We have a budget proposal from the President that expands ISS utilization, invests in building a commercial LEO services-based launch capability, promotes a push to do R&D on exploration-enabling technologies, and, yes, cancels the Constellation program.

We have a Congress that, amongst the members who seem to care, largely doesn’t like this proposal, but is split amongst the various local concerns about what the best response to the budget is.  I have to admit that I share Rep. Dana Rohrabacher’s sense of irony at a Democratic White House arguing for increased privatization against Congressional Republicans advocating the continuation of a monolithic government program.

The space community itself is just as divided.  You can see it on the space blogs and in the press, where we argue amongst ourselves about extending Shuttle, building a more direct derivative of it, saving Constellation (or not), supporting commercial endeavors, and just about every iteration in between.

This goes beyond just a technical debate, though.  People are taking this personally.  I experienced it first-hand when I found myself leaving a young professionals group that I had eagerly helped launch last fall, largely because I felt that dissenting views were no longer welcomed or respected and messaging decisions were being made on the basis of their marketability, not their content.

Speaking as someone who grew up watching the Shuttle, once worked on Constellation, and who now works on the Space Station Program, I can see where most people are coming from.  Putting aside the typical politics that seem to be dominating the debate on Capitol Hill for a moment, I understand why people would feel trepidation at the vanguard of human space flight for the past 30 years coming to an end and discomfort at the uncertainty of what the future holds.  As an engineer myself, I know my first instinct is to prefer the comfort of being pointed in a certain direction and told to go forth.

Personally, though, I do think NASA needs to focus on core strengths – exploration beyond LEO, scientific discovery, and technological innovation.  The Space Act is clear that NASA is not to compete with private industry where such capability exists.  The Vision for Space Exploration and the 2004 Aldridge Commission both said that NASA should not replicate existing LEO launch capabilities.  It’s long past time we stop thinking everything will be alright if we can just pick up where Apollo left off.  The world has changed since then and so must we.

When I search inside myself, I find that my strongest loyalty is to the enterprise of space exploration itself, not necessarily any particular program.  As long as we are moving forward and I am making a meaningful contribution, I’ll be happy.  If that means I have to change my own personal notion of what the future holds, so be it.

So long as we support an endeavor that is subject to the vagaries of the political winds, we will not have any hard-and-fast guarantees. The reality of the matter is that this could all change again when the next President comes along. Our best insurance against having change imposed on us against our will is to pursue missions with clear, unambiguous benefit to the nation.  I think we can take a lesson in this from another part of the government.

Few question the value the military, as an institution, provides our country. No one lamented the “end of the Army,” though, when the immense, $340-billion Future Combat Systems program was canceled.  FCS, despite completing its Systems of Systems Functional Review, was over budget and failing to meet its original requirements.

Before its cancellation, critical funding elements were already strapped and advanced technology development had been deferred.  The Pentagon was recommending further deferral as early as 2005 because of budget strains elsewhere and expected funding declines.  Sound familiar?

The Army is now working to figure out how to manage their programs better, what from FCS is really of value, and how to roll that forward into building its next generation of ground combat vehicles.  Studies of program management have repeatedly shown that there is a declining trend in successful completion with increasing size, budget, and complexity.  Instead of one monolithic program, the Army is now separating their modernization effort into role-specific programs.

We must not make the mistake of conflating the vision with the implementation, nor can we let ourselves fall victim to the sunk costs fallacy.  We need to be honest with ourselves and our stakeholders – the American public – about where the space program is now, where it is going if we stay on the present path, and where we really want to take it.

I think the Vision for Space Exploration is still a good one and that the findings of both the Aldridge and Augustine reports validate it.  Instead of fighting amongst ourselves, we should have a conversation about how to best realize that Vision within the political and fiscal realities we must face.

The traditional disdain of engineers and scientists for dealing with politics has only hurt us over the past few decades.  We must bridge that gap if we expect policymakers to hear us, but we must also be careful to not lose our objectivity in the process of advocacy.  Otherwise, we will fall into the same trap that has recently discredited climate science in the public eye.

I believe with all of my heart that our civilization’s future is in space.  Our continued evolution and survival depends on our ability to explore the solar system, peel back its mysteries through scientific inquiry, and utilize its resources for the benefit of both our country and the rest of the world.  As far as I am concerned, that is our mission. Let’s not lose sight of it.