WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange supports Twitter lawsuit against Trump – Washington Examiner

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange said Saturday that he supports the lawsuit filed this week arguing that President Trump and members of his communications staff should not be blocking users from his Twitter account.

"I support this suit against Trump. It a constitutional violation for a state official to block political comments," Assange wrote on Twitter. He added that the "only exception" would be "if the user makes the same comment endlessly which would have the effect of denying others space to speak."

The lawsuit was filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute on Tuesday, which argues that Trump and his communications team are violating the Constitution through their use of Twitter. The institute, a project created by Columbia University and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, took issue with Trump blocking various Twitter users from viewing his tweets. The suit requests that the court force Trump to remove his Twitter ban on seven users seeking to view his profile.

The suit was filed in the Southern District of New York and follows a letter that the institute sent to Trump last month threatening legal action if he didn't make changes to his account.

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange supports Twitter lawsuit against Trump - Washington Examiner

Australia wants FB, other tech firms to give access to encrypted messages – Blasting News

Australia #Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull wants to have access to encrypted messages of tech companies such as Apple, Facebook and others to assist the rule of law even as he warned that encrypted messaging apps could be used by terrorists and criminals, the BBC reported.

Mr. Turnbull made a recent pitch to reporters about his interest in prying into encrypted messages but he seems instead to be reviving the alleged spy leaks by Edward Snowden, who is still in asylum in Russia after facing espionage charges in 2013 by the U.S. government. Lancaster Online reported this week that "#Edward Snowden's leaks still has NSA in damage-control mode."

Encrypted messages are considered secure online messages that could not be easily intercepted by hackers, terrorists, and criminals.

The encrypted messages cannot be handed over by messaging companies as they do not receive a legible copy.

WhatsApp, for one, uses end-to-end encryption, and its encrypted messages if ever they are intercepted are unreadable. Mr. Turnbull wanted for these encrypted messages be accessed by government spies, an action which could not possibly have any headway without earning a backlash on its citizens freedom of privacy.

There are fears from Australian authorities that this type of messaging has been used by terrorists and criminals.

Mr. Turnbull told journalists that he is not seeking a backdoor by the government into the systems of the tech companies but only wanted the encrypted messages to be accessed and understood like information processed offline.

He said that the access to encrypted messages would assist the rule of the law but tech experts are saying that giving into this would mean that criminals and terrorists could also use the same.

Turnbull's "backdoor" talks have revived government spy talks after Snowden exposed the U.S. governments snooping activities while tech experts and legal communities favoring privacy are again bracing for repercussions as the Australian government presses to have access to encrypted messages.

Snowden, a former contractor for the CIA, leaked to the media the extensive surveillance activities by American intelligence in internet and phone companies in the U.S. in June early June 2013.

He exposed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting telephone records of tens of millions of U.S. citizens. #The Guardian newspaper published a secret court order favoring NSA for the telecommunications company Verizon to provide it with its telephone data on a daily basis.

Subsequent exposes of the Washington Post and the Guardian bared that the NSA tapped directly into the servers of nine internet companies such as Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google, like a backbone to monitor communications via a surveillance program named Prism.

But Prism was also cracked by a British electronic eavesdropping company named GCHQ. Snowden was later uncovered to be the one behind the leak. There was a widespread search for him until he was found to be already in Russia, where he was granted asylum.

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Australia wants FB, other tech firms to give access to encrypted messages - Blasting News

Everything You Should Know About The Government’s New Encryption Laws – Junkee

The people were most worried about will circumvent it and the ones who most need it are the ones who are going to lose their privacy.

In a press conference this FridayPrime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced the Governments intention to introduce new encryption laws that would compel tech companies to provide Australian security agencies with access to encrypted messages. The laws are intended to make it easier for law enforcement to access the messages of suspected terrorists and criminals.

Unfortunately, Turnbull also used the press conference to demonstrate a deep misunderstanding of how encryption works. Specifically, he said that the laws of mathematics are very commendable but do not apply in Australia. This did not inspire confidence.

Given the importance of encryption for security and privacy, and the enormous potential consequences of inserting so called backdoors in software, people are understandably pretty freaked out. The UK laws the Australian laws are supposedly based on have also been roundly criticised as an invasion of privacy, and have been nicknamed the Snoopers Charter for that reason.

For the time being, though, its not totally clear exactly what the Australian laws will entail, whether theyll work, and whether theyll be much of a threat. Heres what you need to know at the moment:

Apart from that the laws of mathematics dont apply down under? Not much.

Basically, Turnbull said the government is concerned about making sure the rule of law applies online as well as offline so that the internet is not used as a dark place for bad people to hide their criminal activities from the law.

Attorney-General George Brandis emphasised that the new laws are not changing any existing legal principle. It has always been accepted that in appropriate cases, under warrant, there can be lawful surveillance of private communications. He characterised the new laws as bringing these up to date with technology.

As far as how the government plans to ensure this, we got vague mixed messages. Turnbull insisted that the legislation will require [tech companies] to provide assistance, except not through backdoors, but legitimately, appropriately.

The problem? Its not clear what this means, or whether its possible.

End-to-end encryption, which is used by messaging applications like WhatsApp, works by scrambling a message as its transmitted such that it can only be unscrambled by the intended recipient. The Guardian has an excellent explainer on how encryption works here, but the basic takeaway you need is this: the service provider (i.e. WhatsApp), cannot unscramble the message.

This is the point on which the governments vague press conference doesnt make a lot of sense. The law may compel companies like WhatsApp to provide assistance, but theres not a lot that WhatsApp can do. In the words of independent cybersecurity researcher Troy Hunt, you cant break the mathematics in that way, its just not how it works.

This brings us to the question of backdoors. A backdoor is a method of bypassing security or encryption, which can end up in a program by design or by mistake. One way that the government could hypothetically obtain encrypted messages is if they were able to compel an encrypted messaging provider to remove encryption, or to implement some kind of backdoor allowing messages to be retrieved from a device.

The problem with inserting backdoors, as Troy Hunt puts it, is that you cant ensure theyll only be used by legitimate forces. Once there is a way of exploiting devices, sooner or later it tends to fall into the hands of people its not meant to, he told Junkee.

The global WannaCry ransomware attacks several months ago, for example, were the result of a backdoor in Windows operating systems being exploited by malicious hackers. When security is compromised through backdoors or the removal of encryption, everybody loses.

Of course, Turnbull was adamant that no backdoors would be used. But given that he was cagey on how exactly the laws would work, people are a bit worried.

Troy Hunt told Junkee what the laws might actually mean in practice.

He thinks that rather than trying to compel services like WhatsApp to remove their encryption, were more likely to see the government proactively pursue intercepting messages at the end points, for example by using exploits to gain access to it on phones of suspects, which makes a lot more sense technically than what some of the headlines say at the moment.

This would entail trying to work with companies like Apple and Samsung to break into their devices something that has received huge pushback from such companies in past. Given that in the past tech companies have stood their ground, and ultimately it took the FBI paying about a million bucks to get some exploit tool to get in, Troy isnt particularly worried about the Australian governments use of backdoors becoming particularly widespread in practice, even if thats their tool of choice.

While it might be unlikely that the government manages to force tech companies to bypass encryption, Troy cautions that it wouldnt be great for most of us if they did.

If they managed to do that, we still have all of these mechanisms of encryption that are outside the scope of any one company or service we still have things like PGP mail. And all of these channels will still exist for people who want to use them and keep their messages private.

The people were most worried about will circumvent it and the ones who most need it are the ones who are going to lose their privacy.

Basically, at the moment what the governments proposing is pretty unclear, and sounds a bitdodgy, but nothings actually been finalised. The takeaway for now is that this is one to watch further details of the actual laws will emerge as the bills themselves are drafted.

Sam Langford is Junkees Staff Writer. She tweets at@_slangers.

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Everything You Should Know About The Government's New Encryption Laws - Junkee

Encryption -Is it enough? – CIOReview

Jerry Irvine, EVP, CIO, Prescient Solutions

CIOs and their corporations are looking for the magic bullet to protect their intellectual property and the personally identifiable information of their clients, partners and employees. Legacy security measures such as firewalls and antivirus provide little protection from hackers and malicious users breaching the enterprise environment and the implementation of more strict access controls.Data loss prevention (DLP) solutions are cumbersome and limit the productivity of end users.

With these technical and business constraints in place, CIOs are turning to encryption of data across the entire data life cycle to mitigate the risks of lost or stolen information. But does todays encryption technology really provide the levels of confidentiality required in this totally Internet connected world?

There are three primary phases in which data can be encrypted: in transit, at rest, and in use. The highest level of data protection currently exists in the data transmission phase. In this phase, encryption occurs between specific communicating devices. Protection provided by encryption in transit includes confidentiality from eavesdropping and sniffing, or man-in-the-middle attacks. Applications such as VPN clients and browser based HTTPS provide strong encryption processes which protect the confidentiality of data making it very difficult for unauthorized users to intercept. It is common practice for organizations to encrypt of data transmitted from remote devices; however, data that is being transmitted on internal networks typically goes unencrypted. There is a perception that data transmitting the internal network, or even that being transmitted to remote facilities, is secure and therefore does not require encryption. Nevertheless, an organizations internal network can be easily breached making data vulnerable to the same risks of eavesdropping, sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks. Consultants, vendors and individuals off the street not only have access to wireless networks but often have access to network jacks in conference rooms, cafeterias and other common areas. Also, devices that do not require direct authentication (i.e. printers, scanners, industrial controls, etc.) can be infected with malware that can eavesdrop, sniff, or capture traffic and send out information to the Internet. Past concerns of implementing encryption to internal data transit included increased overhead on servers, network devices and end user workstations. This overhead could cause systems delays, loss of connectivity and loss or corruption of data. Many of todays server and network technologies have data encryption capabilities built in to allow for easier configuration and implementation and minimize the impact on utilizations. Implementing encryption of data in transit from endpoint to endpoint, both remotely and internally is mandatory in todays cyber risk environment.

The highest level of data protection currently exists in the data transmission phase with the at rest and in use phases close behind

Another phase of data encryption is the encryption of data at rest. Implementing encryption of data at rest is the easiest of all phases and, in fact, is built in on many devices such as smartphones, tablets and PCs. There are really no reasons not to encrypt all data on smartphones, tablets, PCs; however, there are some major limitations of encrypting data at rest. Users and applications must be able read data in order to use it, consequently, when a user or application logs into the system the data must appear decrypted. This is both necessary and a major vulnerability because when a user or application logs in all data, even that data at rest that they have access to, becomes readable. So, if a users device or application is infected with a virus, malware, etc. and they log in all data on their system or systems they can access becomes available to the hacker.

The last phase of data encryption is encryption of data in use, this is the weakest link. As defined in the previous encryption of data at rest section, in order to make use of data, it must be readable or decrypted. Many applications, database companies and cloud service providers are claiming different levels and characteristics of encrypted data in use; but, current technology does not make this completely possible. Encryption of data in use relies heavily on encryption of data at rest and in combination with strong authorization and access controls. By allowing only authorized users, limiting their access to the principles of least privilege and performing on the fly decryption of data upon access, companies are providing a minimal level of encryption of data in use.

Based on the functionality of encryption within the different phases, it must be obvious that encryption is not a silver bullet for the protection of data.

Encrypting data in transit can be compromised even if it is being performed across both internal and remote networks via the placement of malware on authorized devices that can eavesdrop or sniff data as it traverses the enterprise. Encrypting data at rest can also be overcome via the placement of malware on an authenticated device and it can also be bypassed by un-authorized users who illegally obtain valid user ids and password which have rights to view the data. The encryption of data in use with existing technologies uses the same but stricter rules as defined within the encryption of data at rest phase and therefore can be compromised in the same ways.

Encryption is designed to provide an additional layer of data protection but complex authorization policies and strict access controls providing only the least amount of privileges necessary for a user to perform their functions are still required in the protection of data. If hackers get into a network but are unable to gain authorized access with valid credentials, encryption will protect data from being read, copied or manipulated. However, cyber incidents facilitated by gaining un-authorized access to systems using valid user credentials, such as phishing scams or social engineering, can allow hackers complete access to decrypted data.

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Encryption -Is it enough? - CIOReview

Letters: nanny state, Perpetual and encryption – The Australian Financial Review

by Letters Leyonhjelm's superiority is illusionary

Did David Leyonhjelm not prove the "illusionary superiority" of his own intelligence in "The great nanny state delusion" (July 14).

His premise was that academics demonstrated "illusionary superiority" and so, those promoting nanny state policies who are also predominantly academics are wrong in their belief they have the right to dictate what is good for everyone. He endorses this by saying no trade organisation has ever told him what is good for him.

First, his study analysis is weak. If 55 per cent of Americans believed themselves to be above average intelligence, then only 5 per cent overestimated and 95 per cent were quite realistic. If 75 per cent of the people with qualifications thought themselves to be above average intelligence they could be absolutely correct, dependent on the percentage who have a qualification.

Secondly, how can Leyonhjelm ignore the blatant indoctrination of the CFMEU and the like into society?

To conclude that bans on smoking, drinking, cycle helmets and lock-outs are all illusionary dictates from such weak reasoning is the delusion. I share his belief in personal freedoms, but freedoms bounded strongly by societal laws with the consequential costs of such freedoms born by the individual, not the state. It should be an ideological argument, not one based on apparent flawed bias.

Jack Parr

Sandringham, Victoria

Senator Leyonhjelm is a champion for those who believe they should be able to profit from harming others and pass the costs on to others. He also puts his ideology before any objective assessment of the evidence.

In 2008 the NSW Government introduced a measure in which liquor outlets associated with more than 10 violent incidents in a year are publicly listed and subject to a range of restrictions, mainly around the service of alcohol, until such time as the annual number of violent incidents have been reduced. The violent incidents in listed venues had dropped by 84 per cent since the scheme began, when 48 venues were associated with 1270 violent incidents. In 2015 there were only 14 listed venues associated with 200 violent incidents. The vast majority of us would agree that pubs and clubs should be required by law to be responsible in the way they sell their products, to reduce harm to their patrons, their staff and the police and ambulance workers.

Similarly the way gambling products are allowed to be offered impacts on the levels of suicides, family violence, fraud and homelessness that can result from excessive gambling.

The community is right to restrict those who profit from others' suffering.

Mark Zirnsak

Uniting Church in Australia

Melbourne, Vic

Why is David Leyonhjelm surprised if a group of people who have been through a process of selection for intellectual ability are higher than the average in this characteristic? If they weren't smarter then there is something wrong with the process of obtaining high qualifications.

Senator Leyonhjelm thinks that he knows better than the experts who study climate change. But it is going to extremes to then seek to denigrate smart people by saying it is illusionary for them to think that they are smart.

Perhaps politicians should be encouraged to listen to smart people?

Reg Lawler

Dagun, Qld

Chanticleer columnist Tony Boyd has been writing strongly about the Perpetual versus Brickworks court case ("Brickworks case carries lessions for Perpetual and shareholder activists" July 12) but his conclusions about what it means for shareholder activism should not go unchallenged.

The judge's decision supports a grandfathered corporate structure from the 1960s that no modern ASX listed company would be allowed to create.

But a decision at law as to the role of directors is not the same as celebrating a 'win' for directors over minority shareholders. Perhaps the more relevant issue here is who should pay the multi-million dollar bill for the case Perpetual unitholders or shareholders and whether the ASX listing rules or the Corporations Act should be amended so that the undemocratic cross-shareholding arrangement has to be unscrambled.

One vote, one value is an important democratic principle at public companies and the Millner family, along with their independent directors, continue to disregard shareholders in order to entrench their control through structures that neuter traditional board accountability mechanisms.

The Australian Shareholders' Association congratulates Perpetual for trying to do the right thing.

And we would prefer commentary to be balanced and note that the other aspect of the case is that Brickworks and Soul Pattinson directors could show respect for their independent shareholders by voluntarily unwinding the gerrymander.

Judith Fox

Chief executive

Australian Shareholders'Association

The government's proposal to force "backdoors" into encryption creates massive systemic vulnerabilities that outweigh any marginal good. We rely on strong encryption to secure all commerce, privacy and freedom of speech. No entity can guarantee that backdoors can be secured; a fact repeatedly demonstrated by continuing government and private sector data breaches. Further, the "encryption technology genie" is in the public domain and cannot be put back in its bottle. Access to powerful encryption tools is trivially easy, irrespective of legislation. The government is proposing that global information platform companies "don't have to break encryption, they just have to give us the data". This semantic "spin" suggests you can preserve strong encryption and yet still access individual data at will. This is nonsense.

Yes, strong encryption could be preserved for data "in transit" but ultimately a backdoor is required to access the data "at rest" or as it is entered into, or displayed on, a device. This is functionally equivalent to creating encryption backdoors; any of which create global vulnerabilities with ultimately certain catastrophic consequences. And they do not actually guarantee a window into nefarious activity. Strongly encrypted backdoor-free platforms do make law enforcement work harder, but there are a range of approaches to penetrating the communications of specific criminals that do not create massive systemic vulnerabilities for our economies, our societies and for us as individuals. The government's "backdoor by any other name" proposals are folly and ultimately un-enforceable. They should be set aside.

Roderick Laird

Glen Iris,Vic

Vale Liu Xiaobo. An example of standing up for what is right even when being pushed down and locked away. The world needs more heroes that fight for a better and freer world.

Dennis Fitzgerald

Box Hill, Vic

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Letters: nanny state, Perpetual and encryption - The Australian Financial Review

Windows, Linux distros, macOS pay for Kerberos 21-year-old – ZDNet – ZDNet

An attacker sitting between server and client can exploit the Orpheus Lyre bug to impersonate some services to the client.

A bypass bug present in the Kerberos cryptographic authentication protocol for 21 years has now been fixed in patches from Microsoft, Samba, Fedora, FreeBSD, and Debian.

The discoverers of the ancient Kerberos bypass bug have called it Orpheus Lyre after Orpheus, the musician from Greek legend who bypassed Cerberos, the three-headed hound guarding the gates of Hades. Orpheus pacified the dog with the music of his lyre.

Kerberos, which is named after Cerberos, is implemented as a cryptographic authentication protocol in products like Microsoft's Active Directory. Microsoft fixed the bug in this week's patch Tuesday update.

Samba, Debian, and FreeBSD are also affected through the open-source Heimdal implementation of Kerberos V5. Heimdal before version 7.4 is vulnerable. It appears Apple's Kerberos implementation in macOS is also vulnerable to Orpheus Lyre. However, the MIT implementation is not.

Orpheus Lyre was discovered by Jeffrey Altman, Viktor Duchovni and Nico Williams. They explain in a post that Orpheus Lyre can be used by a man-in-the-middle attacker to remotely steal credentials, and from there gain privilege escalation to defeat Kerberos encryption.

Instead of public-key cryptography's use of digital certificates from certificate authorities, the Kerberos protocol relies on a trusted third-party called the key distribution center (KDC).

These KDCs issue "short-lived tickets" that are used to authenticate a client to a specific service. An encrypted portion of the ticket contains the name of the intended user, metadata, and a session key. The KDC also provides the user with a session key that creates an Authenticator, which is used to prove they know the session key.

As they explain, Kerberos' "original cryptographic sin" was the abundance of unauthenticated plaintext in the protocol. While Kerberos can be secure, implementing it so as to authenticate plaintext is difficult.

"In this case, a two-line bug in several independently developed implementations of Kerberos, caused that metadata to be taken from the unauthenticated plaintext, the Ticket, rather than the authenticated and encrypted KDC response," they wrote.

The researchers haven't detailed every method of exploiting the Orpheus Lyre bug but note that an attacker sitting between a client and server can impersonate some services to the client. The bug also can only be closed by patching end-user systems rather than servers.

"If the client presents a Ticket and Authenticator, and the service can decrypt the Ticket, extract the session key, and decrypt the Authenticator with the session key, then the client is whoever the Ticket says they are, for they possessed the cryptographic key with which to make that Authenticator," they explain.

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Windows, Linux distros, macOS pay for Kerberos 21-year-old - ZDNet - ZDNet

Julian Assange says he tried to publish Trump Jr. emails – NY …

Julian Assange says he tried to publish Trump Jr. emails

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

Tuesday, July 11, 2017, 4:37 PM

Julian Assange says he tried to get Donald Trump Jr. to let him publish his bombshell emails before they were shared for the world to see.

Contacted Trump Jr this morning on why he should publish his emails (i.e. with us). Two hours later, does it himself, the WikiLeaks founder said on Twitter Tuesday.

Assange, who has stayed at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London for years to avoid extradition, published documents hacked from the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta on his site last year.

The Russian government, looking to benefit President Trump, was behind the hacks, according to the U.S. intelligence community.

Timeline: How the Trump-Russia meeting happened and how it leaked

Assange has repeatedly denied that his source was the Kremlin or any other state actor.

54 photos view gallery

It was not immediately clear why the website founder, a native Australian, would contact Trump Jr. about the emails, which show a publicist saying that a Moscow real estate developer had received damaging information about Clinton from the Russian government.

The messages were first reported by The New York Times, which published them on their own site shortly after the Presidents son sent them out.

Would have been safer for us to publish it anonymously sourced, Assange said on Twitter, after saying it was better to be transparent.

All the times Trump and associates denied collusion with Russia

I argued that his enemies have it--so why not the public? he recounted of his conversation with Trump Jr.

The release of the emails, which contradicted numerous denials by the Trump campaign that there had been any contact with those working for the Russian government, prompted condemnation from across the political spectrum.

Many lawmakers also called for Trump Jr. to testify before investigations into the alleged Russian meddling, currently taking place in the House, Senate, FBI and special prosecutor Robert Muellers office.

My son is a high quality person and I applaud his transparency, Trump himself said in a statement.

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Julian Assange says he tried to publish Trump Jr. emails - NY ...

Top 4 Altcoins Supported by Cryptocurrency ATMs – The Merkle

Bitcoin ATMs have been a valuable addition to the whole ecosystem. Even though they are still only found in specific locations, their presence is growing every single month. It also appears these ATMs are no longer being used to just buy and sell Bitcoin these days. Below are four altcoins which are supported by some Bitcoin ATMs around the world.

Although Dogecoin is often considered to be the meme of cryptocurrency, demand for this particular coin is a lot stronger than most people give it credit for. In fact, Dogecoin has seen its spurts of popularity over the past few years, which is now translating into some minor success in the cryptocurrency ATM market.

Even though there were far more Bitcoin ATMs installed by the end of June compared to the beginning of the month, additional machines provide Dogecoin support. Only five ATM support Dogecoin currently. But it is one of the only four altcoin found oncryptocurrency ATMs. This makes Dogecoin part of an elite club, in a way.

One would not expect Dash to be supported by so few cryptocurrency ATMs, but that is the case. Thereare now seven different ATMs around the world supporting DASH. That is still a relatively small number, but it is a 40% increase compared to June 1st. It is good to see altcoins gain some support from ATM manufacturers and operators.

Despite its popularity among traders, Ethereum is not thatpopular incryptocurrency ATMs. Even though there are now 13 machines supporting ETH -up from 9- there is still a very long way to go. It remains unclear how popular ETH is when it comes to cryptocurrency ATMs in general. With the number of cryptocurrency ATMs supporting Ether going up, interesting things are bound to happen.

Litecoin is the most commonly supported altcoin across cryptocurrency ATMs. Litecoin has always complemented Bitcoin, thus it makes sense it gets more support than all of the other currencies combined. With the number of LTC-capable ATMs going from 36 to 91 in June, good things are on the horizon.

It is possible this sudden spike in support has something to do with Litecoins price increase. Even though that rise is far less spectacular compared to Ethereum, it also seems to hold its own quite well. More attention for Litecoin is never a bad thing in anyones book andit is a very popular cryptocurrency these days. It will be interesting to see how these rankings look in a few months from now.

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Top 4 Altcoins Supported by Cryptocurrency ATMs - The Merkle

Vault 7: new WikiLeaks dump details Android SMS snooping malware – Naked Security

Since launching its Vault 7 project in March, WikiLeaks has dumped documents outlining the CIAs efforts to exploit Microsoft and Apple technology. In this weeks latest release, it focuses on malware called HighRise, which the agency used to target Android devices.

WikiLeaks describes HighRise this way on its website:

HighRise is an Android application designed for mobile devices running Android 4.0 to 4.3. It provides a redirector function for SMS messaging that could be used by a number of IOC tools that use SMS messages for communication between implants and listening posts. HighRise acts as a SMS proxy that provides greater separation between devices in the field (targets) and the listening post (LP) by proxying incoming and outgoing SMS messages to an internet LP. Highrise provides a communications channel between the HighRise field operator and the LP with a TLS/SSL secured internet communication.

HighRise has to be installed manually on a targets phone, and it has to be set up manually, according to the 12-page HighRise user guide dated December 16 2013. Once the apk is installed on the targeted device,an application named TideCheck appears in the list of apps on the device.

TideCheck houses HighRise, and the agent must open the app to start the process. It then runs a special code once the word inshallah (God willing in Arabic) is entered into a text box disguised to look like its asking for an activation code for the app. Once the code is entered, the agent taps into the apps settings.

After initial installation, HighRise runs in the background and automatically activates whenever the phone is turned on. The app continuously intercepts texts.

Its a powerful spying tool but it has limits. For one thing, it must be installed onto a device manually and not remotely. The agent must have physical contact with the victims device to infect it.

Its unclear if the CIA still uses HighRise.

This latest leak comes nearly a month after WikiLeaks last dump,from a project dubbed Cherry Blossom (WikiLeaks variously writes both Cherry Blossom and CherryBlossom, but the leaked documents routinely refer to Cherry Blossom, or CB for short, if youre a stickler for precision).

In the words of its own Quick Start Guide, the CB project focused on internet surveillance:

The Cherry Blossom (CB) system provides a means of monitoring the internet activity of and performing software exploits on targets of interest. In particular, CB is focused on compromising wireless networking devices, such as wireless (802.11) routers and access points (APs), to achieve these goals.

Such leaks raise concerns that other attackers will use the tools for their own campaigns. Weve already seen that happen with the recent WannaCry and Petya outbreaks, which made use of NSA tools dumped by the Shadow Brokers hacking group. When the Vault 7 dumps began, we asked security experts if there were any silver linings for the good guys.

Eric Cowperthwaite, former VP of strategy for Core Security and now director of managed risk services for Edgile, said at the time that he was conflicted on that question.

He brought up the case ofChelsea Manning,a United States Army soldier convicted by court-martial in 2013 for violating the Espionage Act and other offenses, after givingWikiLeaks thousands of classified and/or sensitive military and diplomatic documents:

There is good and bad in this. We know that some of the Manning leaks had impacts on military operations. That was part of Mannings trial. I also found it interesting that Wikileaks alleges that the US intelligence community has a problem keeping its cyberwar tools off the black market. And if the CIA, NSA, etc. cant keep these things under control, that is something that citizens should know.

Its worth noting that this is an exploit for older, outdated versions of Android, and theres no way of knowing if theres a more current version that works with updated iterations of the mobile operating system. At Naked Security, well be keeping our ear to the ground.

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Vault 7: new WikiLeaks dump details Android SMS snooping malware - Naked Security

Wikileaks publishes Vault 7: Highrise tool for Android devices – SC Magazine

Wikileaks: Highrise aka TideCheck manual published.

WikiLeaks Thursday published the manual of another CIA hacking tool Highrise, aka TideCheck, which is used to intercept and redirect text messages to a remote web server.

The manual, dated Dec. 16, 2013, was part of the Vault 7 leak series and the tool was designed to work on mobile devices running Android 4.0 to 4.3 though it has likely been updated to work on more recent versions.

Features at a glance include proxy incoming SMS messages received by HighRise host to an internet LP, send outgoing SMS messages via the HighRise host, provide a communications channel between the HighRise field operator & the LP, and TLS/SSL secured internet communications.

The last two features suggest Highrise isn't a tool for installing on a targets phone but an app that can be installed on the phones of CIA field operatives and provide a secondary, encrypted communications channel between operatives and supervisors, Bleeping Computer researchers said.

When starting the tool for the first time, CIA operatives must enter the special code "inshallah," which is the Arabic word for "God willing" in order to access its settings. Agents are then given the options to Initialize, Show Configuration, or Send Messages.

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Wikileaks publishes Vault 7: Highrise tool for Android devices - SC Magazine