Here are some squid cooking tips. <\/p>\n
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered. <\/p>\n
Tags: squid <\/p>\n
Posted on March 10, 2017 at 4:02 PM 67 Comments <\/p>\n
A decade ago, I wrote about the death of ephemeral conversation. As computers were becoming ubiquitous, some unintended changes happened, too. Before computers, what we said disappeared once we'd said it. Neither face-to-face conversations nor telephone conversations were routinely recorded. A permanent communication was something different and special; we called it correspondence. <\/p>\n
The Internet changed this. We now chat by text message and e-mail, on Facebook and on Instagram. These conversations -- with friends, lovers, colleagues, fellow employees -- all leave electronic trails. And while we know this intellectually, we haven't truly internalized it. We still think of conversation as ephemeral, forgetting that we're being recorded and what we say has the permanence of correspondence. <\/p>\n
That our data is used by large companies for psychological manipulation -- we call this advertising -- is well-known. So is its use by governments for law enforcement and, depending on the country, social control. What made the news over the past year were demonstrations of how vulnerable all of this data is to hackers and the effects of having it hacked, copied and then published online. We call this doxing. <\/p>\n
Doxing isn't new, but it has become more common. It's been perpetrated against corporations, law firms, individuals, the NSA and -- just this week -- the CIA. It's largely harassment and not whistleblowing, and it's not going to change anytime soon. The data in your computer and in the cloud are, and will continue to be, vulnerable to hacking and publishing online. Depending on your prominence and the details of this data, you may need some new strategies to secure your private life. <\/p>\n
There are two basic ways hackers can get at your e-mail and private documents. One way is to guess your password. That's how hackers got their hands on personal photos of celebrities from iCloud in 2014. <\/p>\n
How to protect yourself from this attack is pretty obvious. First, don't choose a guessable password. This is more than not using \"password1\" or \"qwerty\"; most easily memorizable passwords are guessable. My advice is to generate passwords you have to remember by using either the XKCD scheme or the Schneier scheme, and to use large random passwords stored in a password manager for everything else. <\/p>\n
Second, turn on two-factor authentication where you can, like Google's 2-Step Verification. This adds another step besides just entering a password, such as having to type in a one-time code that's sent to your mobile phone. And third, don't reuse the same password on any sites you actually care about. <\/p>\n
You're not done, though. Hackers have accessed accounts by exploiting the \"secret question\" feature and resetting the password. That was how Sarah Palin's e-mail account was hacked in 2008. The problem with secret questions is that they're not very secret and not very random. My advice is to refuse to use those features. Type randomness into your keyboard, or choose a really random answer and store it in your password manager. <\/p>\n
Finally, you also have to stay alert to phishing attacks, where a hacker sends you an enticing e-mail with a link that sends you to a web page that looks almost like the expected page, but which actually isn't. This sort of thing can bypass two-factor authentication, and is almost certainly what tricked John Podesta and Colin Powell. <\/p>\n
The other way hackers can get at your personal stuff is by breaking in to the computers the information is stored on. This is how the Russians got into the Democratic National Committee's network and how a lone hacker got into the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. Sometimes individuals are targeted, as when China hacked Google in 2010 to access the e-mail accounts of human rights activists. Sometimes the whole network is the target, and individuals are inadvertent victims, as when thousands of Sony employees had their e-mails published by North Korea in 2014. <\/p>\n
Protecting yourself is difficult, because it often doesn't matter what you do. If your e-mail is stored with a service provider in the cloud, what matters is the security of that network and that provider. Most users have no control over that part of the system. The only way to truly protect yourself is to not keep your data in the cloud where someone could get to it. This is hard. We like the fact that all of our e-mail is stored on a server somewhere and that we can instantly search it. But that convenience comes with risk. Consider deleting old e-mail, or at least downloading it and storing it offline on a portable hard drive. In fact, storing data offline is one of the best things you can do to protect it from being hacked and exposed. If it's on your computer, what matters is the security of your operating system and network, not the security of your service provider. <\/p>\n
Consider this for files on your own computer. The more things you can move offline, the safer you'll be. <\/p>\n
E-mail, no matter how you store it, is vulnerable. If you're worried about your conversations becoming public, think about an encrypted chat program instead, such as Signal, WhatsApp or Off-the-Record Messaging. Consider using communications systems that don't save everything by default. <\/p>\n
None of this is perfect, of course. Portable hard drives are vulnerable when you connect them to your computer. There are ways to jump air gaps and access data on computers not connected to the Internet. Communications and data files you delete might still exist in backup systems somewhere -- either yours or those of the various cloud providers you're using. And always remember that there's always another copy of any of your conversations stored with the person you're conversing with. Even with these caveats, though, these measures will make a big difference. <\/p>\n
When secrecy is truly paramount, go back to communications systems that are still ephemeral. Pick up the telephone and talk. Meet face to face. We don't yet live in a world where everything is recorded and everything is saved, although that era is coming. Enjoy the last vestiges of ephemeral conversation while you still can. <\/p>\n
This essay originally appeared in the Washington Post. <\/p>\n
Tags: doxing, essays, Google, Google Glass, hacking, passwords, privacy, surveillance <\/p>\n
Posted on March 10, 2017 at 6:15 AM 53 Comments <\/p>\n
Google's Project Zero is serious about releasing the details of security vulnerabilities 90 days after they alert the vendors, even if they're unpatched. It just exposed a nasty vulnerability in Microsoft's browsers. <\/p>\n
This is the second unpatched Microsoft vulnerability it exposed last week. <\/p>\n
I'm a big fan of responsible disclosure. The threat to publish vulnerabilities is what puts pressure on vendors to patch their systems. But I wonder what competitive pressure is on the Google team to find embarrassing vulnerabilities in competitors' products. <\/p>\n
Tags: browsers, Google, Microsoft, patching, vulnerabilities <\/p>\n
Posted on March 9, 2017 at 6:28 AM 38 Comments <\/p>\n
If I had to guess right now, I'd say the documents came from an outsider and not an insider. My reasoning: One, there is absolutely nothing illegal in the contents of any of this stuff. It's exactly what you'd expect the CIA to be doing in cyberspace. That makes the whistleblower motive less likely. And two, the documents are a few years old, making this more like the Shadow Brokers than Edward Snowden. An internal leaker would leak quickly. A foreign intelligence agency -- like the Russians -- would use the documents while they were fresh and valuable, and only expose them when the embarrassment value was greater. <\/p>\n
James Lewis agrees: <\/p>\n
But James Lewis, an expert on cybersecurity at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, raised another possibility: that a foreign state, most likely Russia, stole the documents by hacking or other means and delivered them to WikiLeaks, which may not know how they were obtained. Mr. Lewis noted that, according to American intelligence agencies, Russia hacked Democratic targets during the presidential campaign and gave thousands of emails to WikiLeaks for publication. <\/p>\n
To be sure, neither of us has any idea. We're all guessing. <\/p>\n
To the documents themselves, I really liked these best practice coding guidelines for malware, and these crypto requirements. <\/p>\n
I am mentioned in the latter document: <\/p>\n
Cryptographic jargon is utilized throughout this document. This jargon has precise and subtle meaning and should not be interpreted without careful understanding of the subject matter. Suggested reading includes Practical Cryptography by Schneier and Ferguson, RFCs 4251 and 4253, RFCs 5246 and 5430, and Handbook of Applied Cryptography by Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD: Herbert Lin comments. <\/p>\n
The most damning thing I've seen so far is yet more evidence that -- despite assurances to the contrary -- the US intelligence community hoards vulnerabilities in common Internet products and uses them for offensive purposes. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD (3\/9): The New York Times is reporting that the CIA suspects an insider: <\/p>\n
Investigators say that the leak was the work not of a hostile foreign power like Russia but of a disaffected insider, as WikiLeaks suggested when it released the documents Tuesday. The F.B.I. was preparing to interview anyone who had access to the information, a group likely to include at least a few hundred people, and possibly more than a thousand. <\/p>\n
An intelligence official said the information, much of which appeared to be technical documents, may have come from a server outside the C.I.A. managed by a contractor. But neither he nor a former senior intelligence official ruled out the possibility that the leaker was a C.I.A. employee. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD (3\/9): WikiLeaks said that they have published less than 1% of what they have, and that they are giving affected companies an early warning of the vulnerabilities and tools that they're publishing. <\/p>\n
Commentary from The Intercept. <\/p>\n
Tags: CIA, cryptography, leaks, malware, Russia, WikiLeaks <\/p>\n
Posted on March 8, 2017 at 9:08 AM 151 Comments <\/p>\n
The New York Times is reporting that the US has been conducting offensive cyberattacks against North Korea, in an effort to delay its nuclear weapons program. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD (3\/8): Commentary. <\/p>\n
Tags: cyberattack, cyberwar, national security policy, North Korea <\/p>\n
Posted on March 8, 2017 at 7:03 AM 20 Comments <\/p>\n
WikiLeaks just released a cache of 8,761 classified CIA documents from 2012 to 2016, including details of its offensive Internet operations. <\/p>\n
I have not read through any of them yet. If you see something interesting, tell us in the comments. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD: There's a lot in here. Many of the hacking tools are redacted, with the tar files and zip archives replaced with messages like: <\/p>\n
::: THIS ARCHIVE FILE IS STILL BEING EXAMINED BY WIKILEAKS. ::: ::: IT MAY BE RELEASED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHAT FOLLOWS IS ::: ::: AN AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED LIST OF ITS CONTENTS: ::: <\/p>\n
Hopefully we'll get them eventually. The documents say that the CIA -- and other intelligence services -- can bypass Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram. It seems to be by hacking the end-user devices and grabbing the traffic before and after encryption, not by breaking the encryption. <\/p>\n
New York Times article. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD: Some details from The Guardian: <\/p>\n
According to the documents: <\/p>\n
I just noticed this from the WikiLeaks page: <\/p>\n
Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized \"zero day\" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive. <\/p>\n
So it sounds like this cache of documents wasn't taken from the CIA and given to WikiLeaks for publication, but has been passed around the community for a while -- and incidentally some part of the cache was passed to WikiLeaks. So there are more documents out there, and others may release them in unredacted form. <\/p>\n
Wired article. Slashdot thread. Two articles from the Washington Post. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD: This document talks about Comodo version 5.X and version 6.X. Version 6 was released in Feb 2013. Version 7 was released in Apr 2014. This gives us a time window of that page, and the cache in general. (WikiLeaks says that the documents cover 2013 to 2016.) <\/p>\n
If these tools are a few years out of date, it's similar to the NSA tools released by the \"Shadow Brokers.\" Most of us thought the Shadow Brokers were the Russians, specifically releasing older NSA tools that had diminished value as secrets. Could this be the Russians as well? <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD: Nicholas Weaver comments. <\/p>\n
EDITED TO ADD (3\/8): These documents are interesting: <\/p>\n
The CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency. Each technique it has created forms a \"fingerprint\" that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity. <\/p>\n
This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution. <\/p>\n
The CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation. <\/p>\n
With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the \"fingerprints\" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from. <\/p>\n
UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques. <\/p>\n
This is being spun in the press as the CIA is pretending to be Russia. I'm not convinced that the documents support these allegations. Can someone else look at the documents. I don't like my conclusion that WikiLeaks is using this document dump as a way to push their own bias. <\/p>\n
Tags: CIA, cyberwar, hacking, malware, redaction, WikiLeaks, zero-day <\/p>\n
Posted on March 7, 2017 at 9:08 AM 101 Comments <\/p>\n
Matthew Green and students speculate on what truly well-designed ransomware system could look like: <\/p>\n
Most modern ransomware employs a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin to enable the payments that make the ransom possible. This is perhaps not the strongest argument for systems like Bitcoin -- and yet it seems unlikely that Bitcoin is going away anytime soon. If we can't solve the problem of Bitcoin, maybe it's possible to use Bitcoin to make \"more reliable\" ransomware. <\/p>\n
[...] <\/p>\n
Recall that in the final step of the ransom process, the ransomware operator must deliver a decryption key to the victim. This step is the most fraught for operators, since it requires them to manage keys and respond to queries on the Internet. Wouldn't it be better for operators if they could eliminate this step altogether? <\/p>\n
[...] <\/p>\n
At least in theory it might be possible to develop a DAO that's funded entirely by ransomware payments -- and in turn mindlessly contracts real human beings to develop better ransomware, deploy it against human targets, and...rinse repeat. It's unlikely that such a system would be stable in the long run humans are clever and good at destroying dumb things but it might get a good run. <\/p>\n
One of the reasons society hasn't destroyed itself is that people with intelligence and skills tend to not be criminals for a living. If it ever became a viable career path, we're doomed. <\/p>\n
Tags: bitcoin, crime, ransomware <\/p>\n
Posted on March 7, 2017 at 8:15 AM 22 Comments <\/p>\n
Longtime Internet security-policy pioneer Howard Schmidt died on Friday. <\/p>\n
He will be missed. <\/p>\n
Tags: cybersecurity, national security policy <\/p>\n
Posted on March 6, 2017 at 2:15 PM 4 Comments <\/p>\n
The New York Times reports that Uber developed apps that identified and blocked government regulators using the app to find evidence of illegal behavior: <\/p>\n
Yet using its app to identify and sidestep authorities in places where regulators said the company was breaking the law goes further in skirting ethical lines -- and potentially legal ones, too. Inside Uber, some of those who knew about the VTOS program and how the Greyball tool was being used were troubled by it. <\/p>\n
[...] <\/p>\n
One method involved drawing a digital perimeter, or \"geofence,\" around authorities' offices on a digital map of the city that Uber monitored. The company watched which people frequently opened and closed the app -- a process internally called \"eyeballing\" -- around that location, which signified that the user might be associated with city agencies. <\/p>\n
Other techniques included looking at the user's credit card information and whether that card was tied directly to an institution like a police credit union. <\/p>\n
Enforcement officials involved in large-scale sting operations to catch Uber drivers also sometimes bought dozens of cellphones to create different accounts. To circumvent that tactic, Uber employees went to that city's local electronics stores to look up device numbers of the cheapest mobile phones on sale, which were often the ones bought by city officials, whose budgets were not sizable. <\/p>\n
In all, there were at least a dozen or so signifiers in the VTOS program that Uber employees could use to assess whether users were new riders or very likely city officials. <\/p>\n
If those clues were not enough to confirm a user's identity, Uber employees would search social media profiles and other available information online. Once a user was identified as law enforcement, Uber Greyballed him or her, tagging the user with a small piece of code that read Greyball followed by a string of numbers. <\/p>\n
When Edward Snowden exposed the fact that the NSA does this sort of thing, I commented that the technologies will eventually become cheap enough for corporations to do it. Now, it has. <\/p>\n
One discussion we need to have is whether or not this behavior is legal. But another, more important, discussion is whether or not it is ethical. Do we want to live in a society where corporations wield this sort of power against government? Against individuals? Because if we don't align government against this kind of behavior, it'll become the norm. <\/p>\n
Tags: courts, Edward Snowden, NSA, power, privacy, surveillance, terms of service, Uber <\/p>\n
Posted on March 6, 2017 at 6:24 AM 41 Comments <\/p>\n
Photo of Bruce Schneier by Per Ervland. <\/p>\n
Schneier on Security is a personal website. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of IBM Resilient. <\/p>\n
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