Summary: Open source does not provide a meaningful inherent security benefit for OpenSSL and it may actually discourage some important testing techniques. Also, panhandling is not a good business model for important software like OpenSSL.<\/p>\n
The ugly episode of Heartbleed has put OpenSSL under more scrutiny than any open source software project ever. At a certain level of scrutiny perhaps any program will look bad, but OpenSSL's on the hot seat because it's OpenSSL that failed in its mission. It's hard to construe these matters in a way that makes OpenSSL or the open source nature of it look good. <\/p>\n
But who is this \"OpenSSL\"? When something goes wrong with a product people want to know who is responsible. Many will be shocked to learn that it's all run by a small group of developers,most volunteers and all but one part-time. Huge parts of the Internet, multi-zillion dollar businesses, implicitly trust the work these people do. Why? <\/p>\n
Let's stipulate that OpenSSL has a good reputation, perhaps even that it deserves that reputation (although this is not the first highly-critical vulnerability in OpenSSL). I would argue that the reputation is based largely on wishful thinking and open source mythology. <\/p>\n
Before the word \"mythology\" gets me into too much trouble, I ought to say, as Nixon might have put it, \"we're all open source activists now.\" For some purposes, open source is a good thing, or a necessary thing, or both. I agree, at least in part, with those who say that cryptography code needs to be open source, because it requires a high level of trust. <\/p>\n
Ultimately, the logic of that last statement presumes that there are people analyzing the open source code of OpenSSL in order to confirm that it is deserving of trust. This isthe \"many eyeballs\" effect described in The Cathedral and the Bazaar, by Eric Raymond, one of the early gospels in the theology of open source. The idea is that if enough people have access to source code then someone will notice the bugs. <\/p>\n
This is, in fact, what has happened with Heartbleed... sort of. Heartbleed was discovered byNeel Mehta, a security researcher at Google. If you look at the vulnerability disclosures coming out of other companies, Apple and Microsoft for example, you can see that Google spends a lot of time scrutinizing other people's programs. They're like no other group in this regard. <\/p>\n
But it took Google two yearsto find it. In the meantime, Google finds lots of security problems in Apple and Microsoft products for which they have no source code. This is because in the time since the formation of the \"many eyeballs\" hypothesis, there have been huge improvements in testing and debugging tools. Some computer time with a marginal cost of $0 is worth thousands of very expensive eyeballs. <\/p>\n
I'd go so far as to suspect that the availability of source makes developers and users discount the necessity of testing that is common on commercial software. I wouldn't be surprised if a static source code analyzer would have found the Heartbleed bug, flagging it for possible buffer over\/underrun issues. Heartbleed might also have been found by a good round of fuzzing. <\/p>\n
As I said recently, some programs are so critical to society at large thatsomeone needs to step in and make sure they are properly secured. Obviously the problem is money. So why, when this program is so critical, is itbeing run like it's public TV? Yes,like Blanche DuBois, OpenSSL has always depended on the kindness of strangers. <\/p>\n
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