The Australian Attorney General and a key    Australian minister have published a     memo detailing the demand they plan on presenting to the    next Five Eyes surveillance alliance meeting, which will be    held next week in Ottawa.  
    The Australian officials will demand that their surveillance    partners join with them in a plan to force "service providers    to ensure reasonable assistance is provided to law enforcement    and security agencies" when spies and police want to read    messages that have been encrypted.  
    The encryption technologies under description are widely    implemented in products and services that are often run by    volunteer communities, or by companies who operate entirely    outside 5 Eyes borders, but whose products can be used by    anyone, anywhere in the world.  
    Working encryption is how we ensure that malicious parties    don't hack our voting machines, pacemakers, home cameras,    telephones, banking systems, power grids, and other key    systems. There is no way to make working cryptography that can    defend these applications against "bad guys" but fail    catastrophically the moment a police officer or spy needs to    defeat them.  
    The demand to ban working encryption dates back to the Clinton    administration and the Electronic Frontier Foundation's    groundbreaking victory in     Bernstein, which ended the US ban on civilian    access to working cryptography. The delusion that authorities    can ban working crypto and still secure their national    infrastructure persists, and is presently being mooted in    Germany,    and formed a key plank in Theresa May's     party platform in the disastrous UK election.  
    As a reminder, here's what countries would lose, and what steps    they would have to take, to ensure that police and spies could    decrypt any communications they wanted to target:  
    Its impossible to overstate how bonkers the idea of sabotaging    cryptography is to people who understand information security.    If you want to secure your sensitive data either at rest  on    your hard drive, in the cloud, on that phone you left on the    train last week and never saw again  or on the wire, when    youre sending it to your doctor or your bank or to your work    colleagues, you have to use good cryptography. Use deliberately    compromised cryptography, that has a back door that only the    good guys are supposed to have the keys to, and you have    effectively no security. You might as well skywrite it as    encrypt it with pre-broken, sabotaged encryption.  
    There are two reasons why this is so. First, there is the    question of whether encryption can be made secure while still    maintaining a master key for the authorities use. As    lawyer/computer scientist Jonathan Mayer     explained, adding the complexity of master keys to our    technology will introduce unquantifiable security risks. Its    hard enough getting the security systems that protect our    homes, finances, health and privacy to be airtight  making    them airtight except when the authorities dont want them to be    is impossible.  
    What these leaders thinks they're saying is, "We will command    all the software creators we can reach to introduce back-doors    into their tools for us." There are enormous problems with    this: there's no back door that only lets good guys go through    it. If your Whatsapp or Google Hangouts has a deliberately    introduced flaw in it, then foreign spies, criminals, crooked    police (like those who fed sensitive information to the    tabloids who were implicated in the hacking scandal -- and like    the high-level police who secretly worked for organised crime    for years), and criminals will eventually discover this    vulnerability. They -- and not just the security services --    will be able to use it to intercept all of our communications.    That includes things like the pictures of your kids in your    bath that you send to your parents to the trade secrets you    send to your co-workers.  
    But this is just for starters. These officials don't understand    technology very well, so they doesn't actually know what    they're asking for.  
    For this proposal to work, they will need to stop Britons,    Canadians, Americans, Kiwis and Australians from installing    software that comes from software creators who are out of her    jurisdiction. The very best in secure communications are    already free/open source projects, maintained by thousands of    independent programmers around the world. They are widely    available, and thanks to things like cryptographic signing, it    is possible to download these packages from any server in the    world (not just big ones like Github) and verify, with a very    high degree of confidence, that the software you've downloaded    hasn't been tampered with.  
    Australia is not alone here. The regime they proposes is    already in place in countries like Syria, Russia, and Iran (for    the record, none of these countries have had much luck with    it). There are two means by which authoritarian governments    have attempted to restrict the use of secure technology: by    network filtering and by technology mandates.  
    Australian governments have already shown that she believes she    can order the nation's ISPs to block access to certain websites    (again, for the record, this hasn't worked very well). The next    step is to order Chinese-style filtering using deep packet    inspection, to try and distinguish traffic and block forbidden    programs. This is a formidable technical challenge. Intrinsic    to core Internet protocols like IPv4/6, TCP and UDP is the    potential to "tunnel" one protocol inside another. This makes    the project of figuring out whether a given packet is on the    white-list or the black-list transcendentally hard, especially    if you want to minimise the number of "good" sessions you    accidentally blackhole.  
    More ambitious is a mandate over which code operating systems    in the 5 Eyes nations are allowed to execute. This is very    hard. We do have, in Apple's Ios platform and various games    consoles, a regime where a single company uses countermeasures    to ensure that only software it has blessed can run on the    devices it sells to us. These companies could, indeed, be    compelled (by an act of Parliament) to block secure software.    Even there, you'd have to contend with the fact that other    states are unlikely to follow suit, and that means that anyone    who bought her Iphone in Paris or Mexico could come to the 5    Eyes countries with all their secure software intact and send    messages "we cannot read."  
    But there is the problem of more open platforms, like GNU/Linux    variants, BSD and other unixes, Mac OS X, and all the    non-mobile versions of Windows. All of these operating systems    are already designed to allow users to execute any code they    want to run. The commercial operators -- Apple and Microsoft --    might conceivably be compelled by Parliament to change their    operating systems to block secure software in the future, but    that doesn't do anything to stop people from using all the PCs    now in existence to run code that the PM wants to ban.  
    More difficult is the world of free/open operating systems like    GNU/Linux and BSD. These operating systems are the gold    standard for servers, and widely used on desktop computers    (especially by the engineers and administrators who run the    nation's IT). There is no legal or technical mechanism by which    code that is designed to be modified by its users can co-exist    with a rule that says that code must treat its users as    adversaries and seek to prevent them from running prohibited    code.  
    This, then, is what the Australian AG is proposing:  
    * All 5 Eyes citizens' communications must be easy for    criminals, voyeurs and foreign spies to intercept  
    * Any firms within reach of a 5 Eyes government must be banned    from producing secure software  
    * All major code repositories, such as Github and Sourceforge,    must be blocked in the 5 Eyes  
    * Search engines must not answer queries about web-pages that    carry secure software  
    * Virtually all academic security work in the 5 Eyes must cease    -- security research must only take place in proprietary    research environments where there is no onus to publish one's    findings, such as industry R&D and the security services  
    * All packets in and out of 5 Eyes countries, and within those    countries, must be subject to Chinese-style deep-packet    inspection and any packets that appear to originate from secure    software must be dropped  
    * Existing walled gardens (like Ios and games consoles) must be    ordered to ban their users from installing secure software  
    * Anyone visiting a 5 Eyes country from abroad must have their    smartphones held at the border until they leave  
    * Proprietary operating system vendors (Microsoft and Apple)    must be ordered to redesign their operating systems as walled    gardens that only allow users to run software from an app    store, which will not sell or give secure software to Britons  
    * Free/open source operating systems -- that power the energy,    banking, ecommerce, and infrastructure sectors -- must be    banned outright  
    The Australian officials will say that she doesn't want to do    any of this. They'll say that they can implement weaker    versions of it -- say, only blocking some "notorious" sites    that carry secure software. But anything less than the    programme above will have no material effect on the ability of    criminals to carry on perfectly secret conversations that "we    cannot read". If any commodity PC or jailbroken phone can run    any of the world's most popular communications applications,    then "bad guys" will just use them. Jailbreaking an OS isn't    hard. Downloading an app isn't hard. Stopping people from    running code they want to run is -- and what's more, it puts    the every 5 Eyes nation -- individuals and industry -- in    terrible jeopardy.  
    Thats a technical argument, and its a good one, but you dont    have to be a cryptographer to understand the second problem    with back doors: the security services are really bad at    overseeing their own behaviour.  
    Once these same people have a back door that gives them access    to everything that encryption protects, from the digital locks    on your home or office to the information needed to clean out    your bank account or read all your email, there will be lots    more people wholl want to subvert the vast cohort that is    authorised to use the back door, and the incentives for    betraying our trust will be much more lavish than anything a    tabloid reporter could afford.  
    If you want a preview of what a back door looks like, just look    at the US Transportation Security Administrations master    keys for the locks on our luggage. Since 2003, the TSA has    required all locked baggage travelling within, or transiting    through, the USA to be equipped with Travelsentry locks, which    have been designed to allow anyone with a widely held master    key to open them.  
    What happened after Travelsentry went into effect? Stuff    started going missing from bags. Lots and lots of stuff. A CNN    investigation into thefts from bags checked in US airports    found thousands of incidents of theft committed by TSA workers    and baggage handlers. And though aggressive investigation    work has cut back on theft at some airports, insider thieves    are still operating with impunity throughout the country, even    managing to smuggle stolen goods off the airfield in airports    where all employees are searched on their way in and out of    their work areas.  
    The US system is rigged to create a halo of buck-passing    unaccountability. When my family picked up our bags from our    Easter holiday in the US, we discovered that the TSA had    smashed the locks off my nearly new, unlocked,    Travelsentry-approved bag, taping it shut after confirming it    had nothing dangerous in it, and leaving it completely    destroyed in the words of the official BA damage report.    British Airways has sensibly declared the damage to be not    their problem, as they had nothing to do with destroying the    bag. The TSA directed me to a form that generated     an illiterate reply from a government subcontractor, sent    from a do-not-reply email address, advising that TSA is not    liable for any damage to locks or bags that are required to be    opened by force for security purposes (the same note had an    appendix warning me that I should treat this communication as    confidential). Ive yet to have any other communications from    the TSA.  
    Making it possible for the state to open your locks in secret    means that anyone who works for the state, or anyone who can    bribe or coerce anyone who works for the state, can have the    run of your life. Cryptographic locks dont just protect our    mundane communications: cryptography is the reason why thieves    cant impersonate your fob to your cars keyless ignition    system; its the reason you can bank online; and its the basis    for all trust and security in the 21st century.  
    In her Dimbleby lecture, Martha Lane Fox recalled Aaron    Swartzs words: Its not OK not to understand the internet    anymore. That goes double for cryptography: any politician    caught spouting off about back doors is unfit for office    anywhere but Hogwarts, which is also the only educational    institution whose computer science department believes in    golden keys that only let the right sort of people break your    encryption.  
        Tackling Encryption and Border Security key Priorities at    Five-Eyes Meeting in Ottawah [Office of the Australian    Attorney General]  
        Australia advocates weakening strong crypto at upcoming Five    Eyes meeting [Cyrus Farivar/Ars Technica]  
    (via /.)  
    (Image: Facepalm,    Brandon Grasley, CC-BY)  
Link:
Australia announces plan to ban working cryptography at home and ... - Boing Boing