Yes, TDE is designed to provide customers the ability to transparently apply encryption within the database without impacting existing applications. Returning data in encrypted format would break most existing applications. TDE provides the benefit of encryption without the overhead associated with traditional database encryption solutions that typically require expensive and lengthy changes to applications, incl. database triggers and views. Oracle Database Vault can be used to protect application data from the DBA and other powerful users as well as implementing robust controls on access to the database and application.

These numbers are important for storage planning, but DBAs or developers don't have to manually expand the columns for TDE column encryption; the expansion is done transparently by TDE when a column is marked 'encrypted'.

Users can reduce the amount of additional storage by choosing the 'no salt' option (16 byte saved), and/or the 'nomac' option (available from 10.2.0.4, 11.1.0.7 and Oracle Database 11g Release 2), which eliminates the additional CPU cycles and disk space needed for calculating and storing the 20 byte hash value for each encrypted field.

TDE supports AES256, AES192 (default for TDE column encryption), AES128 (default for TDE tablespace encryption), and 3DES168.

No, it is not possible to plug-in other encryption algorithms. Oracle provides encryption algorithms that are broadly accepted, and will add new standard algorithms as they become available.

TDE doesn't support encrypting columns with foreign key constraints. This is due to the fact that individual tables have their own unique encryption key. The following query lists all occurrences of RI (Referential Integrity) constraints in your database:

Yes. Joining tables is transparent to users and applications, even if the columns for the join condition are encrypted.

TDE tablespace encryption supports all indexes transparently.

For TDE column encryption, the index needs to be a normal B-tree index, used for equality searches. In case of a composite, function-based index, the encrypted column cannot be the one that was used for the function. When encrypting a column with an existing index, it is recommended to first extract the index definition with dbms_metadata.get_ddl, then drop the index, encrypt the column with the 'no salt' option, and re-build the index.

For TDE tablespace encryption, there are no limitations in terms of supported data types; the following data types can be encrypted using TDE column encryption:

Data encrypted with TDE is decrypted when it is read back from database file. Thus if this data goes on the network, it is clear-text data. However, the data can be encrypted using Oracle's network encryption solution (Example), which is included along with TDE in the Oracle Advanced Security option. Oracle's network encryption solution encrypts all data traveling to and from a database over SQL*Net.

With TDE column encryption, encrypted data remains encrypted inside the SGA, but with TDE tablespace encryption, data is already decrypted in the SGA, which provides 100% transparency.

If you have to comply to the PCI-DSS standard, then credit card numbers (a.k.a. Primary Account Number, or PAN) need to be stored encrypted.

The need to comply to the almost ubiquitous Breach Notification Laws (for example CA SB 1386, CA AB 1950, and similar laws in 43+ more US states), adds first name, last name, driver license number and other PII to your list. In early 2008, CA AB 1298 added medical and health insurance information to PII data.

Additionally, your industry specific privacy and security standards may require encryption of certain assets, plus your own core business assets (such as research results in the pharmaceutical industry, results of oil field exploration, financial contracts, or the personal details of informants in law enforcement) may be worth encrypting to safeguard this information on the storage medium. In the health care industry, the privacy of patient data, health records and X-ray images is of the highest importance. Most X-ray images are stored following the DICOM standard, which intentionally includes PII information into the image meta data, making image and patient data readily available to an intruder if not properly protected through encryption. With Oracle Database 11g, DICOM images can be stored in 'SecureFile' columns where they can be encrypted either with TDE column encryption, or tables with 'SecureFile' columns (or classic LOB columns) can be stored in an encrypted tablespace.

This is the most difficult task ahead of a security team or team of DBAs when using TDE column encryption:

If you run applications that were developed in-house, chances are you can locate tables with sensitive information by talking to your developers.

It is more difficult when you run packaged software applications. Since privacy and security requirements are different for each of the deployments of these applications, vendors themselves cannot readily determine what to encrypt. If PCI compliance is the goal, and the column names of the application tables are named similar to 'CREDIT_CARD' or 'ACCOUNT_NUMBER', they are easy to find using Oracle's rich metadata repository.

More complex is the search for sensitive data when column names are not descriptive about their content; the only method of finding sensitive content is the search for patterns: Social Security Numbers always look like 'aaa-bb-cccc', but Credit Card Numbers are less consistent: They have 13 or 16 digits, and are not always grouped by 4 digits.

If you need to encrypt columns that have characteristics which are not supported by TDE column encryption (in terms of indexes, data types, or foreign keys), or if it is not possible to locate columns that store sensitive data in application tables, TDE tablespace encryption is your best choice.

Use TDE tablespace encryption if any of the following is true:

Oracle introduced an encryption package ('dbms_obfuscation_toolkit') with Oracle8i. In Oracle 10g Release 1, the new 'dbms_crypto' package was introduced. These APIs can be used to manually encrypt data within the database. However, the application must manage the encryption keys and perform required encryption and decryption operations by calling the API.

As opposed to dbms_obfuscation_toolkit and dbms_crypto, both TDE column encryption (from 10gR2) and TDE tablespace encryption (from 11gR1) don't require changes to the application, are transparent to the end users, and provide automated, built-in key management.

TDE is part of the Oracle Advanced Security Option, which also includes Network Encryption and Strong Authentication. It is available for the Oracle Enterprise Edition.

A wallet is an encrypted container that is used to store authentication and signing credentials, including passwords, the TDE master key, PKI private keys, certificates, and trusted certificates needed by SSL. With TDE, wallets are used on the server to protect the TDE master key. With the exception of Diffie-Hellman, Oracle requires entities that communicate over SSL to have a wallet containing an X.509 version 3 certificate, private key, and list of trusted certificates.

Oracle provides two different types of wallets: encryption wallet and (local) auto-open wallet. The encryption wallet (filename 'ewallet.p12') is the one recommended for TDE. It needs to be opened manually after database startup and prior to TDE encrypted data being accessed. Because data is encrypted in REDO logs, UNDO and TEMP tablespaces, the TDE master encryption key needs to be available to the database before it is opened:

On Unix, access to the wallet should be limited to the 'oracle:oinstall' user:group, using proper directory (700) and file permissions (600). Even though the 'root' user has access to the wallet file, if she does not know the wallet password, she has no access to the master encryption key. For all platforms, the password (that encrypts the wallet) should contain a minimum of 8 alphanumeric characters. Wallet passwords can be changed using Oracle Wallet Manager, or the 'orapki' utility. It is highly recommended to make a backup of the Oracle Wallet before changing the wallet password. Changing the wallet password does not change the TDE master key (they are independent). Starting with Oracle Database 11g Release 2 (11.2.0.2) on Linux, it is recommended to store the Oracle Wallet in ACFS, a cluster file system on top of ASM (applies to single instance, RAC one node, multi-node RAC, but not Exadata X2), as it's new Security features provide excellent wallet protection and separation of duties. A detailed step-by-step guide on how to create an access control policy in ACFS incl. separation of duties is available in the frequently updated TDE best practices document.

If you create a wallet with Oracle Wallet Manager, it does not contain the master key required by TDE. Only the SQL command:

creates a wallet (if it doesn't already exist in the location specified in the local sqlnet.ora file) and adds the TDE master key to it.

In Oracle 11gR1, TDE and other security features have been migrated to Enterprise Manager Database Control, thus enabling the wallet and the master key to be generated using the Web-based GUI of Enterprise Manager.

New in Oracle 11g Release 2 is the unified master encryption key, which is used for both TDE column and TDE tablespace encryption; this key can be created, stored and re-keyed (rotated) in the Oracle Wallet.

Yes, the wallet password can be changed with Oracle Wallet Manager (OWM). Create a backup before attempting to change the wallet password. Changing the wallet password does not change the encryption master key they are independent. In Oracle 11gR1 11.1.0.7, orapki has been enhanced to allow wallet password changes from the command line:

A password-protected, encrypted wallet for the TDE master key might not be the right solution when database availability needs to be maintained without human intervention ('lights-out' operation); a (local) auto-open wallet does not require a wallet password after a database came up, so encrypted data is available to authorized users and applications.

A (local) auto-open wallet ('cwallet.sso') needs to be created from an existing encryption wallet ('ewallet.p12'), so that the master key can be transferred to the new auto-open wallet.

You can either open the encryption wallet in Oracle Wallet Manager (OWM), check the 'Auto Login' check box, then select 'Save' to write the auto-open wallet to disk, or, using the command-line tool 'orapki':

The syntax to create a local auto-open wallet is:

In both cases (Oracle Wallet Manager and 'orapki') the user will be prompted for the wallet password. Keep the encryption wallet; it is required for master key re-key operations, and potentially contains a list of retired master keys.

RMAN only adds database files, redo-logs etc. to the backup file, and thus there is no risk of the encryption wallet or the auto-open wallet becoming part of a database backup. Oracle Secure Backup (OSB) uses datasets to define which operating system files to add to a backup. OSB automatically excludes auto-open wallets ('cwallet.sso'). Encryption wallets ('ewallet.p12') are NOT automatically excluded; you need to use the exclude dataset statement to specify what files to skip during a backup:

Backup the Oracle wallet right after creating it, and each time it's content changes, for example due to a master key re-key operation, and each time you change the wallet password. Always store the wallet (encrypted or (local) auto-open) away from your database backups.

Oracle invests in compatibility testing for a range of software solutions including applications that are part of the integrated Oracle hardware-software stack and other third-party applications. The table below summarizes these application certifications. For further details, refer to the linked pages and files.

Transparent Data Encryption is a great way to protect sensitive data in large-scale Exadata scenarios. With Exadata, substantial crypto performance gains are possible. Unique factors in Exadata that maximize the crypto performance include:

For example, the hardware-based crypto acceleration in Exadata alone can improve performance by up to 10x (relative to without hardware acceleration).

Below is a table that summarizes the performance characteristics of Exadata X2 systems across compute and storage. The table highlights where hardware-based crypto accleration may be enabled.

Note: In Oracle Exadata V2 and X2, the table keys (for TDE column encryption) or tablespace keys (for TDE tablespace encryption) are sent to the storage cells, so that content can be first decrypted and then, Smart Scan is applied. Content is encrypted on the compute nodes. Decryption usually takes place in the compute nodes, but when queries are pushed to the storage nodes, decryption takes place there to enable Smart Scan

Oracle Secure Backup provides an optimized, highly efficient tape backup solution for the Oracle Database. OSB can store data on tape in encrypted form, providing protection against theft of backup tapes.

Example for 'transparent' encryption [and compression] when the local TDE master encryption key is available:

A license of the Advanced Security Option is neccessary to encrypt RMAN backups to disk, regardless if the TDE master encryption key or a passphrase is used to encrypt the file.

No, however, Oracle RMAN can be used in conjunction with Oracle Advanced Security to encrypt database backups sent to disk. This requires a license of the Oracle Advanced Security Option.

Yes, but it requires that the wallet containing the master key is copied to the secondary database. If the tablespace is moved and the master key is not available, the secondary database will return an error when the data in the tablespace is accessed.

Customers using TDE tablespace encryption get the full benefit of compression (standard and Advanced Compression, as well as Exadata Hybrid Columnar Compression (EHCC)) because compression is applied before the data blocks are encrypted. Customers using TDE column encryption will get the full benefit of compression only on table columns that are not encrypted. Individual table columns that are encrypted using TDE column encryption will have a much lower level of compression because the encryption takes place in the SQL layer before the advanced compression process.

When TDE is used with Data Guard physical standby (10gR2 and later), encrypted data remains encrypted in the log files during shipping to the secondary database(s), so ASO Network Encryption is optional to encrypt data in transit that has not be encrypted on disk; Metalink note 749947.1 explains how to setup ASO native network encryption, while Metalink note 1143443.1 explains how to setup SSL based encryption. The master key needs to be present and open on any Physical Standby database site, whether just applying redo, open read only, open in Active Data Guard (read only and applying redo) and for role transition (switchover or failover).

When TDE is used with Data Guard logical standby (11gR1), the master key needs to be present and open at the secondary site for SQL Apply to decrypt the data that it reads from the log files. The same master encryption key can also be used to optionally encrypt the incoming data while it is written to the Logical Standby database. Encrypted data remains encrypted in log files and during transit when the log files are shipped to the secondary database; Oracle Network Encryption is optional. Metalink note 749947.1 explains how to setup ASO native network encryption, while Metalink note 1143443.1 explains how to setup SSL based encryption.

When TDE is used with Streams in 11gR1, data is transmitted between active databases in clear text to allow data transformation (character sets, database versions, platforms, etc.). When the receiving side cannot be reached and data needs to be stored temporarily, encrypted columns are stored encrypted on disk. Streams in database versions prior to 11gR1 treat encrypted columns as 'unsupported data types' and skip these tables.

The traffic can be encrypted either with blowfish or SSH port forwarding

TDE tablespace encryption encrypts all content stored in that tablespace and does not conflict with any other database feature. TDE column encryption encrypts and decrypts data transparently when data passes through the SQL layer. Some features of Oracle bypass the SQL layer, and hence cannot benefit from TDE column encryption:

Yes, you can. When the target table contains encrypted columns, the data will be encrypted upon loading the data. Here is a simple example on how to use SQL*Loader with direct path. Simply modify one column in ulcase6.sql from

to

and use the correct syntax for SQL*Loader:

This is no different from finding the data still on the disk even after a table is dropped, or a file is deleted. During the lifetime of a table, data may become fragmented, re-arranged, sorted, copied and moved within the tablespace; this leaves 'ghost copies' of your data within the database file. When encrypting an existing column, only the most recent 'valid' copy is encrypted, leaving behind older clear-text versions in ghost copies. If the data file holding the tablespace is directly accessed bypassing the access controls of the database (for example with an hex editor), old clear text values might be visible for some time, until those blocks are overwritten by the database. To minimize this risk, please follow these recommendations:

The 6th step is recommended to lower the probability of being able to find ghost copies of the database file, generated by either the operating system, or storage firmware.

(*): Content can be moved from one encrypted tablespace to a new encrypted tablespace, where it is encrypted with a new tablespace key.

TDE uses a two tier key mechanism. When TDE column encryption is applied to an existing application table column, a new table key is created and stored in the Oracle data dictionary. When TDE tablespace encryption is used, the individual tablespace keys are stored in the header of the underlying OS file(s). The table and tablespace keys are encrypted using the TDE master encryption key. The master encryption key is generated when TDE is initialized and stored outside the database in the Oracle Wallet. Both the master key and table keys can be independently changed (rotated, re-keyed) based on company security policies. Tablespace keys cannot be re-keyed (rotated); work around is to move the data into a new encrypted tablespace. Oracle recommends backing up the wallet before and after each master key change.

Changing the wallet password does not re-key the TDE master encryption key.

Encrypting columns in an existing table is an 'update' operation and allows Read access, but no DML operations, on that table. With billions of rows, this window of limited availability can last several hours. But with Online Table Redefinition, a mature High-Availability feature of the Oracle Database, the table is locked in exclusive mode only during a very small window that is independent of the size of the table and complexity of the redefinition, and that is completely transparent to users and applications, without any data loss.

Starting in Oracle Database 11g Release 2, customers of Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) optionally may store the TDE master encryption key in an external device using the PKCS11 interface. In this setup, the master key is stored directly in the third-party device rather than in the included Oracle Wallet (note: the Oracle Wallet is a PKCS12 file-based keystore which is used by most TDE customers).

When using PKCS11, the third-party vendor provides the storage device, PKCS11 software client library, secure communication from the device to the PKCS11 client (running on the database server), authentication, auditing, and other related functionality. The vendor also is responsible for testing and ensuring high-availability of the TDE master encryption key in diverse database server environments and configurations. Customers should contact the device vendor to receive assistance for any related issues.

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Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) - Oracle

In order to guard against advanced threats in a complex and evolving climate of virtualization, cloud services, and mobility, while maintaining regulatory compliance, organizations must increasingly take a data-centric approach to safeguarding their sensitive information. SafeNet offers the only complete enterprise encryption portfolio that provides persistent protection of sensitive data at all critical points in its lifecycle.

From the physical and virtual data center to the cloud, SafeNet helps organizations remain protected, compliant, and in control. SafeNetencryption and cryptographic key management productsenable organizations to secure sensitive data in databases, applications, storage systems, virtualized platforms, and cloud environments.

SafeNet delivers the breadth of solutions that enable security teams to centrally employ defense-in-depth strategiesand ultimately make sure encryption yields true security. If access controls are lacking, the efficacy of encryption can be compromised. If cryptographic keys are vulnerable, so is encrypted data.

To truly protect sensitive data, organizations must follow encryption best practices as well as establish a strong Crypto Foundation an approach that incorporates crypto processing and acceleration, key storage, key management, and crypto resource management.

Along with a comprehensive set of encryption platforms, SafeNet delivers the robust access controls and key management capabilities that enable organizations to practically, cost effectively, and comprehensively leverage encryption to address their security objectives.

With SafeNet, organizations can apply data protection where they need it, when they need it, and how they need it.

Explore Our Encryption Products

SafeNet enterprise encryption solutions enable you to protect and control sensitive data as it expands in volume, type and location, from the data center to virtual environments and the cloud while improving compliance and governance visibility and efficiencies through centralized management and policy enforcement.

SafeNet hardware security modules (HSMs) provide reliable protection for transactions, identities, and applications by securing cryptographic keys and provisioning encryption, decryption, authentication, and digital signing services.

With SafeNet, organizations can centrally, efficiently, and securely manage cryptographic keys and policiesacross the key management lifecycle and throughout the enterprisein the cloud or on-premises.

Customers rely on SafeNet's data center protection solutions to secure sensitive structured and unstructured data, including patient records, credit card information, social security numbers, and more.

With SafeNet organizations can efficiently and securely implement encryption in virtual environments. SafeNet solutions can encrypt and secure the entire contents of virtual machines, store and manage the encryption keys from the cloud, or offer encryption for cloud applications, such as Dropboxprotecting sensitive assets from theft or exposure.

SafeNet enables organizations to encrypt sensitive assets in business applications as well as in some instances encrypt the application itself. With SafeNet solutions, customers can harness strong encryption, granular controls, and transparent implementation capabilities to efficiently and effectively secure sensitive assets.

Proven reliability, highest throughput, and lowest latency make SafeNet's network security devices the ideal solution for protecting data in motion, including time-sensitive voice, video streams, and metadata.

Already familiar with our award-winning products? Quickly find your specific product(s) of interest by checking out our complete list of products with links to our product detail pages.

SafeNet enterprise encryption solutions deliver unmatched coveragesecuring databases, applications, personal identifiable information (PII), and storage in the physical and virtual data center and the cloud. Moreover, SafeNet also provides the critical key management needed to effectively and efficiently enable protection across the enterprise wherever data resides.

Offering solutions that are industry-specific, SafeNet is able to serve the particular requirements of our customers, protecting the worlds leading organizations in finance, retail, healthcare, and more.

SafeNet offers a broad range of data encryption solutions that enable enterprises to move past silo-constrained encryption and to centrally, uniformly deployed encryption in a scalable manner that spans the enterprise, and effectively control their security policies. To learn more, please refer to our resources below.

The volume of information is mushrooming and being transformed from paper to digital form at an alarming rate with no end in sight. Properly addressing security threats to all of this data requires proper cryptographic key storage and management.

Long an important security measure, encryption has emerged as a critical component to ensuring compliance in virtualized data centers and cloud environments. However, in order for encryption to be effectively, efficiently, and securely implemented in these emerging environments, there are several fundamental requirements that must be met. This paper provides an overview of these requirements.

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Data Encryption Solutions for Enterprises - SafeNet

Email security and encryption software does more than just encrypt emails. Depending on the solution, you can send compliant email transmissions, thwart data loss, secure proprietary information and instill client confidence. In addition, imposed encryption points range from one-click options to enforced policy-based encryption methods. Although many industries in the past required faxing of sensitive information, nowadays many email encryption services provide compliant encrypted email options that are even more secure than traditional faxing and much more convenient.

Beyond email security, secure email software also provides tools to help with compliance, legal inquiries and tracking. The best email security software provides an administration console, compliance reports, sortable email logs, email trackers, email expiration dating, and archiving technology. Many are also compatible with all email types, DLP filters, security software and mobile email.

To learn more about what email security services can offer check out our top rated products. See HP SecureMail, if you are looking to integrate email encryption with your established business applications. For exceptional ease of use from admin to recipient, see DataMotion. If you are looking for DLP tools combined with email encryption, see Proofpoint. To learn more about email encryption, see our articles on email encryption software.

The first consideration with email security software is the encryption point. Small businesses may trust employees to decide which emails need to be encrypted. In this situation, a desktop or cloud-based solution will work. Other companies may benefit from removing the decision from the employee by using policy-based filters. This encrypts emails after they leave the employee's desktop at the point where they pass through the mail server, gateway, appliance or web portal, based on your company's policy filters.

Other considerations include the integrations and compatibilities you require, such as Outlook plugins, mobile phone emailing, email protocols and archiving methods. You will also want to select a solution that provides the encryption methods your business and clients require. Most services support OpenPGP and S/MIME encryption methods and provide access to other types of email security, such as AES and certificates if requested. Another consideration is the recipient experience. You want to look for a secure email solution that provides a simple and quick way for your customers and recipients to access secure messages.

Here are the criteria we used to compare email encryption software:

Security If your company is bound by compliance or regulatory requirements, you need to ensure that the email encryption service you use can satisfy your security standards. All email encryption software secures emails. However, most secure email services offer a range of security options, such as user-initiated and policy-based encryption. Some will even block email from sending messages that contain non-sharable information. If the service stores your email data and interactions for your company, they should take precautions to secure their data center(s). We compared a wide range of security features and rated highest those that not only encrypt email, but also those that provide additional layers of security.

Recipient Experience While security is critical, you do not want it to inconvenience your customers. We looked for encryption software with features that make the recipients' experience hassle free. The encryption programs that are simplest to use do not require your customers to download software or maneuver through a complicated process to receive secure messages. We rated highest the software that also allows recipients to send secure return emails and easily request passwords without your administrator having to manage the request.

Administration Tools Competitive email encryption software for small businesses and larger companies should supply a powerful, simple to use administration console. We compared services and the tools they offer for managing emails, creating reports, sorting emails, deploying software and configuring policies. The best software provides simple or even automatic deployment options and preconfigured policies that support common regulatory constraints.

Integrations & Compatibility Most companies do not run email encryption software independently. To be truly useful and efficient, it should function alongside popular business solutions such as Salesforce, GroupWise and security software. It also ought to work across platforms with all email types, regardless of the device type (PC, mobile phone or tablet). Top encryption tools also work in conjunction with content and internet filters, as well as eDiscovery and archiving methods. We rated highest the encryption software that is compatible with all popular platforms and commonly used business applications.

Unless you only need encryption software for one seat, you will want to do your share of research before contracting with an email encryption service. We suggest that you peruse our reviews, identify your top three candidates and then contact those companies for a customized quote. Their sales teams and account managers should be able to help you identify the best method for providing the type of email security that would work best for your company and its regulatory requirements.

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The Best Email Encryption Software of 2015 | Top Ten Reviews

Topic Last Modified: 2014-11-03

Office 365 Message Encryption is an easy-to-use service that lets email users send encrypted messages to people inside or outside their organization. Designated recipients can easily view their encrypted messages and return encrypted replies. Regardless of the destination email servicewhether its Outlook.com, Yahoo, Gmail, or another serviceemail users can send confidential business communications with an added level of protection against unauthorized access.

There are many scenarios in which email message encryption might be required, including the following:

A bank employee sending credit card statements to customers

An insurance company representative providing policy details to customers

A mortgage broker requesting financial information from a customer for a loan application

A health care provider sending health care information to patients

An attorney sending confidential information to a customer or another attorney

A consultant sending a contract to a customer

Exchange Online and Exchange Online Protection (EOP) administrators set up Office 365 Message Encryption by defining encryption rules. As an administrator, you can also customize encrypted messages with your own text and logo, presenting a company brand thats familiar to message recipients.

Office 365 Message Encryption is an online service thats built on Microsoft Azure Rights Management (Azure RMS). With Azure RMS set up for an organization, administrators can enable message encryption by defining transport rules that determine the conditions for encryption. A rule can require the encryption of all messages addressed to a specific recipient, for example.

When a user sends an email message in Exchange Online that matches an encryption rule, the message is sent out with an HTML attachment. The recipient opens the HTML attachment in the email message, recognizes a familiar brand if thats present, and follows the embedded instructions to view the encrypted message on the Office 365 Message Encryption portal. The recipient can choose to view the message by signing in with a Microsoft account or a work account associated with Office 365, or by using a one-time passcode. Both options help ensure that only the intended recipient can view the encrypted message.

The following diagram summarizes the passage of an email message through the encryption and decryption process.

For more information about the keys that help ensure the safe delivery of encrypted messages to designated recipient inboxes, see Service information for Office 365 Message Encryption.

This short video shows how Office 365 Message Encryption works.

Office 365 Message Encryption requires that you have an Exchange Online or Exchange Online Protection (EOP) subscription and that youve set up Azure Rights Management. If your setup meets these requirements, all you need to do to enable Office 365 Message Encryption is define rules that trigger encryption

If you need to set up Azure Rights Management, you have two options:

Administrators enable Office 365 Message Encryption by creating Exchange transport rules that determine under what conditions email messages should be encrypted. There are also rules for defining conditions where encryption should be removed from messages. Once youve set the encryption action within the rule, any messages that match the rule conditions are encrypted before theyre sent out.

Transport rules are flexible, letting you combine conditions so you can meet specific security requirements in a single rule. For example, you can create a rule to encrypt all messages that contain specified keywords and are addressed to external recipients. Office 365 Message Encryption also encrypts replies from recipients of encrypted email, and you can create a rule that decrypts those replies as a convenience for your email users. That way, users in your organization wont have to sign in to the encryption portal to view replies.

For more information about how to create Exchange transport rules, see Define rules to encrypt or decrypt email messages.

As an administrator, you can add your companys brand to encrypted messages. For example, you can customize the introduction and disclaimer text in the email message that accompanies encrypted messages as well as some text that appears on the portal where the recipient views the messages. You can also add a logo to the email message and encrypted message viewing portal.

For more information about how to customize encrypted messages, see Add branding to encrypted messages.

With Office 365 Message Encryption, email messages are encrypted automatically, based on administrator-defined rules. An email that bears an encrypted message arrives in the recipients Inbox with an attached HTML file.

Recipients follow instructions in the message to open the attachment and authenticate by using a Microsoft account or a work account associated with Office 365. If recipients dont have either account, theyre directed to create a Microsoft account that will let them sign in to view the encrypted message. Alternatively, recipients can choose to get a one-time passcode to view the message. After signing in or using a one-time passcode, recipients can view the decrypted message and send an encrypted reply.

For detailed guidance about how to send and view encrypted messages, see Send, view, and reply to encrypted messages. To learn how to get a one-time passcode instead of signing in, see Use a one-time passcode to view an encrypted message.

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Encryption in Office 365 - TechNet - Microsoft

What is encryption?

Encryption is the process of encoding user data on an Android device using an encrypted key. Once a device is encrypted, all user-created data is automatically encrypted before committing it to disk and all reads automatically decrypt data before returning it to the calling process.

Caution: Devices upgraded to Android 5.0 and then encrypted may be returned to an unencrypted state by factory data reset. New Android 5.0 devices encrypted at first boot cannot be returned to an unencrypted state.

Android disk encryption is based on dm-crypt, which is a kernel feature that works at the block device layer. Because of this, encryption works with Embedded MultiMediaCard (eMMC) and similar flash devices that present themselves to the kernel as block devices. Encryption is not possible with YAFFS, which talks directly to a raw NAND flash chip.

The encryption algorithm is 128 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with cipher-block chaining (CBC) and ESSIV:SHA256. The master key is encrypted with 128-bit AES via calls to the OpenSSL library. You must use 128 bits or more for the key (with 256 being optional).

Note: OEMs can use 128-bit or higher to encrypt the master key.

In the Android 5.0 release, there are four kinds of encryption states:

Upon first boot, the device creates a randomly generated 128-bit master key and then hashes it with a default password and stored salt. The default password is: "default_password" However, the resultant hash is also signed through a TEE (such as TrustZone), which uses a hash of the signature to encrypt the master key.

You can find the default password defined in the Android Open Source Project cryptfs.c file.

When the user sets the PIN/pass or password on the device, only the 128-bit key is re-encrypted and stored. (ie. user PIN/pass/pattern changes do NOT cause re-encryption of userdata.)

Encryption is managed by init and vold. init calls vold, and vold sets properties to trigger events in init. Other parts of the system also look at the properties to conduct tasks such as report status, ask for a password, or prompt to factory reset in the case of a fatal error. To invoke encryption features in vold, the system uses the command line tool vdcs cryptfs commands: checkpw, restart, enablecrypto, changepw, cryptocomplete, verifypw, setfield, getfield, mountdefaultencrypted, getpwtype, getpw, and clearpw.

In order to encrypt, decrypt or wipe /data, /data must not be mounted. However, in order to show any user interface (UI), the framework must start and the framework requires /data to run. To resolve this conundrum, a temporary filesystem is mounted on /data. This allows Android to prompt for passwords, show progress, or suggest a data wipe as needed. It does impose the limitation that in order to switch from the temporary filesystem to the true /data filesystem, the system must stop every process with open files on the temporary filesystem and restart those processes on the real /data filesystem. To do this, all services must be in one of three groups: core, main, and late_start.

To trigger these actions, the vold.decrypt property is set to various strings. To kill and restart services, the init commands are:

There are four flows for an encrypted device. A device is encrypted just once and then follows a normal boot flow.

In addition to these flows, the device can also fail to encrypt /data. Each of the flows are explained in detail below.

This is the normal first boot for an Android 5.0 device.

/data is not encrypted but needs to be because /forceencrypt mandates it. Unmount /data.

vold.decrypt = "trigger_encryption" triggers init.rc, which will cause vold to encrypt /data with no password. (None is set because this should be a new device.)

vold mounts a tmpfs /data (using the tmpfs options from ro.crypto.tmpfs_options) and sets the property vold.encrypt_progress to 0. vold prepepares the tmpfs /data for booting an encrypted system and sets the property vold.decrypt to: trigger_restart_min_framework

Because the device has virtually no data to encrypt, the progress bar will often not actually appear because encryption happens so quickly. See Encrypt an existing device for more details about the progress UI.

vold sets vold.decrypt to trigger_default_encryption which starts the defaultcrypto service. (This starts the flow below for mounting a default encrypted userdata.) trigger_default_encryption checks the encryption type to see if /data is encrypted with or without a password. Because Android 5.0 devices are encrypted on first boot, there should be no password set; therefore we decrypt and mount /data.

init then mounts /data on a tmpfs RAMDisk using parameters it picks up from ro.crypto.tmpfs_options, which is set in init.rc.

Set vold to trigger_restart_framework, which continues the usual boot process.

This is what happens when you encrypt an unencrypted Android K or earlier device that has been migrated to L. Note that this is the same flow as used in K.

This process is user-initiated and is referred to as inplace encryption in the code. When a user selects to encrypt a device, the UI makes sure the battery is fully charged and the AC adapter is plugged in so there is enough power to finish the encryption process.

Warning: If the device runs out of power and shuts down before it has finished encrypting, file data is left in a partially encrypted state. The device must be factory reset and all data is lost.

To enable inplace encryption, vold starts a loop to read each sector of the real block device and then write it to the crypto block device. vold checks to see if a sector is in use before reading and writing it, which makes encryption much faster on a new device that has little to no data.

State of device: Set ro.crypto.state = "unencrypted" and execute the on nonencrypted init trigger to continue booting.

The UI calls vold with the command cryptfs enablecrypto inplace where passwd is the user's lock screen password.

vold checks for errors, returns -1 if it can't encrypt, and prints a reason in the log. If it can encrypt, it sets the property vold.decrypt to trigger_shutdown_framework. This causes init.rc to stop services in the classes late_start and main.

vold unmounts /mnt/sdcard and then /data.

vold then sets up the crypto mapping, which creates a virtual crypto block device that maps onto the real block device but encrypts each sector as it is written, and decrypts each sector as it is read. vold then creates and writes out the crypto metadata.

vold mounts a tmpfs /data (using the tmpfs options from ro.crypto.tmpfs_options) and sets the property vold.encrypt_progress to 0. vold prepares the tmpfs /data for booting an encrypted system and sets the property vold.decrypt to: trigger_restart_min_framework

trigger_restart_min_framework causes init.rc to start the main class of services. When the framework sees that vold.encrypt_progress is set to 0, it brings up the progress bar UI, which queries that property every five seconds and updates a progress bar. The encryption loop updates vold.encrypt_progress every time it encrypts another percent of the partition.

When /data is successfully encrypted, vold clears the flag ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS in the metadata and reboots the system.

If the reboot fails for some reason, vold sets the property vold.encrypt_progress to error_reboot_failed and the UI should display a message asking the user to press a button to reboot. This is not expected to ever occur.

This is what happens when you boot up an encrypted device with no password. Because Android 5.0 devices are encrypted on first boot, there should be no set password and therefore this is the default encryption state.

Detect that the Android device is encrypted because /data cannot be mounted and one of the flags encryptable or forceencrypt is set.

vold sets vold.decrypt to trigger_default_encryption, which starts the defaultcrypto service. trigger_default_encryption checks the encryption type to see if /data is encrypted with or without a password.

Creates the dm-crypt device over the block device so the device is ready for use.

vold then mounts the decrypted real /data partition and then prepares the new partition. It sets the property vold.post_fs_data_done to 0 and then sets vold.decrypt to trigger_post_fs_data. This causes init.rc to run its post-fs-data commands. They will create any necessary directories or links and then set vold.post_fs_data_done to 1.

Once vold sees the 1 in that property, it sets the property vold.decrypt to: trigger_restart_framework. This causes init.rc to start services in class main again and also start services in class late_start for the first time since boot.

Now the framework boots all its services using the decrypted /data, and the system is ready for use.

This is what happens when you boot up an encrypted device that has a set password. The devices password can be a pin, pattern, or password.

Detect that the Android device is encrypted because the flag ro.crypto.state = "encrypted"

vold sets vold.decrypt to trigger_restart_min_framework because /data is encrypted with a password.

init sets five properties to save the initial mount options given for /data with parameters passed from init.rc. vold uses these properties to set up the crypto mapping:

The framework starts up and sees that vold.decrypt is set to trigger_restart_min_framework. This tells the framework that it is booting on a tmpfs /data disk and it needs to get the user password.

First, however, it needs to make sure that the disk was properly encrypted. It sends the command cryptfs cryptocomplete to vold. vold returns 0 if encryption was completed successfully, -1 on internal error, or -2 if encryption was not completed successfully. vold determines this by looking in the crypto metadata for the CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS flag. If it's set, the encryption process was interrupted, and there is no usable data on the device. If vold returns an error, the UI should display a message to the user to reboot and factory reset the device, and give the user a button to press to do so.

Once cryptfs cryptocomplete is successful, the framework displays a UI asking for the disk password. The UI checks the password by sending the command cryptfs checkpw to vold. If the password is correct (which is determined by successfully mounting the decrypted /data at a temporary location, then unmounting it), vold saves the name of the decrypted block device in the property ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev and returns status 0 to the UI. If the password is incorrect, it returns -1 to the UI.

The UI puts up a crypto boot graphic and then calls vold with the command cryptfs restart. vold sets the property vold.decrypt to trigger_reset_main, which causes init.rc to do class_reset main. This stops all services in the main class, which allows the tmpfs /data to be unmounted.

vold then mounts the decrypted real /data partition and prepares the new partition (which may never have been prepared if it was encrypted with the wipe option, which is not supported on first release). It sets the property vold.post_fs_data_done to 0 and then sets vold.decrypt to trigger_post_fs_data. This causes init.rc to run its post-fs-data commands. They will create any necessary directories or links and then set vold.post_fs_data_done to 1. Once vold sees the 1 in that property, it sets the property vold.decrypt to trigger_restart_framework. This causes init.rc to start services in class main again and also start services in class late_start for the first time since boot.

Now the framework boots all its services using the decrypted /data filesystem, and the system is ready for use.

A device that fails to decrypt might be awry for a few reasons. The device starts with the normal series of steps to boot:

But after the framework opens, the device can encounter some errors:

If these errors are not resolved, prompt user to factory wipe:

If vold detects an error during the encryption process, and if no data has been destroyed yet and the framework is up, vold sets the property vold.encrypt_progress to error_not_encrypted. The UI prompts the user to reboot and alerts them the encryption process never started. If the error occurs after the framework has been torn down, but before the progress bar UI is up, vold will reboot the system. If the reboot fails, it sets vold.encrypt_progress to error_shutting_down and returns -1; but there will not be anything to catch the error. This is not expected to happen.

If vold detects an error during the encryption process, it sets vold.encrypt_progress to error_partially_encrypted and returns -1. The UI should then display a message saying the encryption failed and provide a button for the user to factory reset the device.

The encrypted key is stored in the crypto metadata. Hardware backing is implemented by using Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) signing capability. Previously, we encrypted the master key with a key generated by applying scrypt to the user's password and the stored salt. In order to make the key resilient against off-box attacks, we extend this algorithm by signing the resultant key with a stored TEE key. The resultant signature is then turned into an appropriate length key by one more application of scrypt. This key is then used to encrypt and decrypt the master key. To store this key:

When a user elects to change or remove their password in settings, the UI sends the command cryptfs changepw to vold, and vold re-encrypts the disk master key with the new password.

vold and init communicate with each other by setting properties. Here is a list of available properties for encryption.

ro.crypto.fs_type ro.crypto.fs_real_blkdev ro.crypto.fs_mnt_point ro.crypto.fs_options ro.crypto.fs_flags

See original here:
Encryption | Android Open Source Project

PGP Whole Disk Encryption

OIToffers and supports PGP software and licenses to faculty and staff for whole disk encryption. Whole disk encryption will keep educational records and confidential data secure in case your laptop is lost or stolen. This information should only be stored on a mobile device, like a laptop, when there is a specific business purpose. Find out if PGP whole disk encryption is right for you.

If we had a number we wished to keep secret (say the combination to a safe), one option to protect it is to encrypt the number, after all we can't store the combination to the safe inside the safe. Let's say the combination is 12-28-11 which we shorten to just 122811. Let's use some simple math to make it into a scrambled number.

Here's an equation that adds a secret number (n) to the combination and then multiplies the result by the same secret number:

If we pick 5 as our secret number, then we get:

Our scrambled number, 614080, is an encrypted version of our safe combination. To get our combination number back, we need to know our secret number and the formula used to create the scrambled number. Here's the formula:

We insert our secret number and our scrambled number:

And solve the equation to find our combination:

We have successfully developed our own encryption process for our safe combination.

The process of transforming readable information into an unreadable form. Making the safe combination into the scrambled number.

Decrypt

The process of transforming encrypted information back into its readable form. Making the scrambled number back into the safe combination.

Key

The item used, along with the algorithm, to encrypt and decrypt information. . In the example above, the secret number, n, was our key. The key could be a password, a special file or a hardware device often called a token Strong encryption processes may use multiple keys like both a password and a token.

Key length

Algorithm

The mathematical technique used, along with the key(s), to encrypt and decrypt information. In the example above, the equation, n*(combination + n)=scrambled number, was our algorithm. Popular encryption algorithms include: AES, DES, triple-DES, RSA, blowfish, IDEA

Information is considered "at rest" when it is saved to a computer or storage device (like a CD, tape or thumbdrive) which is usually in contrast to "in transit". Note that data can be considered "at rest" while physically moving like someone carrying a CD with information.

Information is "in transit" when it is being transferred over a network. This could be copying a file from a file server, submitting a webpage order form or sending an email.

The behavior of an encryption technology/product which keeps a file encrypted when it is moved between disks or computers. Many forms of encryption only keep information encrypted when stored in a particular location.

Symmetrical vs Asymmetrical

Encryption/decryption processes are often referred to as being either symmetrical or asymmetrical, which relates to what keys are used to encrypt and decrypt information.

In symmetrical encryption, the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the information. The most common use of this technique is password encryption where the same password is used to encrypt and decrypt the information. This method is simple and useful when sharing the key isn't problematic (either the key isn't shared or all parties are trusted with the information). It requires that all parties who need to encrypt or decrypt the information safely obtain the key.

In asymmetrical encryption, there are two different keys one used to encrypt the information and one used to decrypt the information. In this approach, the key used to encrypt the information cannot be used to decrypt it. This technique is useful when sharing a key might be problematic. These two keys are often referred to as public and private keys. As the names imply, the public key is openly distributed as it can only be used to encrypt information and the private key that can decrypt the information is protected.

Key management Perhaps the most important aspect of encryption deployment is management of keys. This includes what types of keys are used (passwords, files, tokens, certificates, etc), how they are given to users, how they are protected and how to deal with a lost key scenario. Each technology and product handles this differently, but the lost key scenario is usually the most concerning since it could lead to either an unauthorized person decrypting information or the inability for authorized people to decrypt information. Many encryption horror stories come in the form of not being able to decrypt the only copy of very important information. Pay careful attention to key generation, distribution, use, recovery and security when looking into encryption options.

Impacts to system/data management When files or disks are encrypted, an IT administrator might have to adapt some of their management processes or tools. For example, what impact do encrypted hard drives have on system imaging? What about the use of wake-on-LAN for management? The answers to these questions vary with your management processes and the encryption product, so it's important to understand how encryption products will impact your IT environment.

When does encryption stay with the file? Many forms of encryption only protect information while it is transferred over the network (like a website using SSL) or while it is stored in a particular place (like on an encrypted hard drive). This means that once the file is moved out of the situation, it is no longer encrypted. This often confuses users who think encryption "sticks" to files and they can email a file stored on an encrypted disk and it will stay encrypted as an email attachment, or copy a file from an encrypted disk to a thumb drive and the file will remain encrypted. It's important to understand the conditions under which a file will be encrypted and explain those conditions to those in your department. Since encryption conditions vary by technology, product and implementation, there isn't a general rule.

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Security Awareness - Encryption | Office of Information ...