Report: Mobile of German investigator into NSA spying possibly hacked

Berlin (dpa) - The encrypted mobile phone of a legislator leading investigations of US electronic spying on German officials has possibly been hacked, according to a report in newspaper Die Welt.

According to the report, which appeared online Tuesday, Patrick Sensburg, chairman of a committee looking into questions of internet spying, noticed problems with his Blackberry Z30 in February and sent the device to Germanys Federal Office for Information Security for servicing.

When the phone emerged from its security packaging at the office in Bonn, it was clear that the special transporter had been opened while the phone was in transit and signs that the phone removed and replaced, raising fears that someone had accessed its data.

Officials at the legislature, or Bundestag, have demanded an investigation.

Sensburgs committee was created in 2014 as German grappled with the news that various officials and institutions, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, had been the target of spying by the US National Security Agency.

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Report: Mobile of German investigator into NSA spying possibly hacked

Google reneges on its promise of encryption by default for Lollipop devices

Not wanting to be outdone by Apple, when it was announced that iOS 8 would encrypt data by default, Google felt compelled to follow suit. Back in September Google said that in Lollipop "encryption will be enabled by default out of the box, so you won't even have to think about turning it on". But six months is a long time, and it now seems that Google has had a change of heart.

Well, as noted by Ars Technica, many of the Lollipop handsets appearing at MWC 2015 -- including the Samsung Galaxy S6 -- do not have encryption enabled. Of course there is nothing to stop users from manually enabling it, but that's not really the point; the idea was that you "won't even have to think about turning it on". So what gives?

It's all about performance. On-the-fly encryption and decryption eats up valuable processor time, and handsets took a hit in terms of speed. Take a look at a blog post from Google about the release of Lollipop from late October and you'll immediately notice references to "new security features protecting you, like encryption by default" and the assurance that "full device encryption occurs at first boot".

But scroll to the bottom of the post and you'll see that there's an addendum:

In September, we announced that all new Android Lollipop devices would be encrypted by default. Due to performance issues on some Android partner devices, we are not yet at encryption by default on every new Lollipop device. That said, our new Nexus devices are encrypted by default and Android users (Jelly Bean and above) have the option to encrypt the data on their device in Settings ---> Security ---> Encryption. We remain firmly committed to encryption because it helps keep users safe and secure on the web.

Such is the change of heart that full device encryption by default is no longer a requirement for partners according to Google's Android Compatibility Program document (section 9.9 on page 59) it's now optional:

If the device implementation has a lock screen, the device MUST support full-disk encryption of the application private data, (/datapartition) as well as the SD card partition if it is a permanent, non-removable part of the device [Resources, 107]. For devices supporting full-disk encryption, the full-disk encryption SHOULD be enabled all the time after the user has completed the out-of-box experience. While this requirement is stated as SHOULD for this version of the Android platform, it is very strongly RECOMMENDED as we expect this to change to MUST in the future versions of Android.

So there is still a requirement for Samsung et al to support device encryption, but there is no requirement for it to be enabled as initially promised. You'll notice that the Android Compatibility Program document was last updated in the middle of January -- Google didnt publicize the change, and it's only now that people are starting to notice and question it.

Problems with performance and compatibility are quite reasonable reasons for delaying encryption by default, but Google's lack of transparency is worrying. Following Google's promises back in the latter end of 2014, anyone buying a new Lollipop device would quite reasonably expect that their device is encrypted -- and the uninitiated may not even bother to check. The balance between performance and security is one for users to make for themselves, but Google needs to be open and honest about what is going on.

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Google reneges on its promise of encryption by default for Lollipop devices

What you need to know about the ‘FREAK’ bug

Now that has come back to haunt us, in the form of a nasty computer bug.

Researchers have discovered a flaw -- which they call the FREAK bug -- that can let a hacker spy on your Internet session and steal your login credentials.

It affects lots of supposedly secure websites, from Symantec.com to NSA.gov. Apple's Safari browser and some Android Web browsers are vulnerable. (Google's Chrome, Mozilla's Firefox and Microsoft's Internet Explorer are OK.)

Apple (AAPL, Tech30) told CNNMoney it plans to have a fix for iPhone and Mac users next week in the form of a software update. Google (GOOG) did not immediately respond requests for comment.

Kickstarter, WePay, and many other websites that feature Facebook (FB, Tech30) "like" buttons are also vulnerable to this, researchers said.

The issue, explained

Buried somewhere deep inside the code of some Web browsers and websites is an old, weak version of encryption that can easily be cracked. And the only reason it exists is because of bad U.S. policies that have since been abolished.

Back in the 1990s, the federal government restricted the export of powerful data encryption. Computer companies were forced to employ two versions of encryption: weak and strong. But the weak stuff stuck around long after it was no longer needed.

The bug was found late last year by academic security researchers at the French computer science institute INRIA. They've been quietly helping Apple and others fix this behind the scenes since November. They dubbed it the FREAK bug, short for "Factoring Related Attack on RSA Keys."

Akamai (AKAM), a company that hosts websites with an extra layer of protection, made the bug public on Tuesday. The company said it's racing to fix the problem for all of its customers.

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What you need to know about the 'FREAK' bug

What to know about the ‘FREAK’ computer bug

Now that has come back to haunt us, in the form of a nasty computer bug.

Researchers have discovered a flaw -- which they call the FREAK bug -- that can let a hacker spy on your Internet session and steal your login credentials.

It affects lots of supposedly secure websites, from Symantec.com to NSA.gov. Apple's Safari browser and some Android Web browsers are vulnerable. (Google's Chrome, Mozilla's Firefox and Microsoft's Internet Explorer are OK.)

Apple (AAPL, Tech30) told CNNMoney it plans to have a fix for iPhone and Mac users next week in the form of a software update. Google (GOOG) did not immediately respond requests for comment.

Kickstarter, WePay, and many other websites that feature Facebook (FB, Tech30) "like" buttons are also vulnerable to this, researchers said.

The issue, explained

Buried somewhere deep inside the code of some Web browsers and websites is an old, weak version of encryption that can easily be cracked. And the only reason it exists is because of bad U.S. policies that have since been abolished.

Back in the 1990s, the federal government restricted the export of powerful data encryption. Computer companies were forced to employ two versions of encryption: weak and strong. But the weak stuff stuck around long after it was no longer needed.

The bug was found late last year by academic security researchers at the French computer science institute INRIA. They've been quietly helping Apple and others fix this behind the scenes since November. They dubbed it the FREAK bug, short for "Factoring Related Attack on RSA Keys."

Akamai (AKAM), a company that hosts websites with an extra layer of protection, made the bug public on Tuesday. The company said it's racing to fix the problem for all of its customers.

See the original post:
What to know about the 'FREAK' computer bug

Bad, old U.S. policy causes ‘FREAK’ computer bug

Now that has come back to haunt us, in the form of a nasty computer bug.

Researchers have discovered a flaw -- which they call the FREAK bug -- that can let a hacker spy on your Internet session and steal your login credentials.

It affects lots of supposedly secure websites, from Symantec.com to NSA.gov. Apple's Safari browser and some Android Web browsers are vulnerable. (Google's Chrome, Mozilla's Firefox and Microsoft's Internet Explorer are OK.)

Apple (AAPL, Tech30) told CNNMoney it plans to have a fix for iPhone and Mac users next week in the form of a software update. Google (GOOG) did not immediately respond requests for comment.

Kickstarter, WePay, and many other websites that feature Facebook (FB, Tech30) "like" buttons are also vulnerable to this, researchers said.

The issue, explained

Buried somewhere deep inside the code of some Web browsers and websites is an old, weak version of encryption that can easily be cracked. And the only reason it exists is because of bad U.S. policies that have since been abolished.

Back in the 1990s, the federal government restricted the export of powerful data encryption. Computer companies were forced to employ two versions of encryption: weak and strong. But the weak stuff stuck around long after it was no longer needed.

The bug was found late last year by academic security researchers at the French computer science institute INRIA. They've been quietly helping Apple and others fix this behind the scenes since November. They dubbed it the FREAK bug, short for "Factoring Related Attack on RSA Keys."

Akamai (AKAM), a company that hosts websites with an extra layer of protection, made the bug public on Tuesday. The company said it's racing to fix the problem for all of its customers.

Read this article:
Bad, old U.S. policy causes 'FREAK' computer bug

What the FREAK? Huge SSL security flaw stems from US government backdoor

Seven hours is all it takes to crack the encryption that is in place on some supposedly secure websites. Security experts blame the US government's ban on the use of strong encryption back in the 1990s for a vulnerability that has just come to light. Named FREAK (Factoring attack on RSA-EXPORT Keys), the flaw exists on high-profile websites including, ironically, NSA.gov.

Restrictions that limited security to just 512-bit encryptions were lifted in the late 90s, but not before it was baked into software that is still in use today. The ban on the shipping of software with stronger encryption apparently backfired as it found its way back into the States. Security experts say the problem is serious, and the vulnerability is relatively easy to exploit.

Browsers can be hijacked and tricked into accessing websites using legacy encryption -- this was the discovery of researchers at Inria in France. There was disbelief that such old protection measures were still being used, but it soon became clear that hackers needed just a matter of hours to exploit the weak security to steal passwords and personal information, or even launch a full-scale attack on a website.

Talking to the Washington Post Matthew Green, a cryptographer at Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute, said that US government had effectively weakened its own security with the earlier ban on the exporting of strong encryption. "When we say this is going to make things weaker, we're saying this for a reason."

The vulnerability could be exploited on vulnerable sites, with encryption cracked in just seven hours. Worryingly, if test samples are correct, more than a quarter of websites that were previously thought to be secure are vulnerable to the problem. In a blog post, Green explains that the vulnerability affects OpenSSL (used by Android) and Apple TLS/SSL clients (used by Safari). He goes on to explain that "the SSL protocol itself was deliberately designed to be broken" and that a man-in-the-middle attack could be easily launched on sites:

The 512-bit export grade encryption was a compromise between dumb and dumber. In theory it was designed to ensure that the NSA would have the ability to 'access' communications, while allegedly providing crypto that was still 'good enough' for commercial use. Or if you prefer modern terms, think of it as the original "golden master key".

In effect, a backdoor put in place by the US government has left countless websites insecure. Green points out that the lengthy list of affected sites includes connect.facebook.net which is used to deliver Facebook's Like button to millions of websites. If this was hijacked, the consequences could be dire.

Patches will almost certainly be on the way, but the final word goes to Matthew Green who sums up the source of the problem quite succinctly:

Encryption backdoors will always turn around and bite you in the ass. They are never worth it.

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What the FREAK? Huge SSL security flaw stems from US government backdoor

The Open Source Squad at the GSA

A team of open source evangelists is working within the General Services Administration as part of a federal initiative for more transparent government use of technology.

18F, a development unit within the GSA, was established a year ago to tap into the success of the United Kingdom's Government Digital Services unit by pursuing a similar strategy.

The unit is tasked with getting developers from Silicon Valley and the ranks of civic developers all over the country to change how federal technology gets done. The hub of this push for open source consolidation for government agencies is 18F's GitHub account.

This open source team, however, is only focused on establishing an open source model for software projects developed within federal agencies. It has a hands-off attitude toward integrating free and open source software as a replacement for proprietary licensed commercial software.

"There is no focus yet on integrating front-end open source products to replace proprietary software in government agencies...we are really more about custom software development in the open," Greg Godbout, executive director of the General Services Administration's 18F, told LinuxInsider.

18F opened its doors last March. The relatively small unit began operations as a transition team of eight members. The group banded together after an initial fellowship program ended.

The idea to start an open source centered movement within the GSA grew out of the Presidential Innovation Fellowship program. The concept involved bringing highly-skilled technologists into the government, according to Hillary Hartley, deputy executive director of the General Services Administration's 18F.

The idea grew into a plan to get the same folks who participated in the temporary open source program to permanently join the government. At the end of 2013, a number of fellows who had been together found a way to get funding so they could continue working the program after their six-month fellowships ended.

"Eight of us in December [2013] stayed on in the GSA as an in-house consultancy team for the rest of the government. The program has grown from there," Hartley told LinuxInsider.

At the beginning of last year, the 18F consultants recognized that they needed to focus on hiring and the process of deploying websites. With open source concepts in mind, they focused on how to hire efficiently and how to work effectively with the rest of the GSA.

The rest is here:
The Open Source Squad at the GSA

How to keep your email private with PGP encryption on your Mac

In our last episode of Private I, I explained the basics of public-key (PK) cryptography, a way to scramble messages in a way that only someone possessing a particular key can decrypt, without that key ever having to be publicly disclosed or shared. Its an effective system that has no known theoretical exploits, and currently deployed implementations are considered robust.

And to recap: The clever bit with the public-key approach is that you have two complementary keys, one public and one private. The public key can be freely distributed. Anything encrypted by someone else with the public key can only be decrypted by having access to the corresponding private key. And a private key can be used to sign a string of text or a document to prove mathematically that only the private keys possessor could have signed it.

But there are two missing pieces that would let Mac, iOS, and other platforms users take advantage of PK. The first is pragmatic: Senders and recipients need compatible software tools or plugins, preferably integrated into apps so that little effort is required. The second is existential: Without pre-arrangement, such as meeting in person or a phone call, how do you know that what purports to be someones public key is actually that persons key?

The easiest way to solve both problems is to use an end-to-end proprietary ecosystem, but that gets us back, more or less, to iMessage or something similar. Silent Circle has one of the best options that embeds public-key cryptography, if you can convince all the people with whom you need to communicate to opt in. It starts at $10 per month for unlimited text, calls, video chat, and file transfers among its users. The services messaging and calling options received scores of 7 out of 7 in the Electronic Frontier Foundations secure messaging scorecard.

But most of us dont live in a walled garden, and one of the companys founders, Phil Zimmermann, is responsible nearly 25 years ago for turning public-key cryptography into what he called PGP, for Pretty Good Privacy. (How PGP works is described in Part 1.)

Composing a message in Mail to a recipient whose key is in your local GPG Keychain, the lock icon can be clicked to encrypt the message when sent.

PGP is available for the Mac via GPGTools, a version of the free software GPG (GNU Privacy Guard). It lets you build a directory of other peoples public keys, while also letting you carry out encryption, decryption, signing, and verifying. (PGP is a trademark, and GPG coined to get around it, but youll often see PGP used generically to refer to this method of using public keys.)

The EFF has very nice step-by-step instructions for installing GPGTools to allow it to be used directly with either Apple Mail or Mozilla Thunderbird for email; the tools are also available via the application Services menu wherever you can manipulate or select text. GPGTools is currently free, but plans to charge a very modest fee for its email plug-in at some point to help support development costs.

The sent message is shown in the Sent mailbox as being encrypted, and has to be decrypted to view as in this window.

The EFF instructions walk you through creating your own public/private key in GPG Keychain. To use GPGTools with email, your key needs to have the same email address as the return address from which you want to send encrypted messages. Once you have a key, you can upload a key to a keyserver by selecting your key and choosing Key > Send Public Key to Keyserver. This makes your key searchable by your name and email address in a PGP directory. A key has an associated fingerprint, a cryptographic transformation of the public key thats far shorter, which Ill get to in a moment.

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How to keep your email private with PGP encryption on your Mac

Light, meet matter: Single-photon quantum memory in diamond optical phonons at room temperature

11 hours ago by Stuart Mason Dambrot Experimental concept, energy level diagram, and setup. (a) The memory protocol. A horizontally (H) polarized single photon (green, 723 nm) is written into the quantum memory with a vertically (V) polarized write pulse (red, 800 nm). After a delay , an H-polarized read pulse recalls a V-polarized photon. (b) Energy levels in the memory. The ground state j0i and the storage state |1>correspond to the crystal ground state and an optical phonon, respectively. The signal photon and the read-write pulses are in two-photon resonance with the optical phonon (40 THz) and are far detuned from the conduction band j2i. (c) The experimental setup. The laser output is split to pump the photon source and to produce the orthogonally polarized read and write beams. The photons are produced in pairs with one (signal) at 723 nm and the other (herald) at 895 nm. The signal photon is stored in, and recalled from, the quantum memory. The herald and signal photons are detected using APDs and correlations between them are measured using a coincidence logic unit. Credit: D. G. England, K. A.G. Fisher, J-P. W. MacLean, P. J. Bustard, R. Lausten, K. J. Resch, and B. J. Sussman, Storage and Retrieval of THz-Bandwidth Single Photons Using a Room-Temperature Diamond Quantum Memory, Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 053602 (2015).

(Phys.org)Photonic quantum technologies including cryptography, enhanced measurement and information processing face a conundrum: They require single photons, but these are difficult to create, manipulate and measure. At the same time, quantum memories enable these technologies by acting as a photonic buffer. Therefore, an ideal part of the solution would be a single-photon on-demand read/write quantum memory. To date, however, development of a practical single-photon quantum memory has been stymied by (1) the need for high efficiency, (2) the read/write lasers used introducing noise that contaminates the quantum state, and (3) decoherence of the information stored in the memory.

Recently, scientists at National Research Council of Canada, Ottawa and Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo demonstrated storage and retrieval of terahertz-bandwidth single photons via a quantum memory in the optical phonons modes of a room-temperature bulk diamond. The researchers report that the quantum memory is low noise, high speed and broadly tunable, and therefore promises to be a versatile light-matter interface for local quantum processing applications. Moreover, unlike existing approaches, the novel device does not require cooling or optical preparation before storage, and is a few millimeters in size. The scientists conclude that diamond is a robust, convenient, and high-speed system extremely well-suited to evaluating operational memory parameters, studying the effects of noise, and developing quantum protocols.

Prof. Benjamin J. Sussman discussed the paper that he, Prof. Kevin Resch, Dr. Duncan G. England, and their colleagues published in Physical Review Letters. "The possibility of using single photons in quantum technologies offers a host of new opportunities in measurement and communications," Sussman tells Phys.org. "However, it's challenging to do so because the light we typically use that is, from the sun, light bulbs, or lasers contains tremendous numbers of photons." Therefore, much of the technology for manipulating and measuring light (including naturally-evolved light-detecting biological organs, such as our eye) have been designed to deal with larger numbers of photons and in addition, background noise from the faintest light source can mask these single photons.

"Creating a single photon is also a formidable problem," Sussman continues, adding that to generate single photons the scientists employ a low probability stochastic quantum optics process called spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). The method of generation is very effective, but the challenge is that being a probabilistic process a photon is generated not on demand, but unpredictably. "We have to wait for success and then perform an experiment, which means most of the time the experiment fails," Sussman explains. "However, quantum memories are very interesting because they act as photon buffers, and can convert a probabilistic process into a deterministic one. This effectively turns a repeat-until-success single-photon source into an on-demand source."

Sussman notes that the most difficult technical obstacle was verifying the non-classical photon statistics of the memory output. To determine whether single photons were actually retrieved from quantum memory, the scientists performed a so-called g(2) measurement (the degree of coherence between two fields) in which the output photon was coupled into a 50:50 beam splitter, and detectors placed at both output ports. "Because single photons are indivisible, one would never expect to measure coincident detection in both arms and this is what we were able to confirm. Nevertheless, experiments aren't perfect and where the single photon is even slightly contaminated by background noise, we very occasionally make a coincidence measurement. As a result, measuring enough of these coincidences in order to collect significant statistics required over 150 hours of continuous data acquisition." He adds that graduate students Kent Fisher and JP MacLean worked tirelessly to perform the experiment.

"A quantum memory is a conversion between quantum states of light and matter," Sussman tells Phys.org. "However, decoherence is constantly destroying the crucial quantum nature of the matter system, and thus the advantages of quantum technologies. Typically the narrow linewidths of the quantum levels involved limit the bandwidth of such memories to the gigahertz range or below. Our challenge was therefore to work with very short pulses of light to beat decoherence that is, to perform our operations before the system decays. Again, ultrafast Spontaneous Parametric Down-conversion is the most popular source of high purity single photons but with femtosecond oscillators it produces THz-bandwidth photons that can't fully be utilized in lower bandwidth systems. We were able to bridge this three orders of magnitude gap between light and matter by building an ultrafast capable quantum memory."

Since all quantum systems suffer from decoherence effects when they interact with an external environment, isolating the quantum system from its environment is a universal problem in quantum technology. "The key insight behind our experiment was that ultrafast lasers can avoid decoherence. Rather than try to isolate our memory from the environment, we address it on timescales that are fast compared to decoherence by using ultrafast laser pulses of ~200 femtoseconds duration."

Sussman notes that ultrafast lasers were developed to study picosecond and femtosecond dynamics in molecular and bulk phonon vibrations. "It's therefore not surprising that we'd employ these vibration or similar systems as substrates to operate at ultrafast speeds for quantum processing and Dr. England was able to leverage his expertise in these two areas to bridge the National Research Council and Institute for Quantum Computing teams and make the project a success."

The paper states that because the quantum memory is low noise, high speed and broadly tunable, it promises to be a versatile light-matter interface for local quantum processing applications. Sussman explains that the interface between light and matter is an important frontier for quantum information science, in that it combines the advantages of photonic qubits (which move fast and have long decoherence times) with those of matter qubits (stationary and with strong interactions). "The diamond memory is an important innovation because it provides a robust and convenient platform on which to investigate this interface," which he adds are due to its key advantages:

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Light, meet matter: Single-photon quantum memory in diamond optical phonons at room temperature