Introduction to Cryptography Part 2 - Public key and key exchange
Public key, hash functions, and key exchange. Part 1 is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9YuARcSTVY and related examples: http://asecuritysite.com/encryption.
By: Bill Buchanan
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Introduction to Cryptography Part 2 - Public key and key exchange - Video
RARE Voynich Manuscript ILLUSTRATED CODEX Cryptography Glyphs Ltd Ed HB alchemy
Limited Edition of the Voynich Manuscript. Beautiful book. Limited to 200 copies.
By: Max Rainet
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RARE Voynich Manuscript ILLUSTRATED CODEX Cryptography Glyphs Ltd Ed HB alchemy - Video
HP ProLiant Gen8: Integrated lifecycle automation
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been urged to hire more crypto experts so it can confidently tell the NSA to take a hike.
A report (PDF) from NIST's Visiting Committee on Advanced Technology (VCAT) which scrutinizes and advises the institute scolds NIST for being too reliant on the NSA's cryptography expertise. VCAT cited the adoption and backing the use of the dodgy Dual EC DRBG algorithm, an NSA-championed random number generator that was later found to be flawed [PDF].
Random numbers are vital in cryptography, as they thwart an eavesdropper attempting to decrypt intercepted enciphered data.
The report was launched in the wake of allegations from whistleblower Edward Snowden that the NSA deliberately weakened Dual EC DRBG and other algorithms for surveillance purposes. Despite having been warned about the insecurities years ago, the report found that NIST which is part of the US Department of Commerce relied heavily on input from the NSA in maintaining the standard.
VCAT members believe that to guard itself from such scandals in the future, NIST will need to become more transparent and better engage with the security community as a whole.
According to the VCAT report, a lack of qualified personnel was a key shortfall for the NIST. Without enough experts on hand, the institute was unable to spot and address the weaknesses in the Dual EC DRBG and the SP 800-90 standard.
To remedy the issue, the committee is recommending that NIST hire additional staff versed in cryptography as well as reach out to academic institutions and security vendors when building and analyzing encryption standards.
NIST will also need to cut ties with the NSA.
"NIST may seek the advice of the NSA on cryptographic matters but it must be in a position to assess it and reject it when warranted," the report suggests. "This may be accomplished by NIST itself or by engaging the cryptographic community during the development and review of any particular standard."
Originally posted here:
NIST told to grow a pair and kick NSA to the curb
San Francisco: U.S. government standards for software may enable spying by the National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be jettisoned, some of the country's top independent experts concluded in papers released on Monday.
Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other cryptography standards.
But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA.
NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging conclusions by the individual experts.
Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic Curve - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA- the group delved into the details of how it and other NIST standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations in some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review.
As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to confer with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only the United States government but the broader community."
They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members who made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because they were selected through unclear means by the NSA.
"It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," said Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away."
More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an inquiry, then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to be 'tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders.
In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a process whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen.
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Experts Report Potential Software 'Back Doors' in US Standards
San Francisco: US government standards for software may enable spying by the National Security Agency through widely used coding formulas that should be jettisoned, some of US' top independent experts concluded in papers released on Monday.
Such mathematical formulas, or curves, are an arcane but essential part of most technology that prevents interception and hacking, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been legally required to consult with the NSA's defensive experts in approving them and other cryptography standards.
But NIST's relationship with the spy agency came under fire in September after reports based on documents from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to one formula in particular as a Trojan horse for the NSA.
NIST discontinued that formula, called Dual Elliptic Curve, and asked its external advisory board and a special panel of experts to make recommendations that were published on Monday alongside more stinging conclusions by the individual experts.
Noting the partially obscured hand of the NSA in creating Dual Elliptic Curve - which Reuters reported was most broadly distributed by security firm RSA - the group delved into the details of how it and other NIST standards emerged. It found incomplete documentation and poor explanations in some cases; in others material was withheld pending legal review.
As a whole, the panels recommended that NIST review its obligation to confer with the NSA and seek legal changes "where it hinders its ability to independently develop the best cryptographic standards to serve not only the United States government but the broader community."
They also urged NIST to weigh the advice of individual task force members who made more dramatic suggestions, such as calling for the replacement of a larger set of curves approved for authenticating users, in part because they were selected through unclear means by the NSA.
"It is possible that the specified curves contain a back door somehow," said Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Ron Rivest, a co-founder of RSA and the source of the letter R in its name. Though the curves could be fine, he wrote, "it seems prudent to assume the worst and transition away."
More broadly, Rivest wrote, "NIST should ask the NSA for full disclosure regarding all existing standards... If NSA refuses to answer such an inquiry, then any standard developed with significant NSA input should be assumed to be 'tainted,'" absent proof of security acceptable to outsiders.
In an email exchange, Rivest told Reuters that "NIST needs to have a process whereby evidence is publicly presented" about how the curves were chosen.
Originally posted here:
US government software standards may enable spying by NSA
Some commentary from security advocates, including cryptography writer Bruce Schneier.
http://time.com/2966463/nsa-spying-surveillance-cybersecurity-privacy-advocates-schneier/
NSA Spying Hurts Cybersecurity for All of Us Say Privacy Advocates
The surveillance debate has focused on the legality of spying on Americans but some say the biggest danger is in the methods the NSA uses
Privacy advocates Monday slammed the National Security Agency for conducting surveillance in a way they say undermines cybersecurity for everyone and harms U.S. tech companies.
HOPE Number Nine (2012): Why Browser Cryptography is Bad and How We Can Make It Great
Saturday, July 14, 2012: 10:00 am (Nutt): Web apps are becoming almost exponentially responsible for handling user data. This incredible increase summons an ...
By: Channel2600
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HOPE Number Nine (2012): Why Browser Cryptography is Bad and How We Can Make It Great - Video
Unit 5: Cryptography
The key concepts of public key cryptography are introduced.
By: CSP-Alabama
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Unit 5: Cryptography - Video
Introduction to Cryptography: Part 1 - Private Key
This outlines private key encryption and some key cracking. Code examples are at: http://asecuritysite.com/encryption.
By: Bill Buchanan
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Introduction to Cryptography: Part 1 - Private Key - Video
Network Security Part 5 Cryptography
By: Navin Skills
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Network Security Part 5 Cryptography - Video