What is not appreciated even by ministers and MPs is firstly that 33billion is not an absolute number: it is an estimate by the Office for Budget Responsibility, of which the major portion is pension payments.

Secondly, there are future liabilities lurking in the small print of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and, in the analogy, these relate to the investment portfolio: if the EU's investments fail to pay out full value, the UK could be asked to share the loss.

Rewind to the report published by the Centre for Brexit Policy last weekend. Replacing the Withdrawal Agreement: How to ensure the UK takes back control on exiting the transition period includes a section on the UKs future financial liabilities under the WA.

This is a complex and little-known aspect of the WA, but it occupies nearly fifty pages. It comes down to this: during the UKs EU membership, different parts of the EU have made long-dated loans or financial commitments.

The WA saddles the UK with a responsibility to pay for a portion of any future losses on those loans/financial commitments, regardless of whether the UK benefited from them. Furthermore, the marker point for the UKs being responsible is not the end of the Brexit transition period, but the expiry of the loan/financial commitment itself, or of the facility or fund out of which the loan/financial commitment was made.

The only limitation is that the loan or financial commitment must have been granted while the UK was an EU member. However, this limitation is of little comfort: a loan agreed before 31st December 2020 but drawn later will be chalked up against the UKs liability.

The WA states that the UK should have to pay a portion of the amount at risk through the EU Budget, in line with its historical share of the cash budget, or about 12 per cent. But this 12 per cent figure must be regarded as elastic, as it could increase markedly (perhaps double) if, in the midst of a crisis, the likes of Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland were not able to pay their shares.

This total liability now amounts to 185 billion through the EU Budget and 37 billion in subscribed-but-not-called capital in the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Central Bank (ECB).Additionally, in a crisis, the UK probably would have its paid-in capital of 3.6 billion in the EIB and ECB written off.

But there is more. The amount at risk of 185 billion through the EU Budget could rise by 198 billion to 383 billion during 2021 thanks to the headroom in and carry-over provision for the 2014-2020 EU budget period. The hoped-for maximum amount at risk would then be 12 per cent of 383 billion plus 40.6 billion for the EIB/ECB totalling 86.6 billion, noting the elasticity of the 12%.

In addition, there are significant potential liabilities that are largely unquantifiable, such as

The UKs payments, should losses materialise, would simply be debited to the UKs budget - diverting money that would otherwise fund the NHS, schools, paying our own debt costs, etc - and be credited to the respective EU organisation to cover its losses.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) made a calculation of the Brexit Divorce Bill deriving from the WA of around 39billion.They issued a chart for when they believed the payments would materialise, and stated that most of the payments related to pension costs, thereby assigning a very low likelihood of payments being made to Brussels for these reasons described above. The OBRs apparent confidence does not seem to be based on any detailed study of the financings being made through InvestEU or the EIB, and crucially it pre-dated the coronavirus crisis.

The WA saddles the UK with a potential liability, at best of 86 billion and possibly a lot more. Should payments to Brussels be demanded, an equal-and-opposite reduction in public spending in the UK would result.

The risk of loss and the amounts at stake were already rising before coronavirus, and to the UKs detriment. The EUs coronavirus response has just twisted the screw. The result is manifestly unfair when the UK has drawn so little benefit from the EUs various loan and financing schemes.

Bob Lyddon is an experienced management consultant both privately and with PwC, with a specialization in banking and payments. He has published numerous papers about the financial mechanisms of the EU, through the Bruges Group, Politeia and Global Britain. He authored Global Britains series The Brexit Papers.

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Just 33bn? Here's why the Brexit divorce bill could cost tens of billions more than you thought - Telegraph.co.uk