FENG Zhang of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies claims there are several groups and different kinds of strategic thinking inside China concerning the West Philippine Sea (WPS). He discloses that since 2009, there has been an internal debate on the matter that can serve as a useful guide to understanding the nuances of Chinese policy that are not always apparent from behavioral indicators.

Whether this is propaganda to soften the blow of Chinese actions or not, it helps to understand the enemys mind.

According to Feng, there are three dominant groups in this debate: 1) pragmatists, 2) hardliners, and 3) moderates.

PragmatistsWhile it is important for China to maintain a stable and peaceful external environment, Beijing is also determined to protect its own interests and would respond firmly to provocations, encroachments on its territorial sovereignty, or threats to its rights and interests. Thus, there appears to be a dichotomy between (regional) stability and (Chinese) rights.

Pragmatists insist that a rights first approach is not necessarily detrimental to regional stability. The policy goal is to realize Chinese maritime rights in the WPS without engendering conflict, especially against the United States and Southeast Asia. However, they are willing to sacrifice regional stability in order to safeguard Chinese maritime rights.

In terms of strategy, the pragmatists promote a deterrence-based assertiveness approach. This means China should assert itself in the WPS to deter other claimants from further encroaching on Chinese rights. The most clear-cut example of this strategy is Chinese assertiveness during the Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal) standoff with the Philippines in 2012. This is also felt in the reclamation and construction activities of China in the WPS that are meant to strengthen the assertion of their maritime rights over the area.

Pragmatist thinking is guided by a modified version of the American rationalism that was in vogue in the 1960s. Thus, pragmatists utilize Cold War terminologies such as strategic resolve and deterrence in their strategic thinking.

HardlinersHardliners view the WPS as part of Chinas core interests that must be protected at all costs. They are not too concerned about the potential for conflict that can arise from Chinese actions in the WPS. They simply wish to defend, enhance and enforce Chinas rights, and expand Beijings power and influence in the region.

Hardliners usually belong to the military establishment in China. According to Feng, hardliners believe that Chinas rights in the South China Sea require establishing a solid foothold in the region in order to carry out military and law enforcement activities. Such a foothold would also be very useful for protecting the South China Sea as a strategic sea line of communication vital for supporting Chinas economic development and safeguarding its expanding overseas interests.

They see the economic significance of the WPS natural resources and its strategic importance for international commerce. Thus, they want to control as much of the area as they can, primarily through the utilization of various assets. The hardliners imprint can be seen in the recent swarming presence of Chinese maritime militia near the Julian Felipe Reef off the coast of Palawan.

Strategically, the hardliners utilize the principle of opportunistic assertiveness. They avoid making China look like the aggressor if possible and seek to exploit any mistakes committed by rival claimant states like the Philippines by responding forcefully and aggressively to occupy features previously controlled by them. This happened in the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 when the bumbling, clueless and incompetent Aquino 3rd administration was easily outmaneuvered and taken advantage of by the Chinese.

The hardliners pursue a delicate balance of defensive-oriented coercive action through a strategy of deterrence-based assertiveness that demands an equally measured handling by our Philippine national security managers. It requires from the Philippines a thoughtful counter-strategy from experienced national security thinkers unlike the reckless and knee-jerk decision-making of President Benigno Aquino 3rd in 2012.

Chinese President Xi Jinping seems to be the high-profile patron of the hardliners.

Intellectually, Feng claims, the hardliners are influenced by the traditional Chinese military doctrine of active defense. According to Feng: Active defense doctrine is the integration of defense and offense: an overall defensive strategy, it does not preclude partial offense that strikes hard at the enemy. Active defense also promotes the integration of consolidating territorial integrity and recovering lost territory. The Chinese thinking holds that consolidating existing territory and recovering lost territory are both defensive actions. Recovering lost territory through nonmilitary means would be ideal. But should that prove unfeasible or ineffective, force may be used to achieve the objective. The doctrine also advocates the integration of maintaining stability and protecting rights, but among the two goals, protecting rights clearly takes precedence over maintaining stability.

To be continued

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Happy birthday to Luke Cordero (April 2), Zylvette Lim (April 6) and Leticia Andres (April 7).

Continued here:

Inside the enemys mind The Manila Times - The Manila Times