by Clifford F. Thies

General Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, is in trouble, supposedly, for an “interview” published in the rock music magazine “Rolling Stone.” More correctly, he is in trouble for his and his staff officers’ criticism of the civilian leadership of the U.S. government, at times personal. According to General McChrystal, the U.S. is not committing enough soldiers to Afghanistan to accomplish the mission, nor – reading between the lines – enough time.

There was another high-ranking officer who, not so long ago, criticized the civilian leadership. That officer was General Eric Ken Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff from 1999 to 2003. General Shinseki was publically critical of the Bush Administration for not deploying enough troops to Iraq during the early years of the occupation. President Obama rewarded General Shinseki, following his election, by naming him Secretary of Veterans Affairs. But, now, with the Army boot on the other foot, President Obama doesn’t like criticism of the civilian leadership.

In both cases, I appreciate the arguments made by the generals. Overwhelming force saves lives. Not only the lives of our soldiers, but also the lives of the civilian populations we are seeking to defend. But, in both cases, from where is this overwhelming force to come?

Following the Persian Gulf War, we incorrectly concluded that, in future engagements, we would be supported by the rest of the world. We therefore put our focus on high tech weaponry. Our ground units were made smaller, more strategically-deployable and more lethal, and we cut the number of ground soldiers almost in half.

As a consequence of this reconfigured force structure, when we invaded Iraq, we were able to achieve victory very quickly. The Army to the west and the Marines to the east pushed through to Baghdad, sweeping away the enemy. But, then, we had little ability to follow-up with a ground force large enough to occupy the country. We had thought blue-helmeted troops from the U.N. would do the job. But, they were scared off by the ferocity of the resistance.

We then had to require extraordinary sacrifices, in terms of length and frequency of deployments, from our regular military forces and we also called upon the Guard and Reserves . Eventually, a reconstituted Iraqi Army was able to stand up to and defeat the resistance.

The story in Afghanistan is both similar and different. We won the war in Afghanistan through the adroit use of partisan armies, special operations forces and the devastating firepower delivered by air forces. Sometime after this - don’t ask me when - the mission morphed into one of “reconstructing” the country. (Not that Afghanistan ever was “constructed” in any meaningful sense.)

After he was elected, President Obama and his staff, advised by the military, committed to a surge in Afghanistan, similar to what was done in Iraq. The idea was that the Afghani army would be made capable of defending the country. Well, this is just not happening according to plan, although in his most recent report, General McChrystal says that we are “still capable of winning.”

It is for President Obama to decide what to do now: either to withdraw our forces according to the timetable in the plan, or else to commit enough forces and time to get the job done. Obviously, no democratic leader wants to become associated with a long and costly war. Look what it did to the Republicans in 2006 and 2008.