A Springfield alderwomans question about a Labor Day boat parade on Lake Springfield in support of President Donald Trump has perhaps inadvertently turned up the political heat as the November election nears.

The event was one among many boat parades held across the country over the holiday weekend to show support for Trumps reelection. Several participating vessels were decked with pro-Trump flags and other paraphernalia as they paraded around the lake.

Ward 6 Ald. Kristin DiCenso asked City Water, Light and Power officials and city attorney Jim Zerkle at Tuesdays committee of the whole meeting if a permit was necessary for the event and if one had been obtained.

DiCenso said she was enjoying a day at the lake with her son and niece when she noticed the parade of boats "hooting and hollering and tooting their horns and having a jolly old time on Lake Springfield," which is city-owned property. DiCenso said she fielded several calls complaining about the parade.

CWLP chief utility engineer Doug Brown told City Council members that a permit had not been requested, and Zerkle, though acknowledging that a "boat parade" was not something the city typically deals with, said it was likely allowed under the First Amendment.

"Generally speaking, the courts are going to protect freedom of speech," Zerkle said. "So, absent a public safety concern boats too close, driving too fast, unsafe activities by way of jumping out of the boats into the water, things of that nature there's going to be a preference to support the First Amendment."

The question was asked and answered, and the discussion was seemingly over within five minutes. But, it turns out, it was only the beginning.

On Thursday, DiCenso became the target of fierce criticism from Sangamon County Republican Party chairwoman Rosemarie Long, who was responding to information on a flier thats been making the rounds on social media.

The flier claimed that DiCenso, following Tuesdays meeting, had described the boat parade as "horrid and unacceptable" and that she had plans to propose an ordinance that would prevent the displaying of political signs and flags on lake property.

The flier has been distributed to various lake clubs and to lake lease owners. Long, speaking at the partys committee call, said she was "getting goosebumps because I'm so mad" about the claims.

"I cannot tell you how upsetting this is to me," Long said. "What happened to freedom in this country, in this town, in this county when they just think about not letting you place your American flag in your yard?"

But DiCenso flatly denied the claims made in the flier, saying they contained "completely made up statements." She also said she has never proposed preventing political signs or flags from being displayed on lake property and has no plans to introduce such a plan.

Several aldermen reached Friday, including Ward 10 Ald. Ralph Hanauer, said DiCenso has never mentioned such a proposal to them. Hanauer said that he doesnt "think everything's accurate that was in the flier."

Long declined to disclose who sent her the information or identify the "sources" cited in the flier.

"I just feel everyone is jumping at any chance to do away with our American way of life," Long said. "And just even because a group was out having a good time on the lake, now, all of a sudden, 'Oh, weve got to get a permit, we've got to make them do this, we've got to make everyone do this.' I just think every little thing the American people try to do anymore is trying to be taken away from them."

DiCenso said the controversy is an example of the Sangamon County GOP "just looking for something, for anything" to drum up during an election year.

"My question wasn't out of line," DiCenso said. "I never mentioned any candidates name. I just said there was a boat parade. I'm asking what the regulations are. If an alderman can't ask that question at City Council without the other side launching a full-blown smear campaign along with graphics and a pamphlet, then something's really wrong in the city."

Though the Springfield City Council is technically a nonpartisan body, council members typically identify with and are supported by one of the two major political parties.

DiCenso and Alds. Shawn Gregory, Doris Turner, Erin Conley and Jim Donelan identify as Democrats, while Alds. Chuck Redpath, John Fugenzi, Andrew Proctor and Hanauer are Republicans. Ward 7 Ald. Joe McMenamin, who previously lost a Democratic primary for Congress, identifies as an independent.

The council typically keeps the focus on issues facing the city. But in a country deeply divided along partisan lines and with less than two months before a heated presidential election, national politics have inevitably seeped down.

Hanauer briefly challenged DiCenso on her questioning of the parade Tuesday, calling it free speech. But even then, there was levity at the end of the conversation, with DiCenso jokingly telling Hanauer "and now we know who you're voting for," implying his support for Trump.

Hanauer replied, "I dont think there was any doubt on that."

Still, reached Friday, Hanauer said he thinks DiCenso would not have brought up the topic if it were a boat parade for a candidate she supports.

"What rubbed me wrong on this was, if it would have been a boat parade with a Democrat candidate on, Kristin would have never said anything about it," Hanauer said.

But DiCenso said that is not the case.

"Im all for free speech," DiCenso said, noting that an American flag hangs on her porch and four political signs are in her front yard. "But we're talking about municipally-owned property."

"We have rules and regulations on our property, we have speed limits on the lake, you have to wear a life jacket, we have lake police," DiCenso said. "Again, if you have events or activities at the lake, you have to have a permit. I was just asking a question."

Political writer Bernard Schoenburg contributed to this report. Contact Brenden Moore: brenden.moore@sj-r.com, twitter.com/brendenmoore13.

Follow this link:

Alderwomans question about Trump boat rally on Lake Springfield turns up heat as election nears - The State Journal-Register

David Warren, Governors Village

To the Editor:

Like all Americans, I love our country and I am grateful to be born here. I learned to respect the Flag as a Boy Scout, served under it in the Navy and studied its history in law school (e.g., the First Amendment allows flag burning and other means of protest as a form of symbolic speech under a 1989 Supreme Court ruling). And I display the flag proudly on all federal holidays and presented it in the triangular fold at the funeral of my father, a WWII vet.

The First Amendment also allows citizens to not participate in the Pledge of Allegiance and to take a knee during the playing of the National Anthem. I take the Pledge (originally composed by a Union soldier during the Civil War) along with other citizens in patriotic settings, saying Under God even though it was only later added by Cold War fervor and raises questions under the First Amendments religion clause.

Our constitutional traditions permit, and perhaps even encourage, the public expression of starkly different points of view, particularly during a political season. But no one condones violence by the far left and far right perpetrators during the peaceful Black Lives Matter protests. While conservatives and progressives can and do hold the same hopes for our nation to be the Land of the Free and that the military, National Guard and police are important elements in protecting the security and safety of our society, we can easily differ on the paths to achieve the shared goals of racial justice, fair immigration, criminal justice system reforms, educational system upgrades and economic opportunity for all our citizens.

Because I have heard Joe Bidens assurances of policies that emphasize inclusion and tolerance, respect for science and the environment, reliance on competent and experienced advisers, re-engagement with the global community and rebuilding trust in the government at all levels, I will be voting for the Democratic Party ticket in the faith of achieving a more perfect Union.

Regardless of viewpoint, we all have a patriotic responsibility to work hard to restore civility, trust and mutual respect in our institutions and communities, and among ourselves. Especially it is crucial in these testy times of hyperbolic viewpoints that the soul of America be preserved and promoted.

In conclusion, each of us who loves our democracy must take seriously the individual responsibility to honor our common values and to take the time to vote!

Read more from the original source:

Letters: God bless America, and vote! - The Chatham News + Record

Today, Judge Patrick Bumatay dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in NLRB v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Iron Workers. I would commend everyone to read his careful analysis about how lower courts should approach originalism and stare decisis. I may be partial to his approach, as he cites my article on this issue.

I agree with Judge Berzon that this case should have been taken up en banc. I write separately to emphasize my views on why the Supreme Court's decision in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) ("IBEW"), is not binding in this case and why it is our duty to apply the Constitutionnot extend precedenthere.

As inferior court judges, we are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 117071 (9th Cir. 2001). After all, "[f]idelity to precedentthe policy of stare decisisis vital to the proper exercise of the judicial function." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). But our fidelity is not blind. We always have a "duty to interpret the Constitution in light of its text, structure, and original understanding." NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 573 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). The same could be said of precedent that has been eroded by more recent jurisprudence.

This doesn't mean that lower court judges can refuse to follow precedenteven if subsequent caselaw or the original meaning cast it into doubt. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Lower court judges don't have license to adopt "a cramped reading" of a case in order to "functionally overrule" it. Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n, No. 19-4217, 2020 WL 5015460, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2020). Nor are we permitted to create "razor-thin distinctions" to evade precedent's grasp. Josh Blackman, Originalism and Stare Decisis in the Lower Courts, 13 NYU J.L. & Liberty 44, 51 (2019).

But, where precedent is seriously questioned "as an original matter" or under current Supreme Court doctrine, courts "should tread carefully before extending" it. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We can take care not to unduly expand precedents by reading them "in light of and in the direction of the constitutional text and constitutional history." Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 949 F.3d 489, 506 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., dissenting). So too with intervening Supreme Court decisions. And if a faithful reading of precedent shows it is not directly controlling, the rule of law may dictate confining the precedent, rather than extending it further. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378 ("[S]tare decisis is not an end in itself. . . . Its greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional idealthe rule of law. It follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.").

In this case, he finds there is not a "razor-thin" distinction with precedent. Therefore, it should not be extended:

Given this backdrop, nothing in Supreme Court doctrine or principles of stare decisis require the extension of IBEW here. IBEW deals with picketing and this case does not. As the cases above show, this is not a "razor-thin" distinction. And as Judge Berzon ably demonstrates, IBEW cannot be squared with modern First Amendment law. See Dissent at 16 (Berzon, J., dissenting) ("Given such a sea change in First Amendment jurisprudence," IBEW "would need to be quite directly on point to be controlling today.").

Indeed, Judge Bumatay argues that the a careful study of the original meaning further justifies not extending this precedent. He favorably cites the work of Jud Campbell.

Also, I have doubts that 158(b)(4)(i)(B), as applied here, would be consistent with the original meaning of the First Amendment. That Amendment pronounces that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend I. While the contours of this language need further explication, and there is ongoing debate about its meaning among scholars, Justice Scalia articulated the convincing view that the First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech on the basis of content, subject to "traditional categorical exceptions." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 38283 (1992) (identifying obscenity, defamation, and fighting words as examples of such exceptions). Another persuasive view is that the First Amendment cemented the natural right to freely express one's thoughts, spoken or written, subject to restrictions for the common good. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 Yale L.J. 246, 30407 (2017). But, under this view, "the Founders widely thought that the freedom to make well-intentioned statements of one's views belonged to a subset of natural rights . . . that could not be restricted in promotion of the public good and thus fell outside legislative authority to curtail." Id. at 25556. As James Madison said, "[o]pinions are not the objects of legislation." 4 Annals of Cong. 934 (1794); see also Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779) ("[T]he opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction[.]").

Considering our growing understanding of the First Amendment's original meaning, I question whether Congress can abridge the type of expression at issue here, especially the common catchphrase, "friends don't let friends cross." NLRB, 941 F.3d at 904. Such an expression seems precisely like the type of "well-intentioned statement[] of opinion" that the Founders would have thought inalienable. See Campbell, supra, at 25556, 284. By denying rehearing en banc, we've passed on a valuable opportunity to examine First Amendment history and further ground our own jurisprudence in the original meaning of the Constitution.

Judge Bumatay is forming his own string cite for other judges to cite.IAB Local and Edmo are exactly right. (I blogged about Edmo here.) He also cites Judge Thapar's decision in Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n. (Jon Adler blogged about it here.) Judge Bumatay really should have been added to the not-so-short list.

With a contrary perspective, Mike Dorf recently wrote that lower courts should disregard Supreme Court precedent that has been called into doubt.

Read the original:

Judge Bumatay on Originalism in the Lower Courts: "It is our duty to apply the Constitutionnot extend precedent" - Reason

Methods of addressing attorney discrimination already exist, rendering the proposed Rule not just unconstitutional, but wholly unnecessary.

Texas Insider Report: AUSTIN, Texas

In December 2016, Attorney General Paxtonissued an opiniondescribing the Rules glaring unlawfulness. And in 2018, the United States Supreme Court concluded that state restrictions on professional speech are presumptively unconstitutional because they are content-based restrictions on speech. Despite these rulings, the Texas Bar is set to consider on Thursday whether to refer Model Rule 8.4(g) to a committee for further consideration.

The proposed Rule is broad enough to extend beyond judicial proceedings to include participation in education panel discussions, authoring law review articles, or even informal conversations at a bar association event. It effectively suppresses honest and thoughtful exchanges about complex issues, said Attorney General Paxton. Methods of addressing attorney discrimination already exist, rendering the proposed Rule not just unconstitutional, but wholly unnecessary.

Follow this link:

AG Paxton Warns State Bar of Texas Against Adopting Rule that Would Trample Attorneys' First Amendment Rights | texasinsider - Texas Insider

Jeremy Dys, Opinion contributor Published 6:13 a.m. ET Sept. 10, 2020

When U.S. District Judge Gregory Tatenhove placed a temporary restraining order on Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshears unconstitutional attempt to halt in-person worship during the COVID-19 pandemic, he did so with the following moving language: The Constitution will endure. It would be easy to put it on the shelf in times like this, to be pulled down and dusted off when more convenient. But that is not our tradition. Its enduring quality requires that it be respected even when it is hard.

His decision in Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Beshear was a major win for religious liberty. But despite the clear victory in the Tabernacle case, religious liberty remains under threat in Kentucky and across the nation.Far too many governors and local elected officials continue to flex their power by restricting religious worship, including by preventing private, religious schools from opening.

Tabernacle Baptist Church(Photo: Tabernacle Baptist Church)

But Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron seems to respect the autonomy of these religious institutions.He recently issued a thorough opinion defending religious schools from state and local officials attempting to prevent them from reopening. Referencing Tatenhoves opinion and other precedents, Cameron argued that the law governing religious liberty prohibits the government from closing religious schools that choose to offer in-person instruction this fall.

Part of the freedom to practice ones faith is the freedom to be free from governmental interference in the internal governance of religious organizations, including schools. That is no less true in the midst of a pandemic.

After all, as the Supreme Court recently affirmed in Our Lady of Guadalupe Schoolv. Morrissey-Berru, faith-based schools exist primarily to communicate their faith to the young. For the government to interfere in how these schools carry out their central mission necessarily intrudes upon the First Amendments guarantee to the free exercise of religion.

You may like: Preaching 'Black Lives Matter': How Louisville's white churches are talking about racism

Camerons opinion is timely. Across the country, overzealous government officials are continuing to restrict the First Amendment rights of religious organizations, sometimes even in opposition to public health recommendations. In Montgomery County, Maryland, local officials initially issued a directive prohibiting private, religious schools from conducting on-campus learning until at least Oct. 1.Within days, Governor Larry Hogan issued an emergency order removing the authority of local health agencies to shut down private, religious schools.

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton sought to blunt attempts by local officials in his state to close private, religious schools by issuing clear guidance weeks before the start of school making it clear that local officials dont have the authority to do so.That did not stop them from trying.Local officials in Cameron County, Texas ignored the Attorney Generals guidance, dismissing it as nothing more than an opinion and ordering the closure of the countys religious schools until they declared they could open. First Liberty Institute stepped in to remind them of the law.

And, in Californias Santa Cruz County, local officials are preventing in-person instruction in schools despite allowing the schools to act as day camps and childcare centers. In fact, California allows small groups of children to gather for a variety of purposes, including for childcare, preschool, daycare, day camps, and recreation programs. Incredibly, for most of the state who live in counties on the COVID-19 monitoring list, children may still gather in these small groups as long as they arent learning.

All of us, including schools, should consider the advice of experts and their evidence-based health and safety guidance. We should all do what we can to promote a safe reopening. Nonetheless, a pandemic does not grant government officials the authority to ignore the Constitution and the freedoms it has guarded for 200-plusyears.

You may like: Make a joyful ... nothing. How a church choir director is coping without voices in pandemic

As Attorney General Cameron said, The law prohibits the state from mandating the closure of religiously affiliated schools that are complying with recommended health guidelines. Our courts have consistently held, throughout this pandemic, that religious entities are protected by our Constitution.

Lets hope the Governor and local officials in Kentucky and across the nation heed those words.

Jeremy Dys (@JeremyDys) is Special Counsel for Litigation and Communications for First Liberty Institute, a non-profit law firm dedicated to defending religious freedom for all Americans. Read more at FirstLiberty.org.

Read or Share this story: https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2020/09/10/covid-19-kentucky-fight-religious-liberty-amid-coronavirus/5738826002/

More:

The continuing fight for religious liberty in the age of COVID-19 - Courier Journal

Over two years after it was issued, a grand jury report on the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority was released Friday afternoon.

An Escambia County grand jury completed its review into complaints and allegations involving ECUA in July 2018. But that report was never released due to appeals filed by ECUA seeking to block it from becoming public.

A grand jury was convened and tasked with review of the operations, policies, and procedures of ECUA, specifically the grand jury investigation related to eminent domain proceedings, Florida public records and sunshine law, ECUA Board supervision, and delegation of authority.

Following its investigation and witness testimony, the grand jury concluded that criminal charges were not appropriate and returned a no true bill. However, because the grand jury was deeply concerned by the testimony it received, it issued the report. Under Florida law, individuals named in the report were given the opportunity to move to repress or expunge improper unlawful portions of the report. The appeals were ultimately rejected by the First District Court of Appeal.

In reading the findings below and the linked report, keep in mind it was issued two years ago and several aspects have changed. For instance, former ECUA director Stephen Sorrell has since retired, and then board member Elvin McCorvey passed away in January 2019.

TO READ THE FULL REPORT, CLICK HERE (PDF).

In the report, the grand jury made the following recommendations:

We find that the Board has been grossly negligent in their supervision of the executive director, Stephen Sorrell. This is particularly true in the matter involving Bear Marcus Pointe and in their delegation to Sorrell of unlimited authority.

We believe that the absence of term limits on Board Members has created a sense of complacency and has fostered an overreliance on the executive director and attorneys. An amendment to the Special Act should be considered that would place term limits on Board Members.

A clear policy should be established regarding the signing of documents, particularly those involving real property. We believe that the Board Chair should sign such documents. Whenever the executive director is authorized to sign documents on behalf of the Board, there should be clear direction by way of resolution giving that authorization.

There should be a policy, with deadlines, to honor commitments so that builders and developers can properly plan future projects. ECUA should formalize the development process in order to provide cost predictability related to design standards, requirements, and timelines once initial plans have been submitted. The Board should hold a public forum to discuss the development process.

ECUA should develop an advisory board to review engineering manuals and standards to ensure that the manuals are consistent with other similar water and sewer agencies. Public stakeholders should be involved in this process.

We strongly recommend that the Board hire an in-house attorney and support staff who are paid by salary and not on an hourly basis. We believe this would reduce the incentive oflitigation and would foster good will with businesses and individuals that ECUA works with. We also recommend that ECUA maintain a relationship with an attorney who specializes in eminent domain cases.

Indemnity and hold harmless agreements should be in all easements unless specifically prohibited by law. This is standard practice for Gulf Power Company. ECUA has given such coverage to Gulf Power but refused the same request by the owner of the property.

There should be specific policies in place requiring ECUA attorneys to provide regular briefing on attorneys fees and litigation costs in pending cases.

We recommend that appraisal procedures be reviewed particularly as they relate to eminent domain cases. We have noticed appraisals that were considerably under value that resulted in potentially unnecessary litigation.

ODOM AND BARLOW (ECUAs attorneys)

We find that Odom and Barlow heavily misled the Board and failed to keep them informed regarding pending litigation. Information involving settlement offers and discovery sanctions were never presented to the Board. Odom and Barlow did not advise the Board in a timely manner regarding issues with their email system or the missed deadline for the filing of an appeal. This resulted in four years of additional litigation and more than $460,000 in cost to ECUA.

We recommend that ECUA continue to pursue possible legal malpractice claims against Odom and Barlow.

Board members have indicated that they have asked for documents regarding legal fees and expenses, but have not been provided that information. Information regarding attorney expenses should be available at all times. ECUA should establish accounting procedures to make this information readily available.

We find that Odom and Barlow were making policy decisions. This should not continue. We specifically find that they made policy decisions regarding indemnification and hold harmless agreements.In their testimony, Board members have been very supportive of Bradley Odom. Other witnesses did not share this opinion. In his testimony, we found Odom to be both unprofessional and unprepared. We make these findings because they are important and should be considered by the Board in future decisions.

STEPHEN SORRELL

We recommend that an independent review be conducted to determine if Stephen Sorrell should retain his position as executive director of ECUA. Of particular concern are his actions in the Bear Marcus Pointe case. We recommend that the employment contract for the executive director be renegotiated every two years with no automatic renewal provision. The current contract has been in place since 2004.

We recommend that the executive director be formally evaluated annually and that a public feedback component should be included.

SUNSHINE/PUBLIC RECORDS

We recommend ECUA contract with an outside agency to provide annual training for all employees on the requirements for both Sunshine and Public Records. Either the Attorney Generals Office or the First Amendment Foundation may be available to provide this training.

All employees, including Board members, should only use official e-mail accounts when conducting ECUA business. ECUA should establish an archiving system to maintain all e-mail in an offsite location.

ECUA should require that any outside agency that contracts with ECUA comply with all applicable laws regarding Public Records.

BOARD MEETING/SHAD MEETINGS

Board meetings are currently held on Thursday afternoon at 2:00 p.m. We recommend that the meetings be moved to the evening similar to the practices of both Escambia County and the City of Pensacola.

This should result in greater citizen attendance and input.

ECUA should explore broadcasting Board meetings live similar to that done by Escambia County. Meetings should be advertised in multiple ways.

Topics of shade meetings should be announced in public meetings. This procedure is used by Escambia County.

Transcripts of past shade meetings should be posted to the ECU A website as soon as they become a public record.

The Board should hold litigation or shade meetings in all pending cases. Shade meetings may be used to have strategy sessions regarding litigation expenditures. This may help avoid the costly litigation that we have reviewed.

Written by William Reynolds Filed Under TOP STORIES

Read the rest here:

2018 Grand Jury Report On ECUA Allegations Released With Critical Findings And Recommendations - NorthEscambia.com

By Kimberly Gasuras, CCN Reporter September 11, 2020 2:08 pm

BUCYRUSStealing political signs is a crime and several Bucyrus residents have reported signs stolen from their yards in the past few weeks.

Mayor Jeff Reser said he has received calls from citizens who have had their signs stolensome very unhappy folks.

I dont blame them for being unhappy. We have a long history in Bucyrus of getting along with our neighborsregardless of political affiliation. I believe that the thefts of political signs are the work of very few people who dont know that this is a serious issue, said Reser. We live in politically charged times and we need to redouble our efforts to respect those people (and their property) with whom we may not agree with politically. Stealing signs is no way to support your candidate.

Bucyrus resident Lisa Miller has had her Biden signs stolen twice in the past month.

Gary and I have had signs stolen twice this year and in past campaigns. We might disagree with a candidate, but we would not stoop to the level of thievery, said Miller.

Roger Groves, who lives a few blocks away from the Millers, had his Trump sign stolen about a month ago.

I think it was teenagers who did it. I did not replace it because I figure they will do it again, Groves said.

Neither Miller nor Groves made a police report regarding their stolen signs.

That is not a good use of our safety forces time. We just replace the signs. Gary also made one that says, Biden/Harris 2020. Thou shalt not steal, said Miller.

Lt. Tom Walker, public information officer for the Bucyrus Police Department, said there have only been two police reports made about stolen political signs.

According to our records, only two people have reported political signs stolen: one Trump and one Biden, said Walker.

He said that in Ohio, stealing a political sign is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable by up to 180 days in jail and a $1,000 fine.

There are also civil implications, for which someone can be sued by the victim for violating his or her First Amendment rights which is freedom of speech. The penalty for a tort of that kind falls within the discretion of a judge or jury, Walker said.

Walker said there are no suspects yet in the incidents that are being investigated and anyone with information regarding the theft of political signs should contact the Bucyrus Police Department at 419-562-1006.

See the article here:

Political signs targeted by thieves - crawfordcountynow.com

On September 1, 2020, Singapores Ministry of Law introduced an International Arbitration (Amendment) Bill (the Bill) that proposes two changes to the International Arbitration Act (IAA), which governs the conduct of international arbitrations seated in Singapore. The first change is the addition of default processes and timeframes for appointing arbitrators in multi-party situations where the parties agreement does not specify an appointment procedure. The second change would explicitly recognize the powers of an arbitral tribunal and Singapores High Court to enforce confidentiality obligations. Singapore is a world class international commercial arbitration hub, and these changes aim to further enhance its legal framework for international arbitration.

The Bill is the culmination of a public consultation process that took place, and upon which we reported, last year. On June 26, 2019, Singapores Ministry of Law published a consultation paper seeking comments from the public on six proposals for amendments to the IAA. The proposed amendments included: (1) introduction of a default nomination procedure for arbitrators in multi-party arbitrations; (2) a requirement that arbitrators decide on jurisdiction at the preliminary stage if requested by all parties; (3) recognizing the power of an arbitral tribunal and Singapores High Court to enforce confidentiality obligations; (4) provision for parties to opt in to an appellate procedure on questions of law; (5) exclusion/limitation of set aside grounds under the Model Law and the IAA; and (6) empowerment of Singapore courts to order costs following set aside. We discussed these proposals in detail in our previous article. Ultimately, the Bill adopts two of the proposals made in the consultation paper.

The first amendment that the Bill proposes is the addition of a new section 9B of the IAA, setting out a default mode of appointment of arbitrators in multi-party situations where the parties agreement does not specify the procedure applicable where there are more than two parties.

At present, section 9A of the IAA sets out a default procedure for the appointment of three arbitrators: Each party appoints one co-arbitrator, and the parties appoint the third arbitrator by agreement or, if no agreement is reached in 30 days, the appointing authority appoints the third arbitrator. Section 9A closely follows Article 11(3)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006). However, this default procedure applies only to situations involving a single claimant and a single respondent. No provision is made for the possibility of multiple claimants and/or multiple respondents who might not be able to agree among themselves on a single co-arbitrator.

This lacuna in the IAA contrasts with leading institutional rules, which have for several years stipulated default multi-party nomination procedures. In order to ensure the equality of the parties, the current versions of leading institutional rules typically provide that the relevant appointing authority shall select all three arbitrators where the parties on one side are unable to agree among themselves upon a co-arbitrator. See, e.g., SIAC Rules (2016), Rule12.2; HKIAC Rules (2018), Art. 8.2(c); ICC Rules (2017), Art. 12(8); LCIA Rules (2020), Art. 8.1 (except where separate sides have been agreed in writing).

The Bill proposes the following default mode of appointment of arbitrators in an arbitration with three or more parties and three arbitrators:

The addition of a procedure for appointing arbitrators in multi-party situations addresses an important deficiency in the Model Law and the current IAA and is a welcome development as arbitrations with three or more parties are common.

New Recognition of Tribunals and high Courts power to enforce confidentiality obligations

The IAA at present does not contain any express provision imposing a duty of confidentiality in relation to an arbitration or empowering the tribunal or the courts to enforce such obligations. However, under Singapore law, there is an implied common law duty on the parties to keep the arbitration and information surrounding the arbitration confidential, which operates as a default duty absent party agreement to the contrary in all Singapore-seated arbitrations. See, e.g., Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v Win Win Nu [2003] 2 SLR(R) 547; International Coal Pte Ltd v Kristle Trading Ltd [2009] 1 SLR(R) 945; AAY v AAZ [2011] 2 SLR 528.

Many institutional rules impose express confidentiality obligations on parties in relation to the arbitral proceedings and/or the award. See, e.g., SIAC Rules (2016), Rule 39; HKIAC Rules(2018), Art. 45; LCIA Rules (2020), Art. 30; but cf. ICC Rules (2017), Art. 22(3). Arbitration legislation rarely does so, though there are exceptions such as section 17 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.

The proposed amendment would not itself impose a confidentiality obligation, but would rather by new section 12(1)(j) to the IAA expressly empower the tribunal to enforce any existing obligation of confidentiality (i) that the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to in writing, whether in the arbitration agreement or in any other document; (ii) under any written law or rule of law; or (iii)under the rules of arbitration (including the rules of arbitration of an institution or organisation) agreed to or adopted by the parties. This clarification is a welcome amendment and should give tribunals confidence to respond to breaches of confidentiality appropriately.

The Bill is the latest in a series of amendments to the IAA, which was also amended in 2001, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2016, and 2019. The regularity of the amendments highlights the fast pace of innovation in arbitration legislation in Asia, as well as Singapores initiative to ensure that its arbitration legislation remains cutting edge and responsive to the needs of users, and competitive with regional rivals. The latest proposed amendments demonstrate that Singapore remains intent on cementing its status as one of the premier seats of international arbitration. It is important for arbitration users to regularly update their arbitration clauses with the help of experienced counsel to ensure consistency with current procedures and to take advantage of recent innovations.

[View source.]

See the original post here:

Singapore Announces Amendments To Its International Arbitration Act - JD Supra