The North East has historically suffered from poor transport connectivity within and between the seven states as well as with the rest of India and neighbouring countries. This has not only impeded everyday life and livelihoods but also regional development and national security. As China builds and consolidates its hold in its own border regions as well as neighbouring countries through highways across Asia and also Europe, India is lagging behind even in the homestead. The strategic location of the North East and the recent geopolitical developments in the region necessitate the creation of robust infrastructure and multimodal connectivity.

Poor transport connectivity in the North East is one of many reasons for its regional backwardness. This connectivity pertains to various modes and routes of transport facilitating the movement of persons and goods. It also pertains to transport within and between the seven sister states as also mainland India and neighbouring countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and China. The poor state of transport infrastructure and regional connectivity has adverse implications for tourism, trade, and commerce therein as well as the everyday possibilities for residents in terms of life and livelihoods. The scarcity of all-weather roads continues to be one of the biggest infrastructural deficits in the region, whereas rail, water, and air connectivity are yet to receive the thrust they require.

The origins of poor connectivity in the North East may be traced back to the British move to separate Burma (now Myanmar) from British India in 1935 (Srikanth 2016). This decision created a forced political divide in an ethnically and economically contiguous geographical area. It severely disrupted the lines of communication, and dislocated trade and the lives of communities on either side of the artificial border. However, till the time of independence, the region enjoyed easy railway connectivity up to the port of Chittagong and the rest of the subcontinent through Sylhet. In addition, thevibrant inland waterways, especially in the Brahmaputra and Barak rivers, contributed to ease of transportation. There also existed innumerable functional military airstrips all over the region. As a matter of fact, the stupendous allied effort to build a road from Ledo in Assam to Kunming in China was one of the biggest wartime road-building efforts ever witnessed. Known in history as the Stilwell Road, after American General Joseph Stilwell, it stands testimony to the grit and determination to build a road in one of the most inhospitable terrains of the world.

The partition of the country further, and much more fundamentally, disrupted regional connectivity. The loss of access to the port of Chittagongimpeded approach to the sea, whereas roads, railways, and waterways that once provided easy access to Sylhet, Comilla, and Noakhali simply vanished overnight. The region became landlocked and had to learn to live with this partition-inherited legacy of remoteness and inaccessibility. Post-independence, infrastructure development in the North East has been stymied due to the abject lack of strategic thinking and an absence of political will and motivation. Geopolitical developments added to the connectivity woes of the region. Inland waterways practically disappeared, and the Stilwell Road fell into disuse until it was reclaimed by the tropical jungles. The numerous military airstrips were never made functional post independence.

Strategic Concerns

While the remoteness of the north-eastern states is generally well known, what is lesser known is the fact that more than 98% of the regions borders are shared with foreign countries. This includes a nearly 4,097 kilometres (km) long border with Bangladesh, 3,488 km with China, 1,751 km with Nepal, 1,643 km with Myanmar, and 699 km with Bhutan. The geographical connection with the rest of India is confined to a narrow strip of land, called the Siliguri Corridor, which is about 200 km long and 60 km wide. At its narrowest, it is just 17 km wide, thereby obtaining the derisive epithet chickens neck.

The strategic location of the region need not be emphasised. For instance, as an active theatre of World WarII, the North East not only saw intense military action but also the defeat of Japan is said to have begun after its debacle in this sector. The SinoIndian War of 1962 and the IndoPak War of 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh, also had this region as their primary theatre. In this region, the fortunes of many an army were determined by the twin factors of logistics and supply chain. The recent stand-off in Ladakh or the earlier one in Doklam have yet again reinforced the need to urgently scale up connectivity and infrastructure in the North East.

While the imperative need to ensure good connectivity between the North East and the rest of the country is well acknowledged, the abject lack of strategic thinking is intriguing. For instance, Pushpita Das (2009) discusses the post-1959 scenario in SinoIndian border relations, after China made its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. The border dispute that followed prompted the Government of India to hand over the task of road construction in the state to the army albeit with acurious caveat. No roads and airfields were to be made within 30 miles of the border, such as to inhibit easy connectivitybetween the border areas and interior ones in case of an attack. However, as Das (2009) goes on to point out, events on the frontier proved the exact opposite, as the Indian response to the Chinese aggression of 1962 was, in fact, severely hampered by the lack of proper communication and logistics.

Moreover, connectivity projects with high strategic value, such as roads, bridges, petroleum refineries, and gas cracker projects, often had to be demanded and obtained from the stateby popular agitation. For instance, the Dhola Sadiya Bridge, inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2018 (Indian Express 2018), was born out of the Assam Agitation. An actionable clause of the Assam Accord, 1985, marking the end of the Assam agitation, it nevertheless took 33 years to become a reality. It bears mentioning that this bridgethe longest in Indiahas given the country tremendous strategic advantage. The completion of the two bridges over the Brahmaputrathe Dhola Sadiya Bridge and the Bogibeel Bridgehas come not a moment too soon. WhileIndia took 33 years to build one bridge, the Chinese side has executed impressive roads and railway lines close to the Indian side.

Das (2009: 10607) elaborates,

China has been building roads to consolidate its hold over border regions and integrate them. This has been especially so in Tibet, which borders India (along Arunachal Pradesh). Today, Tibet has five NHs (national highways) along with 15 trunk highways and 315 feeder roads. The whole length of highways open to traffic in Tibet is more than 40,000 km. In addition to construction of highways and other trunk roads, China has also built frontier defence patrol roads of 15,000 plus km.

China has laid a railway line in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in 2006, with a daily train service between Beijing and Lhasa ever since.

Das (2009: 107) continues

Further, it has also embarked upon the project of extending these lines of transportation across its borders (especially Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal) Chinas plan to access the Bay of Bengal via the Irrawady Corridor is one such initiative. This involves the construction and upgrading of the Burma Road from Kunming to Mandalay to Ruili and the improvement of the railway line from Dali to Ruili (and also) major road construction projects in Putao, Bhamo, Pangsai, etc. In Bangladesh, China is planning toaccess Chittagong port by constructing a road from Kunming to Chittagong through Mandalay.

China has also been generous inproviding assistance to its other neighbours, Thailand and Mongolia, apart from Myanmar, to build roads, ports, and rail connectivity not only within their own countries but also linking back to China. It has used its clout with funding agencies like the Asian Development Bank to bankroll some of these projects (Srikanth 2016). In addition to the Asian Highway, its One Belt One Road project is probably the most ambitious and seeks to link Asia with Europe. This raises serious concerns for India. There are also legitimate fears that the fine print in project finance by international (including Chinese) bodies often entails insidious clauses that may be used to jeopardise the sovereignty of the aid/loan-receiving nation, as is becoming evident in many African nations (Chiwanza 2018; Love 2018) and even Sri Lanka (Roy Chaudhury 2019). China, in recent years, has also acquired outright ownership, development rights, or a management concession to a bevy of strategically located ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, the Maldives, the Seychelles, and recently Iran, what strategy planners call the Chinese String of Pearls (Johnson 2020).

The pressure is certainly on India to connect the hitherto unconnected areas of the North East to the rest of the country, through air, rail, and an extensive network of all-weather roads. As the gains of Chinas proactive policy and ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) become known, it is only logical for India to activate interregional and subregional forums likeASEAN, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the BangladeshChinaIndiaMyanmar Economic Corridor, MekongGanga Cooperation, etc. Indian aid in the completion of the 160-km-long TamuKalewaKalemyo sector of the proposed IndiaMyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway that seeks to link the three countries is a case in point.

The Trans Asian Scene

As far as road links are concerned, the Asian Highway project has an important implication for the north-eastern states of India. Of the two priority Asian Highway routes, one passes through Iran, Pakistan, and India, meeting Nepal at Banbasa and re-entering India at Siliguri, then proceeding onto Imphal via Bangladesh, and finally extending to Myanmar. Another part of this project is the creation of regional and subregional routes. This is done by identifying some major corridors, which are then sought to be transformed into regional transport networks that connect all significant ports, capital cities, and underserved areas with significant potentials for trade therein.

Some of the high-potential corridors thus identified include the north-east of India and Bangladesh. This includes the GuwahatiSiliguriRaiganjCalcutta corridor and the KathmanduBirganjKolkata route. As part of this project, India has requested Myanmar for access to its territory through the Kaladan river to reach Akyab port in the Bay of Bengal. Though the river begins 50 km away from Aizawl, it covers a long stretch of nearly 150 km in Myanmar before meeting the Bay of Bengal at Akyab. It is opined that if this happens, India will be able to transport goods by river from Kolkata to Mizoram from where they can be further carried to other places through roadways. India has also laid much importance on the Kaladan project to link Sittwe (the port capital of Rakhine province) with the North East through the Kaladan river, and establish road links between Kalewa and Aizawl. There would, of course, be a direct sea link from Sittwe (Akyab), reportedly one of the few good natural harbours, although not quite at the level of Trincomalee.

It should be of special import to policymakers that China is building a new deep-sea water port not far from Sittwe, which will take energy (oil and gas), and connect and transport (over major highways) from the Bay of Bengal to Kunming, over 1,000 km away. As it were, China has emerged as the worlds largest energy consumer and net importer, making it imperative to ensure international energy cooperation, building new energy corridors and supply channels. This would necessarily involve diversifying energy corridors and energy import regions to ensure Chinas energy strategic security (Guo et al 2019). Undoubtedly, the Chinese, through strategic proactive measures, have developed a distinct and major advantage over India, which is seen as trying to play catch-up with its great neighbour, but lagging far behind. The new sea port is of critical concern to Indias as well as the worlds economic, energy, and security interests, as it gives China direct access to the Bay of Bengal. It will also enable China to access and exert control over the Straits of Malacca. This could easily pose a threat to the energy security of the region as container ships have to traverse through the straits. It could challenge the United States control over Malacca and therein poses the potential of destabilising the status quo. The new China-built port is capable of docking large tankers and heavy ships, both cargo and potentially military in nature. In contrast, Sittwe is not a deep-sea water port. Thus, it is apparent that India has been outmanoeuvred byChina again.

It is possible that India might get the short end of the stick even with regard to the Stilwell Road. As it were, Stilwell is the shortest road from India to China via Myanmar and is a mere 773 km long from Ledo in India to Wanding in Yunnan province. After World WarII, this road fell into disuse and the area has since turned into a bed of insurgency in India and Myanmar. Kaustubh Deka (2019: 6) demonstrates the stark contrast where, on the one hand, in India, the discourse continues to be dominated by concerns of national security from above and ethnonationalism from below; a heady mix that creates a policy myopia. Whereas, on the other, China has developed the Yunnan sector and the Chinese stretch of the Stilwell Road into a six-lane highway (Pattnaik 2016), now advertised as a tourist attraction (Trans-Asia Discovery nd), while the Myanmar part of it is in bad shape, but can be repaired. About 80 km of the Stilwell Road inIndia, that is, from Ledo to the border in Arunachal Pradesh, is in good condition. With a little initiative, this road may be made operational.

The point to be noted is that all throughout, Stilwell provided access to regions, spanning three countries, with a thin population base. With the exception of Mytkyina, capital of the Kachin state in Myanmar, there are no major townships on the IndoMyanmar stretch. The Allied Forces used the road for transporting gasoline, military hardware, and food for troops. It had not been used for civilian and commercial purposes. So careful planning is required for creating infrastructure, and servicing the linkages in three entirely different political regimes to make it a success. But the most important stakeholders and potential beneficiaries are the north-eastern states, especially Assam, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh, which will directly benefit from the international road access.

Road Connectivity in the North East

Roads, the most basic of transportinfrastructure in the modern era, arealso highly underdeveloped in the North East. The volume, length, and quality of roads are all wanting. For instance,Assam has a total road length of some 69,000 km (both metalled and non-metalled surface), which accounts for 60% of the total road length of north-eastern India. Yet, both within the state as well as in relation to connectivity with other states of the North East, there is much to be done in the state. Every year, floods and erosion wreak havoc on Assams national highways and arterial roads. Till date, there has been no solution forthcoming. There also are huge concerns about the quality of roads constructed. Almost 75% of the roads in the region are unsurfaced roads. The largest state, Arunachal Pradesh (28.32%), followed by the most populated state, Assam (16.94%), both rank abysmally in the category of surfaced roads as against Meghalaya (46.26%), or the national average (56.68%) (Das 2009).

The North Eastern Council (NEC), the regions nodal development agency, has identified 47 roads with high strategic and economic importance in the entire region (GoInd). These roads, approximating to a total length of 1,665.75 km, were identified in consultation with the regions state governments. It is, however, unclear where the budgetary allocation for the same would be made from as theNEChas sanctioned only 615 km of roads for construction (Times of India2017). However, the author suggests that the recommended roads be differentially categorised and executed under different schemes and policies to ensure speedy completion. While some qualify as roads leading to the international boundary, others include interstate roads as well as intrastate roads of strategic and economic importance. While some can be implemented by the North East Road Sector Development Scheme (NERSDS), others can be carried out by the North East Special Infrastructure Development Scheme.

A major challenge in the sustenance of road connectivity in the region pertains to maintenance. After the construction and contractually mandated maintenance period of four to five years is over, the said road is normally transferred to the respective state government for maintenance. In most cases, it is seen that the states find it impossible to allocate the requisite funds for proper upkeep of the roads. However, maintenance of roads is imperative, more so in hilly regions. The rate of deterioration of roads in the region is rapid due to the topography, heavy and long spells of rainfall, fragile geology, etc. Thus, until and unless a proper mechanism for road maintenance is developed or sufficient funding on a rolling basis allocated by the central government, it would be almost impossible to ensure good quality roads in the region. A few suggestions on this front include: (i) setting aside at least 10% of theNECsbudget for the transport and communication sector for maintenance of the regions roads, and (ii) the setting up of regional road research institutes in any of the state capitals to innovate and find sustainable solutions for the regions unique geological challenges; the region, as part of the Sivalik Himalayas, has soils that are mostly laterite, weathered shale, and composed of boulders and sand, prone to sinking and landslides.

The road sector in the North East also suffers from other on-site issues, which includes the shortage of construction materials and equipments. This problem can be easily overcome with the creation of material banks in all states. In case of the absence of large players to do so, the idea of group consortiums, either individually or through the publicprivate partnership model, could provide a way forward. Further, the capacity of local entrepreneurs needs to be enhanced with support provisions, such as equipment banks and soft loans. This practice has shown promising results in quite a few parts of the world as shown by studies done by the International Labour Organization (2010).

Technology in road construction has seen major advancement in recent times. It is time that industry best practices become the standard in India, especially in the North East. There seems to be some thinking along these lines in the government, reflected in some of the major recommendations of theNITIAayogs Three Year Action Agenda (201720) with regards to connectivity issues in the region. To start with, it has recommended proactive assistance and cooperation from state governments along with capacity building in the relevant departments of the states. It is time that specialised agencies like the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) be engaged in providing solutions for the North East on road construction and maintenance issues. TheCRRIcould also be roped in for conducting capacity building and evaluation in the region. The resources of specialised entities, such as the National Highways andInfrastructure Development Corporation, whose presence in the north-eastern region remains largely nominal, must be greatly augmented.

In this regard, it may be opportuneto start specialised courses on road construction-related subjects, and refresher courses for professionals and functionaries in this sector. For this purpose, it may be possible to seek the assistance of regional institutes of technological studies with the support of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH). Moreover, expert bodies, like the Indian Road Congress, can be encouraged to provide on-site mentoring and handholding supportto road engineers and builders. Multilateral funding agencies engaged ininfrastructure development in the region should also be encouraged to incorporate capacity building of local engineers and contractors as part of their terms of review and agreements.

Connecting Eastern South Asia

The vibrant pre-independence inland water transport system of the region has been allowed to atrophy over the decades. The Brahmaputra river, the main artery of the North East, has been declared the second national waterway of the country. Yet, follow-up action on capitalising over this medium has been tardy. Assams waterway network via the Brahmaputra gives the state access to the ports of Chittagong in Bangladesh, Kolkata and Haldia in West Bengal. With greater coordination between the different north-eastern states, Assam could emerge as the major trade hub of eastern South Asia. Better road connectivity with Bhutan and greater reliance on the use of the Brahmaputra to bolster trade with Bangladesh could also bring about major gains. Studies have shown that about 25% of the in-transit traffic (at present some 25 million tonnes of freight move to and from the north-eastern states and the rest of India) could be diverted through Bangladesh with minimum investment. Transit facilities, through Bangladesh, to goods from the rest of India and from the North East would greatly benefit the former country as well, apart from substantially reducing transportation costs. India should impress upon Bangladesh to provide access to the Chittagong port for facilitating the movement of goods from Assam and the north-eastern region.

Similarly, improved rail and road connectivity between the two countries would also be mutually beneficial. The restoration of the MahisasanShahbazpur railway traffic between India and Bangladesh could provide a major boost in the movement of goods between the two countries. The process of opening up the inland waterways with Bangladesh and the declaration of Jogighopa, Ashuganj, and Karimganj as ports of call to facilitate such river traffic could be done immediately. If Bangladesh emerges as a major trade partner in the coming years, the reopening of the KarimganjSylhetDhaka road for the transportation of goods would need to be seriously considered. Although the prospects of trade with Bangladesh have improved in recent years, the issues of illegal migration into Assam and other north-eastern states as well as the potential presence of anti-India insurgents in Bangladesh have clouded the bilateral relationship. Each side has strong prejudices against the other, notwithstanding the fact that the two nations have so much in common to share (Bhattacharya 2019). Both sides must resolve to address these issues for trade cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and doubt.

With the aim of developing better road connectivity to border areas, development of coastal roads, including road connectivity for non-major ports, improvement in the efficiency of national corridors, development of economic corridors, inter corridors and feeder routes, along with integration with Sagarmala, etc, have been initiated under the Bharatmala Pariyojana. The central government plans to develop about 26,000 km of economic corridors, along with the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) and NorthSouth and EastWest (NSEW) corridors. In addition, about 8,000 km of inter corridors and about 7,500 km of feeder routes have been identified for improving the effectiveness of economic corridors,GQandNSEWcorridors (GoI2020).

Unfortunately, not a single National Highways Development Project (NHDP) component covers the IndiaBangladesh border custom points. India should take the initiative to make operational the trans-shipment of goods from the north-eastern region to mainland India and vice versa, through Bangladeshs territory. The Customs Act, 1962 already has provisions for the transportation of goods from one part of India to another through a foreign territory under the Transportation of Goods (Through Foreign Territory) Regulations, 1965. In this regard, it needs mention that India has already extended transit facilities for goods imported by Bangladesh from Nepal and vice versa, through the Phulbari Land Customs Station (LCS) in West Bengal. In reciprocation, the Bangladesh government, too, has allowed transit facility to goods shipped from the North East to our mainland and vice versa by their riverine route under the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade.

The National Transport Development Policy Committee (2012) of the Planning Commission detailed the need to develop a multimodal transport infrastructure in the North East, suggesting a concerted effort for the improvements in connectivity between Assam and other north-eastern states as well as neighbouring countries. Experts in the region concur with these views and propose that work in some of the identified areas should be implemented as quickly as possible, such as: (i) opening of the Stillwell Road linking Myanmar and China on a priority basis; (ii) reopening of the KarimganjSylhetDhaka road for transportation; (iii) extension of the AmguriMokokchungTuensang road linking Assam with Myanmar; (iv) extension of the Sibasagar, SonariNemtola Road from AssamNagaland border to Lungwa in Myanmar; (v) introducing bus services between GuwahatiImphalMandalay, GuwahatiDhaka via Shillong, and GuwahatiTuraDhaka; (vi) restoration of the MahisasanShahbazpur railway traffic between Assam and Bangladesh to facilitate export of goods like coal, limestone, food items, and agro-based products to Bangladesh from Assam; (vii) creation of an air travel circuit between Assam, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Thailand, and Singapore, so as to increase exports and encourage tourism; (viii) opening up and improving inland waterways between Assam and Bangladesh through a number of river ports; and (ix) negotiating with the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar to provide access to Chittagong and Mandalay ports for the export and import of goods. The task force has also recommended the development of border towns and trade centres at all majorLCS.

Furthermore, Indias engagement with Myanmar should be both widened and deepened. As it were, India is helping Myanmar in the development of its infrastructure. In February 2001, Jaswant Singh, Indias then external affairs minister, inaugurated the 160-km-long TamuKalewaKalemyo road. The National Highway 39, which terminates at Moreh (Manipur), was extended to join this road, such that it now links Moreh to Kalemyo in central Myanmar. Kalewa will get further linked to Mandalay once the MonywaYargyiMyomaKalewa road project is completed. Monywa is already connected to Mandalay. Later, India signed a memorandum of understanding with Myanmar by which it undertook responsibility for the maintenance of the road for its first six years. Later, a trilateral project was signed, which would connect Moreh to Mae Sot (Thailand), passing through Bagan (Myanmar). India has also undertaken the Kaladan (River) Project for which Rail India Technical and Economic Services completed a survey in June 2002. A gas pipeline is planned along the Kaladan river from Nengpui in southern Mizoram to Sittwe port. A multinodal transport from Mizoram to Sittwe can provide an alternative outlet to the sea for the North East, in addition to transit through Chittagong.

Apart from infrastructure, Indias engagement with Myanmar has to be scaled up, especially with regard to cooperation in softer areas, such as education and health, which would provide long-term dividends for India. It must be noted that China is helping the Myanmar government with setting up a telecommunications network in northern Myanmar. Strategically, it should set alarm bells ringing in India. China and Myanmar have exchanged high-level visits, with Myanmars northern cities, like Mandalay, undergoing slow demographic changes due to the influx of Chinese immigrants from Yunnan province. China plans to build a 1,350 km railway line through Laos, Myanmar, and Kunming (China), going up to Bangkok. The rail network from Myitkyina near the Chinese border to Yangon via Mandalay has brought remote areas together and opened up Myanmar to Chinese economic expansion. The development of infrastructure serves both the purpose of expanding trade and military interests.

Hurdles and Hopes

Inordinate delays in the implementation of infrastructure projects is a major constraint in ensuring proper connectivity in the region. Time and cost overruns and the inability to ensure quality constitutes major bottlenecks. Planners have often sought to highlight the difficulties in ensuring the growth of connectivity and infrastructure in the North East, in terms of land acquisition, forest and environment clearance, social unrest, and an adverse law and order situation. In other words, the existence of multiple stakeholders, both state and non-state actors, and a multi-tiered government structure in the Scheduled Areas, such as the district councils, traditional bodies, and village councils, further complicates the matter.

As Rocky Ziipao (2019) notes, the larger the number of stakeholders involved, the deeper the corruption. He alludes to the nexus of the unholy trinity of politicians, bureaucrats, and contractors in project implementation. They procure and share cuts in each project, which ultimately results in work quality being heavily compromised. Apart from bribery from project funds, they also influence which projects go through and which do not. Often the criteria behind these projects are narrowly based on cost and benefit considerations. For instance, the reluctance to build roads in sparsely populated areas is often justified on the imbalance of cost of construction vis--vis value of benefits. It is due to this kind of perverted logic that the strategic border state of Arunachal Pradesh has some of the most pathetic road connectivity in the country (Das 2009).

Thus, rationalising systems and ensuring accountability and transparency is paramount, as is also discarding outrageous rules like the one that does not allow the procurement of sand, chips, and ballast, locally by the railways. Out of the box solutions are both available and necessary. For instance, the lack of individual local contractors in the region with requisite skills, machinery, and financial strength can be overcome by creating consortiums of multi-stakeholder project teams that should also incorporate the local community. Community involvement in project implementation could be a game changer. Apart from ensuring immediate economic benefits for the community during the period of implementation, it could also ensure social insurance and public support for projects. Proper division of responsibilities and a transparent system that ensures benefits to the community can deal a body blow to the corrupt nexus that currently operates.

Large-scale infrastructural projects, even though essential to the growth of a region, inevitably entail social and environmental costs. For instance, the proposed extension of the railway network to the Khasi Hills in Meghalaya continues to be contested on the issue of tribal rights, threats to identity, and the fear of huge unregulated influx of outsiders (Deka 2019). Given that the north-eastern region is a biodiversity hotspot and has a fragile ecology coupled with existence of numerous distinct indigenous communities with small populations, large infrastructure projects have to be implemented with care and empathy. Often, the preservation of culture and ecology is positioned as dichotomous to infrastructure projects and development. This need not necessarily be an either/or proposition. The Indian Constitution has done a commendable job of ensuring the protection and development of its smallest tribes and communities. There is no reason why infrastructure projects and development schemes cannot be designed to ensure a similar outcome.

Studies on infrastructure may be used as a theoretical lens to understand the related issues of hope, anxiety, disrepair, citizenship, and governance (Kikon and McDuie-Ra 2017). This may be particularly true of the North East, where a complex interplay of factors have determined infrastructure building. As Deka (2019) has noted, the concept of infrastructure are linked to ideas of social and ethnic identities, espoused in the persistent opposition to extension of railway lines to the Khasi hills of Meghalaya over fears of influx of outsiders. However, I contend, this understanding not only imposes spatial limitations but also creates and consolidates boundaries and borders.

Better connectivity is important not only for strategic and geopolitical reasons but also for economic considerations. The strength of the country would be determined by its economic robustness and the North East certainly has the potential to emerge as an important driver in reviving the Indian economy. Here, it would be important to ensure that sustainable and inclusive growth practices become institutionalised. However, this would not be possible without improving connectivity.

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Times of India(2017): North Eastern Council Sanctions 615 km Roads across 7 North East States, 30 January,https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/shillong/north-eastern-council-sanctions-615-km-roads-across-7-north-east-states/articleshow/56865955.cms.

Trans-Asia Discovery (nd): 15 Days China Ledo Road Study Tour,https://www.yunnanexploration.com/tours/15-days-china-ledo-road-study-tour.

Ziipao, Raile Rocky (2019): What Are the Impediments to Road Infrastructure in Manipur?Economic & Political Weekly,Vol 54, No 14,https://www.epw.in/engage/article/what-are-impediments-road-infrastructure-manipur.

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Connectivity Issues in the North East - Economic and Political Weekly