Wednesday, May 4, marked the final Student Association (SA) senate meeting of the semester. The meeting began with a historical Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signing, by Chancellor Joe Gow, showing support of the Green Fund Grant to approve a new sustainability program manager. The signed document detailed the universitys commitment to funding this position partially for three years, along with the SAs commitment to also fund them for three years.

It is a wonderful collaboration that we are doing, and a model, I think, for some future things that we can do, said Gow, I know that many students have wanted this position for a long time.

The room was also packed with those waiting to hear from Gow about the chalk-writing statements done by the Hoeschler Tower last week regarding the School of Education (SOE) issues.

I am a very staunch advocate of the First Amendment and would hate to be perceived as an opponent against free speech, said Gow, but I have never really thought about chalking before because we dont really have a policy on it. I am hoping to form one here tonight with the Senate.

The Chancellor said he is mainly concerned with certain lines containing the f-bomb and other profanity but wanted to make clear that, the university has no interest in punishing anyone.

After Gow left for a prior engagement, outgoing senate Vice President, Jared Zwettler gave his opinion on the matter:

I worked with a number of people on this issue, and I dont think its right that the university is censoring profanity. There is case law that does support use of profanity and that it cannot be regulated in many situationsI think that Chancellor Gows arguments do not hold a lot of weight and I strongly disagree with his position and his stance, and I want to make that known here today.

The SA further discussed this issue by way of SA2122-054: Resolution in Support of Student Free Speech Rights, written up by Senator Carter Drost.

James Szymalak, Assistant Professor of Political Science & Public Administration, was called on multiple times during Wednesdays meeting. He teaches many courses of this nature, including legal studies and ethics in government. Before coming to UWL, Szymalak served as a senior Pentagon personnel policy legal advisor within the Department of the Army. The SA called on him to give legal advice about the free speech resolution, and asked for his opinion regarding the chalking:

I am an actual attorney and a First Amendment scholar, and the law is really clear that profanity is not obscenity. The decision to chalk out f-bombs is a policy decision; I am here to talk about legal decisions, and the legal decision is clear. It doesnt matter that it is chalk or a ballpoint pen, the First Amendment is the First Amendment. Using dirty language is not unsettled and its not a recent development. Just because eighth-graders are around it does not change the law.

Szymalak said the universitys decision to strike out offensive wording is a clear violation of the Constitution. He also said the SOE chalking is not vandalism because the campus created it as a designated public forum, on this and many other campus-related events, issues, etc. which overrides the vandalism rule.

Earlier, Chancellor Gow spoke about various faculty members issues with their names being a part of the chalking. Szymalak cleared this up saying, This is also not defamation; the individuals that were named, as far as I know, are public figures. Public employees are public figures, and this idea that they are delicate geniuses that cant be talked about is crazy.

Addressing the senate, he also stated to his fellow faculty, I am disappointed in the university, but I am even more disappointed in my colleagues. How many of your professors have talked about this with you in class? To which no one raised their hand.

He said that he is here to support the students of the SOE. To the university, when are you going to draw the line and say no? No one has stood up and done a thing. Why isnt anyone else standing up for this? Its school event stuff now, but whats next?

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Student Association meets to discuss First Amendment rights and chalking around Hoeschler Tower - The Racquet

A review of Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech: How Disinformation Poisons Our Politicsand How to Cure It (Yale University Press, 2022).

***

In 1995, Eugene Volokh published a law review article in which he predicted that the rapidly growing internet would dramatically reduce the costs of distributing speech and that the new media order that these technologies will bring will be much more democratic and diverse than the environment we see now. The concept, which Volokh dubbed cheap speech, would mean that far more speakersrich and poor, popular and not, banal and avant gardewill be able to make their work available to all.

To say that Volokhs article was prophetic would be an understatement. More than a quarter-century later, the cheap speech that Volokh predicted has upended commerce, art, politics, news and community. Many volumes can and should be written about the effects of the rapid evolution of cheap speech on discrete areas of American life.

Fortunately, Rick Hasen has done just that. In Cheap Speech: How Disinformation Poisons Our Politicsand How to Cure It, Hasen takes on the lofty task of examining the impact of cheap speech on American elections, politics and democracy. Hasen has written an extraordinary, thorough and fair examination of the impact of misinformation on democracy. He examines the costs and benefits of cheap speech and presents carefully crafted proposals that attempt to address the harms without straying from core First Amendment values or from falling into a moral panic about misinformation.

Hasen expands on Volokhs concept of cheap speech, defining it as speech that is both inexpensive to produce and often of markedly low social value. Hasen devotes the first part of the book to an even-handed evaluation of the impact of cheap speech on American democracy. Hasen does not villainize the internet as the source of all that is evil about modern politics. There is no doubt that the rise of the Internet has had many free speech benefits, Hasen writes. We worry much less about media consolidation and scarcity of information than we did when there were just three main broadcast television networks and a handful of local newspapers in each area.

Of course, the discussion of the internets benefits to democracy is followed by a very long but. Hasen documents many information harms that have accompanied the digital revolution: contraction of local journalism, political operations disguised as news sources, reduction in public trust in institutional media and elections, deep fakes, Russian disinformation during the 2016 presidential campaign, and of course the lies that led to the storming of the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.

Hasen explores how the dissemination of cheap speech has shaped modern politics by weakening political parties, accelerating demagoguery of candidates and opening the door to more public corruption. The unique challenges posed by online platforms and the algorithms they use to amplify and target extremist content can further contribute to the spread of conspiracy theories and other misinformation. Hasen writes of the increased power that platforms wield in their decisions to take down or leave up political content.

Although he comprehensively outlines the potential harms of cheap speech on elections and democracy, Hasen readily admits that the magnitude of some of these harms is unclear, in part because of the opacity of the operations of many platforms and the lack of researcher access to their data. (Indeed, the extent of the harms of misinformation is the subject of much-needed and spirited debate.) Hasens candor about the unknown makes readers more likely to consider his ultimate assessmentthat from a voters perspective, the costs of cheap speech likely have outweighed the benefits.

More important than Hasens evaluation of the problem is the second half of the book, in which Hasen considers potential solutions to mitigate some harms of cheap speech. Too often, discussions about misinformation end in solutions that casually dismiss First Amendment principles. Other times, they simply conclude with despair and do not even try to address the problems. Hasenone of the nations most knowledgeable and respected election law scholarscould have gotten away with half-baked proposals to lop off large chunks of the First Amendment for the sake of saving democracy from cheap speech.

Nor would Hasen have been alone had he proposed sweeping limits to free speech. The First Amendment allows the government to limit some false speech, such as perjury, fraud, and defamation, but the Supreme Court has held that false speech is not categoricallyor even generallyexempt from constitutional protection. Nor can the courts easily carve out new exceptions just because they believe that the harms of certain speech outweigh the benefits. The First Amendments guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in 2010.

That hasnt prevented well-intentioned but impractical proposals to censor in the name of misinformation prevention. For instance, earlier this year, Washington Governor Jay Inslee supported a bill that would make it a jailable offense for politicians to tell certain lies about election administration. While such proposals are borne of legitimate concerns about misinformation, too often they do not fully account for fundamental First Amendment values that constrain the governments ability to regulate speech. After state lawmakers consulted legal scholars, they redrafted the bill to limit it to cases that meet the Supreme Courts standard for imminent incitement, a high bar that, if applied faithfully, would make it incredibly difficult for prosecutors to bring charges arising from many politicians election lies. Yet it still likely would have a chilling effect on many politicians who have well-founded concerns about election administration. Even if they likely would not be convicted under the law, why risk the prospect of prosecution and legal fees? (The bill died without receiving a vote in the state legislature.)

Of course, nine people have the power to redefine First Amendment protections for false speech. And two of those nineJustices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuchhave argued that the Supreme Court should reconsider New York Times v. Sullivan, the vital 1964 ruling that requires public officials who are plaintiffs in defamation lawsuits to meet the high bar of actual malice. Among the cases that Thomas cited in support of the need to reconsider Sullivan was Pizzagate, the online conspiracy alleging that prominent Democrats ran a sex trafficking ring in a D.C. pizza shop, causing an armed man to enter the restaurant in December 2016 and fire three shots. Our reconsideration is all the more needed because of the doctrines real-world effects, Thomas wrote. Public figure or private, lies impose real harm.

But Hasen has not joined the calls for substantial abrogations to free speech. As Hasen recognizes, solving the problems created by cheap speech with sweeping new laws that limit speech would undermine some fundamental American values and a key part of our democracy: the benefits of robust and uninhibited political debate. Hasen also properly questions who, in a society animated by distrust, would do the regulating and how they would do it.

Rather than traveling down the censorial road that many others have traveled, Hasen relies on his deep knowledge of election and campaign finance law to suggest ways to mitigate some of the worst political misinformation harms.

Some of Hasens suggestionssuch as ensuring that state and local governments competently administer electionsdo not raise First Amendment problems. The proposals that do implicate potential free speech concerns valiantly attempt to stay within the strictures of the First Amendment. For instance, when Hasen suggests that Congress amend campaign finance disclosure laws to address online advertisements, he attempts to adhere to the Supreme Court precedent that has approved of some campaign finance disclosure requirements. Yet Hasen also recognizes that some justices who supported campaign finance disclosure laws no longer sit on the court, so how the current court would react to new requirements is uncertain.

Hasen also recognizes that it is hard to predict whether the Supreme Court would approve his proposal to require large online platforms to place labels on synthetically altered videos and images of politicians, addressing the concerns about deep fakes. Yet he presents a reasonable argument for such a proposal to survive even the most rigorous constitutional scrutiny and contrasts it with more constitutionally problematic bans on deep fakes.

Hasen argues that the government should have the power to ban false speech about the mechanics of voting, such as lying about when an election will occur or how people can vote. The Supreme Court has suggested that a states ban on speech that is intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures would survive a First Amendment challenge. Hasen is appropriately careful to exclude from his proposed ban generalized claims that an election will be rigged or stolen, as well as postelection claims about stolen or rigged elections. The narrowness of this proposal means that it would not address much of the big lie that fueled the Jan. 6 storming of the Capitol, but it is far more likely to survive a First Amendment challenge than a more sweeping election misinformation proposal.

Hasen rightly resists the temptation to attempt to address misinformation through amendments to Section 230, the 1996 law that shields online platforms from many claims arising from third-party content. A wide swath of misinformation is constitutionally protected, and amending Section 230 could not eliminate that protection. He also correctly recognizes that repealing Section 230 would not address the claims that platforms are biased against conservatives, as the increased legal risk likely would cause platforms to take down more content. That is not to say that Hasen dismisses concerns about platform power; rather, he suggests addressing them via required disclosures about algorithmic tweaking of content, antitrust law and privacy laws.

Even if Congress were to adopt all of Hasens proposals and the courts did not strike them down, he recognizes that law is not a panacea. Law alone is not going to stop millions of people from believing the election was stolen when a president popular within his party repeatedly uses social media to advance the false claim that it was, Hasen acknowledges. He appropriately devotes the final chapter to extralegal solutions to problems caused by misinformation. Hasen recognizes the ability of social media platforms to more effectively address misinformation (as online platforms are not state actors that are bound by the First Amendment). To be sure, content moderation at scale is difficult, and many of the toughest decisions will inevitably attract some criticism. And while public pressure on platforms to moderate can be effective, pressure coming from the government could raise First Amendment concerns about jawboning. Hasen also correctly focuses on the need to invest more heavily in local journalism and improve digital literacy.

The book would benefit from a meaningful analysis of how other countries have confronted misinformation in recent years. Authoritarian governments oppressive use of fake news regulations would further bolster Hasens caution against broader restrictions on false speech. U.S. protections for false speech are not an accident. The First Amendment does apply to a wide range of false speech, but the experiences of these other countries illustrate why it should apply to this speech.

In the books conclusion, Hasen argues that the Supreme Court should recognize that First Amendment balancing must be recalibrated, though he recognizes that the risk of censorship and of stifling robust debate still must figure heavily in constitutional analysis. Recalibration of core First Amendment protections could lead to dangerous consequences. But such recalibration likely is unnecessary for many of the narrow and reasonable proposals that Hasen presents.

Misinformation has the potential to upend individuals, institutions and democracy. It is tempting to seek to address these harms via a radical rethinking of free speech protections. But balanced and narrowly tailored solutions, such as those that Hasen has proposed, are more valuable to this vital discussion.

The views expressed in this review are those of the author and do not represent the Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.

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Confronting Misinformation in the Age of Cheap Speech - Lawfare

La pgina inicial de Twitter en un dispositivo digital el lunes 25 de abril de 2022, en San Diego. (AP Foto/Gregory Bull)

Americas founding fathers may not have contemplated digital spaces could one day simultaneously broadcast millions of statements to millions of listeners and readers.

They also may not have contemplated those digital spaces would in many cases supplant the traditional ones town halls, sidewalks, and courthouse steps that in less technologically advanced times hosted the bulk of Americans political discourse.

Nevertheless, Tesla (TSLA) CEO Elon Musk's pending bid to privatize Twitter (TWTR) one of social medias most controversial forums renews the issue of whether First Amendment speech protections have any application to private forums that use the public internet to elevate and hide third party statements.

Given that Twitter serves as the de facto public town square, Musk wrote in a March Twitter post days ahead of revealing his intentions to buy the social media platform, failing to adhere to free speech principles fundamentally undermines democracy. What should be done?

Tweets posted to Tesla CEO Elon Musk's Twitter account on March 25, 2022 and March 26, 2022

Among social media giants, Twitter hosts 229 million monthly active users (corrected by Twitter following the company's overstatement of 436 active monthly users), far fewer than Facebook's (FB) 2.9 billion, YouTube's (GOOG) 2.6 billion, and Instagram's (FB) 1.5 billion, and TikTok's 1 billion.

Relative scale aside, Musk asserted that "Twitter is the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated."

Debate over the extent to which popular online platforms can legally interfere with or ban their user's content has dragged on for years without resolution, despite dozens of Congressional hearings to that end. On Friday, a federal court upheld Twitter's controversial decision to ban former president Donald Trump by disagreeing with Trump's argument the social media company should be considered a "government actor."

Story continues

Constitutional law experts say whatever the consequence of social medias power to attract and patrol a large percentage of the nations vital debates, what should be done is distinct from what legally can be done to stop Twitter or other social platforms from interfering with their users posts.

Private corporations are private," Stanford Law School professor Nate Persily said, laying out the fundamental rationale for concluding that social media entities are entitled to regulate their users speech. "They don't have to respect the First Amendment. They, in fact, have First Amendment rights themselves.

In addition to the freedom to choose which content gets published on their sites, online platforms enjoy another layer of legal protection for moderating content under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that immunizes them from liability for user's statements.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk introduces the Cybertruck at Tesla's design studio Thursday, Nov. 21, 2019, in Hawthorne, Calif. Musk has laid out some bold, if still vague, plans for transforming Twitter into a place of maximum fun! once he buys the social media platform for $44 billion and takes it private. (AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu, File)

Still, as Persily writes in an analysis for Oxford Press, social medias consolidated corporate domination of the marketplace for speech makes plenty of people uncomfortable. For that reason, he says, its legitimate to question whether each companys moderation standards support or erode the goals of the First Amendment.

The community standards of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube would all be unconstitutional if they were enacted by a government, Persily says. The ways in which they restrict speech, whether by removing nudity or political statements, for example, go beyond what the First Amendment would allow from a government.

There are instances where private enterprises are prohibited from blocking Americans speech.

Fordham University professor Paul Levinson explained television and radio networks that broadcast on public airwaves have authority to choose whose content and what content is broadcast. However, theyre prohibited from doing so in a way that violates the First Amendment.

For example, Levinson says a network that constantly cuts off the voices of people who present a certain opinion, risk legal action from the blocked group and from the Federal Communications Commission.

Similarly, its illegal for a private company doing business in a public park to stop a nearby speaker from expressing political opinions. That would violate the speakers First Amendment rights. In both instances, Levinson says the government has an affirmative obligation to ensure citizens rights remain intact.

Why then are Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Tiktok afforded a more lenient standard, where theyre legally vested with power block users' posts across the public Internet?

Facebook chief operating officer Sheryl Sandberg and then-Twitter chief executive officer Jack Dorsey testify during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing concerning foreign influence operations' use of social media platforms, on Capitol Hill, September 5, 2018 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Levinson says it's because, at first, social media companies were not broadcasting over public airwaves. Instead, like cable television, the content they and other companies delivered across the Internet was through private wired or cabled systems.

Decades later, that changed for many Internet users, when Wi-Fi, which uses public and private radio waves, began pushing some content across public systems regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). However, since many Americans still access social media through the Internet, via wires, the cable rules still apply.

The way that social media companies steer and moderate a significant percentage of todays public discourse may not violate the letter of the Constitution, yet Levinson says it certainly violates the founding documents spirit.

In that respect, Levinson suggests Musk has a point.

I am against violating the spirit of the First Amendment because I think communication is a good thing, he said. But since Twitter is not the government, it has every right to blow people off the system, or to not allow certain kinds of communication, whether that makes us feel comfortable or not.

Elon Musk arrives at the In America: An Anthology of Fashion themed Met Gala at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, New York, U.S., May 2, 2022. REUTERS/Andrew Kelly

As Persily sees it, the Internet, and not Twitter, is the environment that most resembles the types of public spaces that are legally recognized as offering First Amendment protection.

When we talk about the public town square, were talking about the ability of people to go into a location, and then speak their mind, and then people nearby may be able to hear it, Persily said. Twitter is distinct, he argues, in that it doesnt broadcast all speech to all users, but instead organizes and prioritizes it, most of which is never seen by the company's 229 million active monthly users.

It's not as if everybody is talking to everyone at the same time, Persily said.

For Musk, hes free to relax the companys U.S. content moderation policies if his Twitter merger comes to pass. In a Twitter post, the billionaire entrepreneur indicated his preference for imposing as little content moderation as law permits.

"If people want less free speech, they will ask government to pass laws to that effect," Musk wrote. "Therefore, going beyond the law is contrary to the will of the people."

An earlier published version of this story was corrected to reflect Twitter's 229 million monthly active users, which Twitter restated in April following the company's overstated 436 active monthly users.

Alexis Keenan is a legal reporter for Yahoo Finance. Follow Alexis on Twitter @alexiskweed.

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Elon Musk's vision for Twitter and the First Amendment: 'What should be done? - Yahoo News

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Another Supreme Court decision may soon send shock waves. Its the first time the justices will rule on what the Second Amendment means since 2010.

For centuries, the Second Amendment was construed as referring to service in the militia. It wasnt until 2008in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Court established an individual right to gun ownership. The decision was the culmination of a decades-long campaign by the National Rifle Association and other gun rights allies, as I wrote in my book The Second Amendment: A Biography. (Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court forbade states, not just the federal governments, from infringing on the gun ownership rights recognized in Heller.)

The Supreme Court has not made a major Second Amendment ruling since 2010. Meanwhile, hundreds of judges around the country developed a robust approach to the Second Amendment, as my Brennan Center colleague Eric Ruben has documented. Yes, they have ruled, it is an individual right, but like other individual rights, there can be restrictions based on societys needs, such as public safety. The judges borrowed an approach from the First Amendment known as tiered scrutiny. The vast majority of gun laws were upheld.

Now theres a new Supreme Court supermajority of six justices. The NRA is bankrupt and discredited, but its political power lives on in the lifetime-tenured justices, many of whom the organization pushed into power. This case is the result.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen challenges a 1913New York law limiting who can carry a concealed weapon in public places. In order to get a concealed carry license, New Yorkers must show that they have proper cause basically a greater need for self-protection than others in the community. The laws challengers contend that the Second Amendment guarantees them the right to carry a concealed weapon without the permission of a licensor.

At the oral argument, Justice Samuel Alito asked New York States lawyer a startling question: There are a lot of armed people on the streets of New York and in the subways late at night right now, arent there? Alito added, All these people with illegal guns: theyre on the subway, walking around the streets, but ordinary, hardworking, law-abiding people, no. They cant be armed.

The suggestion that anyone would want subway riders to be carrying guns is absurd. Perhaps the justice is spending too much time in his basement watching 1970s Betamax tapes of The Warriors or Death Wish. That dystopian depiction of the transit system hasnt been the reality in decades, if ever. Indeed, in Essex County, New Jersey where Alito grew up, population approximately 800,000 there were more than 150shootings last year. Comparatively, the subway system recorded just three in the same time frame, while moving hundreds of millions of passengers.

The idea that ordinary, hardworking, law-abiding people should show up armed on a subway, or a college campus, or for that matter a city street, is utterly at odds with the real world and real life as real people actually live it. But this Court, drenched in dogma and originalist faux-history, may force that on cities all across the country.

Perhaps they will rule that cities can bar guns from unusually dangerous places. (The argument spent a surprising amount of time on the question of whether the campus of the NYU School of Law was, in fact, a campus, or was too groovily urban to be seen that way.)

Some observers expect Justice Clarence Thomas to write this opinion. He has repeatedly decried the Courts unwillingness to blow up gun laws. He thinks that there should not be First Amendment-style scrutiny but rather a sole focus on text, history, and tradition.

Fortunately, there is much history and tradition that supports restrictions on carrying weapons. We may hear Hollywood-infused ideas of law-abiding people packing heat. In fact theres a striking photo from Dodge City, the legendary frontier town. It shows a sign plantedin the middle of its main street: The Carrying of Fire Arms Strictly Prohibited.

Bruen may be a bigger case than Heller. Only a handful of American cities had DC-style bans on handguns inside the owners home, so the Heller decision didnt touch most of the country. In contrast, eight heavily populated states have concealed carry laws similar to the one at issue in Bruen. If the Court strikes down New Yorks law, roughly one-quarter of Americans can expect to interact with people carrying deadly weapons.

The Supreme Court could issue a more limited ruling in Bruen, for example rescinding the proper cause requirement of the New York law without declaring an absolute constitutional right to concealed carry. But recent history suggests these justices arent interested in limited rulings. Watch out for falling precedents.

Remember what Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote Heller, said of his colleague Clarence Thomas. When asked about the difference between their jurisprudence, Scalia replied, I am a textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut.

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After Abortion, Will the Justices Turn to Concealed Carry Laws? - brennancenter.org

President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih has ratified the first amendment to the Maldives Foreign Services Act (Law no. 20/2021).

The President ratified the amendment on Tuesday.

The People's Majlis of Maldives passed the bill of the first amendment to the Maldives Foreign Services Act at its 35th sitting of the first session on April 25, 2022.

The amendment repealed Section 44 (b) of the legislation, which stated that the National Pay Commission would determine the salaries and allowances of Foreign Service employees based on the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance.

Additionally, amendments were made to Sections 47 (c) and 56 (c), while the bill also rescinded select clauses from Section 71.

The amendment also specified details of retirement benefits for Foreign Service employees.

The new amendment confers the authority to set remuneration and allowances on the National Pay Commission based on the existing pay structures stipulated in the National Pay Policy Act.

Upon ratification, the amendment has now been published in the Government Gazette.

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President ratifies the first amendment to the Maldives Foreign Service Act - Raajjemv

Former Indiana University Professor Mark McPhail faced retaliation for being outspoken on issues of race and diversity on campus, according to a new lawsuit. (Photo courtesy Indiana University)

by Josh Bleisch

Mark McPhail, a former communications professor at Indiana University Northwest in Gary, Indiana, has sued the university and administrators last month for retaliating against his exercise of First Amendment rights, among other things. The lawsuit alleges IU Northwest fired McPhail after he criticized the selection of the person appointed to lead a reorganized School of the Arts and spoke out about racism and diversity efforts. McPhail seeks reinstatement to his tenured position and damages to compensate for lost salary.

IU Northwest initially hired McPhail in 2015 as executive vice chancellor for academic affairs with an appointment as professor of communication with tenure. He resigned from his administrative position and assumed his tenured professorship a year later.

During his time on the faculty, McPhail has been outspoken on issues of race and diversity at his institution. He hosted a public forum in 2018 titled Diversity: An unfulfilled promise at IU Northwest that included members of the Indiana state legislatures Black Legislative Caucus and identified ways IU Northwest had failed to support black students. McPhail argued, overemphasis on institutional diversity initiatives can obscure or frustrate progress.

McPhails complaint alleges that the day after he appealed, IU terminated his employment by sending police to his home.

McPhail also spoke out on matters of university governance. When IU Northwest announced it would merge its Departments of Fine Arts and Performing Arts with the Department of Communication Studies to create a new School of the Arts, McPhail criticized the administrations process for selecting the new schools dean. He argued at the time that IU Northwest selected a dean without a search and without sufficient transparency under university policy. As a result, McPhail alleges, IU Northwest transferred him to IU Bloomington for two years.

Upon his return, McPhail alleges the dean refused to communicate with him about his course assignments and refused to assign him certain courses because McPhail had told IU the deans appointment violated university policy. When the time came for his first performance review after returning, the dean characterized McPhails teaching as inadequate, relying on unspecified reports about his reputation as a teacher and the number of students who failed his class.

Things came to a head when McPhail attempted to defend himself against the deans characterization of his performance. The dean said that, because McPhail had attempted to shift the blame, he would recommend that the university suspend McPhail from teaching and reduce his salary by 75%. IU Northwests executive vice chancellor agreed and did just that.

The situation got even stranger after McPhail attempted to appeal that decision. McPhails complaint alleges that the day after he appealed, IU terminated his employment by sending police to his home with a termination letter. The reason the university gave for its drastic action was that McPhail made a threat of physical violence by saying words to the effect that the only way to end racism is to kill all white people.

Rhetorical hyperbole, or even the endorsement of violence, does not exclude a particular statement from constitutional protection.

McPhail in his complaint disputes saying that or anything to the effect. But even if he had, that speech would be protected under the First Amendment. Despite what IU Northwest says, McPhails purported statement is not a true threat that would fall outside of First Amendment protection. A true threat is a statement by which the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. Rhetorical hyperbole, or even the endorsement of violence, does not exclude a particular statement from constitutional protection.

FIRE will be closely watching McPhails lawsuit as he fights to vindicate his First Amendment rights and get his job back.

FIRE defends the rights of students and faculty members no matter their views at public and private universities and colleges in the United States. If you are a student or a faculty member facing investigation or punishment for your speech, submit your case to FIRE today. If youre faculty member at a public college or university, call the Faculty Legal Defense Fund 24-hour hotline at 254-500-FLDF (3533).

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Fired for criticizing his administration and discussing racism, Indiana professor sues - Foundation for Individual Rights in Education

CONCORD Why should misinformation be protected under the Constitution? Dont we need laws to ensure that citizens receive truthful information? If you are living in an authoritarian country, the answer is easythe state determines what is true and what is false. But in our democracy, the burden for filtering out truth from falsehood falls on each of us.

New Hampshire Humanities will present Tell Me Lies: The First Amendment & the Right to (Mis)inform on Mon., May 9, 5:30-7:30 p.m., at Stark Brewing Company, 500 N Commercial Street in Manchester.

This discussion will examine the 1964 case New York Times v. Sullivan that protects newspapers from libel suits, even when they publish erroneous statements, and its consequences. Well consider the reasoning behind the Sullivan ruling, how journalists depend on its protection, and what would happen should it be overturned. Rather than endorsing one side of the argument, can we work together to create animated yet productive public debates?

Cost is $15 per person and includes appetizers and one beverage (beer, wine, or non-alcoholic drink) in the relaxed atmosphere of the Stark Brewing Co. in downtown Manchester.

To register, go to http://www.nhhumanities.org.

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'Tell Me Lies: The First Amendment & the Right to (Mis)inform' - carriagetownenews.com

In the landmark case Engel v. Vitale in 1962, the Supreme Court ruled that school-sponsored prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment breaching the constitutional wall of separation between church and state.

Do you think prayer has any place in public, state-financed schools? Why or why not?

On April 25, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Joseph Kennedy, a football coach at a public high school in Washington State, who was told by the school board that he could no longer offer prayers on the 50-yard line after games.

In Coachs Prayers Prompt Supreme Court Test of Religious Freedom, published before the arguments before the Supreme Court, Adam Liptak writes about the case and its potential implications for society:

BREMERTON, Wash. Joseph Kennedy, who used to be an assistant coach for a high school football team near Seattle, pointed to the spot on the 50-yard line where he would take a knee and offer prayers after games.

He was wearing a Bremerton Knights jacket and squinting in the drizzling morning rain, and he repeated a promise he had made to God when he became a coach.

I will give you the glory after every game, win or lose, he said, adding that the setting mattered: It just made sense to do it on the field of battle.

Coaching was his calling, he said. But after the school board in Bremerton, Wash., told him to stop mixing football and faith on the field, he left the job and sued, with lower courts rejecting his argument that the board had violated his First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court will hear arguments in the case on Monday, and there is good reason to think that its newly expanded conservative majority will not only rule in Mr. Kennedys favor but also make a major statement about the role religion may play in public life. The courts decision, expected by June, could revise earlier understandings about when prayer is permitted in public schools, the rights of government employees and what counts as pressuring students to participate in religious activities.

The two sides offer starkly different accounts of what happened and what is at stake. To hear Mr. Kennedy tell it, he sought only to offer a brief, silent and solitary prayer little different from saying grace before a meal in the school cafeteria. From the school boards perspective, the public nature of his prayers and his stature as a leader and role model meant that students felt forced to participate, whatever their religion and whether they wanted to or not.

The community in Bremerton appeared to be largely sympathetic to Mr. Kennedy, who is gregarious, playful and popular. But the school boards Supreme Court brief suggested that some residents opposed to prayer on the football field may have hesitated to speak out given the strong feelings the issue has produced.

District administrators received threats and hate mail, the brief said. Strangers confronted and screamed obscenities at the head coach, who feared for his safety.

Rachel Laser, the president of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which represents the school board, said, What were focused on is the religious freedom of students.

Going to the 50-yard line directly after the game when youre the coach, with the students assuming theyre supposed to gather with the coach, and praying at that time puts pressure on kids to join, she said.

Mr. Liptak provides some constitutional background on prayer in public school:

Over the last 60 years, the Supreme Court has rejected prayer in public schools, at least when it was officially required or part of a formal ceremony like a high school graduation. As recently as 2000, the court ruled that organized prayers led by students at high school football games violated the First Amendments prohibition of government establishment of religion.

The delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority.

Mr. Kennedys lawyers said those school prayer precedents were not relevant because they involved government speech. Rather, they said, the core question in Mr. Kennedys case is whether government employees give up their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion at the workplace.

The school district, its lawyers responded, was entitled to require Mr. Kennedy to stop praying as he had. Regardless of whether Kennedys very public speech was official, the district could regulate it, the school districts Supreme Court brief said. His prayer practice wrested control from the district over the districts own events, interfered with students religious freedom and subjected the district to substantial litigation risks.

The sweep of the Supreme Courts decision may turn on which sides characterization of the facts it accepts. But even a modest ruling in Mr. Kennedys favor, saying that his private, solitary prayer was protected even if it took place in public and at least tacitly invited students to participate, would represent a sea change in the courts approach to the role religion may play in public schools.

Students, read the entire article, then tell us:

Does prayer have any place in school? Why or why not? How do you think we should navigate the tension between individuals First Amendment right to freely exercise their religious beliefs and the separation between church and state? How do your own religious views shape your opinion?

What is your reaction to the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, which is now before the Supreme Court? What do you see as the most important facts in the case?

Do you think the Bremerton School District violated Mr. Kennedys First Amendment rights? Or was the board entitled to require that its employees refrain from public prayer if students were likely to feel coerced into participating? Which arguments presented in the article did you find most persuasive? Which less so? Why?

How would you rule if you were one of the nine Supreme Court justices? How do you think they will rule? What impact do you think the ruling will have on the role of religion in public schools?

What questions do you have about the case or the constitutional law around it?

For more information and resources on the question of prayer in public schools, see ProCon.org, the mission of which is to promote civility, critical thinking, education and informed citizenship by presenting the pro and con arguments to debatable issues in a straightforward, nonpartisan, freely accessible way.

See the article here:

Does Prayer Have Any Place in Public Schools? - The New York Times