On Dec. 15, 1791, the Second Congress of the United States officially adopted the first 10 amendments to the Constitution the Bill of Rights which protect our core freedoms. Beginning in 1789 when they were introduced by U.S. Rep. James Madison, the amendments were vigorously debated and eventually ratified by 11 of the 15 states.

The Bill of Rights is a tool to rein in government power. As its preamble states, its purpose is to prevent misconstruction or abuse of (the governments) powers and to best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution. Today, we often think of the Bill of Rights as a list of things the government allows us to do. In fact, it is a list of things the government cannot do. And paramount among the many things the government has no business interfering with are the five freedoms protected by the First Amendment.

Those freedoms religion, speech, press, assembly and petition were bundled together very purposefully. Together, they represent the means by which people have ideas, share ideas and transform those ideas into reality. The freedom of (and from) what is referred to in the text of the amendment as religion was understood by 18th-century statesmen to encompass the freedom of unimpeded belief or thought. Madison called that liberty of conscience in a prior draft. Free thoughts, expressed with free speech, disseminated by a free press, debated and developed by free assemblies of other free thinkers, may eventually be pressured into legislative action through the process of petition.

That process of changing an idea into an action is what enables our society to evolve.

The five freedoms of the First Amendment also empower our individualism and allow the fringes of society to flourish, for good or ill. No ones idea is too far-fetched to be shared, no speech too horrible to utter (unless it presents an imminent threat to the physical safety of others). No media source can be shut down for publishing controversial opinions or scandalous stories, or for speaking truth to power, or for holding the government accountable. No lawful peaceful gatherings can be forcibly disbanded, whether by vigilantes or the authorities; and no opinion can be declared an unlawful cause to petition the government to pay attention to, or to march in support of no matter how distasteful.

The First Amendment is complicated and, at times, frustrating in its inclusivity. The spectrum of its freedoms empowers our individualism on the one hand and enables our collective voice on the other. It facilitates our ability to change the structure of our government, and to decide who gets a voice in that government (and how much of one), but it also can be used to prevent change from happening, to bulwark position and privilege and to support the status quo. It is the power and the inertia on both sides of the metronome.

Americans, no matter how polarized we may be, share a common purpose or goal, whether we are conscious of it or not, from the Preamble of the Constitution: to form a more perfect Union.

The five freedoms in the First Amendment are what empower us, we the people, to create that more perfect union.

On the 230th anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights and the official adoption of the First Amendment, the question is, will we ever agree on what a more perfect union might look like?

The First Amendment protects our right to live our freedoms even as we debate the question.

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Commentary: First Amendment protects our right to live our freedoms - Press Herald

Guest Post by Samuel F. Ernst, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.

Can you register a famous persons name as your trademark without their consent? The Lanham Act seems to say no, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interprets this to mean no, never, no matter what. 15 U.S.C. 1052(c) provides, in pertinent part, that the PTO must deny federal registration to a trademark if it [c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular individual except by his written consent. Unlike registration denials under Section 1052(a), the PTO denies registration without any inquiry into whether the mark suggests a false connection between the mark and the famous person. Nor does the PTO inquire into whether the famous person also sells the goods or services in question, as it does with private individuals under Section 1052(c). Rather, with respect to celebrities and world famous political figures, registration is denied based solely on the determinations that (1) the public would recognize and understand the mark as identifying a particular living individual; and (2) the record does not contain the famous persons consent to register the mark.[1] Under this provision, the PTO routinely denies registration to marks that appear calculated to capitalize on the famous persons name to sell products. For example, the PTO denied registration under Section 1052(c) to ROYAL KATE as applied to watches, cufflinks, jewelry, and other luxury products based solely on the determination that ROYAL KATE identifies Kate Middleton whose identity is renowned.[2] Id. And the PTO denied registration to OBAMA PAJAMA in connection with pajamas based on the examining attorneys excellent job marshalling a variety of press excerpts to demonstrate the obvious namely, that President Barack Obama is extremely well known.[3]

But the PTO also denies registration to marks under this provision even if they constitute political commentary, parody, or other public discourse at the heart of the First Amendment. For example, in 2020 the PTO denied registration to the mark TRUMP TOO SMALL in connection with T-shirts, even though the applicant argued that the mark was political commentary about presidential candidate and president Donald Trump that the relevant consumer in the United States would not understand to be sponsored by, endorsed by, or affiliated with Donald Trump.[4] In particular, the mark is political commentary about [Trumps] refutation at the March 3, 2016 Republican debate of presidential candidate Marco Rubios insinuation that Donald Trump has a small penis; and is also political commentary about the smallness of Donald Trumps overall approach to governing as President of the United States.[5] The applicant appealed the PTABs denial to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is now deciding whether Section 1052(c) is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment,[6] as that court and the Supreme Court have already decided with respect to the provisions in the Lanham Act barring registration of scandalous, immoral, or disparaging marks.[7]

Unlike the bars on registration at issue in Tam and Brunetti, the PTOs ban on registration under Section 1052(c) does not discriminate against speech based on the viewpoint expressed. Rather, the PTO bars registration whether the mark praises, criticizes, ridicules, parodies, or is neutral toward the famous person. Nonetheless, the bar is a content-based restriction because its reach is defined simply by the topic (subject matter) of the covered speech[8] here, the topic being the famous person in question. And even if viewed as a regulation of purely commercial speech and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny the restriction would at least have to pass muster under the Supreme Courts test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, which asks, in pertinent part, whether the regulation burdening speech directly advances a substantial government interest, and whether the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.[9] Section 1052(c), at least as broadly interpreted by the PTO, fails this test and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

The PTOs asserted justification for this total ban on registration is to protect the intellectual property right of privacy and publicity that a living person has in his/her identity.[10] Putting aside whether the PTO has a legitimate interest under the Lanham Act in protecting intellectual property rights that are creatures of state law, these justifications plainly fail on their merits.

With respect to the right of privacy, the government does not have a legitimate interest in protecting public figures, such as former President Trump, from speech that criticizes, ridicules, or even praises them. Rather, the First Amendment recognizes a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.[11]

And even if the government has a legitimate interest in guarding the state right of publicity, the Lanham Acts absolute bar on registering the name of a famous individual absent written consent is far more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. No state recognizes such a sweeping right of publicity that it is subject to zero countervailing First Amendment protections. As Jennifer Rothman observes, [a]t least five balancing approaches have been applied to evaluate First Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases.[12]:

Accordingly, the PTOs absolute ban on the registration of marks such as TRUMP TOO SMALL is far more extensive than necessary to protect the right of publicity, which would not prevent the use of TRUMP TOO SMALL under any states right of publicity regime.

These various free speech defenses to the right of publicity have been criticized by scholars for providing an inadequate, misleading patchwork of First Amendment protections.[23] But the PTOs application of Section 1052(c) is even worse: the PTO takes no countervailing interests into account before denying registration to a mark. The PTO fails to consider: whether registration of the mark would likely cause consumer confusion; whether it would cause dilution of the public figures brand; whether the mark suggests a false connection with the person (as separately provided by other provisions); whether there is unjust enrichment or any other type of unfair competition; whether the use of the famous persons name constitutes news, political commentary, parody, or entertainment speech at the heart of the First Amendment; and indeed without considering any First Amendment defense or legitimate Lanham Act policy whatsoever.

Hence, the PTOs interpretation of Section1052(c) is a First Amendment-free zone. But what remedy should the Federal Circuit provide? Should the statute be construed so as to require source confusion, dilution, or a false connection with the celebrity before denying registration?[24] Such an interpretation is not plausible because there are separate provisions preventing registration under these circumstances, such that this interpretation would render Section 1052(c) duplicative of Sections 1052(a), (d), and (f).[25] Should the Federal Circuit remand with instructions that the PTO apply one of the First Amendment defenses to the right of publicity detailed above before declining to register a mark, even though those defenses are roundly criticized by scholars?; or perhaps one of the First Amendment defenses that are recommended by scholars?[26] Which one? Is the PTO capable of applying First Amendment balancing tests such as transformative use or fair use in routine registration decisions?; determinations that befuddle and confuse Article III federal courts? Is the PTAB the right body to make such determinations? Do we really want the PTO to be judging distinctions between political speech and purely commercial speech, or might that result in new speech discrimination issues? If the PTO cannot apply a First Amendment test in a reliable, predictable way, must the statute be invalidated because it is impermissibly vague with respect to what speech it burdens?[27]

Or have we gotten this whole question exactly backwards? Perhaps the prohibition on registering famous persons names serves in some way to protect political speech. After all, if the PTO registers a mark that is political commentary about a famous person, this gives the registrant certain nationwide rights allowing the registrant to burden other speakers from using the political speech in commerce to the extent it would result in likely confusion. Hence, in some circumstances registration of famous persons names could perhaps result in less political speech, not more. One thinks of a potential 2024 Marco Rubio presidential campaign that seeks to sell T-Shirts saying TRUMP TOO SMALL, but is burdened by the national registration of that mark by Mr. Elster. As Judge Reyna wrote in dissent in In re Tam, if the expressive content of the mark precludes regulation, on what authority may the government grant Mr. Tam the exclusive right to use this mark in commerce?[28] Perhaps the courts should analyze statutes such as this one in the flexible way Justice Breyer suggests in his partial dissent in Brunetti: by focusing on the interests the First Amendment protects and considering whether the harm to those interests is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.[29] But these are mere dissents, not the law. The government has not met its burden of advancing such a pro-speech rationale. If protecting political speech were the true government interest behind Section 1052(c), it is a wholly insufficient vehicle for protecting that interest. It is insufficient protection because it still allows the political figure himself to register the political speech including his name, thereby burdening others from using that speech in commerce. Moreover, the PTO can register all kinds of marks that constitute political speech so long as they do not contain the name of a famous person without his consent. The binding precedent of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court requires the conclusion that denying the benefits of national registration to marks constituting political speech under these circumstances constitutes an impermissible burden on free speech in violation of the First Amendment.

[1] In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113 USPQ2d 1629, 2015 WL 496132, *12 (TTAB 2015).

[2] Id. at *12-*14.

[3] In re Hoefflin, 97 USPQ2d 1176, 2010 WL 5191373, *3 (TTAB 2010).

[4] In re Elster, No. 20-2205, Doc. 43 (Corrected Joint Appendix) at 111 (Response to Office Action of Feb. 19, 2018) (Fed. Cir.) (available on Pacer).

[5] Id.

[6] See In re Elster, No 20-2205 (Fed. Cir.).

[7] See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is unconstitutional with respect to the bar on disparaging marks), affd, Matal v. Tam, 137 Sup. Ct.1744 (2017); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is unconstitutional with respect to the bar on immoral and scandalous marks), affd, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 Sup. Ct. 2294 (2019).

[8] In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015)).

[9] 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). See also Matal, 137 Sup. Ct. at 1764 & n. 17 (opinion of Alito, J.) ([W]e leave open the question whether Central Hudson provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson scrutiny); Brunetti, 139 Sup.Ct. at 2298 (The Court in Tam held that viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional but could not agree on the overall framework for deciding the case); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1364-68 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (purely commercial speech can be regulated subject to the Central Hudson test).

[10] In re Hoefflin, 2010 WL 5191373, *1.

[11] New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

[12] Jennifer Rothman, The Right of Publicity 145 (Harvard U. Press 2018).

[13] C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007).

[14] Id. at 824.

[15] Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Mark S. Lee,Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 471, 500 (2003)).

[16] Id. at 374.

[17] Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[18] Id. at 409-10.

[19] See, e.g., Davis v. Electronic Arts., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015).

[20] Id.

[21] Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 47. Rothman refers to this as the relatedness test. Rothman, Right of Publicity 146.

[22] Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 100405 (2d Cir. 1989).

[23] See, e.g., David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a Paid-for First Amendment, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 977, 1011 (2014) (The right [of publicity] is growing unchecked, and attempts to balance it against the First Amendment have resulted in a patchwork of misleading potential defenses.); Rothman, The Right of Publicity at 145 (The uncertainty of what a speaker can do has itself chilled speech because content creators do not want to risk litigation or liability.); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2006) ([T]he courts have developed no meaningful counterweight to this ever-expanding right [of publicity]. Instead, they have created a few ad hoc exceptions in cases where the sweeping logic of the right of publicity seems to lead to results they consider unfair.); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903, 930 (2003) ([T]here is good reason to think that the right of publicity is unconstitutional as to all noncommercial speech, and perhaps even as to commercial advertising as well.)

[24] See Brunetti, 139 Sup.Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Our precedents warn us against interpreting statutes in ways that would likely render them unconstitutional).

[25] See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1355 (It is thus permissible to construe a statute in a manner that preserves its constitutionality only where the construction is reasonable.); Brunetti, 139 Sup. Ct. at 2302 & note * (declining to narrowly construe the bar on registering scandalous marks to avoid unconstitutionality).

[26] See, e.g., Franklin & Kuhn; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 23.

[27] See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (OMalley, J., concurring) (opining that the disparagement provision of Section 1052(a) should be invalidated because it is impermissibly vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment).

[28] In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting).

[29] Brunetti, 139 Sup.Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Originally posted here:

Section 1052(c) of the Lanham Act: A First Amendment-Free Zone? - Patently-O

With the holiday season upon us, its the perfect time to reflect on the many things for which we can and should be grateful. And yes, 2021, like the year before it, was a challenging year for most of us. But free speech actually had quite a good year.

Given the state of civil discourse and the human impulse to silence or punish others because of their speech, this may come as a surprise to many. Surely, our free speech culture is a cause for concern. However, if you look more closely, there are also plenty of reasons to be thankful. For example, although America seems more divided today than it has been for the past 50 years, the truth is that Americans are less polarized than we think.

But even if we grant that our free speech culture has seen better days, our First Amendment rights have never been better protected than they are now, at the end of 2021. While our culture continues to try to remind itself that free speech really is a good idea, the judiciary continues to do its job of protecting those freedoms.

So this year, Im thankful for four Supreme Court decisions upholding every Americans First Amendment rights.

Future law students may not appreciate needing to remember the names in the first one, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, but the Supreme Courts 8-1 decision will make it easier to vindicate First Amendment rights in court. Georgia Gwinnett College violated the free speech rights of a student by restricting his speech to a small speech zone and then imposing a speech code to censor him because his religious speech disturbed the tranquility of another student. The violation didnt cost Chike Uzuegbunam anything except many months of not exercising his First Amendment rights. Like many government defendants, the college later tried to avoid adjudication and responsibility for its violation of Uzuegbunams free speech rights by changing its policies, arguing that his $1 nominal damages claim wasnt sufficient to keep the case in court if the colleges free speech violations didnt cost him out of pocket. The Supreme Court held that Uzuegbunams free speech rights were priceless, not worthless, and his case could go forward. This resolves an important question and makes it much more likely that campus and other free speech claimants will get their day in court.

Second is Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L., which will forever be known as the cursing cheerleader case. The 8-1decision in this case affirms that in all but the rarest circumstances, a public schools jurisdiction over student speech ends at the schoolhouse gate. Parents, not principals, should be the ones policing a students social media posts during nonschool hours. While not a home run, the decision was a solid double for free speech. And importantly, it avoided the strikeout scenario, in which the court could have opened the door wide to public schools policing their students speech during nonschool hours.

Third is our own case: Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta. This 6-3 decision protects and reaffirms the freedom to support causes and charities anonymously. In reaffirming its decision in NAACPv.Alabama, the court held that the California attorney general could not collect data on charitable contributions for tens of thousands of charities all over the country. A former executive director of the NAACP described the case as one of the most significant wins for civil rights in decades. Underscoring this point is the most diverse set of organizations ever on one side of a constitutional case in the Supreme Court.

Finally, I am grateful for Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Philadelphia had disqualified a Catholic foster parent placement service because of the stated views of Catholic clergy about foster parent placements with same-sex couples. As we argued to the court, free and voluntary association to address social ills is crucial to maintaining our system of government. Throughout our nations history, fights for civil rights have relied on the simultaneous exercise of civil liberties, including this ability to associate freely. Excluding some volunteers from working to address a problem on the basis of their views would imperil ... the very building blocks of civil society. As in Mahanoy, the court failed to go as far as it could have, but it did side unanimously with the Catholic foster placement agency, protecting its freedom to continue to serve children and foster parents in Philadelphia. This was a win for pluralism and First Amendment rights.

As we enjoy the holidays and close in on the end of 2021, when youre tempted to be despondent about the state of our politics and culture, remember that there are bright spots to be appreciated. You get to watch Alabama in the College Football Playoff (maybe thats just something Im happy about), and your First Amendment rights are on firmer footing now than theyve ever been as we leave 2021 behind. Heres to using those freedoms more in 2022.

Casey Mattox is the vice president for legal and judicial strategy atAmericans for Prosperity.

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First Amendment rights are reason for cheer this holiday season - Washington Examiner

This week in my POLS 117 (freedom of speech) class at UW-Eau Claire, we end the semester by discussing the freedom of expression on the internet. To understand constitutional protections for expression online, it is useful to recount how the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to apply to media that emerged earlier in American history.

The Court has not always found the same level of protection for expression in newer media as it has for the printed word and speech uttered in person. For instance, in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (1915), the Court found that movies received no First Amendment protection. The Court overturned this in Burstyn v. Wilson (1952), when the justices held that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Supreme Court maintains that the First Amendment permits the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to restrict more expression in broadcast media (radio and television) than the government may regulate in print media. In cases like Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC (1969) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), the Court ruled that the government possesses greater power over broadcast media due to three factors: (1) the long history of its regulation, (2) the scarcity of available frequencies, and (3) its invasive nature.

What about the internet? The foundational case is Reno v. ACLU (1997), where the Court ruled that the government does not possess greater regulatory power online like it does for broadcast media. Regarding the three factors above, the Court in Reno found that those factors are not present in cyberspace.

Put another way, in 1997 there was no long history of government regulation of the internet, there was no structural limit to how many people could produce online content, and the internet was not deemed to be invasive. Therefore, the governments power to regulate the internet is more restricted by the First Amendment. In Reno, the Court spoke positively of the internet as a vast platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.

As for social media, the Court in Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) reasoned that a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. The Court went on to state the following: While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace the vast democratic forums of the Internet in general, and social media in particular. Thus, the Court scrutinizes government attempts to ban people from social media.

What about persons who have their accounts removed or suspended by social media companies? While the Constitution protects ones free expression rights from being violated by the government, American courts have not found that the First Amendment restricts what social media companies may do regarding user accounts.

The basis of this approach can be found in a case involving a privately-run cable company, Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck (2019), where the Supreme Court stated that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains governmental actors and protects private actors. Other federal courts have used this reasoning in recent cases to protect social media companies which as private actors possess their own First Amendment rights from laws that would restrict those companies abilities to moderate content or ban/suspend users.

The Supreme Court could eventually overrule or modify some of these precedents, just as it did when overturning Mutual Film Corporation in Burstyn to reinterpret First Amendment protections for movies. Although there are legitimate questions about what powers the government has under the Constitution to regulate social media companies, those companies have not been found to be state actors. Individuals who disapprove of social media companies policies can use their own First Amendment rights to advocate that those companies change their policies. The scope of what the First Amendment protects online is shaped by the Reno, Packingham, and Manhattan Access cases.

Eric T. Kasper is a professor of political science and the director of the Menard Center for Constitutional Studies at UW-Eau Claire. He also serves as the municipal judge for the City of Rice Lake and is a member of the Wisconsin Bar Association.

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Ink Blog: The First Amendment and the internet - Ashland Daily Press

SAN DIEGO (KUSI) The San Diego Unified School District Board of Education Tuesday will consider adopting a set of rules for debates and public comment periods at its board meetings in response to a rise in hate speech and unruly behavior at public meetings both locally and nationally.

The board will consider the Code of Civil Discourse, authored by the National Conflict Resolution Center, at its Tuesday meeting.

The district says most often, the unruly or vitriolic speech is made in response to hot- button topics such as vaccine mandates and the mistaken belief schools are teaching critical race theory, officials said.

Its so important for every public agency to model civility and respect at this point in our nations history, but school boards need to always remember that the way we conduct ourselves sets a model for our students, San Diego Unified School Board President Richard Barrera said in a statement. We are grateful that National Conflict Resolution Center, our longtime partner, is taking a leadership role in advocating that public meetings throughout San Diego county are conducted in a way that allows honest, open, and respectful dialogue even when and especially when we disagree with each other.

According to a district statement, hate speech and disorderly conduct at public meetings have become a major problem for local government bodies nationwide and it has reduced public officials ability to do their jobs and serve their communities effectively.

The Code of Civil Discourse, which was first established by the National Conflict Resolution Center in 2015, is intended to serve as a guide for facilitating civil, respectful discussions of opposing views during public meetings.

Our democracy depends on our ability as Americans to have civil discussions that constructively air different points of view, according to Steven Dinkin, president of the National Conflict Resolution Center, which is based in San Diego. Without this, our elected leaders cannot get things done, and our communities suffer.

However, when ground rules are established and adhered to, it is possible to express views on polarizing topics in a civil, respectful manner and work toward solutions that benefit all involved, Dinkin said. The Code of Civil Discourse is intended to encourage productive conversations about policy issues, no matter how strongly-held the views are on either side, while still respecting all participants First Amendment rights.

Last month, in response to a contentious meeting in which some members of the public used racist and threatening language, the county Board of Supervisors approved the same code.

The change for that body added a series of policies, including:

Reading a statement on the countys policy regarding discrimination and harassment into the record during the meeting;

Prohibiting disruptive conduct, including but not limited to loud or threatening language, whistling, clapping, stamping of feet, speaking over or interrupting the recognized speaker;

Creating parameters for group presentations allowing them only to be given for land use or adjudicatory matters as well as a maximum time period of four minutes for individual members of each group within the 10-minute maximum;

Limiting public comment to one minute per person if there are more than 10 individuals wishing to comment, under the Brown Act;

Adopting a consent calendar for routine or administrative items for which debate is not anticipated;

Asking members of the public to bring their own technology to provide presentations; and

Codifying continued allowance of remote participation by the public to participate in board meetings.

Earlier this year, NCRC partnered with UC San Diego to form the Applied Research Center for Civility, the nations first-ever research center dedicated to conflict resolution, civility and bridging political divides, according to a statement from the center.

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SDUSD to consider a set of rules for public comment at it's board meetings 'while still respecting all participants' First Amendment rights' - - KUSI

Michael Cohen, the former attorney for Donald Trump, has issued a defiant message about his legal fight after filing a lawsuit that claimed his return to federal prison was punishment for writing a critical book about the ex-president.

In December 2018, Cohen was given a three-year sentence for crimes including tax evasion, campaign finance violations and lying to Congress.

But in May 2020, Cohen was allowed to serve his sentence at home due to the COVID pandemic, during which he made public statements about the publication of his book, Disloyal: The True Story of Michael Cohen, Former Personal Attorney to President Donald J. Trump.

Cohen was ordered back to prison, with officials saying he had not accepted certain terms of his release.

U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein ordered Cohen to return to home confinement after saying that his transfer back into custody was a "retaliatory" measure, thwarting his "First Amendment rights to publish a book critical of the president and to discuss the book on social media."

Cohen's lawsuit was filed in a Manhattan federal court on Thursday and names Trump, former Attorney General William Barr and federal prison officials.

It said that upon his return to jail, he was held in solitary confinement for 16 days in a small cell in Otisville, New York. There he suffered shortness of breath, severe headaches and anxiety.

According to the suit, Cohen was "retaliated against" for exercising his First Amendment rights and says he seeks "redress for the extreme physical and emotional harm he suffered as a result of the conduct of all defendants and for the pain and suffering he continues to experience."

On Thursday, Cohen shared a Bloomberg article of news of the lawsuit and added the message: "I will never stop until all of these animals who seek to destroy our democracy are held accountable for their unconstitutional and immoral acts!"

Jeffrey K. Levine, an attorney for Cohen, told The Associated Press, "without accountability, we have only chaos."

The suit says Cohen was the victim of a long line of "retaliatory measures" taken by Trump and his associates "in the weaponization of his administration against his enemies."

It also referred to attempts to stop books critical of Trump written by former security adviser John Bolton and the ex-president's niece, Mary Trump.

Cohen spent over 13 months in prison and another year and a half in home confinement. He had faced campaign finance charges connected with helping arrange payments during the 2016 presidential race to silence claims by adult film star Stormy Daniels and model Karen McDougal about affairs with Trump that the ex-president has denied.

Cohen has made public calls for Trump to be prosecuted and has given information to New York prosecutors looking into whether the ex-president misled banks or tax authorities about the value of his assets to get loans or tax breaks.

Newsweek has contacted Trump and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for comment.

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Michael Cohen Says He 'Will Never Stop' After Suing Donald Trump - Newsweek

Mississippi had actually filed its abortion appeal in the previous term, in June 2020, when Justice Ginsburg was still alive, but it wasnt until nearly a year later, this past May, that the court agreed to hear it. The case, Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization, met none of the usual criteria for deciding whether to hear a case: In overturning the states ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit simply applied binding precedent, and there was no dispute among the lower federal courts for the Supreme Court to resolve. What the case offered was a vehicle the newly empowered anti-abortion supermajority was waiting for.

The decision to hear the New York gun case, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, came after years during which the court sidestepped multiple opportunities to expand on the Heller decision, to the frustration of Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, who had taken to complaining that their colleagues were turning the Second Amendment into a second-class right. Their protests finally bore fruit in March of this year, when the court accepted an appeal filed by a National Rifle Association affiliate.

The grant of review in the Maine religious schools case came at the very end of the last term. The grant itself was no surprise; the case is tailor-made to complete a project that Chief Justice Roberts has approached incrementally with the clear goal of enabling religious institutions to enjoy the same public benefits as secular institutions.

His mentor and predecessor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, had a similar goal but lacked the votes, or perhaps the will, to see it to completion. One of his last major opinions, Locke v. Davey in 2004, held that while a state could choose to subsidize religious education, it was not required by the First Amendments Free Exercise Clause to do so. There needed to be play in the joints, Rehnquist wrote, connecting the First Amendments two religion clauses, one that protects the free exercise of religion and the other that prohibits religious establishment by the government.

The new case would transform the permissive into the mandatory, asking the court to rule that Maine cannot exclude religious schools from a program that, in school districts too small to have their own high schools, offers tuition reimbursement to parents who choose to send their children to a private school.

The line Maine drew for its tuition program was based on the states concern that to channel public money to the coffers of parochial schools that provide religious instruction, even though it is a program that relies on parental choice, would violate the Establishment Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the exclusion on the ground that the programs purpose was to duplicate, for children lacking access to a local public high school, the religiously neutral education that a public high school offers. During the oral argument, the conservative justices seemed unable to grasp that simple proposition. They insisted to the states lawyer, Chief Deputy Attorney General Christopher Taub, that some kind of rank anti-religious discrimination was afoot.

Mr. Taub readily agreed with Justice Brett Kavanaugh that a state could not subsidize tuition at the schools of one faith while withholding the subsidy from schools of other religions; that would be discrimination, obviously. But Justice Kavanaugh wanted more. Our case law suggests that discriminating against all religions, as compared to secular, is discriminatory just as it is discriminatory to say exclude the Catholic and the Jewish and include the Protestant, he told Mr. Taub. While the courts recent precedents may suggest such an equal-footing principle when it comes to public education, they arent quite there yet. They soon will be. The Establishment Clause, long understood as a barrier to taxpayer subsidy of religious education, was almost completely absent from the argument. Its absence will be more than rhetorical if the challenge to the Maine program succeeds.

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Opinion | Trump Weaponized the Supreme Court - The New York Times