Information Protection for the Domain Name System: Encryption and Minimization – CircleID

This is the final in a multi-part series on cryptography and the Domain Name System (DNS).

In previous posts in this series, I've discussed a number of applications of cryptography to the DNS, many of them related to the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).

In this final blog post, I'll turn attention to another application that may appear at first to be the most natural, though as it turns out, may not always be the most necessary: DNS encryption. (I've also written about DNS encryption as well as minimization in a separate post on DNS information protection.)

In 2014, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) chartered the DNS PRIVate Exchange (dprive) working group to start work on encrypting DNS queries and responses exchanged between clients and resolvers.

That work resulted in RFC 7858, published in 2016, which describes how to run the DNS protocol over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, also known as DNS over TLS, or DoT.

DNS encryption between clients and resolvers has since gained further momentum, with multiple browsers and resolvers supporting DNS over Hypertext Transport Protocol Security (HTTPS), or DoH, with the formation of the Encrypted DNS Deployment Initiative, and with further enhancements such as oblivious DoH.

The dprive working group turned its attention to the resolver-to-authoritative exchange during its rechartering in 2018. And in October of last year, ICANN's Office of the CTO published its strategy recommendations for the ICANN-managed Root Server (IMRS, i.e., the L-Root Server), an effort motivated in part by concern about potential "confidentiality attacks" on the resolver-to-root connection.

From a cryptographer's perspective the prospect of adding encryption to the DNS protocol is naturally quite interesting. But this perspective isn't the only one that matters, as I've observed numerous times in previous posts.

A common theme in this series on cryptography and the DNS has been the question of whether the benefits of a technology are sufficient to justify its cost and complexity.

This question came up not only in my review of two newer cryptographic advances, but also in my remarks on the motivation for two established tools for providing evidence that a domain name doesn't exist.

Recall that the two tools the Next Secure (NSEC) and Next Secure 3 (NSEC3) records were developed because a simpler approach didn't have an acceptable risk / benefit tradeoff. In the simpler approach, to provide a relying party assurance that a domain name doesn't exist, a name server would return a response, signed with its private key, " doesn't exist."

From a cryptographic perspective, the simpler approach would meet its goal: a relying party could then validate the response with the corresponding public key. However, the approach would introduce new operational risks, because the name server would now have to perform online cryptographic operations.

The name server would not only have to protect its private key from compromise, but would also have to protect the cryptographic operations from overuse by attackers. That could open another avenue for denial-of-service attacks that could prevent the name server from responding to legitimate requests.

The designers of DNSSEC mitigated these operational risks by developing NSEC and NSEC3, which gave the option of moving the private key and the cryptographic operations offline, into the name server's provisioning system. Cryptography and operations were balanced by this better solution. The theme is now returning to view through the recent efforts around DNS encryption.

Like the simpler initial approach for authentication, DNS encryption may meet its goal from a cryptographic perspective. But the operational perspective is important as well. As designers again consider where and how to deploy private keys and cryptographic operations across the DNS ecosystem, alternatives with a better balance are a desirable goal.

In addition to encryption, there has been research into other, possibly lower-risk alternatives that can be used in place of or in addition to encryption at various levels of the DNS.

We call these techniques collectively minimization techniques.

In "textbook" DNS resolution, a resolver sends the same full domain name to a root server, a top-level domain (TLD) server, a second-level domain (SLD) server, and any other server in the chain of referrals, until it ultimately receives an authoritative answer to a DNS query.

This is the way that DNS resolution has been practiced for decades, and it's also one of the reasons for the recent interest in protecting information on the resolver-to-authoritative exchange: The full domain name is more information than all but the last name server needs to know.

One such minimization technique, known as qname minimization, was identified by Verisign researchers in 2011 and documented in RFC 7816 in 2016. (In 2015, Verisign announced a royalty-free license to its qname minimization patents.)

With qname minimization, instead of sending the full domain name to each name server, the resolver sends only as much as the name server needs either to answer the query or to refer the resolver to a name server at the next level. This follows the principle of minimum disclosure: the resolver sends only as much information as the name server needs to "do its job." As Matt Thomas described in his recent blog post on the topic, nearly half of all .com and .net queries received by Verisign's .com TLD servers were in a minimized form as of August 2020.

Other techniques that are part of this new chapter in DNS protocol evolution include NXDOMAIN cut processing [RFC 8020] and aggressive DNSSEC caching [RFC 8198]. Both leverage information present in the DNS to reduce the amount and sensitivity of DNS information exchanged with authoritative name servers. In aggressive DNSSEC caching, for example, the resolver analyzes NSEC and NSEC3 range proofs obtained in response to previous queries to determine on its own whether a domain name doesn't exist. This means that the resolver doesn't always have to ask the authoritative server system about a domain name it hasn't seen before.

All of these techniques, as well as additional minimization alternatives I haven't mentioned, have one important common characteristic: they only change how the resolver operates during the resolver-authoritative exchange. They have no impact on the authoritative name server or on other parties during the exchange itself. They thereby mitigate disclosure risk while also minimizing operational risk.

The resolver's exchanges with authoritative name servers, prior to minimization, were already relatively less sensitive because they represented aggregate interests of the resolver's many clients1. Minimization techniques lower the sensitivity even further at the root and TLD levels: the resolver sends only its aggregate interests in TLDs to root servers, and only its interests in SLDs to TLD servers. The resolver still sends the aggregate interests in full domain names at the SLD level and below2, and may also include certain client-related information at these levels, such as the client-subnet extension. The lower levels therefore may have different protection objectives than the upper levels.

Minimization techniques and encryption together give DNS designers additional tools for protecting DNS information tools that when deployed carefully can balance between cryptographic and operational perspectives.

These tools complement those I've described in previous posts in this series. Some have already been deployed at scale, such as a DNSSEC with its NSEC and NSEC3 non-existence proofs. Others are at various earlier stages, like NSEC5 and tokenized queries, and still others contemplate "post-quantum" scenarios and how to address them. (And there are yet other tools that I haven't covered in this series, such as authenticated resolution and adaptive resolution.)

Modern cryptography is just about as old as the DNS. Both have matured since their introduction in the late 1970s and early 1980s respectively. Both bring fundamental capabilities to our connected world. Both continue to evolve to support new applications and to meet new security objectives. While they've often moved forward separately, as this blog series has shown, there are also opportunities for them to advance together. I look forward to sharing more insights from Verisign's research in future blog posts.

Read the previous posts in this six-part blog series:

See the article here:
Information Protection for the Domain Name System: Encryption and Minimization - CircleID

What is Viber? Everything you need to know about the encrypted messaging platform – Business Insider – Business Insider

Viber is a full-featured cross-platform group messaging app that works on both iOS and Android. Similar to messaging apps like Signal and Discord, Viber offers end-to-end encryption, meaning your conversations can't be intercepted by third parties.

There's also a Viber desktop app that lets you use the service on Windows, Mac, and Linux computers.

Here's everything you need to know to get started calling and texting on Viber.

Viber is a messaging app that claims to have over a million users. It's become popular recently for its security options, which can keep your messages private.

You can install the Viber mobile app for iOS or Android, or the desktop app for Windows, Mac, or Linux.

You can use the free app for text messages, voice calls, and video calls. Unlike some messaging apps, Viber doesn't require a username and password. Instead, after installing the app, it relies on your phone number to identify you, so users can't disguise their identity behind a screen name, alias, or avatar.

That also makes initial setup easier, since setup is simply a matter of confirming your phone number.

Viber's main screen is typical of most messaging apps, with options to text or make voice and video calls. Dave Johnson/Business Insider

With Viber, you can do more than call or message individual people the app accommodates group texts for up to 250 people and group calls for up to 20 people at once.

With a subscription to Viber Out for $5.99 a month, you can also place cellular calls from within the app, which use your cellular plan, rather than Wi-Fi. This is convenient for placing calls to people who aren't Viber users.

Viber isn't remarkably different from any other messaging app, but it has some interesting features. When text messaging, for example, you can include short audio and video snippets as well as stickers and photos. You can also create disappearing messages, similar to WhatsApp.

You can attach images, stickers, and video and voice snippets to your messages. Dave Johnson/Business Insider

The app also has a personalized news feed feature. You can customize the news sources you're interested in (there are over 50, including AOL, Deadspin, Elle, Fox News, NBC, Road & Track, and USA Today) and browse headlines and stories from within the messaging app.

Viber has a customizable news module. Dave Johnson/Business Insider

Read the rest here:
What is Viber? Everything you need to know about the encrypted messaging platform - Business Insider - Business Insider

A glimpse at the messy future of Signal, the popular encrypted messaging app – Boing Boing

In the wake of the Great Parler Ban of 2021, the popular encrypted messaging app Signal managed to double its users from 20 million to 40 million, practically overnight. This is good news for the company at presentbut it also poses some potential problems for the future. Maybe.

Casey Newton reports from his Platformer newsletter:

In the months leading up to and following the 2020 US presidential election, Signal employees raised questions about the development and addition of new features that they fear will lead the platform to be used in dangerous and even harmful ways. But those warnings have largely gone unheeded, they told me, as the company has pursued a goal to hit 100 million active users and generate enough donations to secure Signal's long-term future.

Employees worry that, should Signal fail to build policies and enforcement mechanisms to identify and remove bad actors, the fallout could bring more negative attention to encryption technologies from regulators at a time when their existence is threatened around the world.

[]

Interviews with current and former employees, plus leaked screenshots of internal deliberations, paint a portrait of a company that is justly proud of its role in promoting privacy while also willfully dismissing concerns over the potential misuses of its service. Their comments raise the question of whether a company conceived as a rebuke to data-hungry, ad-funded communication tools like Facebook and WhatsApp will really be so different after all.

It sounds kind of wild to think about a non-profit organization that provides free end-to-end encryption suddenly having to contend with content moderation issues (if such a thing were even possible). But that's where the future might be headed. There are already plenty of activists who use Signal for organizing; what's to stop extremists from doing the same, and who defines the difference?

The battle inside Signal [Casey Newton / Platformer]

Signal's Brian Acton talks about exploding growth, monetization and WhatsApp data-sharing outrage [Manish Singh / TechCrunch]

Image: mikemacmarketing / Flickr (CC-BY-SA 2.0)

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A glimpse at the messy future of Signal, the popular encrypted messaging app - Boing Boing

Houston Police Chief Tries To Blame Encryption for Failure To Uncover Far-Right Cops – Reason

Several police officers were among the mob that invaded the U.S. Capitol on January 6, a fact that has prompted some serious questions for law enforcement agencies about what they're doing to tackle the far-right presence in their departments. An article in Monday's Washington Post discusses how police might work to recognize problematic recruits before they're hired, and how to make it easier to discipline officers who express violent political attitudesa challenge as cop-friendly arbitrators often intervene and force law enforcement agencies keep them on board.

Deep down in the Post story, the debate takes a comically absurdist twist. A former Houston police officer was among those charged with joining the violent mob at the Capitol. With the problem at his doorstep, Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo, who is also president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, decided to blameencryption:

Acevedo also said anonymous online platforms on the "dark web" are making such investigations impossible, even for departments with sufficient resources. He expects the move away from public platforms like Facebook and Twitter to grow rapidly in response to the FBI arrests of those who rioted at the Capitol.

This month, Acevedo was asked by the House Oversight and Reform Committee to explain what actions police chiefs are taking, and responded by asking for help. For years, law enforcement officials have asked for passage of a federal law that would require such platforms to have a "back door" that law enforcement can access if they have "a legitimate investigative need and a court order" to gain entry.

"Congress's failure to act has enabled industry giants to flaunt the law and operate with impunity," Acevedo wrote in response.

Destroying encryptionand yes, mandatory backdoors would utterly destroy encryptionhas been a pet cause of the U.S. Department of Justice for years. The invocation of the "dark web" as a boogeyman has been a constant recently too. Usually those who have demanded encryption back doors have insisted that it was necessary to fight child trafficking and terrorism.

It feels a bit desperate to invoke encryption as a reason why police departments don't know they've got some dangerous officers, particularly whenlet's be frankthese guys weren't being all that secretive. As the Brennan Center for Justice notes, "These officers' racist activities are often known within their departments, but only result in disciplinary action or termination if they trigger public scandals."

Meanwhile, Acevedo has inadvertently revealed that people are right to worry that law enforcement would abuse encryption backdoors. Police leaders have traditionally insisted that they need these to make sure tech platforms and communication tools comply with legal warrants. But Acevedo is talking about using backdoors to investigate potential or current police officers without any specific connection to criminal activity. This isn't crimefighting; it's domestic surveillance. This is precisely why backdoors are dangerous. Worse yet: The whole premise of these investigations is that there are abusive, authoritarian cops out there who can't be trusted. This is supposed to be a reason to give officers more access topeople's communications?

It's absolutely disheartening to see coverage of encrypted communications that suggests apps like Signal or Telegram are problems because they do not (and cannot) police content, therefore allowing extremists to communicate with each other. A tool can be used for good reasons or bad. We don't throw away hammers and move back into caves because they can also be used to beat somebody to death.

To reiterate for the umpteenth time, encryption protects us from criminals, hackers, and authoritarian governments. What Acevedo proposes won't help fight crime. It would actually make us more likely to be victims of crime. And that doesn't even get into what happens when some of our more violent governments across the world start using the backdoors precisely the way Acevedo describes, but against citizens trying to organize for more freedom, not just to cancel an election whose outcome they didn't like.

We shouldn't be surprised Acevedo that doesn't know what his cops are up to. For years, right under his nose, corrupt narcotics officers have been involved in a racket that involved falsifying records, which culminated in 2019 in a botched raid where officers killed a couple. As Reason's Jacob Sullum noted just this week, Acevedo is still trying to defend some of the officers involved and maintaining that there are not systemic problems in his department. What good would backdoors be to a man who refuses to acknowledge the evidence that's already in front of him?

Read more:
Houston Police Chief Tries To Blame Encryption for Failure To Uncover Far-Right Cops - Reason

Police Chief Demands Holes In Encryption Because Some Cops Decided To Participate In The DC Insurrection – Techdirt

from the sure,-make-this-all-about-us-when-it's-really-just-about-you dept

As more evidence comes to light showing a disturbing amount of law enforcement participation in the January 6th attack on the Capitol, police departments around the nation are finally being forced to face something they've ignored for far too long.

The law enforcement officers who participated in the insurrection attacked officers attempting to defend the building, or, at the very least, did nothing to discourage the lawless actions occurring all around them. The officers that went to DC and engaged in a riot aren't an anomaly. They've been part of law enforcement for as long as law enforcement has existed: bigots with a penchant for violence and a thirst for power.

These officers are finally beginning to be rooted out, but only because they did things no one can ignore. Hundreds of participants produced hundreds of recordings, turning their own celebration of their attempted election-thwarting into the evidence needed to identify them and charge them with federal crimes. Posts made to social media platforms provided more evidence, tying incriminating statements to location data to place off-duty cops on the scene.

Now that agencies are finally confronting their in-house white supremacist/militia problem, they're asking for everyone to be made less secure so they can handle the problem that's been hiding in plain sight for years.

Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo -- who presides over an agency with more than its share of bad cops -- was asked what officials like himself are doing to confront this problem. In response, Chief Acevedo asked for Congress to do him -- and other law enforcement agencies -- a favor:

Acevedo... said anonymous online platforms on the dark web are making such [internal] investigations impossible, even for departments with sufficient resources. He expects the move away from public platforms like Facebook and Twitter to grow rapidly in response to the FBI arrests of those who rioted at the Capitol.

This month, Acevedo was asked by the House Oversight and Reform Committee to explain what actions police chiefs are taking, and responded by asking for help. For years, law enforcement officials have asked for passage of a federal law that would require such platforms to have a back door that law enforcement can access if they have a legitimate investigative need and a court order to gain entry.

Then he blamed social media platforms for his own inability to police his police, calling them out as the real lawbreakers here:

Congresss failure to act has enabled industry giants to flaunt the law and operate with impunity, Acevedo wrote in response.

First off, if the bad cops are shifting to "dark web" platforms in response to their own opsec failures during the January 6th riot, mandating backdoors that affect "industry giants" isn't going to make it any easier to track down cops who've moved on to "darker" web services.

Second, law enforcement agencies' continuous failure to hold officers accountable or to perform rigorous background checks should not be used as leverage to make services and devices less secure for millions of Americans. Citizens have already had to watch their tax dollars pay the salaries of brutal thugs whose loyalty to each other often supersedes their sworn duties as public servants. They don't need to be punished further just so it's a little easier for cops to perform the occasional internal investigation.

Finally, the encryption offered by device makers and communications platforms also protects cops -- not just from accountability, as Acevedo implies here -- but from malicious hackers and criminals who would love access to cops' devices, communications, and sensitive files. A backdoor for bad cops is a backdoor for good cops -- and a backdoor that strips a layer of security away from everyone who uses these devices and services.

The ugliness that permeates law enforcement needs to be rooted out. But the security of millions of Americans shouldn't be weakened just because those policing the police haven't done much of this policing for decades. They've had open access to evidence for years and rarely used it. Now that their sins are too big to ignore until the next news cycle hits shouldn't be the impetus for backdoor mandates.

Thank you for reading this Techdirt post. With so many things competing for everyones attention these days, we really appreciate you giving us your time. We work hard every day to put quality content out there for our community.

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Filed Under: art acevedo, backdoors, encryption, going dark, insurrection, washington dc

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Police Chief Demands Holes In Encryption Because Some Cops Decided To Participate In The DC Insurrection - Techdirt

EU warned of ‘slippery slope’ with new encryption plans Just now – Siliconrepublic.com

ProtonMail, Threema, Tresorit and Tutanota are sounding the alarm over a resolution adopted by the Council of the European Union.

A group of encrypted service providers has penned an open letter to EU lawmakers to denounce plans to alter encryption rules in Europe.

ProtonMail, Threema, Tresorit and Tutanota, which provide email and data storage products, said the stance recently taken by the Council of the European Union will undermine security for Europeans.

In December, the Council adopted a resolution on encryption with the slogan security through encryption and security despite encryption, which had been anticipated but still came in for criticism.

The Council said that encryption is necessary for protecting fundamental rights and the digital security of governments, industry and society but also argued for law enforcement having the ability to exercise their lawful powers, both online and offline protecting our societies and citizens.

It is seeking to create some balance between encryption for users but also access for authorities when necessary. However, the open letter from the four companies said the language used in the resolution could be interpreted as stipulating backdoors into encrypted communications.

The resolution makes a fundamental misunderstanding: encryption is an absolute, data is either encrypted or it isnt, users have privacy or they dont, the letter reads.

The desire to give law enforcement more tools to fight crime is obviously understandable. But the proposals are the digital equivalent of giving law enforcement a key to every citizens home and might begin a slippery slope towards greater violations of personal privacy.

While the resolution adopted by the Council is not legally binding, it could open up opportunities for the Commission to prepare proposals for possible legislation.

This is not the first time weve seen anti-encryption rhetoric emanating from some parts of Europe, and I doubt it will be the last. But that does not mean we should be complacent, Andy Yen, chief executive of ProtonMail, said.

The difference this time is that the Council has taken a more subtle approach and avoided explicitly using words like ban or backdoor. But make no mistake, this is the intention. Its important that steps are taken now to prevent these proposals going too far and keep Europeans rights to privacy intact.

Encrypted and secure communications have garnered a lot of attention of late after the backlash against WhatsApps latest update. The furore saw swathes of sign-ups for alternative encrypted messaging apps such as Signal and Telegram. WhatsApps update has since been pushed back to May.

The letter from ProtonMail, Threema, Tresorit and Tutanota has been issued to coincide with Data Privacy Day, a campaigning initiative by the National Cybersecurity Alliance, a group of tech and finance firms.

Continue reading here:
EU warned of 'slippery slope' with new encryption plans Just now - Siliconrepublic.com

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Hardware Encryption Devices Market: Potential Growth, Attractive Valuation Make It Is A Long-term Investment | ASC SIGNAL, CLAMPCO SISTEMI, EASAT...

Signal, the encrypted messenger of the future, has shady links to US national security interests – RT

If the sudden popularity of the encrypted messenger Signal has seemed suspicious to you, you may be onto something the app is at least partially funded through American foreign influence cutouts.

OnJanuary 4, WhatsApp announced sweeping changes to its privacy policies, affecting the vast bulk of its approximately two billion users globally.

The poorly explained rules were interpreted by many as proof that the messaging service was about to commence sharing users private data, including their conversations, with parent company Facebook, and in response millions the world over began flocking to alternative messaging services that offered end-to-end encryption.

The most common destinations for WhatsApp exiles were, and remain, Signal and Telegram. For reasons unclear, while available figures suggest the latter has to datereceived many orders of magnitude more fresh arrivals than the former, corporate news outlets have overwhelminglyfocused on Signals surging intake.

Much of this coverage has been highly approving for instance, The Guardian published a lengthyexplainer on January 24 titled Is it time to leave WhatsApp, and is Signal the answer? The headline was answered very much in the affirmative, to the extent that readers were offered advice on persuading their contacts to likewise make the switch.

The medias damascene conversion to the cause of encrypted communication is rather incongruous. With a few notable exceptions, mainstream reporting on encryption is typically neutral, if not outright condemnatory, the capability frequently framed as purposefully offering sanctuary to philanderers, drug dealers, paedophiles, assassins, and anyone with something sinister to hide in general.

Such perspectives strongly reflect thepublic positions of governments and security services worldwide, to which end-to-end encryption is by definition an extreme detriment, significantly curtailing the monitoring and collection of citizens communications. Privacy advocatescontend authorities oft-expressed anxieties about encryption providing a safe space for criminals and the like are a cynical smokescreen to justify crackdowns on their usage and availability.

Whatever the truth of the matter, efforts to restrict access to end-to-end encryption are demonstrablyongoing, but have predominantly gone largely uncriticized if not outright unremarked upon. Now though, news outlets seem widely gripped by encryption fever.

In a palpable illustration of this abrupt paradigm shift, a mere three days before it effectively urged its readers to install Signal, The Guardianlambasted Facebooks plans to implement end-to-end encryption across all its messaging platforms, on the basis that the move could harm efforts to reduce child exploitation.

Serious discussion of Signals history, and funding sources, has been entirely absent from the deluge of puff pieces on the platform to circulate far and wide in recent weeks an omission perhaps predictable given the centrality of the US national security state to the apps financing, creation and promotion.

Signal waslaunched by now-defunct Open Whisper Systems (OWS) in 2013, brainchild of shadowy tech guru Moxie Marlinspike real name Matthew Rosenfeld. In February 2018, responsibility for managing the app passed to the nonprofit Signal Foundation, launched with $50 million in startup capital provided by billionaire former Facebook higher-up Brian Acton, the Foundations executive chair.

OWS never published financial statements or disclosed the identities of its funders at any point during its operation, although the sums involved in launching and maintaining a messaging platform used by a vast number of people internationally over several years were surely significant.

Rosenfeldalleges the app never [took] VC funding or sought investment at any point during that time, and quite how much money was involved in total is a mystery. Its clear though that at least $2,955,000 wasprovided by the Open Technology Fund (OTF) 2013-2016, and the organizations websiterefers to Signal being originally developed with OTF funding.

The site is also home to a dedicated OWSprofile, which boasts of how the OTF enabled the OWS team to continue providing Signal at no cost around the globe and adapt their operations for a growing user base.

The OTF was created in 2012 as a pilot program of Radio Free Asia (RFA), an asset of US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which is in turnfunded by US Congress to the tune of $637 million annually inAugust 2018, its then-CEO acknowledged the outlets priorities reflect US national security interests.

RFAs own origins harken back to 1948, whenNational Security Council Directive 10/2 officially authorized the then-newly created Central Intelligence Agency to engage in operations targeted at communist states, including propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, subversion, and assistance to underground resistance movements.

The stationformed a key part of this effort, along with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation From Bolshevism, later Radio Liberty it broadcast unrelenting propaganda in China, North Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere.In2007, the CIAs official website stated these psychological warfare initiatives were among the longest-running and successful covert action campaigns the US ever mounted.

After the CIAs role was made public in the 1970s, Congress took over running and funding the stations, before in 1999 they were grouped along with other state-run media entities under the umbrella of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, USAGMs forerunner.

The launch of the OTF followed the US State Department, then led by Hillary Clinton,pursuing an Internet Freedom policy, ostensibly an effort to develop tools to subvert restrictive internet policies.

However, an extensive June 2011 New York Timesinvestigation pointed to a far darker raison detre, concluding that the endeavor was in fact an effort to deploy shadow internet and mobile phone systems dissidents can use to undermine repressive governments.

Among these assets were State Department-funded stealth wireless networks, which would enable activists to communicate outside the reach of governments in countries like Iran, Syria and Libya.

Reinforcing this conclusion, inFebruary 2015 Jillian York, director of the International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and an OTF advisory board member, stated that she fundamentally believed Internet Freedom was at heart an agenda of regime change.

It may be no coincidence that Signal founder Rosenfeld previously created encrypted communications programs TextSecure and RedPhone, bothfeatured in a March 2013 Gizmodo guide, Which Encryption Apps Are Strong Enough to Help You Take Down a Government?

USAGM is moreover evidently extremely proud of Signal, an officialfactsheet published November 2019 giving the app top-billing in a list of tools supported by OTF. The agency might be, given how popular it has become with dissidents overseas, including those in countries and regions of intense interest to Washington.

For example, Signal became the messaging platform of choice for protesters in Hong Kong after its launch, just as the National Endowment for Democracy, the US government regime-change arm, greatlyincreased its direct and indirect support and promotion of activists and activist groups there.

In an unexpected twist, in June 2020 funding for a number of USAGM projects was unexpectedly frozen,including OTF plans to directly aid protesters in Hong Kong, just as the administrative region prepared to implement a highly controversial and much-contested national security law.

One was the creation of cybersecurity incident response teams to analyze Chinese surveillance techniques in real-time during demonstration, and share relevant information directly with developers of secure communications apps, in order to circumvent crackdowns and restrictions. Another shelved initiative was a $500,000 rapid response fund in support of anyone subject to digital attack by authorities.

Still, the next month Signal became themost-downloaded app in Hong Kong, the apps official Twitter account resultantlyboasting that unlike competitor Telegram, which had just announced it would cease cooperating with authorities requests for user data, we never started turning over user data to HK police.

Theres no suggestion whatsoever that any US security agency had a direct hand in crafting the apps now world-standard encryption system, or plays a day-to-day role running the company. However, the same cant be said of popular internet anonymity browser Tor, which is frequently recommended by privacy advocates in the same breath as Signal.

First developed by US Naval Research Laboratory employees in the mid-1990s, Tor quickly caught the attention of the Defense and Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and since then has been almost entirely funded by US government entities, including thePentagon, to the tune of tens of millions.

Its original purpose was to shield clandestine government operatives from detection in the field, by insulating them from the inherently open nature of the internet, although the potential of Tors anonymizing powers to enable regime change in enemy countries wasnt lost on its funders. Perhaps unsurprisingly, its alsosupported by the OTF, and features alongside Signal in the aforementioned USAGMfactsheet.

In March 2011, Tor developer Mike Perry conceded the browser may unfortunately not provide effective sanctuary from prying governmental eyes.

Extremely well-funded adversaries that are able to observe large portions of the internet can probably break aspects of Tor and may be able to deanonymize users, he said. Though I personally dont believe any adversary can reliably deanonymize all Tor users attacks on anonymity are subtle and cumulative in nature.

Among the most well-funded adversaries of internet privacy are of course the NSA and GCHQ, and classified documents leaked by Edward Snowdenin 2013 revealed the partner agencies devote considerable time and resources to attacking and undermining the service and its users.

However, the papers also indicated the pair were keen not to discourage citizens from using Tor. After all, given that it congregates anyone and everyone with something or other to hide on a single network, surveilling their activities is made all the easier. So does Signal and therein lies the rub.

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The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

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Signal, the encrypted messenger of the future, has shady links to US national security interests - RT

Global Online Lottery Market Growth, Trends and Forecasts Report 2020-2025: Improved Internet Connections, Advances in Security, Encryption, and…

Dublin, Feb. 01, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The "Global Online Lottery Market - Growth, Trends and Forecasts (2020-2025)" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.

The global online lottery market is anticipated to record a CAGR of 0.42% during the forecast period (2020-2025).

There is a rise in the popularity of draw-based games and scratch-off instant games across the European countries, which may positively impact the growth of the market studied.

The increased penetration of smartphones is giving rise to a number of mobile application-based lottery games. The end users have the convenience and comfort of gambling within the comfort of their own space, which is one of the major drivers of the segment.

Key Market Trends

Improved Internet Connections, Advances in Security, Encryption, and Streaming Technology

The increasing acceptance and popularity of the lottery, in general, has resulted in the creation of a whole different form of gaming on the internet. The upsurge in consumer choice for online lottery is being supported by faster internet connectivity, which permits operators to stream various events from around the world, allowing the consumers to bet on. The growth opportunity for lottery operators through online channel forced the online vendors to improve betting processes, in terms of security and reliability, which, in turn, propelled the popularity of online lottery across the world.

Additionally, for a long time, consumers were concerned about banking security while conducting any kind of transaction over the internet. However, advances in both online encryption and banking technology helped in resolving this concern, resulting in the consumers playing online securely and, in turn, driving the market studied.

Europe Holds a Major Share in the Market

The shift in demand from traditional modes of physical draw-based games to the virtual ones is augmenting the growth of the European online lottery market. Moreover, as lotteries offer a high return on low investment, a large group of individuals are attracted by the rewards and invest accordingly to participate in these games. Companies offering lottery gaming services use social media as a promotional strategy to attract large number of users, by posting the winning prizes on social networking sites, like Facebook, Twitter, and Google+. This factor is leading to an increase in the sales of various lottery tickets.

Furthermore, stringent government regulations regarding the operation of online lottery in the European countries help in gaining consumer trust and interest.

Competitive Landscape

The global online lottery market is a fragmented market with the involvement of numerous local and international players. There are strong competitors in the market with diversified portfolios, leading to an intense competition among the existing players.

Key players, like Lotto Agent, The Lotter, LottoKings, and Lotto 247, are focusing on optimizing their offerings, along with geographical expansion.

Key Topics Covered:

1 INTRODUCTION

2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY3.1 Market Overview

4 MARKET DYNAMICS4.1 Market Drivers4.2 Market Restraints4.3 Porter's Five Forces Analysis

5 MARKET SEGMENTATION5.1 By End User5.1.1 Desktop5.1.2 Mobile5.2 Geography

6 COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE6.1 Most Active Companies6.2 Most Adopted Strategies6.3 Market Share Analysis6.4 Company Profiles6.4.1 Lotto Direct Limited6.4.2 Camelot Group6.4.3 Lottoland6.4.4 Lotto Agent6.4.5 LottoKings6.4.6 WinTrillions6.4.7 Lotto2476.4.8 Annexio Limited

7 MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND FUTURE TRENDS

For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/pmqice

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Global Online Lottery Market Growth, Trends and Forecasts Report 2020-2025: Improved Internet Connections, Advances in Security, Encryption, and...

Encryption Software Market by Type, Application, Element – Global Trends and For – Fractovia News

Market Study Report LLC has added a new report on Encryption Software Market Size that provides a comprehensive review of this industry with respect to the driving forces influencing the industry. Comprising the current and future trends defining the dynamics of this industry vertical, this report also incorporates the regional landscape of Encryption Software market in tandem with its competitive terrain.

The research report on Encryption Software market evaluates the major trends which define the industry growth in terms of the regional scope as well as the competitive landscape. It also highlights the challenges & restraints faced by the leading companies along with the key growth opportunities that will assist in business expansion.

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The document is also inclusive of information such as the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the revenue generation of this business sphere, further allowing for better understanding among stakeholders.

Key insights to COVID-19 impact analysis:

A summary of the regional terrain:

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Encryption Software Market by Type, Application, Element - Global Trends and For - Fractovia News