Amia Srinivasans specialty, it seems to me, is making sense of moral ambivalence: detecting, dissecting, and sometimes defending its reasonability, even in the face of unavoidable and urgent decisions.

[Knot by Anni Albers]

It begins with the matter of signing open letters:

An open letter is an unloved thing. Written by committee and in haste, it is a monument to compromise: a minimal statement to which all signatories can agree, or worse a maximal statement that no signatory fully believes. Some academics have a general policy against signing them. I discovered that was true of some of my Oxford colleagues last year, when I drafted and circulated an open letter condemning Israels attack on Gaza and calling for a ceasefire. Some, like those who are in precarious employment or whose immigration status isnt settled, have good reasons for adopting such a policy. Others understandably dont want to put their name to something that doesnt perfectly represent their views, especially when it might be read as a declaration of faith. I always cringe at the self-importance of the genre: though open letters can sometimes exert influence, stiffly worded exhortations hardly suffice to stop states, militaries, bombs. And yet, a no open letters policy can serve as a convenient excuse when one is hesitant to stand up for ones political principles.

Srinivasan has signed several open letters about Gaza, and recently signed an open letter committing her to an academic and cultural boycott of Columbia University, owing to how it handled student protestors. Then:

In April I was asked to sign a letter opposing the University of Cambridges investigation into Nathan Cofnas, a Leverhulme early career fellow in philosophy. A self-described race realist, Cofnas has written widely in defence of abhorrently racist particularly anti-Black views, invoking what he claims are the findings of the science of heredity.

She shares her many reservations about signing the open letter, but also her reason for ultimately signing it:

Do we think that students should be able to trigger investigations into academics on the grounds that their extramural speech makes them feel unsafe? Do we want to fuel the rights sense of grievance towards the university, when their minority presence within it is owed to the robust correlation between education and political liberalism, not some Marxist plot? Do we want to empower university administrators to fire academics on the grounds that they are attracting negative publicity? Do we think there is any guarantee that a further strengthened institutional power will only be wielded against those whose views and politics we abhor? If we say yes, what picture of power theirs and ours does that presume?

But thats not the end of the discussion, for theres the question of whether her taking a principled stand is her also being a sucker for her political opponents:

free speech and academic freedom are, for many on the right, ideological notions, weapons to be wielded against the left and the institutions it is (falsely) believed to control, the university most of all [and] the free-speech brigade has found justifications for the draconian repression of student protest.

Theres also the question of the extent to which the free speech brigade understands how academic freedom and freedom of speech come apart, or how even different considerations in favor of free speech might be in tension with each other:

After signing the letter criticising the investigation into Cofnas, I was written to by someone from the Committee for Academic Freedom, which bills itself as a non-partisan group of academics from across the political spectrum. He asked me whether I might consider signing up to theCAFs three principles. I looked them up: I. Staff and students atUKuniversities should be free, within the limits of the law, to express any opinion without fear of reprisal. II. Staff and students atUKuniversities should not be compelled to express any opinion against their belief or conscience. III.UKuniversities should not promote as a matter of official policy any political agenda or affiliate themselves with organisations promoting such agendas. I thought about it for a bit. Im on board with PrincipleII, so long as we dont think that asking staff and students to use someones correct pronouns is akin to demanding they swear a loyalty oath. Principle I is problematic, because it doesnt register that academic freedom essentially involves viewpoint-based discrimination that indeed the whole point of academic freedom is to protect academics rights to exercise their expert judgment in hiring, peer review, promotion, examining, conferring degrees and so on. And PrincipleIIIwould prevent universities from condemning, say, Israels systematic destruction of universities and schools in Gaza, which I think as educational institutions they are entitled to do.

Discussion welcome, but read the whole thing first.

Read the rest here:

Srinivasan on Open Letters, Protests, Free Speech, and Academic Freedom - Daily Nous - Daily Nous