US Government for Kids: Fourth Amendment

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From the Constitution

Here is the text of the Fourth Amendment from the Constitution:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Reasons for the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment came about because of the actions of British tax collectors before the Revolutionary War. They would use general warrants to enter and search any house they wanted without needing evidence of wrongdoing. The Founding Fathers wanted to protect people from this sort of invasion of privacy from the government.

What is "searches and seizures"?

A "search" under the Fourth Amendment is when a public employee (like a police officer) looks at something that is considered "private". It typically takes two things in order for something to be considered "private":

1) the citizen thought it was private and it would not be able to be viewed by the public (For example, something inside a house would be private, something on the driveway could be viewed by anyone).

2) these expectations of privacy are realistic (It wouldn't be realistic to expect something on your driveway to be private).

When someone is "seized" they are not free to leave (like being arrested and placed in jail). When something is "seized" it cannot be taken back (like the police taking your wallet and not giving it back).

In order to conduct a legal "search" or "seizure" the police must have a warrant written by a judge. To get this warrant they must present evidence to the judge that some criminal activity has taken place. This assures that the police can't enter a person's home or arrest a person without evidence that has been reviewed by a judge.

The Fourth Amendment also states that there must be "probable cause." This means that there is enough evidence to show that a crime has likely been committed. The police must have this evidence before any arrest or search. Any evidence found during the search does not count as probable cause.

The requirements for search and seizure are slightly different in the public schools. The Supreme Court has said that school officials and police officers can search a student if they have "reasonable suspicion" that a crime has occurred. This is less of a requirement than "probable cause."

There are certain places and situations where people are searched or stopped without a warrant. Consider the airport where everyone who flies is searched. When you agree to fly, you give up some of your Fourth Amendment rights. Another example is a roadblock that tests for drunk drivers. When you drive on public roads you give up some of your Fourth Amendment rights. These searches are generally accepted by the citizens for their own safety and protection.

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US Government for Kids: Fourth Amendment

Amendment IV – The United States Constitution

Imagine youre driving a car, and a police officer spots you and pulls you over for speeding. He orders you out of the car. Maybe he wants to place you under arrest. Or maybe he wants to search your car for evidence of a crime. Can the officer do that?

The Fourth Amendment is the part of the Constitution that gives the answer. According to the Fourth Amendment, the people have a right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right limits the power of the police to seize and search people, their property, and their homes.

The Fourth Amendment has been debated frequently during the last several years, as police and intelligence agencies in the United States have engaged in a number of controversial activities. The federal government has conducted bulk collection of Americans telephone and Internet connections as part of the War on Terror. Many municipal police forces have engaged in aggressive use of stop and frisk. There have been a number of highly-publicized police-citizen encounters in which the police ended up shooting a civilian. There is also concern about the use of aerial surveillance, whether by piloted aircraft or drones.

The application of the Fourth Amendment to all these activities would have surprised those who drafted it, and not only because they could not imagine the modern technologies like the Internet and drones. They also were not familiar with organized police forces like we have today. Policing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a responsibility of the citizenry, which participated in night watches. Other than that, there was only a loose collection of sheriffs and constables, who lacked the tools to maintain order as the police do today.

The primary concerns of the generation that ratified the Fourth Amendment were general warrants and writs of assistance. Famous incidents on both sides of the Atlantic gave rise to placing the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution. In Britain, the Crown employed general warrants to go after political enemies, leading to the famous decisions in Wilkes v. Wood (1763) and Entick v. Carrington (1765). General warrants allowed the Crowns messengers to search without any cause to believe someone had committed an offense. In those cases the judges decided that such warrants violated English common law. In the colonies the Crown used the writs of assistancelike general warrants, but often unbounded by time restraintsto search for goods on which taxes had not been paid. James Otis challenged the writs in a Boston court; though he lost, some such as John Adams attribute this legal battle as the spark that led to the Revolution. Both controversies led to the famous notion that a persons home is their castle, not easily invaded by the government.

Today the Fourth Amendment is understood as placing restraints on the government any time it detains (seizes) or searches a person or property. The Fourth Amendment also provides that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The idea is that to avoid the evils of general warrants, each search or seizure should be cleared in advance by a judge, and that to get a warrant the government must show probable causea certain level of suspicion of criminal activityto justify the search or seizure.

To the extent that a warrant is required in theory before police can search, there are so many exceptions that in practice warrants rarely are obtained. Police can search automobiles without warrants, they can detain people on the street without them, and they can always search or seize in an emergency without going to a judge.

The way that the Fourth Amendment most commonly is put into practice is in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court decided in the mid-twentieth century that if the police seize evidence as part of an illegal search, the evidence cannot be admitted into court. This is called the exclusionary rule. It is controversial because in most cases evidence is being tossed out even though it shows the person is guilty and, as a result of the police conduct, they might avoid conviction. The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered, declared Benjamin Cardozo (a famous judge and ultimately Supreme Court justice). But, responded another Supreme Court justice, Louis Brandeis, If the government becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.

One of the difficult questions today is what constitutes a search? If the police standing in Times Square in New York watched a person planting a bomb in plain daylight, we would not think they needed a warrant or any cause. But what about installing closed circuit TV cameras on poles, or flying drones over backyards, or gathering evidence that you have given to a third party such as an Internet provider or a banker?

Another hard question is when a search is acceptable when the government has no suspicion that a person has done something wrong. Lest the answer seem to be never, think of airport security. Surely it is okay for the government to screen people getting on airplanes, yet the idea is as much to deter people from bringing weapons as it is to catch themthere is no cause, probable or otherwise, to think anyone has done anything wrong. This is the same sort of issue with bulk data collection, and possibly with gathering biometric information.

What should be clear by now is that advancing technology and the many threats that face society add up to a brew in which the Fourth Amendment will continue to play a central role.

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Amendment IV - The United States Constitution

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by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book http://www.johnwesleyhall.com

2003-19,online since Feb. 24, 2003

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Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links

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Research Links: Supreme Court: SCOTUSBlog S. Ct. Docket Solicitor General's site SCOTUSreport Briefs online (but no amicus briefs) Oyez Project (NWU) "On the Docket"Medill S.Ct. Monitor: Law.com S.Ct. Com't'ry: Law.com

General (many free): LexisWeb Google Scholar | Google LexisOne Legal Website Directory Crimelynx Lexis.com $ Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $ Findlaw.com Findlaw.com (4th Amd) Westlaw.com $ F.R.Crim.P. 41 http://www.fd.org Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Resources FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (2008) (pdf) DEA Agents Manual (2002) (download) DOJ Computer Search Manual (2009) (pdf)Stringrays (ACLU No. Cal.) (pdf)

Congressional Research Service: --Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012) ACLU on privacy Privacy FoundationElectronic Frontier Foundation NACDLs Domestic Drone Information Center Electronic Privacy Information Center Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.) Section 1983 Blog

"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." Me

I am still learning.Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government." Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has notto put it mildlyrun smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up." Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!---Pep Le Pew

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Fourth Amendment – Kids | Laws.com

A Guide to the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment, or Amendment IV of the United States Constitution is the section of the Bill of Rights that protects people from being searched or having their things taken away from them without any good reason. If the government or any law enforcement official wants to do that, he or she must have a very good reason to do that and must get permission to perform the search from a judge. The fourth amendment was introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a part of the Bill of Rights on September 5, 1789 and was ratified or voted four by three fourths of the states on December 15, 1791.

The Text of the Fourth Amendment

The text of the Fourth Amendment which is found in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights is the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

History of the Third Amendment

In Colonial America, laws were written in order to help the English earn money on customs. The justices of the peace would do this by writing general warrants, which allowed general search and seizure to happen. Massachusetts wrote a law in 1756 that banned these warrants, because tax collectors were abusing their powers by searching the colonists homes for illegal goods. These general warrants allowed any messenger or officer to search a suspected place without any evidence. It also allowed them to seize people without even saying what they did wrong or showing evidence of their wrongdoings. Virginia also banned the use of general warrants later due to other fears. These actions later led to the addition of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.

The Fourth Amendment Today

Today, the Fourth Amendment means that in order for a police officer to search and arrest someone, he or she will need to get permission or a warrant to do so from a judge. In order to get a warrant, the police officer must have evidence or probable cause that supports it. The police officer, or whoever has the evidence, must swear that it is true to his or her knowledge.

Facts About the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment applies to the government, but not any searches done by organizations or people who are not doing it for the government.

Some searches can be done without a warrant without breaking the law, like when there is a good reason to think that a crime is happening.

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History and Scope of the Amendment :: Fourth Amendment …

SEARCH AND SEIZUREFOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Annotations

History.Few provisions of the Bill of Rights grew so directly out of the experience of the colonials as the Fourth Amendment, embodying as it did the protection against the use of the writs of assistance. But though the insistence on freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures as a fundamental right gained expression in the colonies late and as a result of experience,1 there was also a rich English experience to draw on. Every mans house is his castle was a maxim much celebrated in England, as Samans Case demonstrated in 1603.2 A civil case of execution of process, Samans Case nonetheless recognized the right of the homeowner to defend his house against unlawful entry even by the Kings agents, but at the same time recognized the authority of the appropriate officers to break and enter upon notice in order to arrest or to execute the Kings process. Most famous of the English cases was Entick v. Carrington,3 one of a series of civil actions against state officers who, pursuant to general warrants, had raided many homes and other places in search of materials connected with John Wilkes polemical pamphlets attacking not only governmental policies but the King himself.4

Entick, an associate of Wilkes, sued because agents had forcibly broken into his house, broken into locked desks and boxes, and seized many printed charts, pamphlets, and the like. In an opinion sweeping in terms, the court declared the warrant and the behavior it authorized subversive of all the comforts of society, and the issuance of a warrant for the seizure of all of a persons papers rather than only those alleged to be criminal in nature contrary to the genius of the law of England.5 Besides its general character, the court said, the warrant was bad because it was not issued on a showing of probable cause and no record was required to be made of what had been seized. Entick v. Carrington, the Supreme Court has said, is a great judgment, one of the landmarks of English liberty, one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution, and a guide to an understanding of what the Framers meant in writing the Fourth Amendment.6

In the colonies, smuggling rather than seditious libel afforded the leading examples of the necessity for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In order to enforce the revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs of assistance, which were general warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place to search for and seize prohibited and uncustomed goods, and commanding all subjects to assist in these endeavors. Once issued, the writs remained in force throughout the lifetime of the sovereign and six months thereafter. When, upon the death of George II in 1760, the authorities were required to obtain the issuance of new writs, opposition was led by James Otis, who attacked such writs on libertarian grounds and who asserted the invalidity of the authorizing statutes because they conicted with English constitutionalism.7 Otis lost and the writs were issued and used, but his arguments were much cited in the colonies not only on the immediate subject but also with regard to judicial review.

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Fourth Amendment:Searches and Seizures

What is the Fourth Amendment?

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment Defined:

Like the majority of fields within American law, the Fourth Amendment is heavily rooted in the English legal doctrine. In a general sense, the Fourth Amendment was created to limit the power of the government and their ability to enforce legal actions on individuals. The Fourth Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the abuse of the writ of assistance, which was a type of general search warrant used by the government during the American Revolution. The Amendment was created to limit the powers of the law enforcement agency who is conducting a search of an individuals personal property.

The Fourth Amendment is a part of the Bill of Rights, which are the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution and the framework to elucidate upon the freedoms of the individual. The Bill of Rights were proposed and sent to the states by the first session of the First Congress. They were later ratified on December 15, 1791.

The first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution were introduced by James Madison as a series of legislative articles and came into effect as Constitutional Amendments following the process of ratification by three-fourths of the States on December 15, 1791.

Stipulations of the 4th Amendment

The Fourth Amendment guards against the governments ability to conduct unreasonable search and seizures when the individual party being searched has a reasonable exception of privacy.

The Fourth Amendment specifically requires a law enforcement agency to possess judicially sanctioned search and arrest warrants, which are supported by probable clause, to be administered before a persons property can be inspected.

The Fourth Amendment ties in numerous limitations whereby an individual may be searched without a warrant given the presence of certain circumstances. The individuals property may be searched and seized if: The individual is on parole or in a tax hearing, faces deportation, the evidence is seized from a common carrier, the evidence is collected by U.S. customs agents, the evidence is seized by probation officers, the evidence is seized outside of the United States, or probable cause is evident.

Court Cases tied into the 4th Amendment

In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is enforceable and should be applied to all states in the Union by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that certain searches and seizures were in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment even when a warrant was properly issued to the coordinating law enforcement agencies.

State Timeline for Ratification of the Bill of Rights

New Jersey:November 20, 1789; rejected article II

Maryland:December 19, 1789; approved all

North Carolina:December 22, 1789; approved all

South Carolina: January 19, 1790; approved all

New Hampshire: January 25, 1790; rejected article II

Delaware: January 28, 1790; rejected article I

New York: February 27, 1790; rejected article II

Pennsylvania: March 10, 1790; rejected article II

Rhode Island: June 7, 1790; rejected article II

Vermont: November 3, 1791; approved all

Virginia: December 15, 1791; approved all

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Fourth Amendment | UpCounsel 2019

The Fourth Amendment includes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.11 min read

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, detention must be 'reasonable.' See:

In the context of a criminal arrest, a detention of longer than 48 hours without a probable cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law in the absence of a demonstrated emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 670 ('91). However, the Supreme Court arrived at this rule by considering the time it takes to complete administrative steps typically incident to arrest.

Non-consensual extraction of blood implicates Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Some examples include:

Even in the law enforcement context, the State may interfere with an individual's Fourth Amendment interests with less than probable cause and without a warrant if the intrusion is only minimal and is justified by law enforcement purposes. For example,

The gathering of fingerprint evidence from 'free persons' constitutes a sufficiently significant interference with individual expectations of privacy that law enforcement officials are required to demonstrate that they have probable cause, or at least an articulable suspicion, to believe that the person committed a criminal offense and that the fingerprinting will establish or negate the person's connection to the offense. For example:

Nevertheless, everyday 'booking' procedures routinely require even the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification, regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves fingerprint evidence. See:

Thus, in the fingerprinting context, there exists a constitutionally significant distinction between the gathering of fingerprints from free persons to determine their guilt of an unsolved criminal offense and the gathering of fingerprints for identification purposes from persons within the lawful custody of the state.

The drawing of blood from free persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense and that his blood will reveal evidence relevant to that offense. See: Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-71; U.S. v. Chapel, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 5753-54 (9th Cir.'95) (en banc), but the absence of such a warrant does not a fortiori establish a violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a minimally intrusive search, as in the following cases:

"An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 421-2 (holding that a warrant was not required in part because "in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate").

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and expanded the principle first enunciated in Skinner, stating that, in some contexts, "testing based on 'suspicion' of [wrongful activity] would not be better, but worse than suspicionless testing." Acton, 1995 WL 373274, at *8. In Acton, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a school district's practice of conducting random, suspicionless urine testing of school athletes for drug use. The Court rejected the proposition that the school district could "conduct such testing only if school officials had suspicion that a specific athlete was using drugs, holding that this alternative 'entails substantial difficulties -- if it is indeed practicable at all." Id. Accusatory drug testing would "transform[] the process into a badge of shame" and would increase the risk that school officials would impose testing arbitrarily upon disfavored, but not drug-using, students. Id.

Except in certain narrowly limited cases, the Court repeatedly has stated its "insist[ence] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution." Chambers v. Moreny, 399 U.S. 42, 51 ('70). Because "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value in our society," searches that invade bodily integrity cannot be executed as mere fishing expeditions to acquire useful evidence: "The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 769-70.

Only when law enforcement faces an exigent circumstance, such as a need to preserve evanescent blood alcohol evidence, and has probable cause to link the sought-after information to a crime under investigation is it constitutional to conduct nonconsensual blood testing without a warrant. Id. at 770-71. Therefore, forced extraction of blood not only 'implicates the Fourth Amendment,' as the majority notes, but also falls squarely within the area of privacy interests for which the traditional probable cause requirement determines reasonableness in the law enforcement context. Forced blood extraction intrudes on the private personal sphere and infringes upon an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.' Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 60 ('85).

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 69 ('66). The Schmerber Court posed two questions:

In answering the first question, the Court recognized that it was 'writ[ing] on a clean slate' regarding the treatment of searches that involve intrusions into the human body. Id. at 767-8. It concluded that such searches require probable cause. Id. at 770-1.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 ('85), recognized that Schmerber's threshold standard was a requirement of probable cause "where intrusions into the human body are concerned," which implicate "deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Id. at 761, 760. The Winston Court then acknowledged "other factors'' [b]eyond these standards that must be considered in determining whether a particular intrusion is reasonable. For instance, whether "the procedure threatens the safety or health of the individual" and "the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests." Id. at 761 (emphasis added).

In regard to the additional 'dignitary' factor (beyond the threshold inquiry of invasion of bodily integrity), the Winston Court noted Schmerber's recognition that blood extraction is not 'an unduly extensive imposition.' Id. at 762. The Court contrasted this lesser bodily invasion, which the Schmerber Court had upheld upon demonstration of probable cause, with the more drastic measure of dangerous surgery to recoup criminal evidence, which the Winston Court concluded would violate the individual's Fourth Amendment rights even when supported by probable cause.

Thus again, the context of the quotation demonstrates that the Court places blood extraction squarely within the probable cause requirement because it is an invasion of bodily integrity, while at the same time acknowledging that it is a less extensive imposition on dignitary interests than surgical removal of a bullet.

The unique situation in which the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches in the traditional law enforcement context includes the practice of stopping motorists at sobriety checkpoints. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 ('90). The Sitz Court relied on well-settled law that motorists have a lessened expectation of privacy regarding stops and visual searches of automobiles on the nation's roadways. Id. at 450 (explaining the importance of the context of 'police stops of motorists on public highways'). At these sobriety checkpoints, which motorists may choose to avoid, only the initial brief stop and preliminary questioning may take place without individualized suspicion: "more extensive field sobriety testing" requires justification. Id. at 450-2.

Like the highway sobriety checkpoints, the 'special needs beyond normal law enforcement' rationale supports searches on lesser grounds than probable cause only in a very few, carefully tailored regulatory contexts that do not involve apprehension of criminal perpetrators. See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 65-66 ('89) (applying the special needs exception to suspicionless quasi-consensual drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction).

The special needs exception covers testing which "is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement [because] . . . results may not be used in criminal prosecution." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (emphases added). Even so, a search in the special needs context almost always requires individualized suspicion. See the following cases:

Nonetheless, routine searches that intrude into prisoners' bodies without probable cause may be upheld only when the search is undertaken pursuant to a valid prison regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. For instance:

Individuals have a categorically different and lesser expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, visual images, or voice prints.

The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what 'a person knowingly exposes to the public'. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.

Blanket searches are unreasonable, however "even-handed" they may be, in the traditional criminal law enforcement context. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-2, 92 n.4 ('79) (invalidating a blanket pat-down search of all patrons in a tavern, even though there was probable cause to search the bartender and the premises). The ill that the Fourth Amendment prevents is not merely the arbitrariness of police discretion to single out individuals for attention, but also the unwarranted domination and control of the citizenry through fear of baseless but "even-handed" general police searches.

In Zurcher, the Supreme Court held that a search of the offices of a university newspaper, which was not involved in any criminal activity, for photographs of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers did not offend the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded: "[T]he Amendment has not been a barrier to warrants to search property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily ('78) 436 U.S. 547, 549-50.

Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." The essence of that protection is a prohibition against some modes of law enforcement because the cost of police intrusion into personal liberty is too high, even though the intrusion undoubtedly would result in an enormous boon to the public if the efficient apprehension of criminals were the sole criterion to be considered. "The easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution allows them to take." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, dissenting).

A permanent resident alien is entitled to constitutional protection. For example:

Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 824, 826-28 (9th Cir.'87) (analyzing whether seizures of three resident aliens complied with Fourth Amendment).

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Fourth Amendment | UpCounsel 2019

Fourth Amendment: Everything You Need to Know

The Fourth Amendment includes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.11 min read

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, detention must be 'reasonable.' See:

In the context of a criminal arrest, a detention of longer than 48 hours without a probable cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law in the absence of a demonstrated emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 670 ('91). However, the Supreme Court arrived at this rule by considering the time it takes to complete administrative steps typically incident to arrest.

Non-consensual extraction of blood implicates Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Some examples include:

Even in the law enforcement context, the State may interfere with an individual's Fourth Amendment interests with less than probable cause and without a warrant if the intrusion is only minimal and is justified by law enforcement purposes. For example,

The gathering of fingerprint evidence from 'free persons' constitutes a sufficiently significant interference with individual expectations of privacy that law enforcement officials are required to demonstrate that they have probable cause, or at least an articulable suspicion, to believe that the person committed a criminal offense and that the fingerprinting will establish or negate the person's connection to the offense. For example:

Nevertheless, everyday 'booking' procedures routinely require even the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification, regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves fingerprint evidence. See:

Thus, in the fingerprinting context, there exists a constitutionally significant distinction between the gathering of fingerprints from free persons to determine their guilt of an unsolved criminal offense and the gathering of fingerprints for identification purposes from persons within the lawful custody of the state.

The drawing of blood from free persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense and that his blood will reveal evidence relevant to that offense. See: Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-71; U.S. v. Chapel, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 5753-54 (9th Cir.'95) (en banc), but the absence of such a warrant does not a fortiori establish a violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a minimally intrusive search, as in the following cases:

"An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 421-2 (holding that a warrant was not required in part because "in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate").

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and expanded the principle first enunciated in Skinner, stating that, in some contexts, "testing based on 'suspicion' of [wrongful activity] would not be better, but worse than suspicionless testing." Acton, 1995 WL 373274, at *8. In Acton, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a school district's practice of conducting random, suspicionless urine testing of school athletes for drug use. The Court rejected the proposition that the school district could "conduct such testing only if school officials had suspicion that a specific athlete was using drugs, holding that this alternative 'entails substantial difficulties -- if it is indeed practicable at all." Id. Accusatory drug testing would "transform[] the process into a badge of shame" and would increase the risk that school officials would impose testing arbitrarily upon disfavored, but not drug-using, students. Id.

Except in certain narrowly limited cases, the Court repeatedly has stated its "insist[ence] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution." Chambers v. Moreny, 399 U.S. 42, 51 ('70). Because "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value in our society," searches that invade bodily integrity cannot be executed as mere fishing expeditions to acquire useful evidence: "The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 769-70.

Only when law enforcement faces an exigent circumstance, such as a need to preserve evanescent blood alcohol evidence, and has probable cause to link the sought-after information to a crime under investigation is it constitutional to conduct nonconsensual blood testing without a warrant. Id. at 770-71. Therefore, forced extraction of blood not only 'implicates the Fourth Amendment,' as the majority notes, but also falls squarely within the area of privacy interests for which the traditional probable cause requirement determines reasonableness in the law enforcement context. Forced blood extraction intrudes on the private personal sphere and infringes upon an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.' Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 60 ('85).

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 69 ('66). The Schmerber Court posed two questions:

In answering the first question, the Court recognized that it was 'writ[ing] on a clean slate' regarding the treatment of searches that involve intrusions into the human body. Id. at 767-8. It concluded that such searches require probable cause. Id. at 770-1.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 ('85), recognized that Schmerber's threshold standard was a requirement of probable cause "where intrusions into the human body are concerned," which implicate "deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Id. at 761, 760. The Winston Court then acknowledged "other factors'' [b]eyond these standards that must be considered in determining whether a particular intrusion is reasonable. For instance, whether "the procedure threatens the safety or health of the individual" and "the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests." Id. at 761 (emphasis added).

In regard to the additional 'dignitary' factor (beyond the threshold inquiry of invasion of bodily integrity), the Winston Court noted Schmerber's recognition that blood extraction is not 'an unduly extensive imposition.' Id. at 762. The Court contrasted this lesser bodily invasion, which the Schmerber Court had upheld upon demonstration of probable cause, with the more drastic measure of dangerous surgery to recoup criminal evidence, which the Winston Court concluded would violate the individual's Fourth Amendment rights even when supported by probable cause.

Thus again, the context of the quotation demonstrates that the Court places blood extraction squarely within the probable cause requirement because it is an invasion of bodily integrity, while at the same time acknowledging that it is a less extensive imposition on dignitary interests than surgical removal of a bullet.

The unique situation in which the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches in the traditional law enforcement context includes the practice of stopping motorists at sobriety checkpoints. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 ('90). The Sitz Court relied on well-settled law that motorists have a lessened expectation of privacy regarding stops and visual searches of automobiles on the nation's roadways. Id. at 450 (explaining the importance of the context of 'police stops of motorists on public highways'). At these sobriety checkpoints, which motorists may choose to avoid, only the initial brief stop and preliminary questioning may take place without individualized suspicion: "more extensive field sobriety testing" requires justification. Id. at 450-2.

Like the highway sobriety checkpoints, the 'special needs beyond normal law enforcement' rationale supports searches on lesser grounds than probable cause only in a very few, carefully tailored regulatory contexts that do not involve apprehension of criminal perpetrators. See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 65-66 ('89) (applying the special needs exception to suspicionless quasi-consensual drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction).

The special needs exception covers testing which "is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement [because] . . . results may not be used in criminal prosecution." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (emphases added). Even so, a search in the special needs context almost always requires individualized suspicion. See the following cases:

Nonetheless, routine searches that intrude into prisoners' bodies without probable cause may be upheld only when the search is undertaken pursuant to a valid prison regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. For instance:

Individuals have a categorically different and lesser expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, visual images, or voice prints.

The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what 'a person knowingly exposes to the public'. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.

Blanket searches are unreasonable, however "even-handed" they may be, in the traditional criminal law enforcement context. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-2, 92 n.4 ('79) (invalidating a blanket pat-down search of all patrons in a tavern, even though there was probable cause to search the bartender and the premises). The ill that the Fourth Amendment prevents is not merely the arbitrariness of police discretion to single out individuals for attention, but also the unwarranted domination and control of the citizenry through fear of baseless but "even-handed" general police searches.

In Zurcher, the Supreme Court held that a search of the offices of a university newspaper, which was not involved in any criminal activity, for photographs of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers did not offend the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded: "[T]he Amendment has not been a barrier to warrants to search property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily ('78) 436 U.S. 547, 549-50.

Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." The essence of that protection is a prohibition against some modes of law enforcement because the cost of police intrusion into personal liberty is too high, even though the intrusion undoubtedly would result in an enormous boon to the public if the efficient apprehension of criminals were the sole criterion to be considered. "The easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution allows them to take." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, dissenting).

A permanent resident alien is entitled to constitutional protection. For example:

Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 824, 826-28 (9th Cir.'87) (analyzing whether seizures of three resident aliens complied with Fourth Amendment).

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Fourth Amendment: Everything You Need to Know

Supreme Court takes on major Fourth Amendment case …

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Were they filtered by labels or sizing?")},h.videoAdapters = [],h.registerBidAdapter = function(e, t) {var n = (2 n

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by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book http://www.johnwesleyhall.com

2003-18,online since Feb. 24, 2003

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Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links

Latest Slip Opinions: U.S. Supreme Court (Home) Federal Appellate Courts Opinions First Circuit Second Circuit Third Circuit Fourth Circuit Fifth Circuit Sixth Circuit Seventh Circuit Eighth Circuit Ninth Circuit Tenth Circuit EleventhCircuit D.C. CircuitFederal CircuitForeign Intell.Surv.Ct.FDsys, many district courts, other federal courtsMilitary Courts: C.A.A.F., Army, AF, N-M, CG, SF State courts (and some USDC opinions)

Google Scholar Advanced Google Scholar Google search tips LexisWeb LII State Appellate Courts LexisONE free caselaw Findlaw Free Opinions To search Search and Seizure on Lexis.com $

Research Links: Supreme Court: SCOTUSBlog S. Ct. Docket Solicitor General's site SCOTUSreport Briefs online (but no amicus briefs) Oyez Project (NWU) "On the Docket"Medill S.Ct. Monitor: Law.com S.Ct. Com't'ry: Law.com

General (many free): LexisWeb Google Scholar | Google LexisOne Legal Website Directory Crimelynx Lexis.com $ Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $ Findlaw.com Findlaw.com (4th Amd) Westlaw.com $ F.R.Crim.P. 41 http://www.fd.org Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Resources FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (2008) (pdf) DEA Agents Manual (2002) (download) DOJ Computer Search Manual (2009) (pdf)Stringrays (ACLU No. Cal.) (pdf)

Congressional Research Service: --Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012) ACLU on privacy Privacy FoundationElectronic Frontier Foundation NACDLs Domestic Drone Information Center Electronic Privacy Information Center Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.) Section 1983 Blog

"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." Me

I am still learning.Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government." Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has notto put it mildlyrun smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up." Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!---Pep Le Pew

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Fourth Amendment | The IT Law Wiki | FANDOM powered by Wikia

Overview Edit

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that:

"The . . . constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, has its source in that principle of the common law which finds expression in the maxim that 'every man's house is his castle.' English history discloses [that the] . . . constitutional provisions . . . had their origin 'in the . . . unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents into the houses . . . of individuals . . . .'"[1]

This right had a long history in English common law. Sometimes colloquially expressed as a mans house is his castle, it meant that one had a right to expect that ones home, possessions, and person were safe against arbitrary and forceful intrusion by the Kings agents. At the same time, it recognized that the lawful agents of the state can intrude on private property to execute or enforce the law, so long as they obey certain procedural rules that protect the subject of the search.

This protection was understood in 1787 to limit and regulate physical trespass, and the seizing of papers, effects, or "things." However, it gradually came to be seen as a protection of something more.[2] "[T]he principal object of the Fourth Amendment," the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "is the protection of privacy rather than property.[3] In addition, "the Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply 'areas' against unreasonable searches and seizures."[4] Thus, in its seminal decision in Katz v. United States,[5] the Court held that police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search using a listening and recording device placed on the outside of a public phone booth to eavesdrop on the conversation of a suspect who had "'justifiably relied' upon . . . [the privacy of the] telephone booth."[6] The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects both a person and that persons expectation of privacy from warrantless searches or seizures in places which are justifiably believed to be private.

The Amendment's operative text can be divided into two clauses. The first clause forbids the government from conducting any search or seizure that is "unreasonable." The second clause prohibits the government from issuing a warrant unless it is obtained based "upon probable cause," is "supported by Oath," and contains particularized descriptions of the "place to be searched" and what is "to be seized." Although "[t]here is nothing in the amendments text to suggest that a warrant is required to make a search or seizure reasonable,"[7] the U.S. Supreme Court has long since read these two clauses together, generally holding that a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively (if not per se) unreasonable.[8]

The critical triggering phrase of the fourth amendment is searches and seizures. If there is no search or seizure, then official behavior is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, and it need not be reasonable, based on probable cause, or carried out pursuant to a warrant. Although there may be statutory protections that require certain conduct, an individual does not have fourth amendment protections unless there is a search and seizure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has said that a search occurs where the Government infringes upon a persons reasonable expectation of privacy, consisting of both an actual, subjective expectation of privacy as well as an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, which requires both that an individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched object and that society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.[9] Thus, the Fourth Amendment ultimately limits the governments ability to conduct a range of activities, such as physical searches of homes or offices and listening to phone conversations. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant (unless a recognized warrant exception applies) before conducting a search.[10]

A seizure of a person occurs when a government official makes an individual reasonably believe that he or she is not at liberty to ignore the governments presence in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The secondary triggering phrase of the fourth amendment is unreasonable. Even if official conduct is regarded as a search or seizure, there is no invasion of fourth amendment protections if the conduct is reasonable. Determination of reasonableness depends on the judicial balancing of the individual interest, generally regarded as a privacy interest, against the governmental interest, including law and order, national security, internal security, and the proper administration of the laws. Reasonableness generally entails a predicate of probable cause and, with many exceptions, the issuance of a warrant.

The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to include a presumptive warrant requirement on all searches and seizures conducted by the government, and has ruled that any violations of this standard will result in the suppression of any information derived therefrom.

Generally, the same warrant rules apply when preparing and executing a search warrant for digital evidence as in other investigations. Law enforcement should consider the following when preparing and executing a search warrant for digital evidence:

The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has also recognized situations that render the obtainment of a warrant impractical or against the publics interest, and has accordingly crafted various exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was originally applied only to tangible things, Supreme Court jurisprudence eventually expanded the contours of the Fourth Amendment to cover intangible items such as conversations. However, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to the governments collection of information for intelligence gathering and other purposes unrelated to criminal investigations is unclear.

As communications technology has advanced, the technology for intrusion into private conversations has kept pace, as have government efforts to exploit such technology for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. At the same time, the Supreme Court has expanded its interpretation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment with respect to such techniques, and Congress has legislated both to protect privacy and to enable the government to pursue its legitimate interests in enforcing the law and gathering foreign intelligence information. Yet the precise boundaries of what the Constitution allows, as well as what it requires, are not fully demarcated, and the relevant statutes are not entirely free from ambiguity.

Although the surveillance of wire or oral communications for criminal law enforcement purposes was held to be subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in 1967,[11] neither the Supreme Court nor Congress sought to regulate the use of such surveillance for national security purposes at that time. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (as originally enacted), contained an exception that stated:

Several years later, the Supreme Court invalidated warrantless electronic surveillance of domestic organizations for national security purposes, but indicated that its conclusion might differ if the electronic surveillance targeted foreign powers or their agents.[13] A lower court has since upheld the statutory scheme governing the gathering of foreign intelligence information against a Fourth Amendment challenge, despite an assumption that orders issued pursuant to the statute might not constitute warrants for Fourth Amendment purposes.[14] The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue. However, even if the warrant requirement was found not to apply to searches for foreign intelligence or national security purposes, such searches would presumably be subject to the general Fourth Amendment reasonableness test.[15]

There are several well-recognized exceptions to securing a warrant. Although the following is not an exhaustive list, the examples provide an idea of how the common exceptions apply to the search and seizure of digital evidence.

Consent. Consent is a valuable tool for an investigator. It can come from many sources, including a log-in banner, terms-of-use agreement, or company policy. Some considerations include:

Exigent circumstances. To prevent the destruction of evidence, law enforcement can seize an electronic storage device. In certain cases in which there is an immediate danger of losing data, law enforcement may perform a limited search to preserve the data in its current state. Once the exigent circumstances end, so does the exception.

Search incident to arrest. The need to protect the safety of law enforcement or to preserve evidence can justify a full search of an arrestee and a limited search of the arrest scene. This search incident to arrest can include a search of an electronic storage device, such as a cell phone or pager, held by the subject.

Inventory search. The inventory search exception is intended to protect the property of a person in custody and guard against claims of damage or loss. This exception is untested in the courts, so it is uncertain whether the inventory search exception will allow law enforcement to access digital evidence without a warrant.

Plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine may apply in some instances to the search for and seizure of digital evidence. For plain view to apply, law enforcement must legitimately be in the position to observe evidence, the incriminating character of which must be immediately apparent. Law enforcement officials should exercise caution when relying on the plain view doctrine in connection with digital media, as rules concerning the application of the doctrine vary among jurisdictions.

In contrast with its rulings on surveillance, the Supreme Court has not historically applied the protections of the Fourth Amendment to documents held by third parties. In 1976, it held that financial records in the possession of third parties could be obtained by the government without a warrant.[16] Later, it likewise held that the installation and use of a pen register a device used to capture telephone numbers dialed does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.[17] The reasoning was that individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy with regard to information held by third parties.

In response to the Supreme Courts rulings regarding the Fourth Amendments non-application to documents held by third parties, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA)[18] to constrain government authorities access to individuals financial records. Although these privacy protections are subject to a foreign intelligence exception,[19] government authorities were not authorized to compel financial institutions to secretly turn over financial records until 1986.[20] That year, the FBI was also given authority, in the form of FBI-issued national security letters, to access customer records held by telephone companies and other communications service providers in specified instances justified by a national security rationale.[21] Two additional national security letter authorities were enacted in the mid-1990s. The first provided access to credit and financial records of federal employees with security clearances.[22] The second gave the FBI access to credit agency records in order to facilitate the identification of financial institutions utilized by the target of an investigation.[23]

At its broadest, a Fourth Amendment analysis is a two-stage inquiry. First, was the action of a government officer toward a person or thing sufficiently intrusive to constitute a search or seizure?[24] Second, if a search or seizure did occur, was the intrusion reasonable in light of the circumstances? The reasonableness of a particular government action is judged by balancing the governmental interest which allegedly justifies the official intrusion against a persons legitimate expectations of privacy. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.

If a court determines that a government intrusion constitutes a search or seizure that was not reasonable in light of the relative weights of the governments interest and a persons constitutionally protected privacy interests, it will conclude that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. A violation of the Fourth Amendment may, as a general rule, result in the suppression of any information derived therefrom in a judicial proceeding.

In most circumstances, government action is implicated when a government official conducts a search. Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendments limitations do not apply to searches by private parties unless those searches are conducted at the direction of the government. Private parties who independently acquire evidence of a crime may turn it over to law enforcement.[25]

For example, if an employee discovers contraband files on a computer that is being repaired in a shop, the employees subsequent release of information to law enforcement does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In such a case, law enforcement may examine anything that the employee observed.

The Fourth Amendment applies when the searched party has an actual expectation of privacy in the place to be searched or thing to be seized, and then only if it is an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[26]

The subjective part of the test focuses attention on the means the individual employs to protect his or her privacy, e.g., closing the door of a phone booth or closing curtains. Additionally, the assumption of risk that the individual appears to take is considered in determining the individuals actual expectation of privacy. Under assumption of risk, an individual is presumed to assume the risk that another party to a conversation or activity may consent to a search. This assumption of risk prevails even if the consenting party is an informer or undercover agent.[28]

The objective part of the test looks to what society regards as a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, it requires this without specifying an objective referent. Is society todays opinion polls, longstanding norms and traditions, a reasonable person, or the knowledge that people have in common? The result of the objective part of the test is that the Court has implicitly constructed a continuum of circumstances under which society would regard an individual as having a reasonable expectation of privacy. The continuum ranges from public places (open fields, in plain view, public highway), in which there is no objective expectation of privacy except in unusual circumstances, to the inside of ones home with the windows and curtains shut and the door bolted, in which there is an objective expectation of privacy. The objective expectation of privacy along the continuum (shopping centers, motels, offices, automobiles, and yards) depends on judicial interpretation. The Court has modified the objective element, referring to it as a legitimate expectation of privacy."

Some courts treat a computer as a closed container for Fourth Amendment purposes. In some jurisdictions, looking at a computers subdirectories and files is akin to opening a closed container.

The second important component of Katz v. United States is the holding that the fourth amendment protects people, not places. The question of what protection the fourth amendment offers people remains unanswered, and defining the scope of such protection still necessitates reference to places. Moreover, the distinction between people and places has raised the question of whether the fourth amendment still protects property interests, or whether it now protects only more personal interests. The issue of the protection afforded people as distinct from that afforded places has become more significant with the growth of third-party recordkeepers, e.g., banks. The thrust of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Katz seemed to represent an expansion, not a replacement, of the existing fourth amendment protections:

It has been argued that, based on Katz, analysis of privacy interests should replace the more traditional property analysis when the Government uses nonphysical methods of search and where relevant privacy interests do not have physical characteristics. The property aspect is viewed as still important because it gives specificity and concreteness to fourth amendment analysis. Yet, in some rulings the U.S. Supreme Court has treated privacy as the only interest protected by the fourth amendment.

This implies a further narrowing of fourth amendment protection, both because property interests are not considered and because of the problems of defining privacy. In evaluating the appropriateness of the use of electronic surveillance technologies by Government officials, the courts have worked within the framework established by Katz. By analogy to traditional surveillance devices, the courts have attempted to determine whether or not individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This becomes more difficult as surveillance devices become more technologically sophisticated because the analogy is often more remote and hence less convincing. The courts have generally continued to consider the place in which a surveillance device is located or the place that a device is monitoring. The courts generally have adopted the more expansive interpretation of Katz and have not abandoned higher levels of protection for certain places, e.g., homes and yards.

Yet, the Katz framework has not offered the courts sufficient policy guidance to deal with the range and uses of new surveillance technologies. "Reasonable expectation of privacy" is an inherently nebulous phrase and, despite decades of judicial application, predicting its meaning in a new context is difficult. Determining whether a place is sufficiently private to offer protection against official surveillance is more and more difficult as the public sphere of activities encroaches on what was once deemed private.

The Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision protects a right of privacy by requiring warrants before government may invade one's internal space or by requiring that warrantless invasions be reasonable. However, "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy. That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."[30]

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4th Amendment Supreme Court Cases – Know My Rights

Stop and FriskTerry v. Ohio [392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1968, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]

A police officer witnessed three men pacing in front of a jewelry store and suspected that a robbery was being planned. He approached the men and identified himself, then performed frisks of defendants Chilton and Terry and discovered illegal concealed weapons. Defendants were convicted and appealed, claiming that the frisk violated their Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that when a law enforcement officer has "reasonable grounds" for suspecting that a criminal suspect may be armed, he may pat down the outer layer of the suspect's clothing for weapons. The ruling held that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a pat down is performed based on reasonable suspicion for the purpose of ensuring officer safety.

The Court's ruling in Terry v. Ohio has been understood to validate the practice of frisking (or patting down) suspects for weapons under diverse circumstances. Generally, law enforcement officers will perform frisks at their discretion, regardless of the "reasonable suspicion" standard established by the ruling in Terry. Thus, it is not uncommon for frisks to be conducted for investigatory purposes where no actual evidence of a threat to officer safety exists.

Due to the prevalence of police frisks, it is important for citizens to understand the rationale behind police authority to pat down suspects and the limitations the Court has placed on that authority:

For more on this, check out our podcast on police pat downs and the 'plain feel' doctrine.

Defendant Bostick boarded a bus from Miami to Atlanta. At a stopover in Ft. Lauderdale, the bus was boarded by two uniformed narcotics officers who were performing a routine inspection of the bus. Without reasonable suspicion, the officers approached Bostick in his seat and requested to see his ticket and identification. Finding nothing out of the ordinary, the officers proceeded to request consent to search his luggage. Bostick reportedly consented, at which point the officers performed a search and discovered cocaine. Bostick was subsequently convicted, and appealed claiming that due to his apparent inability to leave the bus, the encounter constituted an unlawful seizure, the evidence obtained must be suppressed. The Supreme Court upheld Bostick's conviction, finding that the practice of contacting citizens on buses in this fashion did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court's ruling rejected Bostick's claim that because the officers were armed and positioned such that he could not leave his seat or the bus, the encounter was a seizure. Since it was never directly communicated to the defendant that he was not free to leave, the Court concluded that the police officers' actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. So long as nature of the officers' contact with the defendant is held constitutionally valid, his consent to be searched and the evidence that resulted are held valid as well.

Florida v. Bostick is a clear example of law enforcement officers' systematic reliance on the tendency of citizens to overestimate police authority. Moreover, the Supreme Court's ruling in this case indicates a willingness to accommodate manipulative law enforcement practices in order to prevent the Constitution's provisions from interfering with the arrest of drug suspects. So long as the police and the courts cooperate in using the ignorance of suspects as a tool through which to obtain convictions, it is extremely important for all citizens to know their rights.

In the context of investigatory stops and detentions, here are a few important principles that should be remembered:

For more on this, check out our podcast on the 3 levels of police-citizen encounters.

An investigatory stop is a particularly difficult encounter for the citizen because police officers are experienced at controlling the situation. It is important to note, however, that it is actually the citizen who controls all police encounters unless and until there exists such evidence to justify police intrusion into the citizen's privacy or freedom of movement.

Remember that your refusal to be searched cannot be legally interpreted as evidence that you may be involved in a crime. Police cannot detain you merely because you refused consent to a search.

Officer James Rand stopped a car with six occupants and received consent from the driver to search the vehicle. It was determined that the officer did not pressure the driver into consenting. In the back seat he found three checks which had been stolen from a car wash. Defendant Robert Bustamonte challenged his arrest, arguing that while he had consented voluntarily, he had not been informed of his right not to consent to the search.

In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court ruled that consent is valid as long as it is voluntarily given. The ruling held that police may not use threats or coercion to obtain consent, but that they need not inform suspects of their right not to consent to a search. In reaching this decision, the Court overturned the more strict "waiver test", which required that suspects be fully informed of their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures before they can give valid consent.

As demonstrated by the Court in the Schneckloth ruling, the police are under no obligation to inform citizens of their Fourth Amendment rights when requesting to perform a search. This means that it is up to the individual to understand and exercise their right not to be searched. Some states require that police obtain the citizen's signature on a waiver form before conducting the search, however, in most places, police merely need to obtain the citizen's permission verbally. This can be a tricky situation because police will sometimes interpret a broad range of statements or actions as implied consent. Here's what you should remember about police search requests:

Cooperating with someone who is trying to arrest you just might get you arrested!

Police officers forcibly entered Mapp's home in search of a bombing suspect. In the course of the search, officers failed to produce a valid search warrant and denied Mapp contact with her attorney, who was present at the scene. While the suspect was not found, officers did discover illegal pornography in Mapp's home, for which she was charged and convicted. Mapp appealed her conviction claiming that the evidence against her should not be admissible in court because it was illegally obtained.

In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in State courts. The Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures could not be properly enforced as long as illegally obtained evidence continued to be presented in court. The ruling argued that there was no other effective means of deterring widespread Fourth Amendment violations by police. The ruling acknowledged that sometimes a criminal could go free due to improper police conduct, but argued that the interest in promoting professionalism among police outweighed this concern.

The policy established in Mapp v. Ohio is known as the "exclusionary rule". This rule holds that if police violate your constitutional rights in order to obtain evidence, they cannot use that evidence against you. If you have been charged with a crime and you feel that the evidence was illegally obtained, your lawyer can make a "motion to suppress" that evidence. The judge will then consider the manner in which the evidence was obtained and make a decision as to whether or not it can be presented during the trial. In many instances, the evidence is central to the prosecution's case, and if the judge grants a motion to suppress, it is not uncommon for all charges to be dropped.

The exclusionary rule is a critical remedy against improper searches, and can be used as an effective protection by citizens who know their rights. The reality is that police officers on the street consider it their primary duty to identify and arrest criminals, and often consider the procedural guidelines which restrict their authority as a secondary concern or even a hindrance. In this context, it is understandable that police sometimes perform searches when they shouldn't. Here's what you should know about illegally seized evidence:

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Herring v. United States further weakened the exclusionary rule by expanding the so-called "good faith" exception. Listen to our podcast on this, "Herring v. U.S. (and why it sucks!)".

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4th Amendment Supreme Court Cases - Know My Rights

Twenty-fourth Amendment | United States Constitution …

Twenty-fourth Amendment, amendment (1964) to the Constitution of the United States that prohibited the federal and state governments from imposing poll taxes before a citizen can participate in a federal election. It was proposed by the U.S. Congress on August 27, 1962, and was ratified by the states on January 23, 1964.

In 1870, following the American Civil War, the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote to former slaves, was adopted. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was adopted as a response to policies adopted in various Southern states after the ending of post-Civil War Reconstruction (186577) to limit the political participation of African Americans. Such policies were bolstered by the 1937 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, which upheld a Georgia poll tax. The Supreme Court reasoned that voting rights are conferred by the states and that the states may determine voter eligibility as they see fit, save for conflicts with the Fifteenth Amendment (respecting race) and the Nineteenth Amendment (respecting sex). It further ruled that a tax on voting did not amount to a violation of privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, because the tax applied to all votersrather than just certain classes of votersit did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

During the civil rights era of the 1950s, particularly following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, such policies increasingly were seen as barriers to voting rights, particularly for African Americans and the poor. Thus, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed (by Sen. Spessard Lindsey Holland of Florida) and ratified to eliminate an economic instrument that was used to limit voter participation. Two years after its ratification in 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court, invoking the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection clause, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, extended the prohibition of poll taxes to state elections.

The full text of the amendment is:

Section 1The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section 2The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

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Twenty-fourth Amendment | United States Constitution ...

Fourth Amendment – Official Site

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by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book http://www.johnwesleyhall.com

2003-18,online since Feb. 24, 2003

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Fourth Amendment cases, citations, and links

Latest Slip Opinions: U.S. Supreme Court (Home) Federal Appellate Courts Opinions First Circuit Second Circuit Third Circuit Fourth Circuit Fifth Circuit Sixth Circuit Seventh Circuit Eighth Circuit Ninth Circuit Tenth Circuit EleventhCircuit D.C. CircuitFederal CircuitForeign Intell.Surv.Ct.FDsys, many district courts, other federal courtsMilitary Courts: C.A.A.F., Army, AF, N-M, CG, SF State courts (and some USDC opinions)

Google Scholar Advanced Google Scholar Google search tips LexisWeb LII State Appellate Courts LexisONE free caselaw Findlaw Free Opinions To search Search and Seizure on Lexis.com $

Research Links: Supreme Court: SCOTUSBlog S. Ct. Docket Solicitor General's site SCOTUSreport Briefs online (but no amicus briefs) Oyez Project (NWU) "On the Docket"Medill S.Ct. Monitor: Law.com S.Ct. Com't'ry: Law.com

General (many free): LexisWeb Google Scholar | Google LexisOne Legal Website Directory Crimelynx Lexis.com $ Lexis.com (criminal law/ 4th Amd) $ Findlaw.com Findlaw.com (4th Amd) Westlaw.com $ F.R.Crim.P. 41 http://www.fd.org Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Resources FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (2008) (pdf) DEA Agents Manual (2002) (download) DOJ Computer Search Manual (2009) (pdf)Stringrays (ACLU No. Cal.) (pdf)

Congressional Research Service: --Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2012) --Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (2012) --Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions (2012) ACLU on privacy Privacy FoundationElectronic Frontier Foundation NACDLs Domestic Drone Information Center Electronic Privacy Information Center Criminal Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.) Section 1983 Blog

"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." Me

I am still learning.Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).

"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government." Shemaya, in the Thalmud

"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).

"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).

"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)

"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)

"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has notto put it mildlyrun smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)

"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)

Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Governments purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

Libertythe freedom from unwarranted intrusion by governmentis as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark. United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)

"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." Mick Jagger & Keith Richards

"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for meand by that time there was nobody left to speak up." Martin Niemller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]

You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!---Pep Le Pew

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Fourth Amendment - Official Site

Judge Kavanaugh on the Fourth Amendment – SCOTUSblog

Orin S. Kerr is the Frances R. and John J. Duggan Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

Judge Brett Kavanaughs views of the Fourth Amendment have drawn significant interest following his recent nomination to the Supreme Court. This post takes a close look at Kavanaughs key Fourth Amendment opinions. It does so with an eye to guessing how he might rule in search and seizure cases if he is confirmed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has a large Fourth Amendment docket. How might a Justice Kavanaugh approach those cases?

My analysis is tentative for two reasons. The first is probably obvious. Circuit judges are supposed to follow Supreme Court and circuit precedent, while Supreme Court justices have much more room to roam. Given that, translation is hard. You never know how much of a circuit judges rulings simply reflect a lower court judges commitment to stare decisis.

A second reason for caution is that Kavanaughs Fourth Amendment record is modest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit doesnt get many search and seizure cases. A Westlaw search revealed around 35 cases in the subject area in which Kavanaugh sat on the panel or considered a rehearing petition en banc. Most of those were unanimous and pretty easy. I found only five Fourth Amendment decisions, and one recent speech, that I think might reveal something significant about his approach.

With those two important caveats, heres my overall sense of things. In tough Fourth Amendment cases that divide the Supreme Court, a Justice Kavanaugh would likely be on the governments side. He is wary of novel theories that would expand Fourth Amendment protection. And he often sees the Fourth Amendments requirement of reasonableness as giving the government significant latitude. If we had to associate Kavanaugh with a familiar justice, the limited evidence suggests that his approach in Fourth Amendment cases is probably somewhere in the ballpark of Justice Anthony Kennedy or Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Ill now run through the five key cases, and Kavanaughs recent speech, to explain why I think thats the case.

1. The balancing cases: Askew and Vilsack

The first two cases to consider involve balancing of government and privacy interests. In both cases, the majority held that the government practice violated the Fourth Amendment. Kavanaugh dissented, largely on the ground that he would have balanced the interests differently and therefore would have ruled for the government. In a close case that requires balancing of interests, the cases suggest, Kavanaugh is more likely to approach the case from the governments perspective than from the individuals perspective.

The first case is United States v. Askew, a stop-and-frisk case. The police stopped the suspect based on suspicion that he had just committed an armed robbery. After an initial frisk for weapons came up empty, an officer unzipped the suspects outer jacket to see if his clothing matched eyewitness descriptions of what the robber was wearing. It turned out the initial frisk had been poorly done: Unzipping the jacket revealed a gun in Askews waist pouch. Remarkably, the D.C. Circuit went en banc and divided sharply over whether the outer-jacket unzipping was allowed. As I joked at the time, the D.C. Circuits 85 pages of serious constitutional analysis, spread over three opinions, was the latest in zipper jurisprudence.

Askew is factually messy and a bit hard to summarize, but the most significant legal issue was whether the Fourth Amendment permits the police to move a suspects clothing to facilitate an eyewitness identification during a stop that is otherwise valid under the Supreme Courts 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio. There was no obvious answer from Supreme Court caselaw. The en banc D.C. Circuit did not reach a majority view on the issue, although five of its 11 judges, Judges Harry Edwards, Judith Rogers, David Tatel, Janice Brown and Thomas Griffith, argued that identification searches were not permitted. Kavanaugh wrote a 32-page dissent, joined by then-Chief Judge David Sentelle and Judges Karen Henderson and Raymond Randolph, that argued that the unzipping to help identification should be allowed. In his view, the reasonableness framework that applies to Terry stops generally also permits reasonable identification procedures.

The most interesting passage in the dissent is probably Kavanaughs policy argument. Prohibiting the police during Terry stops from conducting identification procedures that constitute searches, he argued, would lead to absurd and dangerous results. For example, imagine that the police detained a suspect in a rape case and the victim claimed that the suspect had a distinctive tattoo on his forearm. If the police detained the suspect on reasonable suspicion of having committed the crime, Kavanaugh argued, the police should be allowed to pull up the suspects sleeve to see if he has the tattoo the victim claims. Not allowing limited moving of clothing to identify suspects would hamstring the police and prevent them from performing reasonable identification procedures that could solve serious crimes and protect the community from violent criminals at large.

You can see a similar focus on public safety in National Federation of Federal Employees v. Vilsack, a case about whether the Fourth Amendment permitted random drug testing for Forest Service Job Corps Center employees. The employees ran a residential job corps program at public schools for at-risk students aged 16 to 24. Under the Supreme Courts caselaw, resolving the constitutionality of the program required weighing the non-law-enforcement public-safety interest advanced by the drug testing against the degree of privacy invasion it caused. Rogers, joined by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, held that the program violated the Fourth Amendment under this test because it was a solution in search of a problem. There was insufficient evidence that a drug problem existed among the staff to justify testing, they reasoned. In addition, testing every employee was too broad because different employees served in different capacities.

Kavanaugh dissented. In his view, the drug-testing program was clearly reasonable. Indeed, he wrote, it would seem negligent not to test the employees for drugs. Many of the at-risk students had a history of drug problems. To maintain discipline, Kavanaugh argued, it was important that employees who ran the program were drug-free themselves and were not potential sources of illegal drugs for the students. As a result, the government had a strong and indeed compelling interest in maintaining a drug-free workforce at these specialized residential schools for at-risk youth. On the flip side, the privacy invasion was modest. The testing only required providing a urine sample, and it only revealed the presence of certain illegal drugs.

2. The flagging-for-SCOTUS cases: Wesby and Maynard

The next two cases show Kavanaugh writing on the Fourth Amendment in dissents from denial of rehearing en banc. In both cases, the original panel reached a surprising holding that the government had violated the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, Kavanaugh dissented from the full circuits refusal to review the outlier panel opinion. And in both cases, the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and handed down a majority opinion that largely echoed Kavanaughs reasoning. I think of these cases as the flagging for SCOTUS cases because its possible that Kavanaughs dissents were written to flag the cases for the justices. And whether or not Kavanaugh intended it, his dissents appear to have done just that.

The first case is along these lines is Wesby v. District of Columbia, which involved trespass arrests at a loud party held in a vacant house. When the police arrived, and the people in the house had trouble identifying whose house it was, the police arrested everyone for trespass. The group sued the officers under the Fourth Amendment. In an opinion by Judge Cornelia Pillard, the D.C. Circuit somewhat remarkably held that the arrests violated the Fourth Amendment and that qualified immunity did not apply. Kavanaugh penned a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc that was joined by Henderson, Brown and Griffith.

Although Kavanaughs dissent mentioned the Fourth Amendment merits in passing, it focused primarily on qualified immunity. In Kavanaughs view, qualified immunity plainly barred the suit. Both the facts and the law created lots of room for a reasonable officer to believe the arrests were based on probable cause. To be sure, he added, I do not dismiss the irritation and anguish, as well as the reputational and economic harm, that can come from being arrested. Police officers should never lightly take that step, and the courts should not hesitate to impose liability when officers act unreasonably in light of clearly established law. But that is not what happened here, not by a long shot. The Supreme Court granted cert and reversed unanimously, ruling that probable cause existed (a view held by seven justices) and holding that in any event qualified immunity applied much as Kavanaugh had argued (a position taken by all nine justices).

A roughly similar dynamic occurred with Kavanaughs dissent from denial of rehearing in United States v. Maynard, later reviewed by the Supreme Court under the name United States v. Jones. Investigators placed a GPS device on the suspects car and tracked its location for 28 days. In an astonishing opinion for the D.C. Circuit, Ginsburg created the mosaic theory by which the monitoring was not a search at first but over time became a search because the government collected a search-like amount of information. The en banc D.C. Circuit denied the petition for rehearing 5-4. Kavanaugh joined Sentelles dissent from denial of rehearing, which argued that the panel opinion was inconsistent with Supreme Court and other circuits precedents and deserved en banc review.

The most interesting part of Kavanaughs approach to Maynard is that he wrote a brief separate dissent that flagged an alternative ground for ruling that a search occurred. Maybe it was the installation of the GPS that was a search, Kavanaugh suggested, rather than its use. Fourth Amendment caselaw before Katz v. United States had held that physical intrusion onto property was a search. If that caselaw was still valid and I see no indication that it is not, Kavanaugh added then installing the GPS device could be a search because it was an unauthorized physical encroachment on to the property of the suspects car. I do not yet know whether I agree with that conclusion, Kavanaugh wrote, but it is an important and close question deserving en banc review. When the government petitioned for certiorari, the lawyers for the defense added Kavanaughs theory as a second question presented in their brief in opposition.

The Supreme Court took up Kavanaughs suggestion. The justices granted certiorari under the name United States v. Jones on the Fourth Amendment implications of both installing the GPS device and its use. The majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia essentially adopted Kavanaughs approach. Installing a GPS was deemed a search because the installation trespassed on to the car. Jones sharply changed Fourth Amendment blackletter law by recognizing two different ways of establishing a search: the Katz test and the pre-Katz trespass test that Kavanaugh had proposed. To be sure, Kavanaughs view didnt come from nowhere. There had been something of a split on the question, and I agreed at the time that this should be the big question. But Kavanaugh was the one who best articulated the theory and teed it up for the justices.

3. The Section 215 opinion in Klayman

The last Kavanaugh opinion to consider is the one that has drawn the most attention. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Richard Leon had ruled for the district court that the National Security Agencys Section 215 call-records program violated the Fourth Amendment. Under the program, the NSA was getting the numbers dialed (but not the contents) for millions of Americans phone calls. Leon ruled that the program was unconstitutional but then stayed any remedy while the appeal was pending. The D.C. Circuit sent the case back to the district court on procedural grounds. With the Section 215 program about to expire, Leon quickly handed down a new decision that the program was unlawful and refused to grant a stay. The next day, the D.C. Circuit issued an administrative stay; plaintiff Larry Klayman then sought an emergency petition for rehearing en banc, which the full court denied.

Kavanaugh filed a two-page solo concurrence in the denial of rehearing. In his view, the Section 215 program was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. That was true for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court had held that collecting telephony metadata was not a search in Smith v. Maryland. Smith settled the Section 215 question, in Kavanaughs view: That precedent remains binding on lower courts in our hierarchical system of absolute vertical stare decisis. Second, even if a future court adopted a different a view of what is a search, the Section 215 program was still reasonable under the balancing of interests of the special needs exception (see the discussion of Vilsack above). [T]elephony metadata serves a critically important special need preventing terrorist attacks on the United States, Kavanaugh wrote, citing the 2004 9/11 Commission Report. [T]hat critical national security need outweighs the impact on privacy occasioned by this program.

What to make of Kavanaughs Klayman concurrence? On one hand, his view that the program satisfied the Fourth Amendment under Smith was doctrinally correct, in my view, at least before Carpenter v. United States last month. Its surprising that Kavanaugh didnt develop the Smith argument more. He gave the whole point only two sentences. But the argument was sound, and it matched what several district courts had said at that point (one example being the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California in 2013 in United States v. Moalin).

On the other hand, Im less persuaded by Kavanaughs argument that Section 215 would fit the special-needs exception if call-records collection is a search. I would think the question is how much the program actually advances the interest in preventing terrorist attacks, not just the importance of its goal in the abstract. But note the echo of Kavanaughs Vilsack dissent. In both cases, Kavanaugh applied the special-needs exception in ways that construed the government interests as very weighty and the privacy interests as comparatively light.

4. Like Rehnquist, or perhaps like Kennedy?

A final data point for Kavanaughs Fourth Amendment views is his recent speech on Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Kavanaugh celebrates Rehnquist as Kavanaughs first judicial hero. As a law student, [i]n class after class, Kavanaugh found that he stood with Rehnquist. Kavanaugh is quick to say that he doesnt agree with every Rehnquist opinion. But in the course of a rather glowing overview of Rehnquists impact as a justice one that Kavanaugh describes as a labor of love to deliver Kavanaugh describes how Rehnquist led the charge in rebalancing Fourth Amendment law after the Warren Courts criminal-procedure revolution had expanded the rights of criminal defendants.

Kavanaugh mentions three areas in particular. First, Rehnquist wrote opinions making the probable cause standard more flexible and commonsensical. Second, Rehnquist wrote decisions expanding the category of special needs searches, which is a particularly interesting reference in light of Kavanaughs separate opinions in Vilsack and Klayman. Finally, Rehnquist opposed the exclusionary rule as a judge-created rule that was beyond the four corners of the Fourth Amendments text and imposed tremendous costs on society. Although Rehnquist did not succeed in having the exclusionary rule overturned, he dramatically changed the law of the exclusionary rule over time through the good-faith exception and other doctrines.

One takeaway from Kavanaughs speech is that his Fourth Amendment views probably arent too far from Rehnquists. Rehnquist was a pretty reliable voice for law enforcement interests in Fourth Amendment cases. The affinity may be revealing.

With that said, its also worth noting that Rehnquists views in Fourth Amendment cases also werent too far from that of Kennedy, the justice for whom Kavanaugh clerked and whose place Kavanaugh has been nominated to fill. Like Rehnquist, Kennedy tended to take a law-enforcement-oriented view in Fourth Amendment cases. You might say that Kennedys views of the Fourth Amendment were Rehnquist-like but without the broader agenda of rebalancing the rules after the Warren court.

If so, perhaps Kavanaughs views are better described as Kennedy-esque than Rehnquist-like. Like Kennedy, Kavanaugh seems to take government interests very seriously. At the same time, Kavanaughs opinions dont seem to reflect a broader agenda. Recall Kavanaughs Maynard concurrence in particular. Although Kavanaugh was unpersuaded by the panel opinions novel theory, he wrote separately to provide an alternative basis for concluding that the GPS installation was a search.

Posted in Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence, Featured

Recommended Citation: Orin Kerr, Judge Kavanaugh on the Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSblog (Jul. 20, 2018, 6:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/judge-kavanaugh-on-the-fourth-amendment/

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Judge Kavanaugh on the Fourth Amendment - SCOTUSblog

A New Backdoor Around the Fourth Amendment: The CLOUD Act …

Theres a new, proposed backdoor to our data, which would bypass our Fourth Amendment protections to communications privacy. It is built into a dangerous bill called the CLOUD Act, which would allow police at home and abroad to seize cross-border data without following the privacy rules where the data is stored.

This backdoor is an insidious method for accessing our emails, our chat logs, our online videos and photos, and our private moments shared online between one another. This backdoor would deny us meaningful judicial review and the privacy protections embedded in our Constitution.

This new backdoor for cross-border data mirrors another backdoor under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, an invasive NSA surveillance authority for foreign intelligence gathering. That law, recently reauthorized and expanded by Congress for another six years, gives U.S. intelligence agencies, including the NSA, FBI, and CIA, the ability to search, read, and share our private electronic messages without first obtaining a warrant.

The new backdoor in the CLOUD Act operates much in the same way. U.S. police could obtain Americans data, and use it against them, without complying with the Fourth Amendment.

For this reason, and many more, EFF strongly opposes the CLOUD Act.

The CLOUD Act (S. 2383 and H.R. 4943) has two major components. First, it empowers U.S. law enforcement to grab data stored anywhere in the world, without following foreign data privacy rules. Second, it empowers the president to unilaterally enter executive agreements with any nation on earth, even known human rights abusers. Under such executive agreements, foreign law enforcement officials could grab data stored in the United States, directly from U.S. companies, without following U.S. privacy rules like the Fourth Amendment, so long as the foreign police are not targeting a U.S. person or a person in the United States.

That latter component is where the CLOUD Acts backdoor lives.

When foreign police use their power under CLOUD Act executive agreements to collect a foreign targets data from a U.S. company, they might also collect data belonging to a non-target U.S. person who happens to be communicating with the foreign target. Within the numerous, combined foreign investigations allowed under the CLOUD Act, it is highly likely that related seizures will include American communications, including email, online chat, video calls, and internet voice calls.

Under the CLOUD Acts rules for these data demands from foreign police to U.S. service providers, this collection of Americans data can happen without any prior, individualized review by a foreign or American judge. Also, it can happen without the foreign police needing to prove the high level of suspicion required by the U.S. Fourth Amendment: probable cause.

Once the foreign police have collected Americans data, they often will be able to hand it over to U.S. law enforcement, which can use it to investigate Americans, and ultimately to bring criminal charges against them in the United States.

According to the bill, foreign police can share the content of a U.S persons communications with U.S. authorities so long as it relates to significant harm, or the threat thereof,to the United States or United States persons. This nebulous standard is vague and overbroad. Also, the bills hypotheticals indicate far-ranging data sharing by foreign police with U.S. authorities. From national security to violent crime, from organized crime to financial fraud, the CLOUD Act permits it all to be shared, and likely far more.

Moreover, the CLOUD Act allows the foreign police who collect Americans communications to freely use that content against Americans, and to freely share it with additional nations.

To review: The CLOUD Act allows the president to enter an executive agreement with a foreign nation known for human rights abuses. Using its CLOUD Act powers, police from that nation inevitably will collect Americans communications. They can share the content of those communications with the U.S. government under the flawed significant harm test. The U.S. government can use that content against these Americans. A judge need not approve the data collection before it is carried out. At no point need probable cause be shown. At no point need a search warrant be obtained.

This is wrong. Much like the infamous backdoor search loophole connected to broad, unconstitutional NSA surveillance under Section 702, the backdoor proposed in the CLOUD Act violates our Fourth Amendment right to privacy by granting unconstitutional access to our private lives online.

Also, when foreign police using their CLOUD Act powers inevitably capture metadata about Americans, they can freely share it with the U.S. government, without even showing significant harm. Communications content is the words in an email or online chat, the recordings of an internet voice call, or the moving images and coordinating audio of a video call online. Communications metadata is the pieces of information that relate to a message, including when it was sent, who sent it, who received it, its duration, and where the sender was located when sending it. Metadata is enormously powerful information and should be treated with the same protection as content.

To be clear: the CLOUD Act fails to provide any limits on foreign police sharing Americans metadata with U.S. police.

The CLOUD Act would be a dangerous overreach into our data. It seeks to streamline cross-border police investigations, but it tears away critical privacy protections to attain that goal. This is not a fair trade. It is a new backdoor search loophole around the Fourth Amendment.

Tell your representative today to reject the CLOUD Act.

Take Action

Stop the CLOUD Act

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A New Backdoor Around the Fourth Amendment: The CLOUD Act ...

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution …

The Fourth Amendment (Amendment IV) to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires any search warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause. It is part of the Bill of Rights. The Fourth amendment was adopted in response to the abuse of the writ of assistance, a type of general search warrant issued by the British government. It was a major source of tension in pre-Revolutionary America. The Fourth Amendment was introduced in Congress in 1789 by James Madison, along with the other amendments in the Bill of Rights.[1] They were proposed in response to Anti-Federalist objections to the new Constitution.[2]

Congress sent 12 amendments to the states in August of 1789.[3] Of these, 10 were approved by the states. The last state, Virginia ratified the amendments (including the fourth amendment) on December 15, 1791.[3] On March 1, 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson announced the adoption of the amendment.

The Bill of Rights did initially apply to the states. Also, federal criminal investigations were less common in the first century of the nation's history. For these reasons there is little case law for the Fourth Amendment before the 20th century. The amendment was held to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961).

Under the Fourth Amendment, search and seizure (including arrest) should be limited in scope to specific information supplied to the issuing court. This is usually by a law enforcement officer who has sworn by it. Fourth Amendment case law deals with three central questions. What government activities constitute "search" and "seizure"? What constitutes probable cause for these actions? How should violations of Fourth Amendment rights be addressed? Early court decisions limited the amendment's scope to a law enforcement officer's physical intrusion onto private property. But with Katz v. United States (1967), the Supreme Court held that its protections, such as the warrant requirement, extend to the privacy of individuals as well as physical locations. Law enforcement officers need a warrant for most search and seizure activities. But the Court has defined a series of exceptions for consent searches, motor vehicle searches, evidence in plain view, exigent circumstances, border searches, and other situations.

The exclusionary rule is one way the amendment is enforced. Established in Weeks v. United States (1914), this rule holds that evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation is generally inadmissible at criminal trials. Evidence discovered as a later result of an illegal search may also be inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree," unless it inevitably would have been discovered by legal means.

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Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ...

4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Wont Protect You Anymore …

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This story first appeared on the TomDispatch website.

Heres a bit of history from another America: the Bill of Rights was designed to protect the people from their government. If the First Amendments right to speak out publicly was the peoples wall of security, then the Fourth Amendments right to privacy was its buttress. It was once thought that the government should neither be able to stop citizens from speaking nor peer into their lives. Think of that as the essence of the Constitutional era that ended when those towers came down on September 11, 2001. Consider how privacy worked before 9/11 and how it works now in Post-Constitutional America.

The Fourth Amendment

A response to British King Georges excessive invasions of privacy in colonial America, the Fourth Amendment pulls no punches: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In Post-Constitutional America, the government might as well have taken scissors to the original copy of the Constitution stored in the National Archives, then crumpled up the Fourth Amendment and tossed it in the garbage can. The NSA revelations of Edward Snowden are, in that sense, not just a shock to the conscience but to the Fourth Amendment itself: our government spies on us. All of us. Without suspicion. Without warrants. Without probable cause. Without restraint. This would qualify as unreasonable in our old constitutional world, but no more.

Here, then, are four ways that, in the name of American security and according to our government, the Fourth Amendment no longer really applies to our lives.

The Constitutional Borderline

Begin at Americas borders. Most people believe they are in the United States as soon as they step off an international flight and are thus fully covered by the Bill of Rights. The truth has, in the twenty-first century, become infinitely more complicated as long-standing practices are manipulated to serve the expanding desires of the national security state. The mining of words and concepts for new, darker meanings is a hallmark of how things work in Post-Constitutional America.

Over the years, recognizing that certain situations could render Fourth Amendment requirements impractical or against the public interest, the Supreme Court crafted various exceptions to them. One was the border search. The idea was that the United States should be able to protect itself by stopping and examining people entering the country. As a result, routine border searches without warrants are constitutionally reasonable simply by virtue of where they take place. Its a concept with a long history, enumerated by the First Congress in 1789.

Heres the twist in the present era: the definition of border has been changed. Upon arriving in the United States from abroad, you are not legally present in the country until allowed to enter by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials. You know, the guys who look into your luggage and stamp your passport. Until that moment, you exist in a legal void where the protections of the Bill of Rights and the laws of the United States do not apply. This concept also predates Post-Constitutional America and the DHS. Remember the sorting process at Ellis Island in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? No lawyers allowed there.

Those modest exceptions were all part of constitutional America. Today, once reasonable searches at the border have morphed into a vast Constitution-free zone. The border is now a strip of land circling the country and extending 100 miles inland that includes two-thirds of the US population. In this vast region, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can set up checkpoints and conduct warrantless searches. At airports, American citizens are now similarly subjected to search and seizure as filmmaker Laura Poitraswhose work focuses on national security issues in general and Edward Snowden in the particularknows firsthand. Since 2006, almost every time Poitras has returned to the US, her plane has been met by government agents and her laptop and phone examined.

There are multiple similar high-profile cases (including those of a Wikileaks researcher and a Chelsea Manning supporter), but ordinary citizens are hardly exempt. Despite standing in an American airport, a pane of glass away from loved ones, you are not in the US and have no Fourth Amendment rights. How many such airport searches are conducted in the aggregate is unknown. The best information we have comes from a FOIA request by the ACLU. It revealed that, in the 18-month period beginning in October 2008, more than 6,600 people, about half of them US citizens, were subjected to electronic device searches at the border.

Still, reminding us that its possible to have a sense of humor on the road to hell, the CBP offers this undoubtedly inadvertent pun at its website: It is not the intent of CBP to subject travelers to unwarranted scrutiny. (emphasis added)

Making It All Constitutional In-House

Heres another example of how definitions have been readjusted to serve the national security states overriding needs: the Department of Justice (DOJ) created a Post-Constitutional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that allows it to access millions of records of Americans using only subpoenas, not search warrants.

Some background: a warrant is court permission to search and seize something. As the Fourth Amendment makes clear, it must be specific: enter Thomas Andersons home and look for hacked software. Warrants can only be issued on probable cause. The Supreme Court defined probable cause as requiring a high standard of proof, or to quote its words, a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

A subpoena on the other hand is nothing more than a government order issued to a citizen or organization to do something, most typically to produce a document. Standards for issuing a subpoena are flexible, as most executive agencies can issue them on their own without interaction with a court. In such cases, there is no independent oversight.

The Department of Justice now claims that, under the Fourth Amendment, it can simply subpoena an Internet company like Facebook and demand that they look for and turn over all the records they have on our Mr. Anderson. Their explanation: the DOJ isnt doing the searching, just demanding that another organization do it. As far as its lawyers are concerned, in such a situation, no warrant is needed. In addition, the Department of Justice believes it has the authority to subpoena multiple records, maybe even all the records Facebook has. Records on you? Some group of people including you? Everyone? We dont know, as sources of data like Facebook and Google are prohibited from disclosing much about the information they hand over to the NSA or other government outfits about you.

Its easy enough to miss the gravity of this in-house interpretation when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. If the FBI today came to your home and demanded access to your emails, it would require a warrant obtained from a court after a show of probable cause to get them. If, however, the Department of Justice can simply issue a subpoena to Google to the same end, they can potentially vacuum up every Gmail message youve ever sent without a warrant and it wont constitute a search. The DOJ has continued this practice even though in 2010 a federal appeals court ruled that bulk warrantless access to email violates the Fourth Amendment. An FBI field manual released under the Freedom of Information Act similarly makes it clear that the Bureaus agents dont need warrants to access email in bulk when its pulled directly from Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, or other service providers.

How far can the use of a subpoena go in bypassing the Fourth Amendment? Recently, the inspector general of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued a subpoenano court involveddemanding that the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) turn over all information it has collected relating to abuses and mismanagement at VA medical facilities. POGO is a private, non-profit group, dedicated to assisting whistleblowers. The VA subpoena demands access to records sent via an encrypted website to POGO under a promise of anonymity, many from current or former VA employees.

Rather than seek to break the encryption surreptitiously and illegally to expose the whistleblowers, the government has taken a simpler, if unconstitutional route, by simply demanding the names and reports. POGO has refused to comply, setting up a legal confrontation. In the meantime, consider it just another sign of the direction the government is heading when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.

Technology and the Fourth Amendment

Some observers suggest that there is little new here. For example, the compiling of information on innocent Americans by J. Edgar Hoovers low-tech FBI back in the 1960s has been well documented. Paper reports on activities, recordings of conversations, and photos of meetings and trysts, all secretly obtained, exposed the lives of civil rights leaders, popular musicians, and antiwar protesters. From 1956 to at least 1971, the government also wiretapped the calls and conversations of Americans under the Bureaus counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO).

But those who look to such history of government illegality for a strange kind of nothing-new-under-the-sun reassurance have not grasped the impact of fast-developing technology. In scale, scope, and sheer efficiency, the systems now being employed inside the US by the NSA and other intelligence agencies are something quite new and historically significant. Size matters.

To avoid such encroaching digitization would essentially mean withdrawing from society, not exactly an option for most Americans. More of life is now onlinefrom banking to travel to social media. Where the NSA was once limited to traditional notions of communicationthe written and spoken wordnew possibilities for following you and intruding on your life in myriad ways are being created. The agency can, for instance, now collect images, photos, and video, and subject them to facial recognition technology that can increasingly put a name to a face. Such technology, employed today at casinos as well as in the secret world of the national security state, can pick out a face in a crowd and identify it, taking into account age, changes in facial hair, new glasses, hats, and the like.

An offshoot of facial recognition is the broader category of biometrics, the use of physical and biological traits unique to a person for identification. These can be anything from ordinary fingerprinting to cutting-edge DNA records and iris scans. (Biometrics is already big business and even has its own trade association in Washington.) One of the worlds largest known collections of biometric data is held by the Department of State. As of December 2009, its Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) contained more than 75 million photographs of Americans and foreigners and is growing at a rate of approximately 35,000 records per day. CCD also collects and stores indefinitely the fingerprints of all foreigners issued visas.

With ever more data available, the NSA and other agencies are creating ever more robust ways to store it. Such storage is cheap and bounteous, with few limits other than the availability of electricity and water to cool the electronics. Emerging tech will surely bypass many of the existing constraints to make holding more data longer even easier and cheaper. The old days of file cabinets, or later, clunky disk drives, are over in an era of mega-data storage warehouses.

The way data is aggregated is also changing fast. Where data was once kept in cabinets in separate offices, later in bureaucratically isolated, agency-by-agency digital islands, post-9/11 sharing mandates coupled with new technology have led to fusion databases. In these, information from such disparate sources as license plate readers, wiretaps, and records of library book choices can be aggregated and easily shared. Basically everything about a person, gathered worldwide by various agencies and means, can now be put into a single file.

Once you have the whole haystack, theres still the problem of how to locate the needle. For this, emerging technologies grow ever more capable of analyzing Big Data. Some simple ones are even available to the public, like IBMs Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness software (NORA). It can, for example, scan multiple databases, geolocation information, and social media friend lists and recognize relationships that may not be obvious at first glance. The software is fast and requires no human intervention. It runs 24/7/365/Forever.

Tools like NORA and its more sophisticated classified cousins are NSAs solution to one of the last hurdles to knowing nearly everything: the need for human analysts to connect the dots. Skilled analysts take time to train, are prone to human error, andgiven the quickly expanding supply of datawill always be in demand. Automated analysis also offers the NSA other advantages. Software doesnt have a conscience and it cant blow the whistle.

What does all this mean in terms of the Fourth Amendment? Its simple: the technological and human factors that constrained the gathering and processing of data in the past are fast disappearing. Prior to these advances, even the most ill-intentioned government urges to intrude on and do away with the privacy of citizens were held in check by the possible. The techno-gloves are now off and the possible is increasingly whatever an official or bureaucrat wants to do. That means violations of the Fourth Amendment are held in check only by the goodwill of the government, which might have qualified as the ultimate nightmare of those who wrote the Constitution.

On this front, however, there are signs of hope that the Supreme Court may return to its check-and-balance role of the Constitutional era. One sign, directly addressing the Fourth Amendment, is this weeks ;unanimous decision that the police cannot search the contents of a cell phone without a warrant. (The court also recently issued a ruling determining that the procedures for challenging ones inclusion on the governments no-fly list are unconstitutional, another hopeful sign.)

Prior to the cell phone decision, law enforcement held that if someone was arrested for, say, a traffic violation, the police had the right to examine the full contents of his or her cell phonecall lists, photos, social media, contacts, whatever was on the device. Police traditionally have been able to search physical objects they find on an arrestee without a warrant on the grounds that such searches are for the protection of the officers.

In its new decision, however, the court acknowledged that cell phones represent far more than a physical object. The information they hold is a portrait of someones life like whats in a closet at home or on a computer sitting on your desk. Searches of those locations almost always require a warrant.

Does this matter when talking about the NSAs technological dragnet? Maybe. While the Supreme Courts decision applies directly to street-level law enforcement, it does suggest an evolution within the court, a recognition of the way advances in technology have changed the Fourth Amendment. A cell phone is not an object anymore; it is now recognized as a portal to other information that a person has gathered in one place for convenience with, as of this decision, a reasonable expectation of privacy.

National Security Disclosures Under HIPPA

While the NSAs electronic basket of violations of the Fourth Amendment were, pre-Snowden, meant to take place in utter secrecy, heres a violation that sits in broad daylight: since 2002, my doctor can disclose my medical records to the NSA without my permission or knowledge. So can yours.

Congress passed the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) in 1996 to assure that individuals health information is properly protected. You likely signed a HIPPA agreement at your doctors office, granting access to your records. However, Congress quietly amended the HIPPA Act in 2002 to permit disclosure of those records for national security purposes. Specifically, the new version of this privacy law states: We may also disclose your PHI [Personal Health Information] to authorized federal officials as necessary for national security and intelligence activities. The text is embedded deep in your health care providers documentation. Look for it.

How does this work? We dont know. Do the NSA or other agencies have ongoing access to the medical records of all Americans? Do they have to request specific ones? Do doctors have any choice in whose records to forward under what conditions? No one knows. My HMO, after much transferring of my calls, would ultimately only refer me back to the HIPPA text with a promise that they follow the law.

The Snowden revelations are often dismissed by people who wonder what they have to hide. (Who cares if the NSA sees my cute cat videos?) Thats why health-care spying stands out. How much more invasive could it be than for your government to have unfettered access to such a potentially personal and private part of your lifesomething, by the way, that couldnt have less to do with American security or combating terrorism.

Our health-care providers, in direct confrontation with the Fourth Amendment, are now part of the metastasizing national security state. Youre right to be afraid, but for goodness sake, dont discuss your fears with your doctor.

How the Unreasonable Becomes Reasonable

At this point, when it comes to national security matters, the Fourth Amendment has by any practical definition been done away with as a part of Post-Constitutional America. Whole books have been written just about Edward Snowden and more information about government spying regularly becomes available. We dont lack for examples. Yet as the obviousness of what is being done becomes impossible to ignore and reassurances offered up by the president and others are shown to be lies, the government continues to spin the debate into false discussions about how to balance freedom versus security, to raise the specter of another 9/11 if spying is curtailed, and to fall back on that go-to nothing to hide, nothing to fear line.

In Post-Constitutional America, the old words that once defined our democracy are twisted in new ways, not discarded. Previously unreasonable searches become reasonable ones under new government interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Traditional tools of law, like subpoenas and warrants, continue to exist even as they morph into monstrous new forms.

Americans are told (and often believe) that they retain rights they no longer have. Wait for the rhetoric that goes with the celebrations of our freedoms this July 4th. You wont hear a lot about the NSA then, but you should. In pre-constitutional America the colonists knew that they were under the kings thumb. In totalitarian states of the last century like the Soviet Union, people dealt with their lack of rights and privacy with grim humor and subtle protest. However, in America, ever exceptional, citizens passively watch their rights disappear in the service of dark ends, largely without protest and often while still celebrating a land that no longer exists.

Peter Van Buren blew the whistle on State Department waste and mismanagement during the Iraqi reconstruction in his first book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. A Tom Dispatch regular, he writes about current events at his blog, We Meant Well. His new book, Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99Percent, is available now. This is the second in a three-part series on the shredding of the Bill of Rights. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch.com here.

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4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Wont Protect You Anymore ...

Violations Of The Fourth Amendment And Other Concerns About … – JD Supra (press release)

In New Jersey, yet another bill amending the animal cruelty statute (S1640) was recently passed into law. The amendments [e]stablish . . . requirements concerning necessary care of dogs, domestic companion animals, and service animals, and for tethering of dogs.

Many of the other provisions requiring necessary care to a companion animal are reasonable if the laws are appropriately enforced by professional law officers, who have sought guidance from individuals with expertise in animal health, care, and handling. Unfortunately this is not the case in New Jersey, where the animal cruelty statute is improperly enforced.

This makes the following provision extremely problematic and of concern to companion animal owners and their attorneys in the State:

any humane law enforcement officer or agent of the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or county society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, certified animal control officer, or other State or local law enforcement officer may immediately enter onto private property where a dog, domestic companion animal, or service animal is located and take physical custody of the animal, if the officer or agent has reasonable suspicion to believe that the animal is at risk of imminent harm due to a violation of this act.

While an earlier provision requires a showing of probable cause before a court of competent jurisdiction could issue a subpoena permitting law enforcement to enter private property and seize an animal, this latter provision impermissibly violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

A district court case provides clarity of rights under the Fourth Amendment:

In Badillo v. Amato, Case No. 13-1553, slip op. (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2014) the Court denied then Monmouth County SPCA Chief Amatos motion to dismiss, in relevant part, Badillos allegation that Amato violated his right to be free from illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In this case, Badillo, a priest of the Santeria religion was issued nine municipal court summons for animal animal abuse and neglect after Amato went around to the back of . . . [Badillos house, opened the gate and let himself in the fenced backyard without permission or a warrant and began taking pictures . . . Case No. 13-1553, slip op., at p. 3 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2014).

As the Court explained, finding that the Complaint sufficiently pleaded Fourth Amendment violations by Amato to survive a motion to dismiss, the Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized. Id., at p. 8 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV.)

The Court reaffirmed that not only is the home sacrosanct but that protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment extend not only to a persons home, but also to the curtilage surrounding the property. Id., at p. 8-9 (citing Estate of Smith v. Maraso, 318 F.3d 497, 518-519 (3d Cir. 2003).

It appears that the foregoing provision of the newly amended animal cruelty statute, permitting entry to private property based on merely reasonable suspicion and in the absence of a court order would violate the Fourth Amendment.

Additional concerns about these amendments, previously discussed, remain included in the final adopted law.

For example, a person may not keep a dog (or other domestic companion animal) in an animal crate or carrier for transport, exhibition, show, contest, training or similar event if the top of the head of the dog touches the ceiling of the animal carrier or crate when the dog is in a normal standing position. There are many acceptable, safe dog carriers that permit dogs to stand, turn around and lie down comfortably, but the top of their head would touch the ceiling of the crate.

The public must be adequately informed about this new requirementthat does nothing to provide for the welfare of dogs transported in dog carriersso they are not victims of animal cruelty citations issued by over zealous agents and officers of the NJ or County SPCAs. As noted in the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2000 report on Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, at least one County society (Warren) routinely stopped vehicles with horse trailers for proof that a Coggins test certificate was available as required by the NJ Department of Agriculture. As the report concluded:

Not only is the absence of a certificate not cruelty, but SPCA personnel lack the expertise to know whether the horse described in the certificate, such as a Bay or Chestnut [which are specific horse colors and patterns], is in fact the horse being transported.

It would not be unprecedented if humane officers decided to target people traveling with dogs throughout the state, and started pulling over and issuing summons related to the size the their dog carriers.

Dog owners beware!

[View source.]

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Violations Of The Fourth Amendment And Other Concerns About ... - JD Supra (press release)

VerizonYes, VerizonJust Stood Up For Your Privacy – WIRED

Roberto Machado Noa/Getty Images

Fourteen of the biggest US tech companies filed a brief with the Supreme Court on Monday supporting more rigorous warrant requirements for law enforcement seeking certain cell phone data, such as location information. In the statement, the signatoriesGoogle, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft among themargue that the government leans on outdated laws from the 1970s to justify Fourth Amendment overreach. One perhaps surprising voice in the chorus of protesters? Verizon.

Verizon's support means that the largest wireless service provider in the US, and a powerful force in Silicon Valley, has bucked a longtime trend of telecom acquiescence. While carriers have generally been willing to comply with a broad range of government requestseven building out extensive infrastructure to aid surveillanceVerizon has this time joined with academics, analysts, and the companys more privacy-focused corporate peers.

Carpenter v. United States is one of the most important Fourth Amendment cases in recent memory, Craig Silliman, Verizons executive vice president for public policy and general counsel, wrote on Monday. Although the specific issue presented to the Court is about location information, the case presents a broader issue about a customers reasonable expectation of privacy for other types of sensitive data she shares with any third party. Our hope is that when it decides this case, the Court will help us better apply old Fourth Amendment doctrines to an evolving digital era.

From the early days of landlines, telecoms have complied with law enforcement requests for customer data such as call length, location, and who has called whom. As the variety of data customers generate has exponentially expanded and evolved, so has this information gathering by government officials, often under a general mandate and without a case-specific warrant. For its part, Verizon cooperated with the National Security Agency as part of broad bulk surveillance programs for years. Details of this coordination was revealed in NSA documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013, but some aspects of it had been publicly debated for years prior.

Carpenter v. United States, which the Supreme Court will hear this fall, relates to the acquisition, without a warrant, of months of individuals location records by law enforcement officials in 2011. Officials looked back on 12,898 location records, spanning a four-month period, of one of these individuals, Timothy Carpenter, to build their case; Carpenter was eventually convicted. His appeal argues that location-data collection by law enforcement without a warrant violates his Fourth Amendment rightsand Verizon agrees.

Verizon stands out because they actually hold the specific kind of location records that are directly at issue, says Nathan Freed Wessler, a staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union, which represents Carpenter. The telecoms have a long history in general of cooperating with law enforcement surveillance demands, but I think Verizons participation reflects a growing understanding of the importance of standing up for customers privacy rights."

As the general public becomes increasingly aware of the privacy risks associated with entrusting their data to corporate entities, a strong stance on data protection has been a boon to companies like Apple. This economic incentive may be even stronger for the numerous telecoms that now straddle the line between traditional utility and tech company. Verizon, for example, now owns Yahoo and AOL in addition to its role as a top-four wireless provider in the US.

"At the end of the day, a company like Verizon isnt going to stick its neck out if it doesnt think that theres a business rationale in addition to it being the right thing to do," Wessler says.

Verizon has laid the groundwork for this move for months. Silliman wrote publicly last year about potential Fourth Amendment concerns when telecoms comply with warrantless law enforcement data requests. The company's stand won't necessarily prompt peers to followno other telecoms joined this particular briefbut it still represents a turning point in the dialog between privacy advocates and monolithic telecoms. And in Carpenter v. United States, it's only one of the voices that matters in the larger discussion about data privacy.

"The other tech companies bring the perspective that this case is also about our emails and our smart devices and all the kinds of cloud-stored data that we create in the course of our daily lives now," Wessler says. "The Justices should not be under the misapprehension that they can just try to narrowly apply these outdated precedents from the 1970s in this case. The implications are really huge, and this is the chance to make sure that our understanding of the Fourth Amendment keeps up with digital technology.

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VerizonYes, VerizonJust Stood Up For Your Privacy - WIRED