The three words that best describe the U.S. Supreme Courts decisions this term are "text," "history" and "tradition." If thats one word too many, try this: Originalism rules! And thats a good thing.

The court considered several important constitutional cases this term. The split in most of these cases was 6-3, with the conservative justices in the majority and the liberal justices in dissent.

In the biggest case, Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization, a five-justice majority ruled the Constitution has no right to obtain an abortion. This overturned Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).

Nearly 50 years ago, Justice Byron White, in his Roe dissent, wrote that the errant ruling represented an exercise of raw judicial power. Similarly, John Hart Ely, an eminent scholar who supported abortion rights, stated that Roe was not constitutional law and g(ave) almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.

Those views were reflected in the majority opinion for Dobbs, written by Justice Samuel Alito. He noted that the right to an abortion is not in the Constitutions text, nor was it part of our nations history or traditions. Indeed, virtually every state outlawed abortion when the Constitution and the 14th Amendment were ratified.

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The court also decided an important Second Amendment case, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the 6-3 majority opinion, striking down a New York law requiring law-abiding citizens who passed a background check to demonstrate a special need beyond a general desire to defend oneself before being permitted to carry a firearm outside the home.

The court said that such a restriction was not supported by drumroll, please either the amendments text or the nations historical traditions. The court further stated the amendment was the product of an interest balancing by the people and that it was improper for a court to engage in a judge-empowering interest-balancing inquiry once the protections of the amendment had been properly invoked.

In an important religious liberty case, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the six-justice majority opinion that a school violated the free exercise and free speech rights of a high school football coach when it fired him for offering a silent post-game prayer at midfield. The court relied on you guessed it historical practices and the original meaning of the First Amendments text.

The court also finally declared that the courts much-criticized three-part test for analyzing Establishment Clause cases, promulgated in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) which Justice Antonin Scalia once described as some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried was indeed dead.

The court also sided with religious adherents in other significant religious liberty and free speech cases, including Carson v. Makin, Shurtleff v. City of Boston, and Ramirez v. Collier. Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, won a significant victory against the Federal Election Commission in which the court, again by a 6-3 vote, held that an FEC rule violated the First Amendment rights of candidates wishing to make personal loans to their own campaigns to engage in pure political speech.

And in NFIB v. OSHA, West Virginia v. EPA and Alabama Association of Realtors v. HHS, the court (via 6-3 votes) held that the separation of powers requires Congress to speak clearly before an administrative agency consisting of unaccountable bureaucrats can exercise nearly unlimited power over decisions of great economic and political significance.

In his dissenting opinion in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, Justice Benjamin Curtis stated: When a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men who, for the time being, have power to declare what the Constitution is according to their views of what it ought to mean.

During this momentous term, the court made great strides toward interpreting the Constitution with fidelity and restoring the rights of all Americans to govern themselves with the exception of those few individual rights that are delineated in our Constitution or firmly rooted in our nations historical traditions. The people should debate, persuade and decide contentious issues directly or through their elected representatives.

In terms of interpreting and adhering to the Constitution, the court deserves an A+" for its latest term.

Malcolm is a Heritage Foundation vice president and the director of its Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies: http://www.heritage.org. He wrote this for InsideSources.com.

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John G. Malcolm: On abortion, guns and speech, the Supreme Court respects text of Constitution - Madison.com

TheSupreme Courthas just finished what will likely go down as one of the most momentous and memorable terms in history.

In addition to the court deciding many blockbuster cases from abortion to the limits of the power of the federal bureaucracy,Justice Stephen Breyerretired, now-Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was sworn in to replace him; there was an unprecedentedleakof a draft opinion,protestersshowed up at justices homes in several attempts to intimidate them, and an armed man made a serious threat to one of the justices lives basedin parton that leaked draft opinion.

This term saw major victories for religious liberty and Second Amendment rights. There were also important decisions about the powers possessed by administrative agencies.

What did the Supreme Court decide this term? How did each of the justices rule? And how is America impacted by the courts rulings?

Theres just too much information for one article (which is why you should watch The Heritage Foundations Scholars and Scribes event), but below is a summary of five major cases from this term.

Overturning Roe v. Wade: Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization

Thiscasearose from a challenge to Mississippis 2018 Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks of gestation except in cases of medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality.

While the state claimed an interest in protecting the lives of innocent unborn children and their mothers, abortion provider Jackson Womens Health Organization sued the state for passing the law, alleging that the law violated Mississippians constitutional rights to access abortion.

Both the federal district court and the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the abortion provider, ruling that the law violated the Supreme Courts framework established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

In what became a historic victory for legal originalists and pro-life advocates alike, the court overruled both Roe and Casey to uphold the Mississippi law. The 6-3 majority opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, held that because a right to abortion is neither found in the text of the Constitution nor deeply rooted in the nations history and tradition, the Constitution does not provide for such a right.

Accordingly, the authority to regulate abortion was returned to the people through their elected representatives in each states legislature, which is where it had resided for all of our nations history prior to the Roe ruling in 1973.

The court also found that a proper application of stare decisis, which is Latin for the thing decided, counseled in favor of overturning Roe and Casey.

First, as to the nature of the error, Roe was not just wrong from a legal perspective, it was egregiously wrong.

Second, the quality of reasoning in the Roe decision was poor, as it lacked any grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent. Rather than stating what the law was, the Roe court established a detailed set of rules for pregnancy that looked more like it was writing a law than a judicial opinion, which is not the courts role.

Third, the workability of past abortion precedent was insufficient and unclear, making it difficult to apply and establish uniform enforcement in the real world.

Fourth, Roes and Caseys deleterious impact on other areas of law was tremendous, leading to the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines.

And fifth and finally, reliance interests would not be upended by overturning Roe and Casey. In other words, contrary to claims by those in favor of keeping Roe and Casey, the court found that individuals had not relied on those court cases to make long-term decisions and order their affairs.

Because regulating abortion does not violate the Constitution and the Mississippi Legislature had legitimate state interests to support its Gestational Age Act, the court upheld it.

The Right to Carry a Gun for Self-defense: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen

This case arose from a challenge to New Yorks strict standards for issuing a license to carry a concealed firearm. The state issued concealed carry licenses only to applicants who could show proper-cause for needing one, which did not include a generalized need for self-protection.

Two adult, law-abiding New York residents sued the state after being denied licenses for not meeting this standard. They only stated that they had a generalized need for self-protection and said that New Yorks refusal to issue them a permit violated their Second and 14th Amendment rights.

The court agreed and found that the proper-cause requirement violates both the Second and 14th Amendments. The 6-3 opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas rejected the use of the prevailing framework for evaluating Second Amendment claims, saying instead that the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.

The court said that text of the Second Amendment protects the right to carry handguns in public for self-defense, without a home/public distinction. Besides a few outliers in the late 1800s, American lawmakers have not broadly prohibited public carry of a commonly used firearm for self-defense, nor have they required a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.

This means that in states and localities that have good cause requirements for issuing handgun permits over and above a generalized need for self-defense, those requirements likely do not survive this ruling.

Protecting Prayer by Government Employees in the Workplace: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

This case arose from a challenge to the Bremerton, Washington, school districts decision to fire a high school football coach for kneeling on the football field after games to offer a personal silent prayer. Coach Joe Kennedy had prayed after each game since 2008. While some players joined him at different times, he never required nor encouraged them to do so.

The school district terminated Kennedy, claiming that allowing any overt actions that might appear to a reasonable observer to endorse prayer while he is on duty as a District-paid coach would violate the First Amendments establishment clause.

Kennedy sued the school district, alleging that it had violated his free exercise and free speech rights under the First Amendment.

The court sided with Kennedy, holding that both the free exercise and free speech clauses protect an individual engaging in personal religious observance from governmental reprisal. Moreover, the court said that the establishment clause neither requires nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

Under the courts ruling, the school district violated the free exercise clause because its policy was neither neutral nor generally applicable to everyone, but instead targeted Kennedys conduct because it was religious. It also violated the free speech clause because Kennedys prayers were private rather than government speechthe court said that they were not pursuant to his official duties.

The court found the schools establishment clause justification for firing Kennedy to be faulty because such a balancing test relies on Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case that, according to the majority opinion, the Court long ago abandoned due to its practical and historical shortcomings.

This observation effectively overruled Lemon and its endorsement test for determining whether a government had violated the Constitutions establishment clause with a requirement that the establishment clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.

Using School Choice Funds for Religious Education: Carson v. Makin

This case arose from a challenge to Maines prohibition against applying state funds from the states tuition assistance program toward secondary schools that, in addition to teaching academic subjects, provide religious instruction.

Two families challenged this practice, claiming that Maine violated the free exercise, establishment, and equal protection clauses by restricting their freedom of school choice.

The court sided with the challengers, holding that Maines nonsectarian requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the free exercise clause.

A 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts found that Maines requirement could not survive strict scrutiny, the most stringent level of review the court uses when determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.

The states interest in avoiding the appearance of supporting a particular religion did not justify excluding members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit simply because of their religious exercise.

The court also noted that the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals attempt to distinguish between religious status prohibitions (prohibiting funding solely based on an institutions status as a religious organization) and religious use prohibitions (supposedly prohibiting funding regardless of an institutions religious status and instead prohibiting funding because it would be put to a religious use, such as teaching a religion course) was unpersuasive, and that the prohibition on status-based discrimination under the free exercise clause didnt justify use-based discrimination.

EPAs Overreach Regulating Greenhouse Gases: West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency

This case arose from a challenge to a cap-and-trade program that the Environmental Protection Agency created in 2016. The EPA launched this policy just after Congress failed to pass the American Clean Energy and Security Act.

The policy aimed to amend the Clean Air Act by establishing a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions that was functionally identical to the one that couldnt get through Congress. The EPA claimed it possessed the authority to issue the policy due to a provision already found in the Clean Air Act.

West Virginia and several other challengers sued the EPA, alleging that the agency lacked the authority to issue such a rule.

The court sided with West Virginia, concluding that Congress did not grant the EPA the authority. In a 6-3 opinion written by the chief justice, the court held that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the EPA to force the fossil fuel energy sector of the economy to shift to so-called green or renewable sources of energy.

The Obama and Biden administrations had argued that the acts term system of pollution reduction actually authorized the EPA to shift from regulating pollution on a factory-by-factory basis (through the use of better pollution-reduction technologies) to demanding that the entire energy sector shift over time from fossil fuels to so-called green energy sources.

But the court judged that the Obama and Biden administrations interpretation of the act is precisely the type of judgment that falls under the major questions doctrine. Under that doctrine, it is necessary for Congress to include a clear statement in the law for a court to conclude that it intended to delegate authority of this breadth to regulate a fundamental sector of the economy. In this instance, Congress issued no such statement.

Honorable MentionMandating Private Employees Get Vaccinated Against COVID-19: National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

While we promised to distill the courts term to the five most important cases, we couldnt resist making one honorable mention.

This conglomerate of cases arose from dozens of challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations vaccine mandate that it issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The mandate required businesses with over 100 employees to have their employees get vaccinated against the novel coronavirus. Businesses would be charged a steep fee each day for each employee who did not comply. This mandate would have applied to over 84 million workers.

In a 6-3 per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Supreme Court stayed (stopped) the implementation of the vaccination mandate. The majority concluded that the government was not likely to later prevail in its argument in court that OSHA possessed the authority to issue this mandate.

The majority noted that neither OSHA nor Congress had ever imposed such a requirement and that although Congress has enacted significant legislation addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, it has declined to enact any measure similar to what OSHA has promulgated here.

As its name suggests, the court explained, OSHA is tasked with ensuring occupational safetythat is, safe and healthful working conditions. The text of the statute empowers OSHA only to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures, and no provision of the Act addresses public health more generally, which falls outside of OSHAs sphere of expertise.

The courts majority rejected the governments argument that the risk of contracting COVID-19 at work empowers OSHA to issue its vaccination mandate on the grounds that the risk is not an occupational hazard, but is a universal risk that is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases.

The federal government has not pursued arguing the case further, and the stay remains in effect.

This term, the court heard, and decided, many momentous cases. It will likely go down as one of the most memorable and important terms in Supreme Court history.While the court didnt get every decision right, its decisions this term make clear that a majority of justices are committed to deciding cases on a more originalist and textualist basis than in the past.

Thats a good thing for the courtand a good thing for our country.

This piece originally appeared in The Daily Signal

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5 Monumental Cases That Highlighted the Supreme Court's 2021-2022 Term - Heritage.org

Plaintiff sued, claiming he was entitled under the state constitution to have a hearing on his petitions, but the court disagreed:

Except for minor differences in punctuation, Part I, Article 32 provides now as it provided when it was first enacted:

The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.

To the framers, the word "redress" in this context meant to remedy or repair. The noun "petition" referred to a written or formal request "to a legislative or other body, soliciting some favor, grant, right or mercy." A "grievance" was defined as "that which burdens, oppresses, or injures, implying a sense of wrong done, or a continued injury, and therefore applied only to the effects of human conduct; never to providential evils" as in, "The oppressed subject has the right to petition for a redress of grievances." A "remonstrance" as used in Part I, Article 32 was a "strong representation of reasons against a measure," which "when addressed to a public body may be accompanied with a petition or supplication for the removal or prevention of some evil or inconvenience," as in "[a] party aggrieved presents a remonstrance to the legislature." Thus, pursuant to its plain language, as understood by the framers, Part I, Article 32 grants citizens the right to request, by way of a formal petition or remonstrance, that the legislature right a wrong.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the analogous provision of the First Amendment does not include a right to a response. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees (1979), the Court ruled that the state highway commission had not violated the First Amendment by failing to respond to or consider grievances that employees had submitted through their union because "the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen" or "respond" to such grievances.

Similarly, in Minnesota Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984), the Court held that a state law that required public employers to discuss certain matters exclusively with a union representative, instead of with employees directly, did not violate the First Amendment because "[n]othing in [that amendment] or in [the] Court's case law interpreting it suggests" that the right to petition requires "government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues." The Court held that individuals "have no constitutional right as members of the public to a government audience for their policy views."

Some commentators have suggested that the Court in Smith and Knight "overlooked important historical information regarding the right to petition," and, therefore, erred by concluding that the federal right to petition does not include a right to a governmental response. "Those commentators point to the government practice of considering petitions in some quasi-formal fashion from the 13th century in England through American colonial timesa practice that continued in the early years of the American Republic." "Based on this historical practice, these commentators contend that the Petition Clause should be interpreted to incorporate a right to a response to or official consideration of petitions." See, e.g., Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right To Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L.J. 142, 155 (1986); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 899, 905 & n. 22 (1997); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 33 (1993).

"Other scholars disagree, arguing based on the plain text of the First Amendment that the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances really is just a right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." "These scholars note that the Petition Clause by its terms refers only to a right 'to petition'; it does not also refer to a right to response or official consideration." see, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 739, 759-62 (1999); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev 1153, 1190-91 (1986).

We need not decide in this case whether Part I, Article 32 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires the legislature to respond to a remonstrance because the plaintiff did not seek a response; rather, he sought a legislative hearing. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the Speaker acted unconstitutionally because he neglected "to call to assemble the legislative body as a whole, [so] as to provide [him] with redress of grievances." The plaintiff requested an order "compelling [the] Speaker (to assign to a committee for public hearing) to assemble the legislative body as a whole for a public hearing as stated in the Constitution for redress of grievances." Accordingly, in light of the plaintiff's allegations, the question we must answer is whether Part I, Article 32, alone or in conjunction with other constitutional provisions, obligates the legislature to assemble in order to hold a public hearing on a remonstrance.

Even those commentators who believe that, historically, the right to petition included the right to a response agree that it did not include a right to a hearing. As one commentator has noted, "[a] petitioner never possessed the right to a full legislative discussion or a debate of a particular petition, nor to a public forum to present testimony relevant to a petition." And, as another has stated with regard to the right to petition in the First Amendment, "the duty, if any, that the First Amendment imposes on government to respond to petitions likely is minimal" and does not include "giv[ing] petitioners the opportunity to personally appear and present their views." Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 557, 643-44 (1999).

Courts construing the right to petition in other state constitutions have ruled that the right to petition does not include a right to a legislative hearing. The plaintiff argues that, in contrast to other state constitutions, the New Hampshire Constitution "confers a right on a citizen to orally address the Senate and the House." He argues that Part I, Article 32 must be read together with Part I, Article 31 and Part I, Article 30, and that, collectively, these provisions establish that right. We disagree.

The plain language of Part I, Articles 31 and 30 of the State Constitution does not support the plaintiff's assertions. As originally enacted in 1784, Part I, Article 31 provided: "The legislature ought frequently to assemble for the redress of grievances, for correcting, strengthening and confirming the laws, and for making new ones, as the common good may require." As amended in 1792, Part I, Article 31 provided: "The legislature shall assemble for the redress of public grievances, and for making such laws as the public good may require." In Merrill v. Sherburne (1818), we clarified that the phrase "redress of public grievances" in Part I, Article 31 refers merely to the legislature's authority to enact laws for the public good. As such, Part I, Article 31 confers no particular rights upon individual citizens. Rather, it "describes the entire purpose of the legislature." David C. Steelman & John Cerullo, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Tumult: New Hampshire's Impeachment Crisis of 2000, 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 1357, 1392 n.158 (2017); see Lawrence Friedman, The New Hampshire State Constitution 100 (2d ed. 2015).

Part I, Article 30, the Speech and Debate Clause of the State Constitution, protects the legislature's right to free deliberation and debate. Part I, Article 30 provides: "The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever." The New Hampshire Speech and Debate Clause "is the equivalent of the speech or debate clause, article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution." As the Supreme Court has stated with regard to the federal Speech or Debate Clause, "[t]he central role of the Speech or Debate Clause [is] to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Thus, Part I, Article 30 protects the right of individual legislators and the legislature as a whole to freely deliberate and debate. While this right inures to the benefit of the public, Part I, Article 30 confers no right upon members of the public to participate in legislative debate or deliberation.

The plaintiff appears to maintain that he had a due process right to a legislative hearing on his remonstrances. The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado (1915), construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We adopt the same reasoning [details omitted -EV] under our State Constitution.

As Chief Justice Doe explained in State v. Hayes (1881), ours is a representative democracy, not a "pure democracy." "It is inherent in a republican form of government that direct public participation in government policymaking is limited." "Not least among the reasons for refusing to recognize such a right is the impossibility of its judicial definition and enforcement," implicating separation-of-powers concerns. "However wise or practicable various levels of public participation in various kinds of policy decisions may be," nothing in the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution suggests that "government must provide for such participation."

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Right to Petition Legislature Right to a Legislative Hearing - Reason

Ongoing protests in Akron following the police shooting of Jayland Walker have led to the city renewing its curfew on Thursday night.

The curfew went into effect at 10 p.m. until 6 a.m., spanningdowntown Akron. It willl remain in effect until the city issues another order that lifts it.

Several protesters have already been arrested, including Breonna Taylors aunt and Jacob Blakes father. Violating the curfew entails a fourth-degree misdemeanor and either a fine up to $350 or up to 30 days in jail.

Heres what you need to know about the curfew and your protest rights in Ohio:

Yes, but theyre limited. Law enforcement, medical and fire personnel are exempt, in addition to the news media. Ohioans fleeing dangerous circumstances, seeking medical care or traveling between their home or work are also in the clear.

Yes the First Amendment guarantees the right to assemble and protest. However, there are some limitations. According to the Ohio American Civil Liberties Union, protesters may not block traffic. Certain locations, including but not limited to private properties and certain parks or plazas, may also require permits to protest on.

Impromptu protests are allowed within two days of an unfolding event, but organizers are still required to notify the Cleveland Division of Police at least eight hours in advance.

Violent, obscene or threatening speech is illegal under the First Amendment, and endangering others could result in arrest. Dont antagonize or touch law enforcement, and be mindful of drugs or weapons these could result in additional charges, if arrested.

You can, and police cannot search cell phones without a warrant. Keep in mind that whatever is said to the police can be used against an individual, and law enforcement can authorize an arrest if you fail to identify yourself, upon being asked. Additionally, you do not have to agree to an officer searching you or your car the Cleveland Legal Aid Society urges protesters to be vocal about their consent.

Law enforcement is still allowed to conduct pat downs (not searches) if they suspect an individual may be armed.

Being arrested and released on bail, from start to finish, can last up to 36 hours. The police will ask for basic information, followed by a court agency interview to determine bail you do not need to answer the agencys questions (you can request for an attorney), but doing so accurately will move the process faster.

The Ohio ACLU said that the main types of crimes a protester is charged with are minor misdemeanor, misdemeanor offense and a felony offense.

Officers may also detain, not arrest, protesters for suspected involvement in criminal activity.

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Jayland Walker's death sparked protests in Akron. What are your rights as a protester? - Akron Beacon Journal