies, there is therefore no difficulty in principle in perceiving the physical world. On Spinoza's account, we perceive the physical world in two ways(1) by perceiving the actions of our own bodies, and (2) by perceiving the effects of other bodies on ours. Thus, when one's body runs, the correlative ideas are in one's mind. Likewise, when someone steps on one's toe, the physical effects on the toe likewise have their counterparts in the mind's ideas.

Despite the necessary connection the mind has with the body, argued Spinoza, sensation and imagination are inherently limited. The idea of substance qua substance must be a perfect unity. However, the idea which constitutes the human mind is complexnot a unity but a plurality of ideas. That idea is therefore confused, rather than clear and distinct. Clear and distinct understanding, on Spinoza's account must partake of the unity of the idea of substance, and not of the fragmentary nature of the idea of the human body and its affects. This cognitive unity is achieved in two waysthrough reason (which Spinoza termed knowledge of the second kind) and through intuition (knowledge of the third kind). When we cognize through sensation and imagination (knowledge of the first kind), we try to grasp many ideas at once, and thereby produce confusion. Reason and intuition, by contrast, provide us with access to just one ideathe substantial unity underlying our body and our mind. Reason does this from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things, while intuition proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God. To understand the substantial unity that is the necessary cause of our body and our mind is to grasp them sub specie aeternitatis.

This epistemological ideal forms the core of Spinoza's rationalistic ethicsand, hence, on one plausible account, the core of his Ethics. Spinoza's monism entails that the sort of individuals that Aristotle regarded as primary substances are distinguished not by their own substantial unity, but by their conatustheir striving to persist. Thus, self-preservation is not just one possible goal of ethical agents; it is the very thing that makes those agents individuals. Our essence, and our ethical task, is thus to be active, whereas, by contrast, to be passive threatens our persistence. The mind persists through activity and is threatened by passivity. It is therefore in our self-interest to pursue adequate ideas through knowledge of the second and third kinds. The more we join our minds with God through adequate knowledge of things under the form of eternity, the less we are affected by external things and, hence, by our own passions, which are nothing but our passivity in the face of forces external to us. Adequate knowledge of God gives us equanimity and calm, and literally ensures our persistence. Ethical virtue is thus fundamentally epistemological. For Spinoza, the most rationalist of figures discussed here, the good life is the utterly rational life.

As we have seen, rationalist epistemology is grounded in a metaphysical commitment to substance. The concept of substance allowed the rationalists to reduce all complexity and plurality to an underlying simplicity and unity, versus the empiricists, who, in their skepticism about substance, were committed to regarding reality as fundamentally plural and complex. Spinoza's metaphysics marked the culmination of this rationalist momentum. In Leibniz, the last great continental rationalist, we see its final movement. Leibniz, like other rationalists before him, regarded quotidian things as phenomena that ultimately reduce to perfectly simple substances. However, for Leibniz, there is an infinite number of these simple substances, each of them causally and perceptually isolated from all of the others. Leibniz reasoned that this is the best of all possible worlds because it balances the maximal possible complexity with the maximal possible order. In thus privileging neither unity nor plurality, neither simplicity nor complexity, and in striking the balance that he did on purely rational principles, Leibniz exemplified a more complex, more comprehensive and, ultimately, more mature rationalism than that of his predecessors.

For Leibniz, at the most fundamental level, reality is characterized by simple substances, or monads. Since there are composites, Leibniz argued, there must be simple substances that, together, constitute these composites. Being simple, monads have neither parts, nor extension, nor form, nor divisibility. Leibniz saw them as the true Atoms of nature. While Leibniz thus retained a strong commitment to substance, he resisted rationalism's synechistic momentum by rehabilitating substance's Aristotelian role as an individuator. However, while, for Aristotle, Bucephalus is a proper substance, Leibniz regarded Bucephalus not as a substance but as himself comprising a collection of simple substances. Leibniz agreed with Aristotle's characterization of substance as the grammatical subject of predication and not itself predicable of anything else. However, he complained that this account does not go far enough. For Leibniz, the essence of substance lies not in the fact that it is the subject of predication, but in the fact that every possible predicate may be asserted or denied of it. In this way, every individual substance has a complete concept, a conception so complete (that is, so fully determinate) that every fact about the substance, and about its situation in the universepast, present or futurefollows from it analytically. In fact, Leibniz offered a statement of this very principle as his Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Leibniz's insistence that every individual substance has a complete concept entailed that, unlike Spinoza, he regarded Cartesian thinking substance and not Cartesian extended substance as paradigmatic of substance. Descartes' extended substance (like Spinozistic substance) is, on Leibniz's account, not a substance at all since it does not afford a principle of individuation. Leibniz argued that, whereas a real substance has a complete concept, the Cartesian notion of extended substance is an abstraction arrived at through an incomplete concept. Matter on its own is insufficient to form or to constitute a substance. For Leibniz, a body could never be a candidate for substance since bodies are susceptible to alteration and are infinitely divisible. We can thus never arrive at a body of which it can be said, Here really is an entity. Moreover, whereas Cartesian extended substance is totally inert, Leibniz insisted that activity is the hallmark of substance. Anything that acts is a substance; every substance constantly and uninterruptedly acts. For Leibniz, this position follows from God's perfection. God's planning of the universe was so perfect that it only required to be set in motion by him. True substances (that is, entia per se) are active and self-causing. On Leibniz's account, God would lack all dignity were he the sole cause in the universethat is, if occasionalism or interventionalism were necessary. God's perfect planning avoids the necessity for (continual or continuous) extraordinary concourse. Thus, God's perfection entails that all substances are active; passive extension is only matter, not substance.

The activity, or appetition, that Leibniz regards as characterizing the monads is intimately bound up with his Principle of Sufficient Reason. For Leibniz, a monad contains its whole history because each monadic state (except for those statescreation is paradigmatic of thesethat are the result of divine causation) has its sufficient cause in the preceding state. In turn, the present state is the sufficient cause of all succeeding states. Despite this emphasis on the inherent activity of substance, Leibniz, like Spinoza, rejected the possibility of transeunt causation among substances. Monads are windowless and neither admit nor emit causal influence. Moreover, being thus windowless, monads can no more receive perceptions from the world than they can any other external causation. Rather, a monad's perceptions are built-in at creation. By pre-established harmony, these perceptions perfectly align with the universe's infinite monadic states. This entails that while there is no genuine transeunt causation at the monadic level, a kind of pseudo-causation results from monads' harmonized perceptions of each other as their respective appetitions convey them through successive changes. For Leibniz, causal relations thus reduce to logical relations in that every change in a substance follows from its concept.

While Leibniz's view that every substance has a complete concept reinforces the centrality of reason in his epistemology, in doing so, it seems to undercut human and even divine volition, and thereby to slide toward Spinozism. If every fact about Julius Caesar, and indeed, every other fact about the universe is rationally deducible from the Roman Dictator's complete concept, then it would seem that only one course for the universe is possible. However, this is not a step that Leibniz was willing to take. Were there no distinction between contingent and necessary truths, argued Leibniz, fatalism would be true, and human liberty of the will would be impossible. Leibniz sought to avert this result by distinguishing between hypothetical and absolute necessity. Absolute necessity, he argued, is governed by the principle of contradiction. Something is absolutely necessary if its negation is logically impossible. Hypothetical necessity, on the other hand, describes a state of affairs that is necessary ex hypothesithat is, just in case a particular antecedent holdsbut not logically necessary. On Leibniz's account, the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is only hypothetically necessary; it follows necessarily from the existence of the individual substance that is Caesar, but its denial is not logically impossible. According to Leibniz, God at creation conceived of an infinite array of possible worlds. The myriad contingent facts of each of these worlds are only hypothetically necessary. That is, they would only be necessary if God were to instantiate that world. Since the present world is the one that God chose to instantiate, all of the contingent facts of this world are certain. However, they are nonetheless contingent since their negation implies no absurdity. That is, there was no logical impossibility preventing Caesar from deciding not to cross the Rubicon. In this sense, his willand, indeed, human will generallyis free. Leibniz's argument for hypothetical necessity has an obvious antecedent in Descartes's doctrine of created truth. However, unlike Descartes, Leibniz limited the doctrine's scope to contingent truths. He nonetheless hoped to avoid Spinozist necessitarianism. Whether or not he succeeded in doing so is a matter of debate in the literature.

Inasmuch as it characterizes the universe as composed of a plurality of individual existences, none of which has any genuine causal efficacy over any other, Leibniz's position shows considerable affinities with Hume's empiricism. However, while Hume inferred from this the importance of empirical experience, Leibniz instead took this ontology to preclude adventitious knowledge. He thus remained committed on metaphysical grounds to the doctrine of innate ideas. In his rejection of transeunt causation among substances, Leibniz rejected the notion that we can learn new things about the world in the sense of gaining new ideas that do not already exist in our souls. On Leibniz's account, the temporal coincidence of a certain phenomenon with one's learning of the phenomenon was pre-established at creation in the same way that all monadic states were. Leibniz admitted that it is idiomatically acceptable to speak about acquiring knowledge via the senses. However, he regarded all sensory reports as reducible to, and explicable as, descriptions of logical relations. Leibniz's theory of knowledge thus relegates the Aristotelian idea of human beings as blank slates who learn through induction to a mere faon de parler. By contrast, he strongly endorsed Plato's doctrine of recollection to the extent that it locates all knowledge in ideas already residing in the soul. Socrates's exchange with Meno's slave boy, argued Leibniz, shows that the soul already possesses the ideas upon which truths about the universe depend, and needs only to be reminded of them.

On Leibniz's account, substances have built into them perceptions of the whole universe. Every substance, he argued, is a mirror of the whole universe to the extent that everything that has ever happened or existed or will ever happen or exist are included in its complete concept. The perceptions of all substances, he maintained, thus resemble God's infinite perception in their unlimited scope. It is with respect to clarity and distinctness that the perceptions of created substance fall short of God's. For Leibniz, the best of all possible worlds is that world that balances the maximal possible complexity with the maximal possible order. The existing world satisfies this through the infinite variety of perspectives taken by the monads. By the principle of order, each monad reflects the very same world as do the other monads. However, by the principle of complexity, the monads reflect the world from an infinite number of unique perspectives. This infinite variety in perspectives entails that each monad reflects all of the others with varying degrees of clarity and distinctness. In this way, the universe is replete with an infinite number of different representations of God's works. Among these, only God's perceptions are universally clear and distinct. While the complexity requirement for the best of all possible worlds would seem to preclude in principle the possibility of human beings achieving knowledge of the universe sub specie aeternitatis, Leibniz made a special exception for human souls. On Leibniz's account, all monads have low-level perceptions, of the kind that we experience when we are in a stupor. However, the souls of living things have, over and above this, feelings and memories. Human souls have, besides this, through divine election, the power of reason. It is reason that allows us to understand the universe as a system, through the use of models and idealizations, and thereby to grasp the eternal truths. In this way, argued Leibniz, human minds are not only mirrors of the universe of created things, but indeed mirror God himself. While the rise of British empiricism, and of Kant's critical philosophy marked the end of continental rationalism as a movement, Leibniz's elegant vision was a fitting paean to the movement and, indeed, to the power of human reason.

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Continental Rationalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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