Cyber Defense

A private sector firm is offering a new kind of reinforced encryption technology for the U.S. military services to safeguard mobile phone, radio and computer transactions from brute force cyberattacks.

The Internet Promise Group has used internal funding to patent a new technical method of securing encrypted military communications by implementing, integrating and changing random bits with an existing encryption key algorithm.

The idea is to strengthen existing encryption keys to make them less vulnerable to brute force attacks where adversaries or cyber intruders use computer algorithms to try multiple combinations of keys until the details are discovered and the key is broken, said Tara Chand, founder and CEO of Internet Promise Group.

Brute force attacks, which require both substantial coordination and sophistication, are typically thought to be associated with major cyberattacks from near-peer adversaries, such as Russia or China.

We want to figure out a way to make the key so strong that you cannot break it, he said.

Chand explained that his firm has patented Random Dance Keys, a new class of military encryption technology engineered to be impenetrable to brute force cyberattacks.

Random Dance Key innovation is based upon its focus on the key space itself rather than encryption algorithms, to provide ultimate defense and protection of critical data and communications. This patented, advanced key management system employs heuristic random wave envelopes derived from the three different types of waves to yield a perpetual sequence of random vectors, Chand added.

Random Dance Keys, Chand explained, are able to change encryption keys with every data package by using a new random sequence of bits. Random keys are used and then discarded.

Every time you have a data package, you come up with a random key and integrate that with an algorithm and encryption key you already have. You leave them as they are, he added.

The Internet Promise Group is now in the process of introducing this technology to the U.S. military services. Early conversations are underway, Chand explained.

Current U.S. military concerns about cyber intrusions are heightened by recent revelations of Russian hacking and Chinas previous record of hacking U.S. military databases.

About the Author

Kris Osborn is editor-in-chief of Defense Systems. He can be reached at kosborn@1105media.com.

Continued here:
Industry firm patents new cyber encryption technology - Defense Systems

As we have come to terms with recent tragic events in the UK understandably there is great anxiety and a lot of questions about the causes of such terrible loss of life. It has again highlighted the debate around regulating the internet giants like Google, Facebook, Twitter and Amazon. These channels have given criminals and terrorists the opportunity to broadcast their message, so politicians in the UK responded in the first instance by suggesting the technology industry should play their part in addressing this huge challenge. However, the Queens Speech, the list of laws that the government hopes to get approved by Parliament over the coming year, leaves me confused.

Listening to the earlier comments from policy makers the rhetoric suggested the new Government would push the technology industry for tougher legislation that might not have proper checks and balances in place. These concerns were heightened reading Matt Burgess report claiming the Government wanted to push through demands for tech companies to provide access to user information by breaking end-to-end encryption as needed.

The Home Secretarys comments, especially in relation to encryption compounded that concern, so it was very pleasing to see positive signals from the European Union on the individuals right to privacy. The European Parliaments Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs underlined its support for the principle of confidentiality.

However, a week really is a long-time in politics, especially when it comes to digital and technology legislation.

The Queens Speech has highlighted a commitment to make the UK the safest place online and added new right to be forgotten laws, as well as a determination to comply with the European Unions GDPR legislation. The speech also included a pledge to review counter terrorism strategy. This might suggest the Government is revising its view on cybersecurity, placing the individuals right to privacy above national security issues. Unfortunately the vagueness of the Queens address leaves far too much room for interpretation. The talk of a Digital Charter is good if its goal is to protect the privacy of consumers, but how will that be weighed up against national security needs?

From the perspective of MaidSafe we applaud attempts to protect user privacy. However, there is no clarity on the question of encryption, particularly giving intelligence services exceptional access in the name of national security. The Investigatory Powers Bill still stands and there appears to have been no mention of the unassumingly named Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) Regulations, which will require service and application providers to give access to information. While this remains unaddressed we have one simple question for the authorities: what if the technology has been designed so that it cannot reveal user information?

As most people who follow the story of MaidSafe know the start point for the SAFE Network was creating a better internet one where users were in control of their data and privacy was paramount. That is why it has been designed with encryption at its core and why users are the only ones, who control access to their data. However, to ensure MaidSafe cannot compromise a users identity and data MaidSafe has no way to break the encryption. The user is the only one with the keys and we have no master key that can override the system. Bottom line we cannot put a backdoor into our network, because we have no way of identifying users once they are set up.

If you listen to the arguments from politicians the potential threat outweighs the right to privacy and freedom of speech. We believe that rushing legislation through is the wrong approach. This should be a time for cool reflection and a recognition that it is a complex problem, which cannot be solved by pressurising technology companies to create backdoors to their products. Even if you do not accept the fundamental right of individuals to privacy and freedom of speech there is a simple practical point - weakening encryption will make itwell insecure. A vast array of organisations use encryption today for everything from banking to processing legal documents, tax accounts and protecting email. Creating mechanisms for the security services to access information means there is a weak point which hackers can exploit too. If you dont believe they will then you have clearly erased Wannacry from your memory. The excellent article by Andy Greenberg in Wired on the extent of the hacking in the Ukraine shows how devastating cyberattacks already are without giving the hackers a short cut and this weeks episode has only served as a stark reminder.

The more difficult moral debate we are fully aware of is that we are building a network, which could be used for both good or bad purposes. It is our view that users should be given the right to make this choice for themselves. If they control their data and who they share it with, they control whether or not an individual can broadcast information to them. Security services may also say the SAFE Network will make it harder for them to do their jobs, but there is little or no evidence that mass surveillance and breaking encryption will mean it is easier to catch criminals. Indeed while the bad guys appear to take an innovative approach to new technologies it often seems as though the authorities wish to take a step backwards.

Compromising security and allowing sweeping powers more often than not leads to abuses of such authority. We have seen this time and again. We would argue there is evidence the police and security services are more successful with targeted surveillance and building partnerships with communities. John Thornhill at the Financial Times recently reminded me of a report I had seen before, originally published in 2015. MITs Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) produced a damning criticism of backdoor access to encryption the title of the report underlining the crudeness of such an approach: Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications. While it sounds obvious there is absolutely no point in locking the door and allowing the bad guy to find the keys. It makes for good drama in Hollywood, but it in real life it has serious consequences.

The intelligence community terms this breaking of encryption as exceptional access which makes it sound very benign. However, MIT CSAIL was clear about the consequences in its report: In the wake of the growing economic and social cost of the fundamental insecurity of todays Internet environment, any proposals that alter the security dynamics online should be approached with caution. Exceptional access would force Internet system developers to reverse forward secrecy design practices that seek to minimise the impact on user privacy when systems are breached.

If you are not convinced on moral grounds there is also a simple technical reason why giving control back to users works. If an individual controls his or her identity that person is anonymous, but also potentially traceable. As John Thornhill rightly points out using encryption also authenticates the user and in environments such as the blockchain it should not be forgotten that once an individual, including a hacker, adds something to the blockchain it is recorded for posterity. Suggesting that encryption is an enabler for the bad guys shows a lack of understanding of next generation technologies, because unlike previous analogies of good guys versus bad guys technologies in the current landscape are more complex.

At its heart this debate needs a reset, because it feels like cybersecurity strategy is still in the 2000s when Web 2.0 came along. The technology is cleverer now, but so too are the users and the technology is reflecting what users want. They want privacy, but equally they do not want to propagate terrorism or hatred. They believe technology exists that balances the absolute right of individuals for privacy and the need for national security.

Sadly we do not live in a perfect world and technology is unfortunately being used by bad actors to do some nefarious things. Certainly, the approach of the big tech companies in response to growing consumer and political concerns has not been as quick and responsive as many would like, but weakening encryption in the name of national security is not the answer. Paul Bernal, in Matt Burgess article, raised the important issue of accountability and oversight. If the Technical Capability Regulations are passed into law there is also an even more fundamental question of right to privacy and right to freedom of speech. This is a time for cool heads. The MIT CSAIL report is good not just in its technical analysis but also as a historical reminder. We have been debating this issue since the 1970s when computers became increasingly mainstream. Today we are seeing rights undermined increasingly around the world and if a country like the UK is seen to promoting more draconian laws it will give more authoritarian states the justification they need to implement similar and worse rules. If we force technology companies to break their encryption we do not just compromise security we compromise fundamental human rights.

Nick Lambert, Chief Operating Officer, MaidSafe Image Credit: Yuri Samoilov / Flickr

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We need to protect encryption - ITProPortal

Introduction

On May 23, 2017, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (District Court) denied a motion for summary judgment that the patent claims asserted in a lawsuit brought by TecSec, Inc. (TecSec) are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101.[1]

In the lawsuit, TecSec accused Adobe Systems, Inc. (Adobe) of infringing four related patents[2] directed to a multi-level encryption system that allows encrypted objects [to] be nested within other [encrypted] objects . . . resulting in multiple layers of encryption.[3] Representative Claim 1 from the 702 Patent is reproduced below:

Click here to view the image.

1. A method for providing multi-level multimedia security in a data network, comprising the steps of:

A) accessing an object-oriented key manager;

B) selecting an object to encrypt;

C) selecting a label for the object;

D) selecting an encryption algorithm;

E) encrypting the object according to the encryption algorithm;

F) labelling the encrypted object;

G) reading the object label;

H) determining access authorization based on the object label; and

I) decrypting the object if access authorization is granted.

Patent Eligibility Inquiry

The eligibility inquiry under 35 U.S.C. 101 proceeds in two steps.[4] First, the court determines whether the patent claim at issue is directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts (e.g., abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon) (step one).[5] If the claim is not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the inquiry ends.[6] Otherwise, the court determines whether the claim includes any additional elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application (step two).[7] If a claim is found to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept in step one and also lack any additional elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application in step two, the claim is ineligible for patent protection under 101.[8]

Arguments before the District Court

Adobe argued that the claims in the asserted patents are directed to the abstract idea of managing access to objects using multiple levels of encryption.[9] According to Adobe, Claim 1 of the 702 patent provides no guidance at all as to how to encrypt an object, how to nest objects, or any specific type of object that the process may operate on and is thus abstract because it provides no restriction on how the result is accomplished.[10]

TecSec contended that Adobe failed to properly perform the step one analysis by overgeneralizing the claims, failing to tie the identification of the abstract idea to the claim language at issue, and oversimplifying the claims and downplaying the inventions benefits.[11] Further, TecSec argued that there is no risk of preemption because there are other ways to manage access to objects using multiple levels of encryption that do not require an [object-oriented key manager] component along with the recited encryption and labelling steps.[12]

District Courts Discussion

Siding with TecSec, the District Court found that the claims in the asserted patents are not directed to an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon.[13] According to the District Court, the patent claims provide a solution to a computer-centric problem that would not exist but for the ubiquity of computer technology.[14] Rejecting Adobes contention that the claims are reducible to putting a sealed envelope (single-level encryption) into a second sealed envelope (multi-level encryption) for extra security, the District Court stated that the claims provide a specific solution that allows multiple users in multiple locations [to access] information at different security levels from a central repository.[15]

Further, the District Court noted that the asserted patents preempt systems which make use of the specific method of an object-oriented key manager without foreclos[ing] all forms of multi-level security.[16] Having determined that the patent claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the District Court ended the patent-eligibility analysis and denied Adobes motion for summary judgment.[17]

Takeaways

This case illustrates that (i) a solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology as illustrated in DDR[18] and (ii) evidence of no preemption as illustrated in McRO[19] both continue to play an important role in helping patent owners survive 101 challenges. When drafting claims, patent applicants should carefully consider how the claims solve a computer-specific problem without preempting all possible ways of solving such a problem.

On the other hand, patent challengers should emphasize how the problem solved by the claims is a conventional one, and not one that exists only because of the Internet or the computer technology. Additionally, patent challengers should point out why the claims impermissibly preempt an entire field of ideas. Here, Adobe presumably had some difficulty arguing that TecSecs claims cover all types of multi-level encryption because Adobe also had to argue that its multi-level encryption system did not infringe the asserted claims. In such cases, patent challengers may want to, if possible, formulate the abstract idea in a way that does not include their own products.

See more here:
Multi-level Encryption Patent Survives 101 Challenge in District Court - Lexology (registration)

Physicists in China have achieved the first quantum teleportation from Earth to a satellite, while their counterparts in Japan are the first to use a microsatellite for quantum communications. Both achievements suggest that practical satellite-based quantum communications could soon be a reality.

Jian-Wei Pan of the University of Science and Technology of China in Hefei and colleagues used China's $100m Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS) satellite to receive a quantum-teleported state. This was done over a distance of 1400km from a high-altitude (5100m) ground station in Tibet to QUESS. This is more than 10 times further than the 100km or so possible by sending photons through optical fibres or through free space between ground-based stations.

Described in a preprint on arXiv, the process involves creating photons that are quantum-mechanically entangled and then transmitting them to QUESS. Last month, Pan and colleagues reported the distribution of quantum entanglement over 1200km using QUESS.

Meanwhile, Masahide Sasaki and colleagues at the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology in Japan have shown that quantum information can be transmitted to Earth from a 5.9kg photon source called SOTA which is on board a 48kg Japanese microsatellite called SOCRATES.

Writing in Nature Photonics, Sasaki's team reports that they were able to receive and process the information at a ground station in Japan using a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. QKD is uses principles of quantum mechanics to ensure that two parties can share an encryption key secure in the knowledge that it has not been intercepted by a third party.

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Quantum satellites demonstrate teleportation and encryption - physicsworld.com