New Arizona Law Will Make it Illegal to Film Within Eight Feet of Police – Reason

Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey, a Republican, signed a bill into law Wednesday that will make it illegal to film the police within eight feet.

The legislation, H.B. 2319, makes it a misdemeanor offense to continue filming police activity from within eight feet of an officer after receiving a verbal warning. The bill originally restricted filming the police from no closer than 15 feet away, but it was amended after criticisms.

There are also exceptions for filming the police in a private residence, during a traffic stop, and for the subject of a police encounter. But the law qualifies those exceptions, saying they apply only if the person recording is "not interfering with lawful police actions," or "unless a law enforcement officer determines that the person is interfering in the law enforcement activity or that it is not safe to be in the area and orders the person to leave the area."

Interfering with police, or obstruction of justice, is one of the most frequently cited justifications for frivolous and retaliatory arrests.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Arizona opposed the legislation, saying it "lacks specificity and gives officers too much discretionmaking it the bill more apt to protect bad cops who want to hide misconduct than those who are doing their job properly with a bystander recording nearby."

The bill's sponsor, state Rep. John Kavanagh (RFountain Hills), wrote in a March op-ed that he introduced it "because there are groups hostile to the police that follow them around to videotape police incidents, and they get dangerously close to potentially violent encounters."

"I can think of no reason why any responsible person would need to come closer than 8 feet to a police officer engaged in a hostile or potentially hostile encounter," Kavanagh wrote. "Such an approach is unreasonable, unnecessary and unsafe, and should be made illegal.

T. Greg Doucette, a criminal defense attorney who also specializes in free speech law, told Reason in February that there are constitutional problems with the law.

"Can you be arrested for standing still while wearing a GoPro under this statute?" Doucette asked. "It seems the answer here is yes, which would violate the First Amendment (since standing still isn't interfering with an officer's duties)."

The First Amendment right to film the police has been upheld by several federal appeals courts, as Reason's Billy Binion has reported:

The right to film government officials in public has been at the center of a slew of legal challenges over the last few decades. And several federal appeals courtsincluding the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 11th Circuitshave ruled that it is indeed an activity protected by the First Amendment.

It was also established in the 9th Circuitwhere Arizona is locatedalmost 30 years ago, in a 1995 decision where the court ruled that a cop violated the Constitution when he physically sought to stop a man from videotaping a public protest in 1990.

The National Press Photographers Association, joined by numerous media outlets and press freedom groups, issued a letter in February opposing the bill. They declared that the legislation"violates not only the free speech and press clauses of the First Amendment, but also runs counter to the 'clearly established right' to photograph and record police officers performing their official duties in a public place."

While civil liberties groups say recording the police is both protected and crucial for government accountability, lawmakers in some states have been trying to make it harder for citizens to do it. In addition to Arizona, the South Carolina and Florida legislatures have also introduced bills over the past two years to restrict the ability to film the police.

State legislators should be less concerned with cops' feelings and more concerned about citizens' right to document how armed government agents go about their business. Giving officers another discretionary offense to slap on someone who annoys them will lead only to more confusion and more censorship.

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1A Remaking America: Is It Time For A 28th Constitutional Amendment? : 1A – NPR

The 19th Amendment was ratified 100 years ago this week. ANDREW HARNIK/POOL/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

The 19th Amendment was ratified 100 years ago this week.

America wouldn't be the country it is today without its 27 constitutional amendments.

It was these later additions to the founding document that ended slavery in the U.S. and granted Americans the right to bear arms.

It also protected the right for a show like ours to existand gave us our name1A, after the First Amendment.

But the last time a new one was added was 30 years ago.

We'll hear from the person who got the 27th amendment ratified later. But the push to add a 28th is happening now. We hear from one of those voices too.

Three-fourths of the states must ratify an amendment before it gets added to the Constitution. In today's divided nation, could any issue realistically gain that level of support?

Russ Feingold, Aziz Rana, Zakiya Thomas, and Gregory Watson join us for the conversation.

This conversation is part of our Remaking America collaboration with six public radio stations around the country. Remaking America is funded in part by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

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Letter: Don’t patronize me on the Second Amendment – NRToday.com

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Letter: Don't patronize me on the Second Amendment - NRToday.com

John G. Malcolm: On abortion, guns and speech, the Supreme Court respects text of Constitution – Madison.com

The three words that best describe the U.S. Supreme Courts decisions this term are "text," "history" and "tradition." If thats one word too many, try this: Originalism rules! And thats a good thing.

The court considered several important constitutional cases this term. The split in most of these cases was 6-3, with the conservative justices in the majority and the liberal justices in dissent.

In the biggest case, Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization, a five-justice majority ruled the Constitution has no right to obtain an abortion. This overturned Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).

Nearly 50 years ago, Justice Byron White, in his Roe dissent, wrote that the errant ruling represented an exercise of raw judicial power. Similarly, John Hart Ely, an eminent scholar who supported abortion rights, stated that Roe was not constitutional law and g(ave) almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.

Those views were reflected in the majority opinion for Dobbs, written by Justice Samuel Alito. He noted that the right to an abortion is not in the Constitutions text, nor was it part of our nations history or traditions. Indeed, virtually every state outlawed abortion when the Constitution and the 14th Amendment were ratified.

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The court also decided an important Second Amendment case, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the 6-3 majority opinion, striking down a New York law requiring law-abiding citizens who passed a background check to demonstrate a special need beyond a general desire to defend oneself before being permitted to carry a firearm outside the home.

The court said that such a restriction was not supported by drumroll, please either the amendments text or the nations historical traditions. The court further stated the amendment was the product of an interest balancing by the people and that it was improper for a court to engage in a judge-empowering interest-balancing inquiry once the protections of the amendment had been properly invoked.

In an important religious liberty case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the six-justice majority opinion that a school violated the free exercise and free speech rights of a high school football coach when it fired him for offering a silent post-game prayer at midfield. The court relied on you guessed it historical practices and the original meaning of the First Amendments text.

The court also finally declared that the courts much-criticized three-part test for analyzing Establishment Clause cases, promulgated in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) which Justice Antonin Scalia once described as some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried was indeed dead.

The court also sided with religious adherents in other significant religious liberty and free speech cases, including Carson v. Makin, Shurtleff v. City of Boston, and Ramirez v. Collier. Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, won a significant victory against the Federal Election Commission in which the court, again by a 6-3 vote, held that an FEC rule violated the First Amendment rights of candidates wishing to make personal loans to their own campaigns to engage in pure political speech.

And in NFIB v. OSHA, West Virginia v. EPA and Alabama Association of Realtors v. HHS, the court (via 6-3 votes) held that the separation of powers requires Congress to speak clearly before an administrative agency consisting of unaccountable bureaucrats can exercise nearly unlimited power over decisions of great economic and political significance.

In his dissenting opinion in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, Justice Benjamin Curtis stated: When a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men who, for the time being, have power to declare what the Constitution is according to their views of what it ought to mean.

During this momentous term, the court made great strides toward interpreting the Constitution with fidelity and restoring the rights of all Americans to govern themselves with the exception of those few individual rights that are delineated in our Constitution or firmly rooted in our nations historical traditions. The people should debate, persuade and decide contentious issues directly or through their elected representatives.

In terms of interpreting and adhering to the Constitution, the court deserves an A+" for its latest term.

Malcolm is a Heritage Foundation vice president and the director of its Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies: http://www.heritage.org. He wrote this for InsideSources.com.

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John G. Malcolm: On abortion, guns and speech, the Supreme Court respects text of Constitution - Madison.com

5 Monumental Cases That Highlighted the Supreme Court’s 2021-2022 Term – Heritage.org

TheSupreme Courthas just finished what will likely go down as one of the most momentous and memorable terms in history.

In addition to the court deciding many blockbuster cases from abortion to the limits of the power of the federal bureaucracy,Justice Stephen Breyerretired, now-Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was sworn in to replace him; there was an unprecedentedleakof a draft opinion,protestersshowed up at justices homes in several attempts to intimidate them, and an armed man made a serious threat to one of the justices lives basedin parton that leaked draft opinion.

This term saw major victories for religious liberty and Second Amendment rights. There were also important decisions about the powers possessed by administrative agencies.

What did the Supreme Court decide this term? How did each of the justices rule? And how is America impacted by the courts rulings?

Theres just too much information for one article (which is why you should watch The Heritage Foundations Scholars and Scribes event), but below is a summary of five major cases from this term.

Overturning Roe v. Wade: Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization

Thiscasearose from a challenge to Mississippis 2018 Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks of gestation except in cases of medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality.

While the state claimed an interest in protecting the lives of innocent unborn children and their mothers, abortion provider Jackson Womens Health Organization sued the state for passing the law, alleging that the law violated Mississippians constitutional rights to access abortion.

Both the federal district court and the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the abortion provider, ruling that the law violated the Supreme Courts framework established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

In what became a historic victory for legal originalists and pro-life advocates alike, the court overruled both Roe and Casey to uphold the Mississippi law. The 6-3 majority opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, held that because a right to abortion is neither found in the text of the Constitution nor deeply rooted in the nations history and tradition, the Constitution does not provide for such a right.

Accordingly, the authority to regulate abortion was returned to the people through their elected representatives in each states legislature, which is where it had resided for all of our nations history prior to the Roe ruling in 1973.

The court also found that a proper application of stare decisis, which is Latin for the thing decided, counseled in favor of overturning Roe and Casey.

First, as to the nature of the error, Roe was not just wrong from a legal perspective, it was egregiously wrong.

Second, the quality of reasoning in the Roe decision was poor, as it lacked any grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent. Rather than stating what the law was, the Roe court established a detailed set of rules for pregnancy that looked more like it was writing a law than a judicial opinion, which is not the courts role.

Third, the workability of past abortion precedent was insufficient and unclear, making it difficult to apply and establish uniform enforcement in the real world.

Fourth, Roes and Caseys deleterious impact on other areas of law was tremendous, leading to the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines.

And fifth and finally, reliance interests would not be upended by overturning Roe and Casey. In other words, contrary to claims by those in favor of keeping Roe and Casey, the court found that individuals had not relied on those court cases to make long-term decisions and order their affairs.

Because regulating abortion does not violate the Constitution and the Mississippi Legislature had legitimate state interests to support its Gestational Age Act, the court upheld it.

The Right to Carry a Gun for Self-defense: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen

This case arose from a challenge to New Yorks strict standards for issuing a license to carry a concealed firearm. The state issued concealed carry licenses only to applicants who could show proper-cause for needing one, which did not include a generalized need for self-protection.

Two adult, law-abiding New York residents sued the state after being denied licenses for not meeting this standard. They only stated that they had a generalized need for self-protection and said that New Yorks refusal to issue them a permit violated their Second and 14th Amendment rights.

The court agreed and found that the proper-cause requirement violates both the Second and 14th Amendments. The 6-3 opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas rejected the use of the prevailing framework for evaluating Second Amendment claims, saying instead that the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.

The court said that text of the Second Amendment protects the right to carry handguns in public for self-defense, without a home/public distinction. Besides a few outliers in the late 1800s, American lawmakers have not broadly prohibited public carry of a commonly used firearm for self-defense, nor have they required a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.

This means that in states and localities that have good cause requirements for issuing handgun permits over and above a generalized need for self-defense, those requirements likely do not survive this ruling.

Protecting Prayer by Government Employees in the Workplace: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

This case arose from a challenge to the Bremerton, Washington, school districts decision to fire a high school football coach for kneeling on the football field after games to offer a personal silent prayer. Coach Joe Kennedy had prayed after each game since 2008. While some players joined him at different times, he never required nor encouraged them to do so.

The school district terminated Kennedy, claiming that allowing any overt actions that might appear to a reasonable observer to endorse prayer while he is on duty as a District-paid coach would violate the First Amendments establishment clause.

Kennedy sued the school district, alleging that it had violated his free exercise and free speech rights under the First Amendment.

The court sided with Kennedy, holding that both the free exercise and free speech clauses protect an individual engaging in personal religious observance from governmental reprisal. Moreover, the court said that the establishment clause neither requires nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

Under the courts ruling, the school district violated the free exercise clause because its policy was neither neutral nor generally applicable to everyone, but instead targeted Kennedys conduct because it was religious. It also violated the free speech clause because Kennedys prayers were private rather than government speechthe court said that they were not pursuant to his official duties.

The court found the schools establishment clause justification for firing Kennedy to be faulty because such a balancing test relies on Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case that, according to the majority opinion, the Court long ago abandoned due to its practical and historical shortcomings.

This observation effectively overruled Lemon and its endorsement test for determining whether a government had violated the Constitutions establishment clause with a requirement that the establishment clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.

Using School Choice Funds for Religious Education: Carson v. Makin

This case arose from a challenge to Maines prohibition against applying state funds from the states tuition assistance program toward secondary schools that, in addition to teaching academic subjects, provide religious instruction.

Two families challenged this practice, claiming that Maine violated the free exercise, establishment, and equal protection clauses by restricting their freedom of school choice.

The court sided with the challengers, holding that Maines nonsectarian requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the free exercise clause.

A 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts found that Maines requirement could not survive strict scrutiny, the most stringent level of review the court uses when determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.

The states interest in avoiding the appearance of supporting a particular religion did not justify excluding members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit simply because of their religious exercise.

The court also noted that the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals attempt to distinguish between religious status prohibitions (prohibiting funding solely based on an institutions status as a religious organization) and religious use prohibitions (supposedly prohibiting funding regardless of an institutions religious status and instead prohibiting funding because it would be put to a religious use, such as teaching a religion course) was unpersuasive, and that the prohibition on status-based discrimination under the free exercise clause didnt justify use-based discrimination.

EPAs Overreach Regulating Greenhouse Gases: West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency

This case arose from a challenge to a cap-and-trade program that the Environmental Protection Agency created in 2016. The EPA launched this policy just after Congress failed to pass the American Clean Energy and Security Act.

The policy aimed to amend the Clean Air Act by establishing a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions that was functionally identical to the one that couldnt get through Congress. The EPA claimed it possessed the authority to issue the policy due to a provision already found in the Clean Air Act.

West Virginia and several other challengers sued the EPA, alleging that the agency lacked the authority to issue such a rule.

The court sided with West Virginia, concluding that Congress did not grant the EPA the authority. In a 6-3 opinion written by the chief justice, the court held that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the EPA to force the fossil fuel energy sector of the economy to shift to so-called green or renewable sources of energy.

The Obama and Biden administrations had argued that the acts term system of pollution reduction actually authorized the EPA to shift from regulating pollution on a factory-by-factory basis (through the use of better pollution-reduction technologies) to demanding that the entire energy sector shift over time from fossil fuels to so-called green energy sources.

But the court judged that the Obama and Biden administrations interpretation of the act is precisely the type of judgment that falls under the major questions doctrine. Under that doctrine, it is necessary for Congress to include a clear statement in the law for a court to conclude that it intended to delegate authority of this breadth to regulate a fundamental sector of the economy. In this instance, Congress issued no such statement.

Honorable MentionMandating Private Employees Get Vaccinated Against COVID-19: National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

While we promised to distill the courts term to the five most important cases, we couldnt resist making one honorable mention.

This conglomerate of cases arose from dozens of challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations vaccine mandate that it issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The mandate required businesses with over 100 employees to have their employees get vaccinated against the novel coronavirus. Businesses would be charged a steep fee each day for each employee who did not comply. This mandate would have applied to over 84 million workers.

In a 6-3 per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Supreme Court stayed (stopped) the implementation of the vaccination mandate. The majority concluded that the government was not likely to later prevail in its argument in court that OSHA possessed the authority to issue this mandate.

The majority noted that neither OSHA nor Congress had ever imposed such a requirement and that although Congress has enacted significant legislation addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, it has declined to enact any measure similar to what OSHA has promulgated here.

As its name suggests, the court explained, OSHA is tasked with ensuring occupational safetythat is, safe and healthful working conditions. The text of the statute empowers OSHA only to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures, and no provision of the Act addresses public health more generally, which falls outside of OSHAs sphere of expertise.

The courts majority rejected the governments argument that the risk of contracting COVID-19 at work empowers OSHA to issue its vaccination mandate on the grounds that the risk is not an occupational hazard, but is a universal risk that is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases.

The federal government has not pursued arguing the case further, and the stay remains in effect.

This term, the court heard, and decided, many momentous cases. It will likely go down as one of the most memorable and important terms in Supreme Court history.While the court didnt get every decision right, its decisions this term make clear that a majority of justices are committed to deciding cases on a more originalist and textualist basis than in the past.

Thats a good thing for the courtand a good thing for our country.

This piece originally appeared in The Daily Signal

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5 Monumental Cases That Highlighted the Supreme Court's 2021-2022 Term - Heritage.org

Right to Petition Legislature Right to a Legislative Hearing – Reason

Plaintiff sued, claiming he was entitled under the state constitution to have a hearing on his petitions, but the court disagreed:

Except for minor differences in punctuation, Part I, Article 32 provides now as it provided when it was first enacted:

The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.

To the framers, the word "redress" in this context meant to remedy or repair. The noun "petition" referred to a written or formal request "to a legislative or other body, soliciting some favor, grant, right or mercy." A "grievance" was defined as "that which burdens, oppresses, or injures, implying a sense of wrong done, or a continued injury, and therefore applied only to the effects of human conduct; never to providential evils" as in, "The oppressed subject has the right to petition for a redress of grievances." A "remonstrance" as used in Part I, Article 32 was a "strong representation of reasons against a measure," which "when addressed to a public body may be accompanied with a petition or supplication for the removal or prevention of some evil or inconvenience," as in "[a] party aggrieved presents a remonstrance to the legislature." Thus, pursuant to its plain language, as understood by the framers, Part I, Article 32 grants citizens the right to request, by way of a formal petition or remonstrance, that the legislature right a wrong.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the analogous provision of the First Amendment does not include a right to a response. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees (1979), the Court ruled that the state highway commission had not violated the First Amendment by failing to respond to or consider grievances that employees had submitted through their union because "the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen" or "respond" to such grievances.

Similarly, in Minnesota Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984), the Court held that a state law that required public employers to discuss certain matters exclusively with a union representative, instead of with employees directly, did not violate the First Amendment because "[n]othing in [that amendment] or in [the] Court's case law interpreting it suggests" that the right to petition requires "government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues." The Court held that individuals "have no constitutional right as members of the public to a government audience for their policy views."

Some commentators have suggested that the Court in Smith and Knight "overlooked important historical information regarding the right to petition," and, therefore, erred by concluding that the federal right to petition does not include a right to a governmental response. "Those commentators point to the government practice of considering petitions in some quasi-formal fashion from the 13th century in England through American colonial timesa practice that continued in the early years of the American Republic." "Based on this historical practice, these commentators contend that the Petition Clause should be interpreted to incorporate a right to a response to or official consideration of petitions." See, e.g., Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right To Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L.J. 142, 155 (1986); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 899, 905 & n. 22 (1997); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 33 (1993).

"Other scholars disagree, arguing based on the plain text of the First Amendment that the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances really is just a right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." "These scholars note that the Petition Clause by its terms refers only to a right 'to petition'; it does not also refer to a right to response or official consideration." see, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 759-62 (1999); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev 1153, 1190-91 (1986).

We need not decide in this case whether Part I, Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires the legislature to respond to a remonstrance because the plaintiff did not seek a response; rather, he sought a legislative hearing. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the Speaker acted unconstitutionally because he neglected "to call to assemble the legislative body as a whole, [so] as to provide [him] with redress of grievances." The plaintiff requested an order "compelling [the] Speaker (to assign to a committee for public hearing) to assemble the legislative body as a whole for a public hearing as stated in the Constitution for redress of grievances." Accordingly, in light of the plaintiff's allegations, the question we must answer is whether Part I, Article 32, alone or in conjunction with other constitutional provisions, obligates the legislature to assemble in order to hold a public hearing on a remonstrance.

Even those commentators who believe that, historically, the right to petition included the right to a response agree that it did not include a right to a hearing. As one commentator has noted, "[a] petitioner never possessed the right to a full legislative discussion or a debate of a particular petition, nor to a public forum to present testimony relevant to a petition." And, as another has stated with regard to the right to petition in the First Amendment, "the duty, if any, that the First Amendment imposes on government to respond to petitions likely is minimal" and does not include "giv[ing] petitioners the opportunity to personally appear and present their views." Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 557, 643-44 (1999).

Courts construing the right to petition in other state constitutions have ruled that the right to petition does not include a right to a legislative hearing. The plaintiff argues that, in contrast to other state constitutions, the New Hampshire Constitution "confers a right on a citizen to orally address the Senate and the House." He argues that Part I, Article 32 must be read together with Part I, Article 31 and Part I, Article 30, and that, collectively, these provisions establish that right. We disagree.

The plain language of Part I, Articles 31 and 30 of the State Constitution does not support the plaintiff's assertions. As originally enacted in 1784, Part I, Article 31 provided: "The legislature ought frequently to assemble for the redress of grievances, for correcting, strengthening and confirming the laws, and for making new ones, as the common good may require." As amended in 1792, Part I, Article 31 provided: "The legislature shall assemble for the redress of public grievances, and for making such laws as the public good may require." In Merrill v. Sherburne (1818), we clarified that the phrase "redress of public grievances" in Part I, Article 31 refers merely to the legislature's authority to enact laws for the public good. As such, Part I, Article 31 confers no particular rights upon individual citizens. Rather, it "describes the entire purpose of the legislature." David C. Steelman & John Cerullo, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Tumult: New Hampshire's Impeachment Crisis of 2000, 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 1357, 1392 n.158 (2017); see Lawrence Friedman, The New Hampshire State Constitution 100 (2d ed. 2015).

Part I, Article 30, the Speech and Debate Clause of the State Constitution, protects the legislature's right to free deliberation and debate. Part I, Article 30 provides: "The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever." The New Hampshire Speech and Debate Clause "is the equivalent of the speech or debate clause, article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution." As the Supreme Court has stated with regard to the federal Speech or Debate Clause, "[t]he central role of the Speech or Debate Clause [is] to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Thus, Part I, Article 30 protects the right of individual legislators and the legislature as a whole to freely deliberate and debate. While this right inures to the benefit of the public, Part I, Article 30 confers no right upon members of the public to participate in legislative debate or deliberation.

The plaintiff appears to maintain that he had a due process right to a legislative hearing on his remonstrances. The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915), construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We adopt the same reasoning [details omitted -EV] under our State Constitution.

As Chief Justice Doe explained in State v. Hayes (1881), ours is a representative democracy, not a "pure democracy." "It is inherent in a republican form of government that direct public participation in government policymaking is limited." "Not least among the reasons for refusing to recognize such a right is the impossibility of its judicial definition and enforcement," implicating separation-of-powers concerns. "However wise or practicable various levels of public participation in various kinds of policy decisions may be," nothing in the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution suggests that "government must provide for such participation."

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Right to Petition Legislature Right to a Legislative Hearing - Reason

Jayland Walker’s death sparked protests in Akron. What are your rights as a protester? – Akron Beacon Journal

Ongoing protests in Akron following the police shooting of Jayland Walker have led to the city renewing its curfew on Thursday night.

The curfew went into effect at 10 p.m. until 6 a.m., spanningdowntown Akron. It willl remain in effect until the city issues another order that lifts it.

Several protesters have already been arrested, including Breonna Taylors aunt and Jacob Blakes father. Violating the curfew entails a fourth-degree misdemeanor and either a fine up to $350 or up to 30 days in jail.

Heres what you need to know about the curfew and your protest rights in Ohio:

Yes, but theyre limited. Law enforcement, medical and fire personnel are exempt, in addition to the news media. Ohioans fleeing dangerous circumstances, seeking medical care or traveling between their home or work are also in the clear.

Yes the First Amendment guarantees the right to assemble and protest. However, there are some limitations. According to the Ohio American Civil Liberties Union, protesters may not block traffic. Certain locations, including but not limited to private properties and certain parks or plazas, may also require permits to protest on.

Impromptu protests are allowed within two days of an unfolding event, but organizers are still required to notify the Cleveland Division of Police at least eight hours in advance.

Violent, obscene or threatening speech is illegal under the First Amendment, and endangering others could result in arrest. Dont antagonize or touch law enforcement, and be mindful of drugs or weapons these could result in additional charges, if arrested.

You can, and police cannot search cell phones without a warrant. Keep in mind that whatever is said to the police can be used against an individual, and law enforcement can authorize an arrest if you fail to identify yourself, upon being asked. Additionally, you do not have to agree to an officer searching you or your car the Cleveland Legal Aid Society urges protesters to be vocal about their consent.

Law enforcement is still allowed to conduct pat downs (not searches) if they suspect an individual may be armed.

Being arrested and released on bail, from start to finish, can last up to 36 hours. The police will ask for basic information, followed by a court agency interview to determine bail you do not need to answer the agencys questions (you can request for an attorney), but doing so accurately will move the process faster.

The Ohio ACLU said that the main types of crimes a protester is charged with are minor misdemeanor, misdemeanor offense and a felony offense.

Officers may also detain, not arrest, protesters for suspected involvement in criminal activity.

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Jayland Walker's death sparked protests in Akron. What are your rights as a protester? - Akron Beacon Journal

Donating to help women get abortions is a First Amendment right protected by Supreme Court precedents – The Conversation

Several Texas abortion funds which are charities that help people who cant afford to get an abortion pay for their travel, lodging and medical bills paused disbursements on June 24, 2022, after the Supreme Court ruled that Americans have no constitutional right to the procedure.

The Lilith, Equal Access, Frontera and other funds said they were taking this step to assess the legal consequences of the courts ruling in Texas, which already had some of the nations strictest abortion laws. Abortion funds in some other states, including Oklahoma, were also reportedly halting their work.

Some funds active in Texas made this decision based on concerns that their financial assistance to women seeking abortions may now be illegal in that state, as well as fears that their donors could also be sued for violating Texas law.

But as an expert on reproductive rights and First Amendment law who has argued before the Supreme Court, I believe that donating to abortion funds even in places where helping people get abortions is illegal is protected by the U.S. Constitution.

The Supreme Court has ruled on several occasions that fundraising, whether its by charitable organizations or political candidates, is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.

The court handed down the first relevant ruling in 1980, with its Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment decision. The court struck down an Illinois city ordinance that had prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions unless 75% or more of their revenue was used directly for charitable purposes, rather than for salaries, administration and overhead costs.

The city of Schaumburg had defended that ordinance by contending it regulated conduct involving commercial transactions and was necessary to prevent fundraising for fraudulent causes. The Supreme Court rejected this characterization, asserting that fundraising is a form of protected speech because it is intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues.

The court further noted that without the right to seek and receive donations, the flow of information and advocacy would likely cease.

Several campaign finance rulings have reinforced the Schaumberg ruling.

The best-known among them is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Two other key rulings are Buckley v. Valeo, which preceded the Schaumberg case, and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. All three established that contributions to political candidates, and spending by those candidates, is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.

In the eyes of the law, seeking donations and making contributions are two sides of the same coin. The Supreme Court has said that both are important ways to show support for political preferences, advance ideas and advocate for policy changes.

The First Amendment right to solicit or give funds is not limited to charitable organizations or candidates. Simply panhandling on the street, the most basic form of soliciting funds, is entitled to First Amendment protection, according to several lower federal courts.

The Supreme Court has also held that the freedom of association principle embodied in the First Amendment protects the right to support a cause by making donations or paying dues.

Based on the freedom of association, which includes the right to join together with others for social or political purposes, the court has been very protective of the right of donors to remain anonymous. That has especially been the case for donors who support controversial causes and when revealing their identity might subject them to harassment, threats, public hostility or other forms of reprisal.

In 1958, the Supreme Court ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the First Amendment barred Alabama from forcing the NAACP to disclose the names of its members or donors who resided in the state. The court pragmatically recognized that compelling disclosure of supporters of a civil rights group in Alabama in the 1950s could endanger the donors.

This First Amendment principle of protecting the speech and the rights of donors to fund charitable causes guards both sides of the political spectrum.

In July 2021, for example, the Supreme Court decided a case brought by two organizations considered to be conservative: the Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law Center. The two organizations challenged a California law that required them to disclose the names of their donors who gave more than $5,000.

California tried to justify this law as necessary to prevent fraud by registered charities the same preventing fraud rationale that Schaumburg had unsuccessfully asserted as the reason it needed to restrict charitable solicitation.

Relying on the NAACP case among others, the Court held in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta that the compelled disclosure requirement violated the donors right to freedom of association.

Based on this body of law, the First Amendment protects the right of abortion funds to seek contributions and to make contributions to individuals in Texas and other states where abortion is illegal to support their activities. The First Amendment also protects the right of people to make donations to abortion funds.

A 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 8 prohibits aiding and abetting an abortion after six weeks into pregnancy. The measure specifically mentions providing financial assistance as a form of aiding and abetting.

The law authorizes any person in the world to bring a civil damages lawsuit against anyone who aids and abets an abortion, and to recover attorneys fees in addition to at least $10,000.

One reason why abortion funds might be leery right now is that Texas law permits someone to seek a court order to force others to hand over information that might provide a basis for suing them.

Two individuals have already sought such an order to require the Lilith Fund to disclose information about its funding and donors in order to determine if they violated the 2021 restriction on aiding and abetting an abortion by giving money.

The Thomas More Law Society the same organization that successfully asked the Supreme Court to protect it from having to disclose its donors is representing the people seeking donor information from the Lilith Fund, and tweeted that Lilith Fund donors could face legal action for violating the Texas abortion laws aiding and abetting prohibition.

A Texas trial court judge has found that the provisions authorizing anyone to sue someone who provides or aids and abets an abortion likely violate the Texas Constitution, and has temporarily enjoined the law, meaning that it is on hold pending appeal.

The case is likely to go to the Texas Supreme Court. How that court rules will have a great impact on the liability risk faced by the Lilith Fund for providing financial assistance to women to help them get an abortion. While the legal process is playing out, the Lilith Fund is trying to minimize its legal risk by suspending the distribution of money to women.

If the Texas appellate courts eventually uphold S.B.8, the ban on providing financial assistance to Texas women could be enforced. In that event, the Lilith Fund would be able to make a strong case that they dont need to reveal any information because of First Amendment protections.

If states try to punish abortion funds or individuals for providing a woman with financial assistance to get an abortion in another state where it remains legal, including the money required to travel there, that would likely violate the Constitution.

Giving money to people who want to obtain a legal abortion would not be aiding and abetting a crime. Moreover, the Constitution protects the right to interstate travel. The freedom to cross state lines is a right deeply embedded in U.S. history dating to the Articles of Confederation, prior to the Bill of Rights.

Assisting someone with obtaining a legal abortion by giving them money also could be protected as a form of free speech because it can be one aspect of advocating for and supporting the right to legal abortion. Disbursing these funds could also be protected under the Constitution as an aspect of the freedom to associate with women who seek legal abortions by giving them financial support.

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Donating to help women get abortions is a First Amendment right protected by Supreme Court precedents - The Conversation

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Trumpists Call on Supreme Court to Let States Establish Religion Within Their Borders – Rolling Stone

America First Legal (AFL), a right-wing group whose team includes several former Trump administration officials, is urging the Supreme Court to do even more to shatter whats left of the wall between church and state.

On Tuesday, June 28, the group issued a statement essentially calling for a total overhaul of the First Amendments establishment clause, a key provision separating church and state. The statement arrived one day after the Supreme Court cracked part of the clauses foundation with its ruling in Kennedy v. Bremerton. In that case, the courts far-right majority ruled that public school officials in Bremerton, Washington, violated the First Amendment rights of high school football coach Joseph Kennedy when they fired him following a controversy stemming from his ritual of praying at the 50-yard line during football games. The 6-3 decision effectively overruled a 1971 precedent for interpreting the First Amendments establishment clause.

While the establishment clause exists to keep the government from establishing an official religion in the United States, or doing anything that might favor one religion over another, the AFL is now hopeful that the Supreme Court will eventually disincorporate the establishment clause in a future case. Doing so, the AFL suggests, would allow states to decide whether and to what extent they will establish religion within their borders.

The AFLs vice president and general counsel Gene Hamilton a former Trump official in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, whose hits include axing DACA and helping create the infamous family separation policy argued in a statement that the original intent of the establishment clause was to let the states decide just how much they want to separate church and state.

We are pleased that the Supreme Court decided in Coach Kennedys favor, Hamilton said. Perhaps the Court will, in a future case, finally restore the original meaning of the Establishment Clause and disincorporate it as to the states. But for today, we celebrate with Coach Kennedy and all Americans who value religious freedom.

Allowing individual states to establish their own official religions is just one possible tidal wave-sized ripple that could follow Kennedy v. Bremerton. Considering the current Courts apparent disdain for established precedent, it could also pave the way for overturning the landmark 1962 case that ruled prayer in public schools was unconstitutional.

Kennedy v. Bremerton is also just one of two major SCOTUS rulings this term to take a crack at the long-established boundaries between church and state. Earlier in June, the right-wing majority ruled in Carson v. Makin that taxpayer money from a tuition assistance program in Maine could be used to send kids to private religious schools.

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Trumpists Call on Supreme Court to Let States Establish Religion Within Their Borders - Rolling Stone