President Trumps use of Twitter to shape the narrative is notorious. True to form, he was tweeting fast and furious during the impeachment hearings. Negative testimony about the presidents interactions with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky repeatedly incited his aggressive retorts, prompting speculation about whether his outbursts may be viewed as witness intimidation. Citing the First Amendment, Trump claims he is free to say what he pleases, including name-calling and denigrating witnesses. But is it criminal witness intimidation?

A number of recent cases have examined the use of social media platforms to conduct witness intimidation. In 2018, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the witness tampering conviction of a woman who posted on Facebook the name of a potential witness in her brothers criminal trial who she warned not to get upon the stand, posting watch out little snitch. The Supreme Court too has had occasion to consider the criminality of Facebook posts suggesting that the defendants soon-to-be ex-wife should be killed. Even beyond our prolific president, the issue of improper use of digital media to harass or intimidate has seeped into the political realm. Earlier this year, House Representative Matt Gaetz (R-Fl) was censured for tweets made on the eve of congressional testimony from former Trump attorney, Michael Cohen, suggesting that unfavorable information about Cohen would be released if he testified.

Recent impeachment-related tweets from Trump are not the first public statements from the president to be called into question. Critics previously argued that the president was obstructing justice by dangling a pardon to his former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, during the Mueller investigation. Tweets expressing sympathy for Manafort and referring to him as a brave man in contrast to his personal attorney, Michael Cohen, who cooperated with authorities and was referred to by Trump as a coward were viewed as a subtle message to Manafort to stay strong and possibly reap the benefits ala a presidential pardon.

Trumps tweets about the Whistleblower who filed the complaint that has instigated the impeachment hearings also have been questioned. A September 26, 2019 tweet likened the Whistleblower to a spy and further stated You know what we used to do in the old days when we were smart? Right? With spies and treason, right? We used to handle them a little differently than we do now. This tweet prompted the Whistleblowers attorneys to send a letter to the Acting Director of National Intelligence expressing concern for their clients anonymity and safety.

Most recently, a tweet from President Trump blasting Marie Yovanovitch, the former ambassador to Ukraine, as she testified has been called witness intimidation. After hearing Trumps statement that everywhere she went turned bad, Yovanovitch herself stated that it was intimidating. Democrats opined that the Presidents tactics would, and were intended to, scare off other potential witnesses.

The Law of Witness Intimidation

Knowingly using intimidation or threats to influence testimony in an official proceeding, such as a proceeding before Congress, is a crime under Section 1512 of the United States Code. Whether a presidential tweet storm might be considered a violation of this statute centers on a few questions: 1) when can a tweet or public statement implicate Section 1512; 2) when are tweets or statements considered a threat under federal law; and 3) what is the requisite criminal intent?

Section 1512 has been applied to social media posts. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction under Section 1512 of Delexsia Harris, who took to Facebook two weeks before her brothers trial for murder. Harris posted threatening statements and depictions of guns and bombs pointing at police cars alongside broad references to individuals identified as potential witnesses in the case. (886 F3d 1120) Harris also named one witness directly. Stating that the question of whether a communication is a threat is a factual question to be resolved by a jury, the Court upheld the jurys determination that a reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of the communication, would interpret [Harriss posts] as a threat.

In Trumps case, Democrats argue that his tweet made during Ambassador Yovanovitchs testimony could have had an effect both on Yovanovitch, who was still in the process of providing information to Congress, as well as on other potential witnesses. The Second Circuit has held that the language of Section 1512 does not require the intimidating statement or threat be directly made to the threatened individual. (US v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015)). The statute states that a violation occurs when the defendant engages in wrongful conduct toward another person with the intent to influence any person in an official proceeding. Accordingly, a threat to X which causes Y to withhold information, qualifies as witness intimidation so long as the person making the threat had corrupt intent.

Section 1512 requires proof of specific corrupt intent to intimidate or persuade a witness either not to testify or to alter his or her testimony. Reasonable minds differ on Trumps motivation. The witness intimidation claims made against Representative Gaetz earlier this year suggest that even where the motivation to intimidate or persuade arguably is clearer, it may not rise to the level of criminality.

The night before Trumps former lawyer, Michael Cohen, was scheduled to testify before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Gaetz, a staunch defender of Trump, tweeted Hey @MichaelCohen212- Do your wife & father-in-law know about your girlfriends? Maybe tonight would be a good time for that chat. I wonder if shell remain faithful to you when youre in prison. Shes about to learn a lot . Gaetz defended claims that he was threatening Cohen by stating that he was only challenging the veracity and character of a witness. No criminal charges were brought against Gaetz and an investigation into his behavior by the Florida Bar resulted only in a written censure. In this highly-charged political environment, evidence of criminal intent may be difficult to prove.

Interaction with the First Amendment

The First Amendment may add another layer of protection to unbridled tweeters. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider what distinguishes a true threat from speech protected by the First Amendment in Elonis v. United States in 2014. The Court reviewed Eloniss conviction for transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another under 18 U.S.C. 875(c). Specifically, Elonis made a series of posts on Facebook suggesting that his soon-to-be ex-wife should be killed. Other posts contained threats against police, the FBI and a kindergarten class. On appeal, Eloniss lawyer argued the conviction should be overturned because Elonis lacked the requisite specific intent to injure, was just venting about his personal problems, and did not mean to threaten anyone.

The question as phrased by the Supreme Court was whether the statute required that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication and, if not, whether the First Amendment required such a showing. Unfortunately, the Courts opinion did not resolve the question directly, but took issue with the Third Circuits application of a reasonable person standard a civil tort concept to determine the defendants criminal intent, stating that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal. The conviction was reversed and the matter was remanded to the Third Circuit. Thereafter, the Third Circuit found the error to be harmless and affirmed the conviction because Elonis testified at trial that he knew his posts would be viewed as threats, thereby satisfying the knowledge element of the crime.

Conclusion

Courts and attorneys are going to have to contemplate how the use of Twitter and other social medium platforms increasingly used as a forum for political and commercial speech must be analyzed under criminal statutes. Like any other form of communication, courts correctly have determined that these types of public statements may be viewed as threats subject to criminal charges. Whether the conduct is criminal will depend upon first, whether a reasonable person familiar with the context within which the statement was made would view it as a threat, and second, whether the speaker intended to intimidate. Certainly, the words and the speakers power and ability to make good on the threat will play a part in that analysis.

To read more fromRobert J. Anello, please visitwww.maglaw.com.

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Intimidation or Free Speech: Are Trump's Tweets Witness Tampering? - Forbes