This view that humanity is essentially a destroyer leads from Anthropocene antihumanism to Kirschs other main topic: transhumanism. The corruption of our species that makes our destruction as a result of climate change inevitable goes hand in hand with the transhumanist view that the human species must be replaced.

In his analysis of transhumanism, Kirschs presentation goes even further to make its adherents seem more convincing than they actually are. Some readers may be attracted to the antihumanist idea that our inherent corruption has led us to the brink of disaster but repelled by their embrace of extinction. Transhumanism seems to offer a more hopeful option. Instead of simply letting humanity go, transhumanists propose to replace us with something better. Their embrace of technology that can create a new, posthuman species makes them look like saviors compared to the Anthropocene antihumanists. As Kirsch writes, according to transhumanists, Its true that humanity has reached a point where our technological power threatens to destroy us. But if that power continues to grow at the same pace it has over the past two hundred years, it will become the means of our salvation.

There are two big assumptions involved here that Kirsch helpfullyfor transhumanismfails to unpack. The first is that technological progress from the past to the present can be projected into the future. This makes predictions of the posthuman seem logical rather than ideological. The second is that replacement is our salvation. Transhumanists assume that technological progress will culminate in a new step in human evolution where the posthuman wont really replace us but will instead improve usextend our existence in a new and better form. In other words, transhumanism requires that we can remove our identities, conceived basically as software, from our bodies and simply move them onto new hardware.

Kirsch does point out that transhumanism has an innate tendency to overpromise and that the big breakthroughs always seem to lie just over the horizon. But he then immediately defends the prognostications of transhumanists by claiming that they are extrapolating from developments that are undeniably real.

Many of these developments, however, are both deniable and not real. For example, without citing evidence, Kirsch echoes transhumanist claims that we know that the human mind has a completely material basis and that the brain itself is a computer. This means that we can have an uploaded mind in the virtual reality of the metaverse where we will need our physical bodies as only a substrate for our virtual ones. Alternatively, through laser porting, we can free our consciousness to explore the galaxy or even the universe at the speed of light. Kirsch doesnt treat these claims with enough skepticism.

Philosophers have long aimed to overcome this kind of simplistic Cartesian mind-body dualism. Even Descartes did not think the mind could actually be separated from the body. He denied that the relationship between mind and body is comparable to that between a sailor and a ship. Our minds cannot be reduced to our brains, and our brains cannot be reduced to computers. What has come to be known as the hard problem of consciousness (explaining how something entirely physical can possibly be conscious) remains unsolved. And it may remain so, despite the confidence of some scientists and philosophers. Similarly, the hard problems of the metaversethat no one has legs, for example, or that no one seems to want to use itmay remain unsolved as well. Mark Zuckerberg, it seems, has already gotten bored and pivoted to something else.

Yet it must be recognized that whether or not these developments are currently real, or even possible, is less important than whether they sound plausible to investors. Even more tempting and persistent than mind-body dualism is the idea of immortality. And there is perhaps no one for whom it is more tempting than the aging billionaires nowhere near done spending their money and enjoying their lifestyles. Transhumanist tech companies promising digital immortality are, therefore, attractive investments. Of course, were such mind uploading to become possible, only the wealthiest would be able to afford it. Still, investment in digital immortality might eventually begin to sound reasonable, especially if Anthropocene antihumanism has made it seem futile to use that money to combat climate change instead.

Anthropocene antihumanism and transhumanism do not just involve a revolt against humanity, but a revolt against responsibility. Combined, they make the CEOs of tech companies look like our saviors rather than our destroyers. Those who have become wealthy by destroying the planet in the name of technological progress can use that destruction to justify their pursuit of further technological progress, which now appears as the only solution to the crisis they helped to cause. Kirsch suggests that ultimately, transhumanists and antihumanists could converge on an ideal of extinction, with rapacious humanity making way for wiser virtual beings who tread more lightly on the planet, but this vision reinforces the fantasy that tech companies are a solution to climate change rather than among the drivers of it. The creation of virtual beings requires massive data centers and massive amounts of electricity, and so the pursuit of transhumanism reinforces Anthropocene antihumanism, much like Anthropocene antihumanism reinforces transhumanism.

Fittingly, given the nihilism behind both Anthropocene antihumanism and transhumanism, Kirsch concludes by discussing Nietzsche. Nietzsche railed against the ascetic priests he thought offered nothing but cures to the diseases they were spreading. In the same way, he would have rejected both Anthropocene antihumanism and transhumanism for not only seeing humanity as fundamentally sick, but for offering solutions that can only serve to make humanity sicker. Kirsch worries that these views are convincing enough to have an impact on society whether or not they are correct, but too often he is unwilling to point out basic flaws in these views or the interests they serve. Anthropocene antihumanism and transhumanism are dangerous not only because they might stop people from caring about the destruction of the planet, but because they embolden the people actually destroying it.

This piece was published as part of a symposium aboutThe Revolt Against Humanity. For more of the symposium, read:

To see the full collection, click here. To listen to an interview with Adam Kirsch on theCommonweal Podcast, clickhere.

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Posthumanisms Revolt Against Responsibility - Commonweal