Book review: Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the Surveillance State, by Barton Gellman – Scotland on Sunday

Arts and CultureBooksI must begin with a confession of incompetence: much of this book is beyond me. When Barton Gellman recounted the methods by which Edward Snowden extracted some 50,000 documents from the deep store of information garnered by the USAs National Security Agency (NSA), and devised means to protect the fruits of his theft, I understood next to nothing.

Saturday, 30th May 2020, 6:34 pm

Fortunately this mattered less than I feared it would, even though Heartbeat, the second section of the book, might be sub-titled What Snowden did, and, in passing, one should observe that Gellman believes that he did substantially more good than harm, even though I am prepared to accept (as he is not) that his disclosures must have exacted a price in lost intelligence.

Gellman, a winner of three Pulitzer Prizes for investigative journalism, persuaded the Washington Post (where he had been a staff reporter) to take the risk of publishing some of what Snowden had given him. It should be said that, throughout the book, Gellman shows himself to have been less interested in the content of the documents than in the implications of their existence.

At its core, he writes, this is a book about power. Information is the oxygen of control. Secrecy and surveillance, intertwined, define its flows. Who knows what? is a pretty good proxy for Who governs whom? Are citizens equipped to hold their government accountable. Are they free to shield themselves from an unwanted gaze? Can anyone, today, draw a line and say None of your business and make it stick?

This is the question at the heart of the book. The government, in the form of the NSA, has acquired an unprecedented degree of knowledge about its citizens and their communications thanks to the work of the great tech companies. They acquire and store knowledge and this is at the disposal of the agencies of the state which are charged with surveillance. Their ability to track the words and activities of ordinary people is without a parallel in history. The NSAs ability to spy on American citizens makes the KGB, the East German Stasi and Hitlers Gestapo look like clumsy novices. And of course the technology continues to advance. An executive of one at the tech giants asked Gellman if he would like to have a phone which could tell him where his mislaid car keys were.The suggestion horrified him.

Much of the book consists of conversations Gellman had with high-ups in the NSA, the FBI and the CIA. They were mostly indignant, naturally enough. They were engaged in protecting the security of the United States and the American people. There were regulations by which they had to abide, even, they usually claimed, when dealing with the bad guys. Yes, some admitted, occasionally the regulations might be bent, but this was done only in the public interest. Investigative journalists like Gellman were irresponsible, seeking out information which it was in the public interest to keep secret. Moreover, such publicity endangered operatives. One sees their point. Gellman sees their point, certainly better than they see his.

The modern state has unprecedented knowledge of its citizens. We have come to live in a world which is abolishing privacy. The CIAs chief technical officer once said it is nearly within our grasp to compute on all human generated information. That was eight years ago. Perhaps the word nearly is now out of date.

Further back, in 1975, an American senator, Frank Church, was already worried. If this country ever became a tyranny, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back. It would be what Edward Snowden called turnkey tyranny.

Gellmans book is very meaty, requires digestion. It is like so many big books today, especially American ones, too long and too repetitive. I would guess than many readers will find themselves skipping passages. Nevertheless, the subject is so important that it is a book which ought to be read by anyone concerned with the way the world is going.

Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the Surveillance State, by Barton Gellman, Bodley Head, 412pp, 20

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Book review: Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the Surveillance State, by Barton Gellman - Scotland on Sunday

Today’s Headlines and Commentary – Lawfare

Defense Secretary Mark Esper stated that he opposes the use of military force for law enforcement purposes in response to protests. President Trump has threatened to make use of the powers afforded under the Insurrection Act but Esper said invocations of that act should be reserved for only "the most urgent and dire of situations," AP reports.

A U.S. Department of Homeland Security intelligence assessment found that opportunists from White supremacist groups have been working to increase tensions between police and protesters, but found no evidence that white supremacist groups were causing any of the violence at protests, reports Reuters.

Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote a letter to the Defense Departments acting inspector general asking him to launch an investigation into the use of the military in quelling protests, according to The Hill.

The National Guard of the District of Columbia is launching an investigation into the use of one of its helicopters as a "show of force" against protesters near the White House Monday night, writes AP.

In response to Beijingsrefusal to allow American air carriers to resume operation in China, the U.S. will ban all commercial passenger flights from Chinese carriers beginning June 16th, writes the Washington Post.

Former deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein testified at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and the the warrant to surveil former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page. Rosenstein said, among other things, that in retrospect he feels that he should not have approved the warrant application, writes The Hill.

The Center for Democracy and Technology filed a lawsuit against President Trump's executive order on social media, saying it violates the First Amendment, The Hill reports.

Internal Huawei documents have revealed an effort within the company to cover up its role in violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, writes Reuters.

Russian President Vladimir Putin endorsed a new nuclear deterrence policy which allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that "threatens the very existence of the state," AP reports.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Lawfare

Elliot Setzer shared the Center for Democracy and Technologys challenge of the executive order on Section 230.

Susan Hennessey and Margaret Taylor asked if Congress can work together to calm the country.

Paul Rosenzweig reviewed Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Future by P.W. Singer and August Cole.

Herb Lin offered some ways that lessons from cybersecurity and the pandemic can inform each other.

Jen Patja Howell shared an episode of the National Security Law Podcast on Insurrection Act with Ben Wittes, Robert Chesney and Steve Vladeck. Robert Chesney and Steve Vladeck shared the same conversation on their National Security Law Podcast feed.

Elliot Setzer shared the brief urging the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to force D.C. District Court judge Emmet Sullivan to dismiss the prosecution of former national security adviser Michael Flynn.

Stewart Baker shared an episode of the Lawfare Podcast featuring an interview with Bart Gellman about his new book, Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State.

Peter E. Harrell explained what the U.S. could do to respond to moves by China to restrict Hong Kongs autonomy.

Email the Roundup Team noteworthy law and security-related articles to include, and follow us on Twitter and Facebook for additional commentary on these issues. Sign up to receive Lawfare in your inbox. Visit our Events Calendar to learn about upcoming national security events, and check out relevant job openings on our Job Board.

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Today's Headlines and Commentary - Lawfare

Signal should be protesters’ messaging app of choice thanks to new blur face tool – Fast Company

When it comes to privacy, there are some good messaging apps (Apples Messages, WhatsApp) and some bad ones (Facebook Messenger). But theres only one truly great messaging app when it comes to privacy: Signal.

Heres why the app, famously endorsed by whistleblower Edward Snowden, should be your messaging app of choice. However, as of today, Signal has gotten even betterand if youre an organizer or protester marching in support of black lives, it should be the app you use to communicate with and share photos with other people.

[Photo: courtesy of Signal]Thats because Signal now allows users to quickly blur faces in photos shared via the appno external photo editor needed. This means you can quickly and safely share images of protests without putting the protesters around you at risk of identification and retaliation. From Signals blog post on the new features:

Many of the people and groups who are organizing for that change are using Signal to communicate, and were working hard to keep up with the increased traffic. Weve also been working to figure out additional ways we can support everyone in the street right now.

One immediate thing seems clear: 2020 is a pretty good year to cover your face.

The latest version of Signal for Android and iOS introduces a new blur feature in the image editor that can help protect the privacy of the people in the photos you share. Now its easy to give every face a hiding place, or draw a fuzzy trace over something you want to erase. Simply tap on the new blur tool icon to get started.

Best yet, the new blur tools operations are carried out entirely on your smartphoneso no images are transmitted to a server somewhere to have faces blurred. But Signal does note that its new blur faces tool isnt perfectit may not blur every face in a photo. Thats why users can also quickly add blurs to any part of the photo they want just by using their fingers. Portions of a photo protesters might want to blur (besides faces) are any protesters distinguishing marks, such as tattoos or logos on their clothes.

Signal has already submitted the updated app to Apple and Google for approval on their respective app stores, so the new blur tool for Signal for iPhone and Android should be rolling out shortly.

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Signal should be protesters' messaging app of choice thanks to new blur face tool - Fast Company

Memes, lolz and intel incels: behind the scenes in the NSA hacker corps – British GQ

Since its debut in 2006, for reasons lost to history, the annual hackers conference in northern Virginia has been known as Jamboree. Possibly the name is meant to be tongue-in-cheek. It brings to mind incongruous scenes of Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts and campfires and songs of peace. In the wiretappers Jamboree, the setting is less pastoral a conference space and the lyrics sing of digital battlefields.

Jamboree celebrates technical brilliance, audacity on offense and a relentless drive to win. It promotes a laser focus on mission accomplishment. Those are virtues among spies, important ones. They are not the only virtues. Jamboree springs from an operational world that can be nonchalant about the privacy of innocents and contemptuous of men and women who allow themselves to be owned, as hackers say, by American cyber warriors. Sexual innuendo, ethnic slurs and mockery of the dead are neither furtive nor especially rare in the discourse of USs National Security Agency (NSA). The people who speak this language among themselves show no apparent concern for reproach by superiors. They are the same people whose work may decide who lives and who dies in a conflict zone. As many of you know, our forces in Iraq are dropping bombs on the strength of sigint alone, Charles H Berlin III, the former chief of staff of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, told his workforce in an internal newsletter in 2004.

There are many professionals in the NSA who take no part in the japery. I have little doubt that they make up a large majority. NSA personnel and veterans I have met are thoughtful about their power and conflicted about trespassing, as inevitably they do, into private terrain that does not belong to a foreign intelligence target. Among the top guns of the NSA hacker club and those who make use of their work, looser language and attitudes are commonplace. Scores of examples in documents and confidential interviews reveal a tendency in those precincts to infuse official reports with snickering insults and derisive memes invented by teenagers, gamers and nerds on the internet.

The NSAs blue-badge employees divide between civilian hires and uniformed personnel on assignment from Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard intelligence. Military employees arrive prescreened. Civilians run a gauntlet when they apply: a 567-question psychological test, a follow-up interview, the SF-86 Questionnaire For National Security Positions and a polygraph exam to probe for counterintelligence threats. Even so, in the internet age, the NSA has had to adaptin order to recruit the cohort of gifted hackers it needs. They do not tend to arrive with spit-shined shoes and hair cut high and tight. The culture, Edward Snowden said, is T-shirts, jeans, bleached hair, green hair, earrings, meme shirts, memes posted all over your cubicle. Screeners make allowances. Some of the top recruits would never have made the cut in the analog age of listening posts and paper files.

The larger part of the NSAs intake depends upon what the agency describes as special sources. The NSA asks for secret access to one or another piece of the backbone of the global communications network. Security-cleared executives at US internet and telecommunications companies agree to provide it. The NSA likes that arrangement. Why hot-wire a car when the owner will lend you the keys? Some executives not as many since Snowden regard support for US intelligence as a patriotic duty. Some are compelled by law. Some companies, such as AT&T, have classified arrangements with the NSA, code-named Blarney, that stretch back to the 1970s. The companies are compensated for their trouble from a classified budget for corporate partners that reached $394 million in fiscal year 2011.

When the NSA cannot negotiate access, it helps itself. Overseas, where domestic legal restrictions do not apply, the acquisitions directorate, S3, is free to tunnel just about anywhere it likes. A worldwide hacking infrastructure called Quantum deploys a broad range of tools to inject software exploits, intercept communications with methods known as man in the middle and man on the side and reroute calls and emails through NSA collection points. Most of these are known as passive operations because they collect electronic signals automatically as they pass through large trunk lines and junctions. When passive methods do not suffice, the job becomes, in NSA parlance, interactive. During one representative week in April 2012, there were 2,588 such interactive missions. That kind of bespoke hacking is the province of Tailored Access Operations (TAO).

Sexual innuendo, ethnic slurs and mockery of the dead are neither furtive nor rare in NSA discourse

Locker room bravado is one thing when it takes place in the field. The trash talk, in this case, is built into the official vocabulary of the NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, where engineers and managers describe close access work in terms of seduction and drunken conquest. Surveillance targets, as depicted in formal accounts of expeditionary operations, are like women who would regret the night if only they remembered it in the morning.

One common mission for TAO is to hack into a local wireless network. Wi-Fi signals do not travel far, even when amplified by surveillance equipment, which means that access teams have to sneak in fairly close. Every stage of their work comes with a suggestive cover name. First comes Blinddate, in which a team member searches for vulnerable machines. He slips into the network during Happyhour, mingles among the computers there and lures his tipsy victim into a liaison. Next comes Nightstand, short for one-night stand, wherein the operator delivers a load of malware into the defenceless machine. Further exploitation and hilarity ensue on Seconddate. For all their subtlety, the cover names might as well be Bimbo, Roofie, Bareback and The Clap.

None of this is to cast shade on the operations themselves. By nature an expeditionary mission is closely targeted, the opposite of mass surveillance, and the NSA chooses the marks to fit the demands of its political masters. The targets I saw in documents are what you would expect of an intelligence agency doing its job. The question is what to make of the giggles between the lines. It is not too much, I think, to say that sexual exploitation is an official metaphor of close-access operations, passed up the chain of command in operations reports and back down to the lower ranks in training materials. The seven-part qualifying course on wireless exploitation techniques, for example, includes units called Introduction To Blindate (Grab a partner!) and Introduction To Nightstand. There are plenty more where those come from. The NSA archive features dozens of cover names in the same style, from Vixen and Badgirl to Ladylove and Pant_sparty. The latter is versatile slang in pop culture, suitable for any of several intimate acts. In surveillance speak it stands for injection of an NSA software tool into a backdoor in the targets defences. Get up close, whip out your Pant_sparty tool and stick it in her back door. The developers, briefers and trainers who trade in this kind of mirth, without exception that I could find, are men.

Alan Tu, a former threat operations analyst, told me the dick-swinging badinage is the product of a workforce that was incredibly young, young and male. Many either in their first post-college job or 19- to 21-year-old military operators. This is the age of peak testosterone. It would not occur to those men, Tu added, that anyone outside their circle would read what they wrote or find reason to object. And oversight can be thin, he recalled: Getting quality managers was sometimes a struggle because often they would pick from what seemed to be the most appropriate technical guy and give them their first leadership and management job.

Snowden turned down a job in TAO, but this was the culture he grew up in. The memes are awesome for morale and having fun but youre having fun with systems that get people literally killed, he told me. It is adolescent empowerment. Literally, I can do what I want. What are you going to do to stop me? I am all-powerful. I would point out what defines our understanding of adolescence and what it means to be juvenile is a lack of self-awareness and restraint.

Towards the end of 2018, I sat down with former FBI director James B Comey for a long conversation in a midtown New York hotel suite. He put a lot of effort into cultural change in his own agency before Donald Trump fired him in May 2017.

The FBI, like the NSA, worked hard to recruit and accommodate young technical talent. Before the Trump administration came topower, Comey was looking for ways to soften a ban on applicants with a history of marijuana use. I have to hire a great workforce to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview, he told the Wall Street Journal then. Attorney general Jeff Sessions put a stop to any squishiness on that point, but the bureau, like the NSA, relaxed some entrenched ideas about who belonged. I asked Comey whether he thought Fort Meade has come to grips with the subculture that the young hacker recruits brought with them.

Thats a great question, he said. I suspect not, because I remember the first time I went there, 2004, 2005, I was struck that Id just stepped into the 1950s. I remember walking in and seeing the old wood panelling, old-fashioned carpeting. I felt like Id gone back in time. The support staff seemed to be mostly white women with beehive hairdos, all done up, and a lot of men in short sleeves. Kind of like what you see in a Nasa movie [set in] the 1960s. Thats what it felt like. I remember, when I joked about it, someone saying a huge number of employees are legacy. Their parents worked there. Its a family business.

There are hundreds of cover names that make no effort to be opaque. They are hand-selected for meaning, simple or otherwise

By doctrine the agency is supposed to assign its cover names at random. That is only sometimes true in practice. A true cryptonym, usually a pair of randomly selected words, conceals any hint of the secret it protects. Byzantinehades, for instance, betrays no link to Chinese cyber espionage. But there are hundreds of other cover names that make no effort to be opaque. They are hand-selected for meaning, simple or otherwise. At times the names are artlessly literal. One classified compartment, shared with the United Kingdoms GCHQ, is called Voyeur. It refers to spying on another countrys spies as they spy on someone else, an especially intimate encounter. Scissors, a more prosaic choice, is a processing system that slices up data for sorting. Voyeurs peer through windows. Scissors cut. No mystery is intended or achieved.

The most revealing cover names are compact expressions of culture akin to street art. The culture owes a great deal to gamers, coders and other digital natives in the outside world. Some of its products, like the sequence from Blinddate to Nightstand, evoke the brotopia of Emily Changs eponymous book about Silicon Valley. Some, like Boundlessinformant, which is a live-updated map of surveillance intake around the world, are so tone-deaf as to verge on self-parody. (The map itself, despite some breathless commentary, is nothing sinister.) In public remarks and testimony, NSA officials often speak of their compliance culture, humble and obedient to post-Watergate laws. There is truth in that, but when the agencys hackers roam abroad, where far fewer restraints apply, they strike an outlaw pose. There is a whole branch of the acquisitions directorate, S31177, devoted to Transgression. A mysterious Badass compartment is mentioned but left unexplained. Pitiedfool, a suite of technical attacks on the Windows operating system, evokes the ferocity of Mr Ts warning to enemies (I pity the fool!) in the film Rocky III. Blackbelt, Felonycrowbar, Zombiearmy and Devilhound share the macho vibe. Another whole class of cover names, including Epicfail and Erroneousingenuity, jeer opsec errors by surveillance targets who imagine that they are covering their tracks.

The insider folkways signal membership in a tribe. The tribe likes science fiction and fantasy, comic book heroes, Star Trek, Star Wars, Harry Potter, fast food, whiskey, math jokes, programmer jokes, ethnic jokes, jokes about nontechnical people and caustic captions on photographs. NSA nerds use dork and bork as verbs. As in: dork the operating system to exploit a device, but dont bork it completely or the device will shut down. They illustrate reports with photos of animals in awkward predicaments; one of them likens a surveillance target to a horse with its head stuck in a tree. They condescend about leet (or l33t) adversaries, wannabe elite hackers who think they can swim with the NSAs sharks. They boast of dining on rivals who are honing their skillz, another term of derision. The themes and memes of NSA network operations are telltales of a coder class that lives its life on-screen, inattentive to the social cues of people who interact IRL in real life.

The keyboard geekery can be whimsical. One training officer, apropos of nothing, dropped a joke about binary numbers into a cryptography lecture. There are ten types of people in this world: those who understand binary and those that dont, the instructor wrote. A weekly briefing on surveillance operations paused to celebrate Pi Day, 14 March, when the numeric form of the date is the best-known constant in math. Then there is the NSA Round Table, an electronic discussion group that invites participants to vote one anothers comments up or down. The voting system, lifted from Reddit, rewards amusing insults as much as content in a forum ostensibly devoted to classified business. Why is a scoop of potatoes larger than a scoop of eggs in the cafeteria? a contributor named Michael wondered one day. Paul jumped in to play the troll. Let me be the first to down-vote you, Paul wrote, naming several pedantic reasons. A side debate erupted: should Michaels post be down-voted, flagged or removed? Clyde returned to the topic at hand with a facetious theory that scoop volume is proportional to the relative size of potatoes and eggs themselves. In that case, Scott replied, what would happen if we served eggs that were bigger than potatoes, like of an ostrich? Someone proposed a uniform system, One spoon to scoop them all, an homage to The Lord Of The Rings. Punsters demanded the inside scoop and lamented the waste of time on small potatoes.

The same aspirations to nerdy wit define a large universe of NSA cover names. Somebody came up with Captivated Audience for a software tool that listens in on conversations by switching on the microphone of a targets mobile handset.

Many, many cryptonyms juxtapose animal names rabbits, goats, monkeys, kittens, a whole menagerie with incongruous adjectives. Comic book heroes and villains take prominent places in the pantheon. Mjolnir, the mythical hammer of Thor, is an NSA weapon to break the anonymity of Tor. Batcave includes a digital hideout for agency hackers who emerge to steal another countrys software code. Batmans alluring foe and sometime love interest, Poisonivy, is the cover name for a remote-access trojan used by Chinese government spies. Another programme is named for Deputydawg, the cartoon sheriff in a Terrytoons childrens show. Nighttrain is harder to source with confidence, being a blues song and a country song and a Guns N Roses song, but it seems to refer in context to a volume of the Hellboy comic series. Inside the agency it is part of an especially sensitive programme: espionage on a close US ally during operations alongside the ally against a common foe. Nighttrain is the allys surveillance technology. The NSA hacks into it with Ironavenger, named for a Marvel Comics story line about robot duplicates of famous superheroes. An NSA system for automated decryption of enciphered data is named Turtlepower, after the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles.

So it goes. Harry Potter fans dreamed up Quidditch in honour of the exploits of the NSAs Special Collection Service. Sortinghat, the enchanted cap that selects a Hogwarts house for each young wizard, is what the NSA calls the traffic control system for information exchanged with its British counterpart. Dystopian fiction contributes Bladerunner and Alteredcarbon, a pair of stories adapted from print to film. Grok, a verb invented by science-fiction author Robert Heinlein to signify deep understanding, is an NSA key logger that records every character a victim types. Favourite libations (Makersmark, Walkerblack, Crownroyal) and junk foods (Krispykreme, Cookiedough, Lifesaver) make regular appearances. Unpacman is a nod to early arcade games.

The culture is T-shirts, jeans, bleached hair, green hair, earrings, memes posted all over your cubicle

Star Trek lore provides an especially rich source of memes. Vulcandeathgrip, first officerSpocks ultimate combat move, is a nerdy play on network lingo: the grip in this case seizes encryption keys during the handshake of two devices as they establish a secure link. Borgerking is a twofer: fast food and a nod to the Borg collective that overmatches Starfleet captain Jean-Luc Picard. Trekkies account for Vulcanmindmeld and Wharpdrive, too, but their best work is no doubt Kobayashimaru. That is what the NSA calls its contract with General Dynamics to help break into another countrys surveillance equipment. In the Star Trek oeuvre, the name refers to a simulated mission at Starfleet Academy that tests a young cadets character in the face of certain doom. Every path in the game is programmed to destroy the players ship and crew. Cadet James T Kirk, having none of that, hacks into the simulator and adds a winning scenario. The metaphor stands for more than it may intend: not only creative circumvention, an NSA speciality, but a hacker spirit that gamifies its work.

Anthony Brown / Alamy Stock Photo

The fun and games are sometimes dispiriting to read. In the NSAs Hawaii operations centre, civilian and enlisted personnel used their work machines to circulate dozens of photo memes that originated on Reddit, 4chan, and somethingawful.com. One photo showed a four-foot plastic Donald Duck with hips positioned suggestively between the legs of a pigtailed little girl. Another depicted a small boy tugging at a playmates skirt with the caption, I would tear that ass up! An image of blue balls accompanied a warning to a girl in her early teens against teasing her boyfriend without submitting to sex. Beneath a photo of smiling middle school children, one of them in a wheelchair, another caption read, Who doesnt belong? Thats right. Wheel your ass on outta here. A similar photo, overlaid with an arrow that pointed to one of the boys, declared, Everyone can be friends! Except for this little faggot. One more, shot at the finish line of a Special Olympics footrace, advised the joyful victor, Even if you win, youre still retarded.

None of that could be called official business, even if distributed at work, but ethnic and other slurs find their way into NSA briefings and training resources as well. They turn up most commonly when syllabus writers are called upon to make up foreign names. Invented names are a staple of NSA course materials because analysts in training have no need to know the identities of actual foreign surveillance targets. Instructors use fictional substitutes to teach the technical and procedural fine points of target selection.

One of the first things an analyst needs to learn is what counts as an adequate reason to judge that a prospective surveillance target is a foreign national on foreign territory.

(Fourth Amendment restrictions apply otherwise.) The NSA syllabus for its Smart Target Enhancement Program walks through 12 foreignness factors that analysts may rely upon, each illustrated with examples. Some of the ersatz target names are merely playful: Elmer Fudd, Dr Evil, Bad Dude, Bad Girl, Bad Guy and Super Bad Guy. Most of them descend into stereotype. Lotsa Casho is a Colombia-based coordinator for a drug cartel. A Beijing-based Chinese party of interest can be found online as friedrice@hotmail.com. The Turkish target (kababs4u@yahoo.com) is Master Kabob, believed by the NSA to have provided grilled kabobs for hungry Islamic cells.

The most derisive descriptions, and the ones used most often, are reserved for fictional Arabs and Muslims. Many are named with a bastardised reference to an Arabic term of respect for fatherhood. Abu Bad Guy, Abu Evil and Abu Raghead make appearances, among others. Another version takes the name of the Prophet: Mohammed Bad Guy, Mohammed Evil, and so on. Weekly programme updates in briefings prepared for supervisors display related tropes. One report on a surveillance operation in progress took a break from matters at hand to joke about what happens when the mulla [sic] mixes his Viagra with his heroin. (Now he gets an erection but cant stand up.) Save for the last example, these are bureaucratically vetted teaching materials.

In the age of Trump, I found a new openness among my bitter critics in the intelligence community. People who had shunned contact after the Snowden revelations began to talk to me again.

One of them, soon after retiring as director of national intelligence, was Air Force lieutenant general James Clapper. Both his parents had worked for a time at Fort Meade and Clapper himself did a tour there as aide to the NSA director in the course of a half-century career. In 2014, Clapper had come as close as anyone in government to accusing me, along with the documentary maker Laura Poitras and journalist Glenn Greenwald, of taking part in a criminal conspiracy with Snowden. Four years later, in the summer of 2018, he agreed to meet face-to-face. Clapper had responded crankily at first to my request for half a day of his time. I need to know what this is about before I sit for an hours-long recorded interrogation, he wrote. I made fun of his choice of noun but replied at length. Eventually he agreed to breakfast at the McLean Family Restaurant, a CIA hangout in northern Virginia, where Clapper seemed to know half the room. He made the rounds, chatting up old friends and colleagues, then ordered an egg white omelette. During several hours of conversation, long after servers cleared our plates, he listened respectfully and responded without mincing words. I recounted some of the stories I planned to tell here.

Near the end of the interview, I asked Clapper what to make of an agency culture in which hackers and analysts feel free to mock the dead and conduct official business with ethnic and sexual slurs. These are not necessarily the people you want to be in charge, I said.

His face tightened. TAO, he said, referring to Tailored Access Operations, is supposed to be, you know, our legitimate government officially sanctioned hackers.

Right. Theyre supposed to be, I replied. But if theyre snickering about...

He interrupted, sarcastic. But we want them to be nice. We dont want to do anything thats politically incorrect. Right? Isnt that what youre saying?

What you want is to think theres a certain level of maturity and respect for the amount of power they have.

Clapper softened. Well, yeah. You do. But, hey, theyre human beings too. And Im sure we could clean that up.

Open-mindedness in a leader of Clappers rank is not to be taken for granted. Even so, he could have probed more deeply. Language is the symptom, not the problem. NSA geeks are not like other geeks whose folkways they share. The NSAs top guns build and operate the machinery of a global surveillance hegemon, licensed to do things that would land them in prison if they tried them anywhere else. The eagle and serpent would not be alpha predators without them. Only judgment and self-control can govern them where there is some play in the rules, as there usually is in a sprawling enterprise. Digital weapons designers, like engineers everywhere, are inclined to do what works. The choices they make reach well beyond the terrain of Bad Girls and Bad Guys.

Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden And The American Surveillance State by Barton Gellman (The Bodley Head, 20) is out now. amazon.co.uk

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Memes, lolz and intel incels: behind the scenes in the NSA hacker corps - British GQ

Actor John Cusack accuses police of coming at him with batons and hitting his bike – Straight.com

For well over a decade, John Cusack has been one of America's most politically active actors.

He met whistleblower Edward Snowden in Moscow and coauthored a book about this with Indian writer Arundhati Roy.

Cusack has also slammed the Obama administration for using drones to kill people.

And he has suggested over Twitter that Donald Trump should be removed from office due to the emoluments clause in the U.S. constitution, which prohibits the president from receiving gifts from foreign powers.

But last night may have been the first time that Cusack felt under attack from police.

He was videotaping a burning car in Chicago when a large number of baton-wielding cops approached him.

According to Cusack, they "gently tuned up my bike with their batons".

You can see and hear some of what was said below.

Chicago, like many other cities, was the scene of a gigantic protest against last week's police-involved death of Minnesota resident George Floyd.

A police officer, Derek Chauvin, has been fired and charged with third-degree murder and manslaughter after he was videotaped with his knee on Floyd's neck. Three other officers watched as Floyd pleaded to be released.

While the vast majority of this weekend's demonstrators were peaceful, there were also many fires started and windows smashed.

Some have suggested that white supremacists may have contributed to the mayhem.

Here's the scene in Nashville, where the city hall was set ablaze.

Below, you can read some of the comments and reports being passed around over social media.

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Actor John Cusack accuses police of coming at him with batons and hitting his bike - Straight.com

Edward Snowden will not be pardoned in his lifetime, says author of new book on the NSA whistleblower – Yahoo News

The Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington Post reporter who documented the scope of the U.S. governments surveillance on its own citizens after receiving leaked National Security Agency documents from Edward Snowden told Yahoo News that he believes the former NSA contractor will not be pardoned in his lifetime.

Barton Gellman, now a staff writer at the Atlantic, was one of three reporters Snowden first approached in 2013 with the archive of documents showing mass surveillance of American citizens by their own government. Gellmans book about Snowden,Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State,was released Tuesday. Gellman, who is sympathetic to Snowden but raises questions about some of his actions, said Snowden will not be able to return to America in his lifetime unless he comes in handcuffs.

Getting pardoned is going to be a very, very big lift for any president, Gellman told Yahoo News Skullduggery podcast. The intelligence community, the national security community, loathes Snowden and have long memories for this sort of thing, and I dont think hell be pardoned in his lifetime.

Gellman has spent significant time with Snowden since first meeting him in 2013 and said his books title reflects his own view of the U.S. governments surveillance capabilities and efforts.

Were transparent to our government, our government is opaque to us, and that creates distortions in the balance of power, he said.

Still, Gellman is clear that his book is not meant to be a full-throated defense of Snowden, who remains in Russia, where he has been since shortly after Gellman and other Washington Post reporters first revealed the NSAs illegal mass data collection efforts thanks to Snowdens disclosures.

Snowden had been a Hawaii-based NSA contractor before he made the decision to give Gellman the trove of documents. Snowden then traveled to Hong Kong before continuing on to Moscow in what he has said was a bid to make his way to Ecuador, which has historically refused to extradite criminal suspects to the U.S. After the Guardian and Gellman at the Washington Post first published their stories, Snowden then sharedhighly classifiedmaterial with the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post revealing NSA targets inside China, a revelation that seemed unrelated to his professed concern about wanting to protect the privacy of American citizens.When asked to explain why Snowden chose to leak information about U.S. intelligence gathering efforts in China to the South China Morning Post, Gellman said he would not defend what Snowden did.

Story continues

I have no defense of the South China Morning Post story; Snowdens view was that he was showing that even universities and hospitals that is, not defense facilities or foreign ministers were a target, Gellman said of the disclosures to a hostile foreign government. I would not have published that story, because I dont publish stories that warn specific foreign targets of legitimateforeign adversaries that theyre being spied on.

Download or subscribe on iTunes:Skullduggery from Yahoo News

Over the years, Gellman and Snowden have debated the surveillance state and its importance, sometimes ending up on opposite sides of the debate. Gellman said Snowden intrigues him in part because of how far he was willing to go to reveal sensitive and previously unknown NSA practices such as the illegal bulk collection of phone records. Congress outlawed the practice in 2015, a step that almost definitely would not have happened without Snowdens revelations.

Why do people like Snowden do what they do? Gellman asked. Most people are going to go along and get along. ... It requires a supreme confidence in your own sense of right and wrong, which Snowden does have. And it requires a sensibility that cant tolerate inaction.

Gellman said that despite speculation by others that Snowden is aRussian spy, he just doesnt believe it based on his experiences with the whistleblower. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said Snowden reached out to Russian diplomats based in Hong Kong during the two weeks he spent there before the story broke, but Gellman said he spent significant time investigating Snowdens relationship with Russia and has concluded that Snowden is not a Russian asset.

Gellman pointed to the fact that Snowden ended up in Moscow when his passport was revoked en route to Cuba and then Ecuador Gellman said he has seen Snowdens plane ticket, which showed a final destination in Ecuador. And Snowden urged him not to bring any of the documents he shared with him on a trip to Russia, hardly a warning one would expect from a Russian intelligence operative hoping to access as much material as possible. As for what Putin said, Gellman concludes the Russian president may have wanted to leave a false trail or to poke the Americans.

Whatever Snowdens historical relationship with the Russian government, it is evident that Putin sees tremendous value in having Snowden remain in Moscow, where U.S. authorities cant touch him. Gellman said he believes Putin enjoys his role as international human rights defender protecting a whistleblower like Snowden. Even Snowden realizes he is a prize for Putin and is open about it, Gellman said.

Snowden has also acknowledged to me, and I thought it was very interesting, that Putin has reason to protect him, because although he is not in fact a Russian agent, he might look that way to other people and Putin does not want to discourage walk-ins by foreign intelligence officers of other countries, Gellman said. If he sent Snowden back, that would make people wary ... so Snowden says, Even though I am not a spy, he is treating me as though I were so that he doesnt blow chances with somebody else.

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Edward Snowden will not be pardoned in his lifetime, says author of new book on the NSA whistleblower - Yahoo News

Journalist Reflects On High-Stakes Reporting Of The Edward Snowden Story – NPR

Former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, shown broadcasting from Moscow in 2014, says he acted as a whistleblower when he shared classified documents with journalist Barton Gellman. Charles Platiau/AP hide caption

Former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, shown broadcasting from Moscow in 2014, says he acted as a whistleblower when he shared classified documents with journalist Barton Gellman.

In 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor with the National Security Agency, rocked the world when he leaked thousands of classified documents about U.S. surveillance programs.

Barton Gellman, formerly of The Washington Post, was one of three journalists including filmmaker Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian with whom Snowden chose to share the documents. Gellman says initially Snowden was skeptical of him.

"He thought that The Washington Post would be afraid to publish or would bow down to government pressure," Gellman says. "It took a lot of convincing for him, just as it took a lot of convincing for me that he was for real."

Snowden shared information about surveillance programs previously unknown to the American public, including the fact that the government was keeping records of private citizens' phone calls and that the NSA was harvesting data from big internet companies, including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.

Gellman reached out to The Washington Post, the paper he had left three years earlier, which went on to publish a series of articles based on Snowden's classified information.

In a new book, Dark Mirror, Gellman writes about his relationship with Snowden and the high-stakes reporting that ultimately garnered him, Poitras and Greenwald a Pulitzer Prize.

The U.S. government charged Snowden with espionage, but Snowden, who is living in exile in Russia, maintains that he acted as a whistleblower in sharing the classified documents.

Gellman says that no matter what your opinion about Snowden is, one thing is clear: "Ed Snowden succeeded beyond the wildest ambitions that he could plausibly have had. ... Even the biggest critics of Snowden not all of them, but some of them ... all say he started a debate that the public needed to have about the limits of surveillance in a democratic society."

"At the same time," Gellman adds, "most of the programs that he exposed continue."

On the terms Snowden agreed upon with Gellman, Poitras and Greenwald

I told Snowden that ... I would make my own judgment about the news value and that I would give the government an opportunity to tell me about damage they foresaw, if the story was published. And so I had that conversation with the government every time. Snowden at first seemed a little skeptical about this and worried that it simply meant I was going to give the government veto power over an article. And in fact, he saw it as potential evidence of a cowardly approach by The Washington Post. Later, he came to see the value and the importance of trying to avoid avoidable harm in the publication of these stories. And he began to insist that that was what he wanted all along. ...

Snowden absolutely wanted us to make our own judgments about newsworthiness. He absolutely did not want us to dump the entire archive online. If he wanted that, he could have done it himself. I mean, the guy knows how to work the Internet. He wanted the credibility of journalists behind the disclosures. He wanted us to check the facts and set the context. And he wanted us to decide what was newsworthy and what was harmful. So he essentially relinquished all the close judgment calls to me and my fellow journalists.

On the importance of checks and balances on the government's surveillance power

In 2014, Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman shared a Pulitizer Prize with fellow journalists Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald for their reporting on Edward Snowden and the NSA's surveillance programs. The Washington Post via Getty Images hide caption

In 2014, Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman shared a Pulitizer Prize with fellow journalists Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald for their reporting on Edward Snowden and the NSA's surveillance programs.

There were people in 2013 and '14 and '15 who told me they didn't worry about the enormous power of this surveillance machinery because they trusted the people who were running it. They trusted themselves. They trusted the inspector general to call out and prevent bad behavior. They trusted supervisors. They trusted, fundamentally, the president and the presidency. And they trusted Democrats and Republicans. They trusted George W. Bush and Barack Obama equally to use this stuff with the right motives and with the right kinds of limits.

But so much of what is done under authority of the NSA is done based on norms and traditional understandings of what terms mean and on legal interpretations. When [Donald] Trump came to power a guy who is allergic to norms, a guy who is at war with every institution of accountability, whether it's the press, whether it's inspectors general, whether it's courts when that kind of person has his hands on the enormous power that is granted by the ability to look into [and] see into anything that travels across the Internet, then they're worried.

So people who surprise me people like Jim Comey, and people like Gen. [James] Clapper, who had been the director of national intelligence, these were people who had ardently defended the surveillance powers and the checks and balances held on them they were no longer so confident about those checks and balances.

On his tense relationship with Snowden

Snowden wanted advocates on his side. He wanted a pure and clear message of dissent against the way the NSA was behaving. And he wanted nothing that would raise any doubts or questions about him or get into his personal life or anything like that. I continued to ask questions the way a journalist should ask questions. And so we would have these tense exchanges in which he would say, for example, "Are you purposely asking me things you know I won't answer just to piss me off?"

The first time [Snowden] got angry at me he was right to be angry. In an early profile of him, I inadvertently exposed an online handle an anonymous handle that he was still using for communications. And that caused him some trouble as he tried to change handles and encryption keys on the fly.

Barton Gellman

The first time he got angry at me he was right to be angry. In an early profile of him, I inadvertently exposed an online handle an anonymous handle that he was still using for communications. And that caused him some trouble as he tried to change handles and encryption keys on the fly. ...

He quit talking to me for several months after that. And we started up again because he believed I was handling these stories seriously, that I was diving into the subject in a way that was exposing truths that weren't being exposed anywhere else, because this wasn't just a question of opening the documents, reading and writing your story. The documents were incomplete, pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, very hard to understand. They required external reporting with sources in the government and out of the government. They required interpretation and discovery. And I was putting things together in a way that he thought was important. And so he got over his personal anger at the way I behaved.

On the cybersecurity precautions he took when he visited Snowden in Moscow in December 2013

I don't like to be dramatic or self-important, but I thought, "Yeah, there's a pretty good chance that if an American journalist who is writing about secret American intelligence programs comes over to interview a former intelligence officer, Ed Snowden, that that would probably be worth their diversion of a little bit of surveillance to themselves."

I assumed that my devices and my telephone calls would be monitored, and so to begin with, I didn't bring any data over with me. I wasn't gonna bring classified U.S. documents to a country where they could possibly read them and directly expose American secrets to a foreign power.

So I didn't log onto any of my accounts, I didn't bring my actual computer or my usual telephone, I brought empty ones. But I still had the puzzle of how I was going to interview Snowden, take notes, take photographs, make recordings, and then bring those back to the United States while crossing an international border and not hand over those documents, those recordings and so on to either government. I didn't want the U.S. government to hear everything I'd said with Snowden. I didn't want the Russian government to have access to all that information either.

On the House Intelligence Committee report, which was very critical of Snowden

If there were particular harms done by particular disclosures, that fact itself would be classified. ... And so I can't argue with an assertion that's made in the dark, and there may be legitimate reasons to keep that classified. On the other hand, I would have to say that, not to put a fine point on it, that House Intelligence Committee report was garbage. It was a political document. It was basically a long screed about Ed Snowden, and it was filled with facts or assertions of fact that were plainly rebuttable, that they were simply wrong.

Just the simple question of calling Ed Snowden "a high school dropout." He had earned his GED at the same time that his class graduated, with top, top scores. They knew that he had advanced computer security and computer science credentials. Or, for example, they said there's no evidence that Ed Snowden actually was injured in the Army. And so he was lying about the reasons for the end of his Army service. Well, Army records made it very clear. I've seen the records. He broke both legs in training, and for the House Intelligence Committee, which had privileged access to government records, to say things like that gives you a decent flavor of the more complicated untruths in the report.

On being a target for international hackers

It's not paranoid if people are really trying to get you. I knew from the first time I saw the documents before I published a story that this was going to paint a big target on my back. It's advertising that you have something special and secret and advertising pretty quickly that I was not going to publish all of it. So I knew that I would be a subject of interest to hackers, to the U.S. government and to foreign intelligence agencies. And I gradually accumulated considerable evidence that this was true.

Someone tried to break into my Gmail accounts, where I did not store sensitive documents. But nevertheless, Google warned me, a big flashing pink bar on my screen said, "Warning! We believe that state-sponsored attackers are trying to break into your device or your account." I found out later that that was the government of Turkey. Turkey was unexpected and bad news for me, because I thought there were a substantial number of likely candidates and more capable candidates coming after me. So if Turkey also was joining the party, that suggested the threat landscape was broader than I would have liked to think.

My iPad was hacked right in front of my eyes as I was holding it.

Barton Gellman

My iPad was hacked right in front of my eyes as I was holding it. The screen gutted out of the static and then white letters started marching across the screen with technical commands in a language called Unix. If that had worked as expected, as intended, it would have happened while I slept or wasn't looking at the machine. And after a couple of minutes of fooling around like that, the hacker would have complete control of the device. And what worried me about that was that remotely hacking an iPad is not a beginners' hack. It's quite difficult and quite expensive to break through Apple's considerable security remotely without physically connecting to the device. It's a million-dollar hack, that is, say that data brokers or surveillance brokers pay million-dollar bounties for what's called an untethered hack of the iPad operating system. I did not want to be worth that kind of effort. I did not want to be worth that kind of expense. But I was.

Sam Briger and Joel Wolfram produced and edited this interview for broadcast. Bridget Bentz, Molly Seavy-Nesper and Meghan Sullivan adapted it for the Web.

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Journalist Reflects On High-Stakes Reporting Of The Edward Snowden Story - NPR

A look at how Jitsi became a ‘secure’ open-source alternative to Zoom – The Next Web

The coronavirus pandemic pushed people to stay in their homes, and in turn, forced them to use video conferencing products. In the past couple of months, Zoom became an almost indispensable app, Facebook had to step up and make a rival product, and Google made its enterprise conferencing product free for everyone.

Amid this video conferencing boom, Zooms security and privacy-relatedproblems made a lot of people skeptical about using its products. Plus, the company wasnt transparent about communicating its mishaps this forced a lot of people to look for free open source products, and Jitsi emerged as a perfect solution for them.

Apart from being open-sourced, Jitsi benefited from endorsements by a few highly-regarded names in the security community. In March, a privacy-focusedbrowser Tor tweeted about the product as an alternative to Zoom.

In 2017, in an interview with WIRED, Edward Snowden talked about using his own Jitsi server. Later, in a security conference, a lot of people saw Snowden using Jitsi to deliver a talk.

The product suddenly exploded during the pandemic. That meant Emil Ivov, Jitsis founder, and the rest of the team had to work even longer hours to keep the ship running.

Ivov originally built Jitsi as a project in 2003, when he was studying at the University of Strasbourg. Later, he spun off the project into an app and kept building it for desktop. In 2009, he started a company called BlueJimp (not to confused with BlueJeans, another video conferencing app) around it.

In 2011, Google open-sourced WebRTC communication standards to facilitate things like video-conferencing over browsers.The team took advantage of that and built abrowser-basedproduct, and so Meet Jitsi was born.

Apart from being open-sourced Jitsis ease of use helped it gain more users. To set up a call, you need to go to its website, and itll generate a meeting link with four words. That makes it difficult for Zoombombers uninvited people who join public video conferences and broadcast pornographic material to guess the link. Plus, you dont need to sign up to set up a meeting.

While the open-sourced version is free-to-usefor everyone. Its parent company, 88 offers a paid version with features such as transcription and meeting history.

In the past few months, the team had to scale up the infrastructure as users started to mount due to lockdowns all over the world.

The company learned that all kinds of people started to use video conferencing products. So they had to make things easier for users and educate them about the product as many of them were used to old-fashioned dial-in calls.

However, the pandemic has popularized the companys product. Ivov claims it pushed the apps growth by 10 years:

The pandemic provided an acceleration of 10 years in terms of growth. The last decade was an indicator of people moving towards remote work. This situation has just put us into the fast track mode.

After the pandemic hit the world, Jitsis open-sourced version and 88s paid version have managed to achieve 20 million unique monthly participants.

The next challenge for the company is to introduce end-to-end encryption for calls. The service already offers end-to-end encryption one-on-one calls and plenty of other security measures.

Ivov told me that hes never heard so many people talk about end-to-end encryption:

Ive never heard so many people talk about security and end-to-end encryption as I have in the past few months. We provide different levels of security for different needs. So primarily, we needed to educate people about the options they have.

He said that end-to-end encryption for a call with multiple people is challenging to develop. Ideally, when someone joins an encrypted call without a valid key, they would only see jumbled up video streams. When they have the legitimate key, the video stream would look normal. You can see that in a demo video below.

Now, this is easy to execute when there are two or three people on the call. When video services such as Jitsi meet use WebRTC, they create a connection with a central server that dishes out a single video stream to all participants.

If a service wants to use encryption, it has to create the same number of encrypted connection to the central server as the number of participants on a call.And the central server has to decrypt every stream, re-encrypt it, and send it to another participant.This works well for two or three-person calls. But puts a lot of load on the server for calls with multiple people.

To solve this problem, Jitsi is going to use Insertable Streams, a new feature released by the Chromium team that lets you add an additional layer of encryption. The idea is to encrypt frames rather than connections.

Ivov says the open-source nature of the app has helped people find bugs and report them and thats why we havent seen a major security scare on the app yet.Plus, this also helps anyone who wants to implement their own set of functions on top of Jitsis app.

For instance, the Italy-based classroom collaboration platform WeSchool has built some features on top of Jitsis open-sourced version. And according to WeSchools CEO, Marco De Rossi, nearly 30% of secondary schools in the country are using that tool. Rocket Chat, a free and open-source enterprise team chat solution also uses Jitsi for video conferencing.

The number of people using video conferencing simultaneously might decrease as countries are opening up, but Ivov believes a lot of people will still prefer this method of communication instead of a meeting packed with people.

He said that conferencing apps will need to try and make peoples lives easier by making meeting itemssuch as slideshows, documents, and transcripts available even after the session ends. However, the challenge for them would be to do all of this without compromising anyones privacy, and Ivov believes its possible.

Read next: Ben Goertzel: I'm just another neuron in the goddamn global brain

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A look at how Jitsi became a 'secure' open-source alternative to Zoom - The Next Web

Signal secure messaging can now identify you without a phone number – Naked Security

Signal is a popular instant messaging (IM) app with a difference.

That difference or at least its major difference is simple: its not owned and operated by an industry behemoth.

WhatsApp belongs to Facebook, Skype is part of Microsoft, and iMessage is owned by Apple, but the open-source app Signal belongs, inasmuch as it belongs to anyone, to Signal.

Signal is a US-registered non-profit organisation that was founded entirely around making and supporting the messaging app.

As a result, Signals big selling point is, well, that it isnt selling anything.

Sharing information about you with third parties isnt part of Signals business model, so theres actually no point in it figuring out how to do so

which means that theres a much more compelling reason to believe the organisation when it claims to have an unbending focus on end-to-end encryption.

Signal not only has no desire, but also has no need, to take any interest in what youre saying, or whom youre saying it to.

Signal is also endorsed by a privacy celebrity that other IM service providers cant match, namely Edward Snowden.

Snowden is quoted on Signals website with the five simple words, I use Signal every day.

(With apologies to well-known cryptographers Bruce Schneier and Matt Green, who are two of Signals other celebrity endorsers.)

Signal, however, has one curious aspect that puts some people off, this author included.

Weve never bothered with Signal for the reason that signing up means handing over your phone number.

Conveniently, a phone number is all you need to sign up, but you cant sign up with your name instead, or with an email address.

You need to use a working phone number that really is yours.

Basing the identity of accounts on a phone number makes a lot of sense, not least because a phone number is something you can easily and cheaply acquire in many countries, and it guarantees that the user has a satisfactory way of verifying their identity.

But in some countries, getting hold of a phone number isnt an easy process, and may involve proving not only your identity but also your address.

Indeed, getting hold of an anonymous SIM card, or using an improperly registered one, is a criminal offence in some jurisdictions.

And theres something unappealing about entrusting your identity on a secure online service (one that prides itself on immunity to surveillance) to a cryptographic chip that must by law be registered with a central authority so it can keep tabs on you via that same chip.

Theres something even less appealing about the worry that you could be locked out of your own account simply by losing the right to the phone number you used for the account.

This irony isnt lost on Signal, and it has just announced a new feature called Signal PINs that allow you to keep control of your account even if you lose your phone or are forced to switch numbers and cant get your old one back.

Signal aims to be easy and safe to use for everyone, which is why it hasnt insisted on using long and hard-to-remember recovery codes.

Signal PINs can be as long and complex as you like, including letters as well as digits, if thats what you prefer, but you can safely use a short PIN if you want something thats easy to remember and doesnt need writing down, an act that could be a risk for some Signal users.

Signal is using a technique it announced late last year called SVR, short for Secure Value Recovery.

One obvious problem with short PINs used as recovery codes for databases that arent stored in secure memory on your smartphone is the issue of whats called an offline attack.

For example, your iPhone can get away with a 6-digit PIN because you can only type in the PIN on the phone, and the only way to verify the PIN (unless there is a bug somewhere) is to communicate directly with a tamper-resistant chip inside the phone.

That chip cant be opened up, modified or cloned, so the internal counter it maintains of how many guesses youve had at the PIN cant be reset or bypassed you get 10 goes and then its game over.

You cant make 10,000 copies of the chip and have 9 guesses on each copy without getting locked out forever.

But regular server databases arent as easy to protect against attacks where the crooks arent hindered by the presence of dedicated, tamper resistant hardware.

Signal has therefore put a lot of effort into developing hacker-resistant storage enclaves that the company can run on its own servers using Intels Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to keep your master secrets secure with a pass code thats easy to remember.

As we mentioned, however, you dont need to use a PIN to secure your Signal account you can just use your phone number alone, as before, or choose a proper pass-phrase thats as long as you like. (We recommend the latter, SVR or no SVR.)

The disappointing news here, at least in our opinion, is that Signal isnt yet announcing a way to use its product without handing over a phone number at all.

Weve seen excitable reports in the media suggesting that this marks the beginning of the end of phone-based identity for Signal, but we dont think it does.

You still cant use the laptop versions of the app without setting Signal up on your phone first, and you cant set it up on your phone without handing over a real, live phone number right at the start of the installation.

As Signal itself says, PINs arent a replacement for phone numbers but they do provide a safer way to recover your account in an emergency than a phone number alone.

In the latest version of our apps, were introducing Signal PINs. Signal PINs are based on Secure Value Recovery, which we previewed in December, to allow supporting data like your profile, settings, and who youve blocked to be securely recovered should you lose or switch devices. PINs will also help facilitate new features like addressing that isnt based exclusively on phone numbers, since the system address book will no longer be a viable way to maintain your network of contacts.

Its a start, not least because it means an interfering government or mobile phone company cant lock you out of your account simply by cancelling your SIM card.

But you still need a phone to get onto Signal in the first place.

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Signal secure messaging can now identify you without a phone number - Naked Security

Beware calls from unknown numbers – this top messaging app has placed millions of iOS and Android users at risk – TechRadar India

UPDATED: We have updated this article following a response from Signal, which told us new, updated versions of the app are available to download now.

Researchers have identified a security vulnerability in popular privacy-centric messaging app Signal.

Discovered by security firm Tenable, the bug could allow hackers to gain access to users coarse location data and map out patterns of movement - such as time-periods during which a user is likely to be at home, work, or their favorite local haunt.

To execute an attack, the hacker need only use Signal to call another user, whose location could be compromised whether or not the call is answered.

The Signal messaging app features end-to-end encryption for both calls and text messages, attracting millions of privacy-conscious users every day across Android and iOS. Even infamous whistleblower and champion of data privacy Edward Snowden claims to use Signal every day.

However, according to an advisory published by Tenable, the app is not as watertight from a privacy perspective as its users might expect.

The newly discovered flaw exploits the WebRTC code handling DNS requests on a user's device. This can be used to leak information about a users DNS, which can in turn reveal coarse location data and allow the hacker to identify the victims location within a 400 mile radius.

While this might appear inconsequential to most, using coarse location data in conjunction with DNS server pings from different networks (domestic Wi-Fi, public hotspots, 4G connections etc.) could be used by the hacker to make more precise location assumptions.

Signal was quick to issue a patch for the vulnerability via GitHub, as well as a patch to the WebRTC project in order to help other potentially affected apps.

The company added that an updated version of the app is also available now on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store, which users should download immediately.

Tenable noted that although average Signal users arent to be impacted, for certain Signal users, the issue could be, "quite serious". As the flaw affects WebRTC code used in many other popular apps, the company notes that users of other services could also be at risk.

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Beware calls from unknown numbers - this top messaging app has placed millions of iOS and Android users at risk - TechRadar India