Putin’s weak economic hand – The Boston Globe

Foreign currency mortgage borrowers rallied against banks in Moscow in 2014, holding balloons reading Mortgage.

As President Vladimir Putin of Russia meets President Trump this week at the G-20 summit, it will hardly be from a position of economic strength. Despite the steep drop in oil prices that began three years ago, Russia has managed to escape a deep financial crisis. But while the economy is enjoying a modest rebound after two years of deep recession, the future no longer seems as promising as its leadership thought just five years ago. Barring serious economic and political reform, that bodes ill for Putins ability to realize his strategic ambitions for Russia.

Back in 2012, when Putin appeared onstage with the Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman at a Moscow bank conference, Russias 1998 economic crisis seemed a distant memory. With oil prices well over a $100 a barrel, the governments coffers were bursting. So Putin could proudly contrast Russias government budget surplus with large recession-driven deficits across the West. He surely delighted in having Russian audiences hear Krugmans view that Western democracies had come up badly short in handling the global financial crisis.

In a different session, Russian academic economist Sergei Guriev (who later had to flee the country) argued that there was no hope for diversification of Russias resource-based economy as long as institutions such as courts were so weak. Too many key decisions rested with one man. Speaking in the same session, I emphasized that without fundamental reforms, a sharp drop in global energy prices would create profound problems.

Inevitably, that drop came, with prices plummeting from $119 in February 2012 (for Brent crude oil in Europe) to $27 in 2016. Even the current level (under $50 at the start of July 2017), is less than half the 2011-2012 peak. For a country that depends on oil and natural gas for the lions share of export revenue, the price collapse has been a massive blow, rippling through the economy.

Get This Week in Opinion in your inbox:

Globe Opinion's must-reads, delivered to you every Sunday.

The fact that Russia has avoided a financial crisis is remarkable and largely due to the efforts of the Central Bank of Russia. But the burden of adjustment has largely fallen on consumers, owing to a roughly 50 percent drop in the rubles value relative to the dollar; real wages and consumption both fell sharply.

The attorney general gave a vote of confidence to Robert Mueller, the special counsel leading the investigation.

The shock to the real economy has been severe, with Russia suffering a decline in output in 2015 and 2016 comparable to what the United States experienced during its 2008-2009 financial crisis, with the contraction in GDP totaling about 4 percent. Many firms went bankrupt, and in 2016 the International Monetary Fund estimated that almost 10 percent of all bank loans were nonperforming (a figure that surely understates the severity of the situation).

In many cases, banks chose to relend funds rather than take losses onto their books or force politically connected firms into bankruptcy. At the same time, though, the Central Bank moved aggressively to force smaller banks to raise capital and write down bad loans. And, in the face of intense lobbying by powerful oligarchs, the Central Bank kept interest rates up to tame inflation, which had reached more than 15 percent but has since fallen to close to 4 percent.

Of course, Western sanctions, particularly restrictions on banks, have exacerbated the situation. But the media tend to over-emphasize this aspect of Russias economic woes. All countries that rely heavily on energy exports have suffered, especially those, like Russia, that have failed to diversify their economies.

In a Western democracy, an economic collapse on the scale experienced by Russia would have been extremely difficult to digest politically, as the global surge in populism demonstrates. Yet Putin has been able to remain firmly in control and, in all likelihood, will easily be able to engineer another landslide victory in the presidential election due in March 2018.

Russias state-owned media juggernaut has been able to turn Western sanctions into a scapegoat for the governments own failures, and to whip up support for foreign adventurism including the seizure of the Crimea, military intervention in Syria, and meddling in US elections. Most Russians, constantly manipulated by their countrys schools and media, are convinced that conditions are much worse in the West (a hyperbolic claim even in the era of fake news).

Unfortunately, such disinformation is hardly a recipe for generating reform. And, without reform, there is little reason to be optimistic about Russias long-run growth trend, given its poor demographic profile, weak institutions, and abject failure to diversify its economy, despite having an enormously talented and creative population.

Where will future growth come from? If the world continues to move toward a low-carbon future, Russia will confront an inevitable choice: Launch economic and political reforms, or face continuing marginalization, with or without Western sanctions. No meeting between the US and Russian presidents can change this reality.