Chinas web censorship machine, the Great Firewall, has a more    offensive brother, researchers have declared today. Called the    Great Cannon by Citizen    Lab, a research body based at the University of Toronto, it    can intercept traffic and manipulate it to do evil things.  
    In recent     distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on code repository    Github, the Great Cannon was used to redirect traffic    intended for Baidu Baidu,    the equivalent of Google    Google in China, to hit    two pages on the target site, including one that provided links    to the Chinese-language edition of the New York Times.    GreatFire.org, a website dedicated to highlighting Chinese    censorship, was hit by a similar attack.  
    The Great Cannon only intercepts traffic to or from a specific    set of targeted addresses, unlike the Great Firewall, which    actively examines all traffic on tapped wires going in and out    of China. According to Citizen Lab, in the recent DDoS hits, it    intercepted traffic going to Baidu, and when it saw a request    for certain JavaScript files on a Baidu server, it appeared to    either pass the request on unmolested, as it did for 98 per    cent of connections, or it dropped the request before it    reached Baidu and sent a malicious script back to the    requesting user, as it did nearly 2 per cent of the time. That    malicious script would fire off traffic to the victims    servers. With so many users redirected to the targets, the    internet pipes feeding Github and GreatFire.org were clogged    up, taking them offline. It was an effective, if blunderbuss,    approach to censoring the targets.  
      A Baidu paper cup is seen on a table at the Baidu      headquarters building in Beijing on December 17, 2014. Baidu      visitors were used in recent attacks on Github and      GreatFire.org AFP PHOTO / Greg BAKER (Photo credit should      read GREG BAKER/AFP/Getty Images)    
    But, as the researchers noted, the Great Cannon could be abused    to intercept traffic and insert malware to infect anyone    visiting non-encrypted sites within the reach of the attack    tool. That could be done, said Citizen Lab, by simply telling    the system to manipulate traffic from specific targets, say,    all communications coming from Washington DC, rather    than going to certain sites, as in the abuse of Baidu visitors.    Since the Great Cannon operates as a full man-in-the-middle,    it would also be straightforward to have it intercept    unencrypted email to or from a target IP address and    undetectably replace any legitimate attachments with malicious    payloads, manipulating email sent from China to outside    destinations, Citizen Lab added in its report released today.  
    The Great Cannon is not too dissimilar to QUANTUM, a system    used by the National Security Agency and the    UKs GCHQ, according to the Edward Snowden leaks.    So-called lawful intercept providers, FinFisher and    Hacking Team Team, sell products that    appear to do the same too, Citizen Lab noted.  
    But theres one simple way to stop the Great Cannon and the NSA    from infecting masses of users: encrypt all websites on the    internet. The system would not be able to tamper with traffic    that is effectively encrypted. The SSL/TLS protocols (which    most users commonly use when on HTTPS websites rather than    HTTP) drop connections when a man-in-the-middle like the    Cannon is detected, whilst preventing anyone from peeking at    the content of web communications.  
    There are some significant projects underway designed to bring    about ubiquitous web encryption. Just this week, the Linux    Foundation announced it would be hosting the Lets Encrypt project, which    seeks to make SSL certificates, which website owners have to    own and integrate into their servers to provide HTTPS services,    free and easy to acquire. It should be possible to grab these    simple and (hopefully) secure certificates from mid-2015,    though Josh Aas, executive director at the the Internet    Security Research Group (ISRG), which runs Lets Encrypt, would    not say when exactly. It has some serious backers, including    Akamai, Cisco, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Mozilla.  
    Its unclear whether Lets Encrypt would provide certificates    to Chinese sites. The default stance is that we want to issue    to everyone  but we will have to comply with US laws our    legal team is looking into it.  
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Another Reason For Ubiquitous Web Encryption: To Neuter China's 'Great Cannon'