What follows is the Conclusion of the last book("The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvment in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements") of the three-volume "Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy" series, by Kevin MacDonald.

 

Conclusion: Whither Judaism and the West?

 

One conclusion of this volume is that Jews have played a decisive role in developing highly influential intellectual and political movements that serve their interests in contemporary Western societies. These movements are only part of the story however. There has been an enormous growth in Jewish power and influence in Western societies generally, particularly the United States. Ginsberg (1993) notes that Jewish economic status and cultural influence have increased dramatically in the United States since 1960. Shapiro (1992, 116) shows that Jews are over-represented by at least a factor of nine on indexes of wealth, but that this is a conservative estimate, because much Jewish wealth is in real estate, which is difficult to determine and easy to hide. While constituting approximately 2.4 percent of the population of the United States, Jews represented half of the top one hundred Wall Street executives and about 40 percent of admissions to Ivy League colleges. Lipset and Raab (1995) note that Jews contribute between one-quarter and one-third of all political contributions in the United States, including one-half of Democratic Party contributions and one-fourth of Republican contributions. The general message of Goldberg's (1996) book Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment, is that American Judaism is well organized and lavishly funded. It has achieved a great deal of power, and it has been successful in achieving its interests. There is a great deal of consensus on broad Jewish issues, particularly in the areas of Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties (p. 5). Indeed, the consensus on these issues among Jewish activist organizations and the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed here despite a great deal of disagreement on other issues is striking. Massive changes in public policy on these issues beginning with the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s coincide with the period of increasing Jewish power and influence in the United States. Since the 1950s empirical studies of ethnic hierarchy in the United States have tracked changes in ethnic group resources, including elite representation (e.g., Alba & Moore 1982; Lemer, Nagai & Rothman 1996). These studies have often emphasized the overrepresentation of Protestant whites in corporate hierarchies and the military, but have failed to take into consideration group differences in commitment and organization. Salter (1998b) provides a theoretically based assessment of Jewish influence relative to African Americans and gentile European Americans based on Blalock's (1967, 1989) model of group power as a function of resources multiplied by mobilization. Jews are far more mobilized than these other ethnic populations (one hesitates calling gentile European Americans a "group"). For example, while specifically ethnic organizations devoted to the ethnic interests of gentile European Americans are essentially political fringe groups with meager funding and little influence on the mainstream political process, Salter notes that the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee ranked second out the 120 most powerful lobbies as rated by members of Congress and professional lobbyists, with no other ethnic organization rated in the top 25. Furthermore, AIPAC is one of the few lobbies that relies heavily on campaign contributions to win allies. As indicated above, Jews contribute between one-third and one-half of all campaign money in federal elections, the donations motivated by "Israel and the broader Jewish agenda" (Goldberg 1996, 275). Jews are thus over-represented in campaign contributions by a factor of at least 13 based on their percentage of the population and are overrepresented by a factor of approximately 6.5 if adjustment is made for their higher average income. In overseas donations, the Jewish lead is even greater. For example, in the 1920s, before the post -- World War II explosion of Jewish giving to Israel, Jewish Americans may have given as much as 24 times more per capita to assist overseas Jews than did Irish Americans to assist Ireland in its struggle for independence from Great Britain. Yet this was the period of peak Irish ethnic philanthropy (Carroll 1978). The disparity has become much greater since World War II. Salter has adopted a preliminary conservative estimate of Jewish ethnic mobilization as four times that of white gentiles, based on comparison of per capita donations to non-religious ethnic causes. In the Blalock equation influence is affected not only by mobilization but also by the resources held by the group. Salter estimates that Jews control approximately 26 percent of the "cybernetic resources" of the United States (i.e., resources as measured by representation in key areas such as government, media, finance, academia, corporations, and entertainment). This average level of resource control reflects both areas of high (> 40 percent) Jewish representation (e.g., mass media, high finance, the legal profession, the intellectual elite, entertainment) and low (< 10 percent) Jewish representation (e.g., corporate elite, military leaders, religious leaders, legislators). The overall estimate is comparable to that made by Lemer et al. (1996, 20) based on data gathered in the 1970s and 1980s. Lerner et al. arrive at a 23 percent overall Jewish representation in American elites. The results also parallel levels of Jewish overrepresentation in other societies, as in early twentieth-century Germany where Jews constituting approximately one percent of the population controlled approximately 20 percent of the economy (Mosse 1987, 1989) and also had a dominating influence on the media and the production of culture (Deak 1968, 28; Laqueur 1974, 73). Substitution of these resource and mobilization values into the Blalock equation yields an estimate that Jewish influence on ethnic policy (immigration, race policy, foreign policy) is approximately three times the influence of gentile European Americans. The results are highly robust for different weightings of resources. Only an "extreme neo-Marxist" weighting of resources (i.e., one that weights only the corporate elite, the legislative branch of government, the military elite, foundations, and total group income) brings Jewish influence down to approximate parity of influence with gentile European Americans. As indicated above, there is a broad Jewish consensus on such issues as Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties. This implies that Jewish influence and Jewish interests dominate these issues--a result that is highly compatible with the discussion of Jewish influence on immigration policy discussed Chapter 7 as well as the fact that all of these areas have seen enormous swings in public policy in accordance with Jewish interests that coincide with the rise of Jewish influence in the United States. Salter's estimate that Jewish mobilization may be conceptualized as several times greater than that of gentile European Americans is well illustrated by the history of Jewish involvement in immigration policy: All of the major Jewish organizations were intensively involved in the battle over restrictive immigration for a period lasting an entire century despite what must have seemed devastating setbacks. This effort continues into the contemporary era. As discussed in Chapter 7, opposition to large-scale immigration of all racial and ethnic groups by large majorities of the European-derived population as well as the relative apathy of other groups--even groups such as Italian Americans and Polish Americans that might be expected to support the immigration of their own peoples--were prominent features of the history of immigration policy. This "rise of the Jews"--to use Albert Lindemann's (1997) phrase--has undoubtedly had important effects on contemporary Western societies. A major theme of the previous chapter is that high levels of immigration into Western societies conforms to a perceived Jewish interest in developing nonhomogeneous, culturally and ethnically pluralistic societies. It is of interest to consider the possible consequences of such a policy in the long term. In recent years there has been an increasing rejection among intellectuals and minority ethnic activists of the idea of creating a melting pot society based on assimilation among ethnic groups (see, e.g., Schlesinger 1992). Cultural and ethnic differences are emphasized in these writings, and ethnic assimilation and homogenization are viewed in negative terms. The tone of these writings is reminiscent of the views of many late-nineteenth- and early -twentieth-century Jewish intellectuals who rejected the assimilationist effects of Reform Judaism in favor of Zionism or a return to a more extreme form of cultural separatism such as Conservative or Orthodox Judaism. The movement toward ethnic separatism is of considerable interest from an evolutionary point of view. Between-group competition and monitoring of outgroups have been a characteristic of Jewish-gentile interactions not only in the West but also in Muslim societies, and there are examples of between-group competition and conflict too numerous to mention in other parts of the world. Historically, ethnic separatism, as seen in the history of Judaism, has been a divisive force within societies. It has on several occasions unleashed enormous intrasocietal hatred and distrust, ethnically based warfare, expulsions, pogroms, and attempts at genocide. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that the future will be much different. At the present time there are ethnically based conflicts on every continent, and clearly the establishment of Israel has not ended ethnically based conflict for Jews returning from the diaspora. Indeed, my review of the research on contact between more or less impermeable groups in historical societies strongly suggests a general rule that between-group competition and monitoring of ingroup and outgroup success are the norm. These results are highly consistent with psychological research on social identity processes reviewed in SAID (Ch. 1). From an evolutionary perspective, these results confirm the expectation that ethnic self-interest is indeed important in human affairs, and obviously ethnicity remains a common source of group identity in the contemporary world. People appear to be aware of group membership and have a general tendency to devalue and compete with outgroups. Individuals are also keenly aware of the relative standing of their own group in terms of resource control and relative reproductive success. They are also willing to take extraordinary steps to achieve and retain economic and political power in defense of these group imperatives. Given the assumption of ethnic separatism, it is instructive to think of the circumstances that would, from an evolutionary perspective, minimize group conflict. Theorists of cultural pluralism such as Horace Kallen (1924) envision a scenario in which different ethnic groups retain their distinctive identity in the context of complete political equality and economic opportunity. The difficulty with this scenario from an evolutionary perspective (or even a common sense perspective) is that no provision is made for the results of competition for resources and reproductive success within the society. Indeed, the results of ethnic strife were apparent in Kallen's day, but "Kallen lifted his eyes above the strife that swirled around him to an ideal realm where diversity and harmony coexist" (Higham 1984, 209). In the best of circumstances one might suppose that separated ethnic groups would engage in absolute reciprocity with each other, so that there would be no differences in terms of economic exploitation of one ethnic group by the other. Moreover, there would be no differences on any measure of success in society, including social class membership, economic role (e.g., producer versus consumer; creditor versus debtor; manager versus worker), or fertility between the separated ethnic groups. All groups would have approximately equal numbers and equal political power; or if there were different numbers, provisions would exist to ensure that minorities would retain equitable representation in terms of the markers of social and reproductive success. Such conditions would minimize hostility between the groups because attributing one's status to the actions of the other groups would be difficult. Given the existence of ethnic separatism, however, it would still be in the interests of each group to advance its own interests at the expense of the other groups. All things being equal, a given ethnic group would be better off if it ensured that the other groups had fewer resources, lower social status, lower fertility, and proportionately less political power than itself. The hypothesized steady state of equality therefore implies a set of balance-of-power relation-ships--each side constantly checking to make sure that the other is not cheating; each side constantly looking for ways to dominate and exploit by any means possible; each side willing to compromise only because of the other sides's threat of retaliation; each side willing to cooperate at cost only if forced to do so by, for example, the presence of external threat. Clearly, any type of cooperation that involves true altruism toward the other group could not be expected. Thus the ideal situation of absolute equality in resource control and reproductive success would certainly require a great deal of monitoring and undoubtedly be characterized by a great deal of mutual suspicion. In the real world, however, even this rather grim ideal is highly unlikely. In the real world, ethnic groups differ in their talents and abilities; they differ in their numbers, fertility, and the extent to which they encourage parenting practices conducive to resource acquisition; they also differ in the resources held at any point in time and in their political power. Equality or proportionate equity would be extremely difficult to attain or to maintain after it has been achieved without extraordinary levels of monitoring and without extremely intense social controls to enforce ethnic quotas on the accumulation of wealth, admission to universities, access to high status jobs, and so on. Because ethnic groups have differing talents and abilities and differing parenting styles, variable criteria for qualifying and retaining jobs would be required depending on ethnic group membership. Moreover, achieving parity between Jews and other ethnic groups would entail a high level of discrimination against individual Jews for admission to universities or access to employment opportunities and even entail a large taxation on Jews to counter the Jewish advantage in the possession of wealth, since at present Jews are vastly over-represented among the wealthy and the successful in the United States. This would especially be the case if Jews were distinguished as a separate ethnic group from gentile European Americans. Indeed, the final evolution of many of the New York Intellectuals from Stalinism was to become neoconservatives who have been eloquent opponents of affirmative action and quota mechanisms for distributing resources. (Sachar [1992, 818ff] mentions Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, Irving Howe, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Charles Krauthammer, Norman Podhoretz, and Earl Raab as opposed to affirmative action.) Jewish organizations (including the ADL, the AJCommittee, and the AJCongress) have taken similar positions Sachar (1992, 818ff). In the real world, therefore, extraordinary efforts would have to be made to attain this steady state of ethnic balance of power and resources. Interestingly, the ideology of Jewish-gentile coexistence has sometimes included the idea that the different ethnic groups develop a similar occupational profile and implicitly control resources in proportion to their numbers. In medieval France, for example, Louis IX's ordinance of 1254 prohibited Jews from engaging in money-lending at interest and encouraged them to live by manual labor or trade (see Richard 1992, 162). The dream of German assimilationists during the nineteenth century was that the occupational profile of Jews after emancipation would mirror that of the gentiles--a "utopian expectation . . shared by many, Jews and non-Jews alike" (Katz 1986, 67). Efforts were made to decrease the percentage of Jews involved in trade and increase the percentages involved in agriculture and artisanry. In the event, however, the result of emancipation was that Jews were vastly over-represented among the economic and cultural elite, and this overrepresentation was a critical feature of German anti-Semitism from 1870 to 1933 (see SAID, Ch. 5). Similarly, during the 1920s when the United States was attempting to come to grips with Jewish competition at prestigious private universities, plans were proposed in which each ethnic group received a percentage of placements at Harvard reflecting the percentage of racial and national groups in the United States (Sachar 1992, 329). Similar policies--uniformly denounced by Jewish organizations--developed during the same period throughout Central Europe (Hagen 1996). Such policies certainly reflect the importance of ethnicity in human affairs, but levels of social tension are bound to be chronically high. Moreover, there is a considerable chance of ethnic warfare even were precise parity achieved through intensive social controls: As indicated above, it is always in the interests of any ethnic group to obtain hegemony over the others. If one adopts a cultural pluralism model involving free competition for resources and reproductive success, differences between ethnic groups are inevitable; from an evolutionary perspective, there is the very strong prediction that such differences will result in animosity from the losing groups. After emancipation there was a powerful tendency for upward mobility among Jews in Western societies, including a large overrepresentation in the professions as well as in business, politics, and the production of culture. Concomitantly there were outbreaks of anti-Semitism originating often among groups that felt left behind in this resource competition or who felt that the culture being left behind in this resource competition or who felt that the culture being created did not meet their interests. If the history of Judaism tells us anything, it is that self-imposed ethnic separatism tends to lead to resource competition based on group membership, and consequent hatred, expulsions, and persecutions. Assuming that ethnic differences in talents and abilities exist, the supposition that ethnic separatism could be a stable situation without ethnic animosity requires either a balance of power situation maintained with intense social controls, as described above, or it requires that at least some ethnic groups be unconcerned that they are losing in the competition. I regard this last possibility as unlikely in the long run. That an ethnic group would be unconcerned with its own eclipse and domination is certainly not expected by an evolutionist or, indeed, by advocates of social justice whatever their ideology. Nevertheless, this is in fact the implicit morality of the criticism by several historians of the behavior of the Spanish toward the Jews and Marranos during the Inquisition and the Expulsion, as, for example, in the writings of Benzion Netanyahu (1995), who at times seems openly contemptuous of the inability of the Spaniards to compete with the New Christians without resorting to the violence of the Inquisition. From this perspective, the Spaniards should have realized their inferiority and acquiesced in being economically, socially, and politically dominated by another ethnic group. Such a "morality" is unlikely to appeal to the group losing the competition, and from an evolutionary perspective, this is not in the least surprising. Goldwin Smith (1894/1972, 261) made a similar point a century ago:"A community has a right to defend its territory and its national integrity against an invader whether his weapon be the sword or foreclosure. In the territories of the Italian Republics the Jews might so far as we see, have bought land and taken to farming had they pleased. But before this they had thoroughly taken to trade. Under the falling Empire they were the great slave-traders, buying captives from barbarian invaders and probably acting as general brokers of spoils at the same time. They entered England in the train of the Norman conqueror. There was, no doubt, a perpetual struggle between their craft and the brute force of the feudal populations. But what moral prerogative has craft over force? Mr. Arnold White tells the Russians that, if they would let Jewish intelligence have free course, Jews would soon fill all high employments and places of power to the exclusion of the natives, who now hold them. Russians are bidden to acquiesce and rather to rejoice in this by philosophers, who would perhaps not relish the cup if it were commended to their own lips. The law of evolution, it is said, prescribes the survival of the fittest. To which the Russian boor may reply, that if his force beats the fine intelligence of the Jew the fittest will survive and the law of evolution will be fulfilled. It was force rather than fine intelligence which decided on the field of Zama that the Latin, not the Semite, should rule the ancient and mould the modern world." Ironically, many intellectuals who absolutely reject evolutionary thinking and any imputation that genetic self-interest might be important in human affairs also favor policies that are rather obviously self-interestedly ethnocentric, and they often condemn the self-interested ethnocentric behavior of other groups, particularly any indication that the European-derived majority in the United States is developing a cohesive group strategy and high levels of ethnocentrism in reaction to the group strategies of others. The ideology of minority group ethnic separatism and the implicit legitimization of group competition for resources, as well as the more modern idea that ethnic group membership should be a criterion for resource acquisition, must be seen for what they are: blueprints for group evolutionary strategies. The history of the Jews must be seen as a rather tragic commentary on the results of such group strategies. The importance of group-based competition cannot be overstated. I believe it is highly unlikely that Western societies based on individualism and democracy can long survive the legitimization of competition between impermeable groups in which group membership is determined by ethnicity. The discussion in SAID (Chs. 3-5) strongly suggests that ultimately group strategies are met by group strategies, and that societies become organized around cohesive, mutually exclusionary groups. Indeed, the recent multicultural movement may be viewed as tending toward a profoundly non-Western form of social organization that has historically been much more typical of Middle Eastern segmentary societies centered around discrete homogeneous groups. However, unlike in the multicultural ideal, in these societies there are pronounced relations of dominance and subordination. Whereas democracy appears to be quite foreign to such segmentary societies, Western societies, uniquely among the stratified societies of the world, have developed individualistic democratic and republican political institutions. Moreover, major examples of Western collectivism, including German National Socialism and Iberian Catholicism during the period of the Inquisition, have been characterized by intense anti-Semitism. There is thus a significant possibility that individualistic societies are unlikely to survive the intra-societal group-based competition that has become increasingly common and intellectually respectable in the United States. I believe that in the United States we are presently heading down a volatile path--a path that leads to ethnic warfare and to the development of collectivist, authoritarian, and racialist enclaves. Although ethnocentric beliefs and behavior are viewed as morally and intellectually legitimate only among ethnic minorities in the United States, the theory and the data presented in SAID indicate that the development of greater ethnocentrism among Euro-pean-derived peoples is a likely result of present trends. One way of analyzing the Frankfurt School and psychoanalysis is that they have attempted with some success to erect, in the terminology of Paul Gottfried (1998) and Christopher Lasch (1991), a "therepeutic state" that pathologizes the ethnocentrism of European-derived peoples as well as their attempts to retain cultural and demographic dominance. However, ethnocentrism on the part of the European-derived majority in the United States is a likely outcome of the increasingly group-structured contemporary social and political landscape--likely because evolved psychological mechanisms in humans appear to function by making ingroup and outgroup membership more salient in situations of group-based resource competition (see SAID, Ch. 1). The effort to overcome these inclinations thus necessitates applying to Western societies a massive "therapeutic" intervention in which manifestations of majoritarian ethnocentrism are combated at several levels, but first and foremost by promoting the ideology that such manifestations are an indication of psychopathology and a cause for ostracism, shame, psychiatric intervention, and counseling. One may expect that as ethnic conflict continues to escalate in the United States, increasingly desperate attempts will be made to prop up the ideology of multiculturalism with sophisticated theories of the psychopathology of majority group ethnocentrism, as well as with the erection of police state controls on nonconforming thought and behavior. I suppose that a major reason some non-Jewish racial and ethnic groups adopt multiculturalism is that they are not able to compete successfully in an individualistic economic and cultural arena. As a result, multiculturalism has quickly become identified with the idea that each group ought to receive a proportional measure of economic and cultural success. As indicated above, the resulting situation may oppose Jewish interests. Because of their high intelligence and resource-acquisition ability, Jews do not benefit from affirmative action policies and other group-based entitlements commonly advocated by minority groups with low social status. Jews thus come into conflict with other ethnically identified minority groups who use multiculturalism for their own purposes. (Nevertheless, because of their competitive advantage within the white, European-derived group with which they are currently classified, Jews may perceive themselves as benefiting from policies designed to dilute the power of the European-derived group as a whole on the assumption that they would not suffer any appreciable effect. Indeed, despite the official opposition to group-based preferences among Jewish organizations, Jews voted for an anti-affirmative action ballot measure in California in markedly lower percentages than did other European-derived groups.) Although multiculturalist ideology was invented by Jewish intellectuals to rationalize the continuation of separatism and minority-group ethnocentrism in a modern Western state, several of the recent instantiations of multiculturalism may eventually produce a monster with negative consequences for Judaism. Irving Louis Horowitz (1993, 89) notes the emergence of anti-Semitism in academic sociology as these departments are increasingly staffed by individuals who are committed to ethnic political agendas and who view Jewish domination of sociology in negative terms. There is a strong strain of anti-Semitism emanating from some multiculturalist ideologues, especially from Afrocentric ideologues (Alexander 1992), and Cohen (1998, 45) finds that "multiculturalism is often identified nowadays with a segment of the left that has, to put it bluntly, a Jewish problem." Recently the Nation of Islam, led by Louis Farrakhan, has adopted an overt anti-Semitic rhetoric. Afrocentrism is often associated with racialist ideologies, such as those of Molefi Asante (1987), in which ethnicity is viewed as the morally proper basis of self--identity and self-esteem and in which a close connection exists between ethnicity and culture. Western ideals of objectivity, universalism, individualism, rationality, and the scientific method are rejected because of their ethnic origins. Asante accepts a naive racialist theory in which Africans (the "sun people") are viewed as superior to Europeans (the "ice people"). Such movements mirror similar Jewish ideologies that rationalize a powerful concern with Jewish ethnicity and attempt to produce feelings of ethnic superiority within the group. These ideologies have been common throughout Jewish intellectual history, the most enduring embodied in the idea of chosenness and the "light of the nations" concept. SAID (Ch. 7) reviewed evidence indicating that Jewish historians and intellectuals, beginning in the ancient world, have often attempted to show that gentile cultural influences have had specifically Jewish precedents or even that various gentile philosophers and artists were actually Jews. This tradition has been carried on recently by two Sephardic Jews, Martin Bernal (1987) in his Black Athena and Jose Faur (1992) in his In the Shadow of History: Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity. Indeed, there may well be a general trend since the Enlightenment in which Jewish intellectuals have been at the vanguard of secular political movements, such as the movement for cultural pluralism, intended to serve Jewish interests as well as appeal to segments of the gentile population. Also apparent is a trend such that eventually these movements fractionate, the result of anti-Semitism within the very segment of the gentile population to which the ideology attempts to appeal, and Jews abandon these movements and seek to pursue their interests by other means. Thus it has been noted here that Jews have played a prominent role in the political left in this century. We have also seen that as a result of anti-Semitism among gentiles on the left and on the part of Communist governments, eventually Jews either abandoned the left or they developed their own brand of leftism in which leftist universalism was compatible with the primacy of Jewish identity and interests.' Gore Vidal (1986) is a prominent example of a gentile leftist intellectual who has been highly critical of the role of neoconservative Jews in facilitating the U.S. military buildup of the 1980s and allying themselves with conservative political forces to aid Israel--charges interpreted as implying anti-Semitism because of the implication that American Jews place the interests of Israel above American interests (Podhoretz 1986). Vidal also suggests that neoconservatism is motivated by the desire of Jews to make an alliance with gentile elites as a defense against possible anti-Semitic movements emerging during times of economic crisis. Indeed, fear of anti-Semitism on the left has been the major impetus for founding the neoconservative movement (see Gottfried 1993, 80)--the final resting point of many of the New York Intellectuals whose intellectual and cumulative effect of neoconservatism and its current hegemony over the conservative political movement in the United States (achieved partly by its large influence on the media and among foundations) has been to shift the conservative movement toward the center and, in effect, to define the limits of conservative legitimacy. Clearly, these limits of conservative legitimacy are defined by whether they conflict with specifically Jewish group interests in a minimally restrictive immigration policy, support for Israel, global democracy, opposition to quotas and affirmative action, and so on. As indicated in William F. Buckley's (1992) In Search of Anti-Semitism, however, the alliance between gentile paleoconservatives and Jewish neoconservatives in the United States is fragile, with several accusations of anti-Semitism among the paleoconservatives. Much of the difficulty derives from the tension between the nationalist tendencies of an important segment of U.S. conservatism and the perceptions of at least some gentile conservatives that Jewish neoconservatism is essentially a device for pursuing narrow Jewish sectarian interests, particularly with regard to Israel, church-state separation, and affirmative action. Moreover, the neoconservative commitment to many aspects of the conservative social agenda is half-hearted at best (Gottfried 1993). Most importantly, neoconservatives pursue what is essentially an ethnic agenda regarding immigration while opposing the ethnocentric interests of the paleoconservatives in retaining their ethnic hegemony. The ethnic agenda of neoconservatism can also be seen in their promotion of the idea that the United States should pursue a highly interventionist foreign policy aimed at global democracy and the interests of Israel rather than aimed at the specific national interests of the United States (Gottfried 1993). Neoconservatism has also provided a Jewish influence on the American conservative movement to counterbalance the strong tendency for Jews to support liberal and leftist political candidates. Jewish ethnic interests are best served by influencing both major parties toward a consensus on Jewish issues, and, as indicated above, neoconservatism has served to define the limits of conservative legitimacy in a manner that conforms to Jewish interests. As anti-Semitism develops, Jews begin to abandon the very movements for which they originally provided the intellectual impetus. This phenomenon may also occur in the case of multiculturalism. Indeed, many of the most prominent opponents of multiculturalism are Jewish neoconservatives, as well as organizations such as the National Association of Scholars (NAS), which have a large Jewish membership. (The NAS is an organization of academics opposed to some of the more egregious excesses of feminism and multiculturalism in the university.) It may well be the case, therefore, that the Jewish attempt to link up with secular political ideologies that appeal to gentiles is doomed in the long run. Ginsberg (1993, 224ff) essentially makes this point when he notes that there is increasing evidence for anti-Semitism among American liberals, conservatives, and populist radicals. The case of multiculturalism is particularly problematic as a Jewish strategy. In this case one might say that Jews want to have their cake and eat it too. "Jews are often caught between fervent affirmation of the Enlightenment and criticism of it. Many Jews believe that the replacement of the Enlightenment ideal of universalism with a politics of difference and a fragmented 'multiculture' would constitute a threat to Jewish achievement. At the same time, they recognize the dangers of a homogeneous 'monoculture' for Jewish particularity... . [Jews] seek to rescue the virtues of the Enlightenment from the shards of its failures and salvage an inclusive vision from multiculturalism, where fragmentation and divisiveness now reign" (Biale, Galchinsky, & Heschel 1998, 7). Multicultural societies with their consequent fragmentation and chronic ethnic tension are unlikely to meet Jewish needs in the long run even if they do ultimately subvert the demographic and cultural dominance of the peoples of European origin in lands where they have been dominant. This in turn suggests a fundamental and irresolvable friction between Judaism and prototypical Western political and social structure. Certainly the very long history of anti-Semitism in Western societies and its recurrence time and again after periods of latency suggests such a view. The incompatibility of Judaism and Western culture can also be seen in the tendency for individualistic Western cultures to break down Jewish group cohesiveness. As Arthur Ruppin (1934, 339) noted earlier in the century, all modern manifestations of Judaism, from neo-Orthodoxy to Zionism, are responses to the Enlightenment's corrosive effects on Judaism--a set of defensive structures erected against "the destructive influence of European civilization." And at a theoretical level, there is a very clear rationale for supposing that Western individualism is incompatible with group-based resource conflict that has been the consistent consequence of the emergence of a powerful Judaism in Western societies (see SAID, Chs. 3--5). One aspect of this friction is well articulated in Alan Ryan's (1994, 11) discussion of the "latent contradiction" in the politics of Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the authors of the highly controversial volume The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. Ryan states, "Herrnstein essentially wants the world in which clever Jewish kids or their equivalent make their way out of their humble backgrounds and end up running Goldman Sachs or the Harvard physics department, while Murray wants the Midwest in which he grew up--a world in which the local mechanic didn't care two cents whether he was or wasn't brighter than the local math teacher. The trouble is that the first world subverts the second, while the second feels claustrophobic to the beneficiaries of the first." The social structure whose acceptance is here attributed to Murray envisions a moderately individualistic society, a society that is meritocratic and hierarchical but also cohesive and culturally and ethnically homogeneous. It is a society with harmony among the social classes and with social controls on extreme individualism among the elite. There has been a powerful Western tendency to develop such societies, beginning at least in the Middle Ages, but also present, I believe, in the classical Roman civilization of the Republic. The ideal of hierarchic harmony is central to the social program of the Catholic Church beginning during the late Roman Empire and reaching its pinnacle during the High Middle Ages (MacDonald 1995c; SAID, Ch. 5). This ideal is apparent also in a powerful strand of German intellectual history beginning with Herder in the eighteenth century. A very central feature of this prototypical Western hierarchical harmony has been the social imposition of monogamy as a form of reproductive leveling that dampens the association between wealth and reproductive success. From an evolutionary perspective, Western societies achieve their cohesion because hierarchical social relationships are significantly divorced from reproductive consequences. Such a world is threatened from above by the domination of an individualistic elite without commitment to responsible lower-status individuals who may have lesser intellectual ability, talent, or financial resources. It is threatened from within by the development of a society constituted by a set of ethnically divided, chronically competing, highly impermeable groups as represented historically by Judaism and currently envisioned as the model for society by the proponents of multiculturalism. And it is threatened from below by an increasing underclass of people with the attributes described by Herrnstein and Murray: intellectually incompetent and insufficiently conscientious to hold most kinds of job; irresponsible and incompetent as parents; prone to requiring public assistance; prone to criminal behavior, psychiatric disorders, and substance abuse; and prone to rapid demographic increase. Such people are incapable of contributing economically, socially, or culturally to a late-twentieth-century society or, indeed, to any human civilization characterized by a substantial degree of reciprocity, voluntarism and democracy. Given that the continued existence of Judaism implies that the society will be composed of competing, more or less impermeable groups, the neoconservative condemnation of multiculturalism must be viewed as lacking in intellectual consistency. The neoconservative prescription for society embraces a particular brand of multiculturalism in which the society as a whole will be culturally fragmented and socially atomistic. These social attributes not only allow Jewish upward mobility, but also are incompatible with the development of highly cohesive, anti-Semitic groups of gentiles; they are also incompatible with group-based entitlements and affirmative action programs that would necessarily discriminate against Jews. As Horowitz (1993, 86) notes, "High levels of cultural fragmentation coupled with religious options are likely to find relatively benign forms of anti-Semitism coupled with a stable Jewish condition. Presumed Jewish cleverness or brilliance readily emerges under such pluralistic conditions, and such cleverness readily dissolves with equal suddenness under politically monistic or totalitarian conditions." Jewish neoconservatives readily accept a radically individualistic society in which Jews would be expected to become economically, politically, and culturally dominant while having minimal allegiance to the lower (disproportionately gentile) social classes. Such a society is likely to result in extreme social pressures as the responsible lower middle classes are placed in an increasingly precarious economic and political situation. As in the case of the intellectual activity of the Frankfurt School, the Jewish neoconservative prescription for the society as a whole is radically opposed to the strategy for the ingroup. Traditional Judaism, and to a considerable extent contemporary Judaism, obtained its strength not only from its intellectual and entrepreneurial elite but also from the unshakable allegiance of responsible, hardworking, lower-status Jews of lesser talent whom they patronized. And it must be stressed here that historically, the popular movements that have attempted to restore this prototypical Western state of hierarchic harmony, in opposition to the exploitation of individualistic elites and the divisiveness of intergroup conflict, have often had intensely anti-Semitic overtones. Moreover, to a considerable extent the font et origo of the social policies and cultural shifts that have resulted in the dangerous situation now rapidly developing in the United States has been the Jewish-dominated intellectual and political movements described in this volume. I have attempted to document the role of those movements, particularly the 1960s leftist political and intellectual movement, in subjecting Western culture to radical criticism; it is the legacy of this cultural movement that has taken the lead in providing the intellectual basis of the multiculturalist movement and in rationalizing social policies that expand the underclass and expand the demographic and cultural presence of non-European peoples in Western societies. From the standpoint of these leftist critics, the Western ideal of hierarchic harmony and assimilation is perceived as an irrational, romantic, and mystical ideal. Western civility is nothing more than a thin veneer masking a reality of exploitation and conflict---"a vast ecclesia super cloacum" (Cuddihy 1974, l42). It is interesting in this regard that a basic strand of sociological theory beginning with Marx has been to emphasize conflict between social classes rather than social harmony. For example, Irving Louis Horowitz (1993, 75) notes that one result of the massive influence of Jewish intellectuals on American sociology beginning in the 1930s was that--"the sense of America as a consensual experience gave way to a sense of America as a series of conflicting definitions," including a heightened concern with ethnicity in general. Historically, this conflict conception of social structure has typically been combined with the idea that the inevitable struggle between social classes can be remedied only by the complete leveling of economic and social outcomes. This latter ideal can then be attained only by adopting a radical environmentalist perspective on the origins of individual differences in economic success and other cultural attainments and by blaming any individual shortcomings on unequal environments. Because this radical environmentalism is scientifically unfounded, the social policies based on this ideology tend to result in high levels of social conflict as well as an increase in the prevalence of intellectual incompetence and social pathology. From an evolutionary perspective, the prototypical Western social organization of hierarchic harmony and muted individualism is inherently unstable, a situation that undoubtedly contributes to the intensely dynamic nature of Western history. It has often been remarked that in the history of China nothing ever really changed. Dynasties characterized by intensive polygyny and moderate to extreme political despotism came and went, but there were no fundamental social changes over a very long period of historical time. The data reviewed by Betzig (1986) indicate that much the same can be said about the history of political organization in other stratified human societies. In the West, however, the prototypical state of social harmony described above is chronically unstable. The unique initiating conditions involving a significant degree of reproductive leveling have resulted in a highly dynamic historical record (see MacDonald 1995c). The most common threat to hierarchic harmony has been the individualistic behavior of elites--a tendency that hardly surprises an evolutionist. Thus the early phases of industrialization were characterized by the unraveling of the social fabric and high levels of exploitation and conflict among the social classes. As another example, the slavery of Africans was a short-term benefit to an individualistic elite of southern aristocrats in the United States, but it also resulted in exploitation of the slaves and has been a long-term calamity for the society as a whole. We have also seen that Western elites in traditional societies have often actively encouraged Jewish economic interests to the detriment of other sectors of the native population, and in several historical eras Jews have been the instruments of individualistic behavior among gentile elites thus facilitating such individualistic behavior. Of considerable importance to the history of U.S. immigration policy has been the collaboration between Jewish activists and elite gentile industrialists interested in cheap labor, at least in the period prior to 1924. Recently, writers such as Peter Brimelow (1995, 229--232) and Paul Gottfried (1998) have called attention to an elite 'New Class' of internationalists who are opposed to the nation-state based on ethnic ties and highly favorable to immigration that decreases the ethnic homogeneity of traditional societies. The self-interest of this group is to cooperate with similar individuals in other countries rather than to identify with the lower levels of their own society. Although this type of internationalism is highly congruent with a Jewish ethnic agenda--and Jews are undoubtedly disproportionately represented among this group, gentile members of the New Class must be seen as pursuing a narrowly individualistic agenda. The individualism of elites has not been the only threat to Western hierarchic harmony, however. As recounted in SAID, this ideal has been shattered in critical historical eras by intense group conflict between Judaism and segments of gentile society. In the present age, perhaps for the first time in history, this hierarchic harmony is threatened by the development of an underclass whose membership consists disproportionately of racial and ethnic minority members and which has also resulted in intense group-based conflict. In particular, it is the large disproportion of African Americans in the American underclass that makes any political solution to this threat to hierarchic harmony problematic. I have suggested that there is a fundamental and irresolvable friction between Judaism and prototypical Western political and social structure. The present political situation in the United States (and several other Western countries) is so dangerous because of the very real possibility that the Western European tendency toward hierarchic harmony has a biological basis. The greatest mistake of the Jewish-dominated intellectual movements described in this volume is that they have attempted to establish the moral superiority of societies that embody a preconceived moral ideal (compatible with the continuation of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy) rather than advocate social structures based on the ethical possibilities of naturally occurring types. In the twentieth century many millions of people have been killed in the attempt to establish Marxist societies based on the ideal of complete economic and social leveling, and many more millions of people have been killed as a result of the failure of Jewish assimilation into European societies. Although many intellectuals continue to attempt to alter fundamental Western tendencies toward assimilation, muted individualism, and hierarchic harmony, there is a real possibility that these Western ideals are not only more achievable but also profoundly ethical. Uniquely among all stratified cultures of the world, prototypical Western societies have provided the combination of a genuine sense of belonging, a large measure of access to reproductive opportunities, and the political participation of all social classes combined with the possibilities of meritocratic upward social mobility. As an evolutionist, one must ask what the likely genetic consequences of this sea change in American culture are likely to be. An important consequence--and one likely to have been an underlying motivating factor in the countercultural revolution--may well be to facilitate the continued genetic distinctiveness of the Jewish gene pool in the United States. The ideology of multiculturalism may be expected to increasingly compartmentalize groups in American society, with long-term beneficial consequences on continuation of the essential features of traditional Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. There is increasing consensus among Jewish activists that traditional forms of Judaism are far more effective in ensuring long-term group continuity than semi-assimilationist, semi-cryptic strategies such as Reform Judaism or secular Judaism. Reform Judaism is becoming steadily more conservative, and there is a major effort within all segments of the Jewish community to prevent intermarriage (e.g., Abrams 1997; Dershowitz 1997; see pp. 244-245). Moreover, as discussed in several parts of this book, Jews typically perceive themselves to benefit from a nonhomogeneous culture in which they appear as only one among many ethnic groups where there is no possibility of the development of a homogeneous national culture that might exclude Jews. In addition, there may well be negative genetic consequences for the European-derived peoples of the United States and especially for the "common people of the South and West" (Higham I 984, 49)--that is, for lower-middle-class Caucasians derived from Northern and Western Europe--whose representatives fought a desperate and prolonged political battle against the present immigration policy. Indeed, we have seen that a prominent theme of the New York Intellectuals as well as the Authoritarian Personality studies was the intellectual and moral inferiority of traditional American culture, particularly rural American culture. James Webb (1995) notes that it is the descendants of the WASPS who settled the West and South who "by and large did the most to lay out the infrastructure of this country, quite often suffering educational and professional regression as they tamed the wilderness, built the towns, roads and schools, and initiated a democratic way of life that later white cultures were able to take advantage of without paying the price of pioneering. Today they have the least, socioeconomically, to show for these contributions. And if one would care to check a map, they are from the areas now evincing the greatest resistance to government practices." The war goes on, but it is easy to see who is losing. The demographic rise of the underclass resulting from the triumph of the 1960s counter-cultural revolution implies that European-derived genes and gene frequencies will become less common compared to those derived from the African and the Latin American gene pools. On the other end of the IQ--reproductive strategy distribution, immigrants from East Asian countries are out-competing whites, especially of the lower-middle and working classes, in gaining admission to universities and in prestigious, high-income jobs. The long term result will be that the entire white population (not including Jews) is likely to suffer a social status decline as these new immigrants become more numerous. (Jews are unlikely to suffer a decline in social status not only because their mean IQ is well above that of the East Asians but, more importantly, also because Jewish IQ is highly skewed toward excelling in verbal skills. The high IQ of East Asians is skewed toward performance IQ, which makes them powerful competitors in engineering and technology. See PTSDA, [Ch. 7] and Lynn [1987]. Jews and East Asians are thus likely to occupy different ecological niches in contemporary societies.) Lower-middle-class Caucasians, more than any other group, are expected to lose out. If present trends continue, in the long run the United States will be dominated by an Asian technocratic elite and a Jewish business, professional, and media elite. Moreover, the shift to multiculturalism has coincided with an enormous growth of immigration from non-European-derived peoples beginning with the Immigration Act of 1965, which favored immigrants from non-European countries (see Auster 1990; Brimelow 1995). Many of these immigrants come from non-Western countries where cultural and genetic segregation are the norm, and within the context of multicultural America, they are encouraged to retain their own languages and religions and encouraged to marry within the group. As indicated above, the expected result will be between-group resource and reproductive competition and increased vulnerability of democratic and republican political institutions in a context in which longterm projections indicate that European-derived peoples will no longer be a majority of the United States by the middle of the next century. Indeed, one might note that, while the Western Enlightenment has presented Judaism with its greatest challenge in all of its long history, contemporary multiculturalism in the context of high levels of immigration of peoples of all racial and ethnic groups presents the greatest challenge to Western universalism in its history. The historical record indicates that ethnic separatism among Caucasian-derived groups has a tendency to collapse within modern Western societies unless active attempts at ethnic and cultural segregation are undertaken, as has occurred among Jews. As expected from a resource-reciprocity point of view (MacDonald 1991, 1995b,c), in the absence of rigid ethnic barriers, marriage in Western individualist societies tends to be importantly influenced by a wide range of phenotypic features of the prospective spouse, including not only genetic commonality but also social status, personality, common interests, and other points of similarity. This individualist pattern of marriage decisions has characterized Western Europe at least since the Middle Ages (e.g., MacFarlane 1986; see PTSDA , Ch. 8). The result has been a remarkable degree of ethnic assimilation in the United States among those whose ancestry derives from Europe (Alba 1985). This is particularly noteworthy because ethnic conflict and violence are on the rise in Eastern Europe, yet European-derived groups in the United States have an overwhelming sense of commonality. The long-term result of such processes is genetic homogenization, a sense of common interest, and the absence of a powerful source of intrasocietal division. To suppose that the conflict over immigration has been merely a conflict over the universalist tendencies of Western culture would, however, be disingenuous. To a great extent the immigration debate in the United States has always had powerful ethnic overtones and continues to do so even after the European-derived peoples of the United States have become assimilated into a Western universalist culture. The present immigration policy essentially places the United States and other Western societies "in play" in an evolutionary sense which does not apply to other nations of the world, where the implicit assumption is that territory is held by its historically dominant people: Each racial and ethnic group in the world has an interest in expanding its demographic and political presence in Western societies and can be expected to do so if given the opportunity. Notice that American Jews have had no interest in proposing that immigration to Israel should be similarly multiethnic, or that Israel should have an immigration policy that would threaten the hegemony of Jews. I rather doubt that Oscar Handlin (1952, 7) would extend his statement advocating immigration from all ethnic groups into the United States by affirming the principle that all men, being brothers, are equally capable of being Israelis. I also doubt that the Synagogue Council of America would characterize Israeli immigration law as "a gratuitous affront to the peoples of many regions of the world" (PCN 1953, 117). Indeed, the ethnic conflict within Israel indicates a failure to develop a universalist Western culture. Consider the disparities between Jewish attitudes regarding multiculturalism in Israel versus the United States. "From a Jewish viewpoint, rejection of Zionism as an ideology and a force shaping the state [of Israel] is like rejecting the state itself. The refined distinction between the state and its character, and that between its Jewishness and Zionism, are neither understood nor condoned by the Jews. They are not interested in having Israel as a state, but rather as a Jewish-Zionist state. . . . While it is legal, but not legitimate, in Israel to reject publicly or act against Zionism, according to the 1985 amendment of the election law, one may not run for the Knesset on an election slate which denies Israel as the state of the Jewish people. (Smooha 1990, 397)" "A substantial digression from [the principle of equality] is caused by the special legal status accorded to the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund. They perform quasi-governmental functions such as planning and funding of new rural localities, support for cultural enterprises, provision of assistance to the elderly and other disadvantaged groups, and development and leasing of lands. Yet by their own constitution, these powerful institutions are obliged to serve Jews only. . . . Discrimination is also embedded in the Jewish Religious Services Law which provides for publicly funded religious services to Jews only. Most of the discrimination is, however, rather covert.(Smooha 1990, 401)" Smooha (1990, 403) also notes that in a 1988 survey, 74 percent of Israeli Jews said that the state should prefer Jews to Arabs, and 43 percent favored the denial of the right to vote to Israeli Arab citizens. Whereas American Jews have been in the forefront of efforts to ensure ethnic diversity in the United States and other Western societies, 40 percent of the Jewish respondents agreed that Israel should encourage Israeli Arabs to leave the country, 37 percent had reservations, and only 23 percent objected to such a policy. Almost three quarters of Israeli Jews did not want to have an Arab as a superior in a job. Moreover, immigration to Israel is officially restricted to Jews. It is also noteworthy that whereas Jews have been on the forefront of movements to separate church and state in the United States and often protested lack of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, the Orthodox rabbinical control of religious affairs in Israel has received only belated and half-hearted opposition by American Jewish organizations (Cohen 1972, 317) and has not prevented the all-out support of Israel by American Jews, despite the fact that Israel's policy is opposite to the polices that Jewish organizations have successfully pursued in Western democracies. This phenomenon is an excellent example of the incompatibility of Judaism with Western forms of social organization, which results in a recurrent gap between Jewish behavior vis-a-vis its own group strategy and Jewish attempts to manipulate Western societies to conform to Jewish group interests. At present the interests of non-European-derived peoples to expand demographically and politically in the United States are widely perceived as a moral imperative, whereas the attempts of the European-derived peoples to retain demographic, political, and cultural control is represented as "racist," immoral, and an indication of psychiatric disorder. From the perspective of these European-derived peoples, the prevailing ethnic morality is altruistic and self-sacrificial. It is unlikely to be viable in the long run, even in an individualistic society. As we have seen, the viability of a morality of self-sacrifice is especially problematic in the context of a multicultural society in which everyone is conscious of group membership and there is between-group competition for resources. Consider from an evolutionary perspective the status of the argument that all peoples should be allowed to immigrate to the United States. One might assert that any opposition to such a principle should not interest an evolutionist because human group genetic differences are trivial, so any psychological adaptations that make one resist such a principle are anachronisms without function in the contemporary world (much like one's appendix). A Jew maintaining this argument should, to retain intellectual consistency, agree that the traditional Jewish concern with endogamy and consanguinity has been irrational. Moreover, such a person should also believe that Jews ought not attempt to retain political power in Israel because there is no rational reason to suppose that any particular group should have power anywhere. Nor should Jews attempt to influence the political process in the United States in such a manner as to disadvantage another group or benefit their own. And to be logically consistent, one should also apply this argument to all those who promote immigration of their own ethnic groups, the mirror image of group-based opposition to such immigration. Indeed, if this chain of logic is pursued to its conclusion, it is irrational for anyone to claim any group interests at all. And if one also rejects the notion of individual genetic differences, it is also irrational to attempt to further individual interests, for example, by seeking to immigrate as an individual. Indeed, if one accepts these assumptions, the notion of genetic consequences and thus of the possibility of human evolution past and present becomes irrational; the idea that it is rational is merely an illusion produced perhaps by psychological adaptations that are without any meaningful evolutionary function in the contemporary world. One might note that this ideology is the final conclusion of the anti-evolutionary ideologies reviewed in this volume. These intellectual movements have asserted that scientific research shows that any important ethnic differences or individual differences are the result of environmental variation, and that genetic differences are trivial. But there is an enormous irony in all of this: If life is truly without any evolutionary meaning, why have advocates propagated these ideologies so intensely and with such self-consciously political methods? Why have many of these same people strongly identified with their own ethnic group and its interests, and why have many of them insisted on cultural pluralism and its validation of minority group ethnocentrism as moral absolutes? By their own assumptions, it is just a meaningless game. Nobody should care who wins or loses. Of course, deception and self-deception may be involved. I have noted (p. 195) that a fundamental agenda has been to make the European-derived peoples of the United States view concern about their own demographic and cultural eclipse as irrational and as an indication of psychopathology. If one accepts that both within-group and between-group genetic variation remains and is non-trivial (i.e., if evolution is an ongoing process), then the principle of relatively unrestricted immigration, at least under the conditions obtaining in late twentieth-century Western societies, clearly involves altruism by some individuals and established groups. Nevertheless, although the success of the intellectual movements reviewed in this volume is an indication that people can be induced to be altruistic toward other groups, I rather doubt such altruism will continue if there are obvious signs that the status and political power of European-derived groups is decreasing while the power of other groups increases. The prediction, both on theoretical grounds and on the basis of social identity research, is that as other groups become increasingly powerful and salient in a multicultural society, the European-derived peoples of the United States will become increasingly unified; among these peoples, contemporary divisive influences, such as issues related to gender and sexual orientation, social class differences, or religious differences, will be increasingly perceived as unimportant. Eventually these groups will develop a united front and a collectivist political orientation vis-a-vis the other ethnic groups. Other groups will be expelled if possible or partitions will be created, and Western societies will undergo another period of medievalism. Jewish interests in immigration policy are an example of conflicts of interest between Jews and gentiles over the construction of culture. This conflict of interests extends well beyond immigration policy. There is a growing realization that the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s is a watershed event in the history of the United States. Such a conceptualization is compatible with the work of Roger Smith (1988), who shows that until the triumph of the cultural pluralist model with the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s, there were three competing models of American identity: the "liberal" individualist legacy of the Enlightenment based on "natural rights"; the "republican" ideal of a cohesive, socially homogeneous society (what I have identified as the prototypical Western social organization of hierarchic harmony); the "ethnocultural" strand emphasizing the importance of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity in the development and preservation of American cultural forms. . From the present perspective no fundamental conflict exists between the latter two sources of American identity; social homogeneity and hierarchic harmony may well be best and most easily achieved with an ethnically homogeneous society of peoples derived from the European cultural area. Indeed, in upholding Chinese exclusion in the nineteenth century, Justice Stephen A. Field noted that the Chinese were unassimilable and would destroy the republican ideal of social homogeneity. As indicated above, the incorporation of non-European peoples, and especially peoples derived from Africa, into peculiarly Western cultural forms is profoundly problematic. As discussed at several points in this volume, the radical individualism embodied in the Enlightenment ideal of individual rights is especially problematic as a source of long-term stability in a Western society because of the danger of invasion and domination by group strategies such as Judaism and the possibility of the defection of gentile elites from the ideals represented in the other two models of social organization. These latter two events are particularly likely to destroy the social cohesiveness so central to Western forms of social organization. As Smith notes, the transformations of American society in the post--Civil War era resulted from the "liberal" cultural ideal "that opposed slavery, favored immigration, and encouraged enterprise while protecting property rights" and that posed a severe threat to the collective life at the center of American civilization. It is this liberal legacy of American civilization that the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed in this volume have exploited in rationalizing unrestricted immigration and the loss of social homogeneity represented by the unifying force of the Christian religion. As Israel Zangwill said in advocating a Jewish strategy for unrestricted immigration, "tell them they are destroying American ideals" (see p. 267). The effect has been to create a new American ideal that is entirely at odds with the historic sources of American identity: "This ideal carries on the cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and respect for human liberty of the older liberal tradition, and so it can properly be termed a modern version of the liberal ideal. It is novel, however, in its rejection of Lockean liberalism's absolutist natural law elements in favor of modern philosophic pragmatism and cultural relativism. And one of its chief theoretical architects, philosopher Horace Kallen, argued that cultural pluralism better recognizes human sociality, our constitutive attachments to distinctive ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. It therefore envisions America as a "democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind" (Kallen 1924, 124). Since all groups and individuals should be guaranteed equal opportunities to pursue their own destinies, the nation's legacy of legal, racial, ethnic and gender discriminations is unacceptable according to the cultural pluralist ideal. At the same time, there must be no effort to transform equality into uniformity, to insist that all fit into a standard Americanized mold. The ideal of democratic cultural pluralism finally came to predominance in American public law in the 1950s and especially the 1960s, finding expression in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the liberalizing 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, in new programs to provide educational curricula more attuned to the nation's diverse cultural heritage, in bilingual ballots and governmental publications, and in affirmative action measures. (Smith 1988, 246)" Within this perspective, there is tolerance for different groups but the result is a tendency to "deprecate the importance or even the existence of a common national identity" (Kallen 1924, 59). Kallen, of course, was a very strongly identified Jew and a Zionist, and it is not at all surprising that his cultural ideal for the United States represents a non-Western form of social organization that conforms to Jewish interests and compromises the interests of the European-derived peoples of the United States. It is a social form that guarantees the continued existence of Judaism as a social category and as a cohesive ethnic group while at the same time, given the characteristics of Jews, guarantees Jews economic and cultural pre-eminence. Public policy based on this conceptualization is having the predictable long-term effect of marginalizing both culturally and demographically the European-derived peoples of the United States. Because the European-derived groups are less organized and less cohesive than Jews and because a therapeutic state has been erected to counter expressions of European-American ethnocentrism, it raises the distinct possibility that in the long run European Americans will be fragmented, politically powerless, and without an effective group identity at all. The conflict of interest between Jews and gentiles in the construction of culture goes well beyond advocacy of the multicultural ideal. Because they are much more genetically inclined to a high-investment reproductive strategy than are gentiles, Jews are able to maintain their high-investment reproductive strategy even in the absence of traditional Western cultural supports for high-investment parenting (Ch. 4). Compared to gentiles, Jews are therefore much better able to expand their economic and cultural success without these traditional Western cultural supports. As Higham (1984, 173) notes, the cultural idealization of an essentially Jewish personal ethic of hedonism, anxiety, and intellectuality came at the expense of the older rural ethic of asceticism and sexual restraint. Moreover, traditional Western supports for high-investment parenting were embedded in religious ideology and, I suppose, are difficult to achieve in a postreligious environment. Nevertheless, as Podhoretz (1995, 30) notes, it is in fact the case that Jewish intellectuals, Jewish organizations like the AJCongress, and Jewish-dominated organizations such as the ACLU have ridiculed Christian religious beliefs, attempted to undermine the public strength of Christianity, or have led the fight for lifting restrictions on pornography. Further, we have seen that psychoanalysis as a Jewish-dominated intellectual movement has been a central component of this war on gentile cultural supports for high-investment parenting. Whereas Jews, because of their powerful genetically influenced propensities for intelligence and high-investment parenting, have been able to thrive within this cultural milieu, other sectors of the society have not; the result has been a widening gulf between the cultural success of Jews and gentiles and a disaster for society as a whole. The countercultural revolution of the 1960s may well be incompatible with traditional American freedoms. Traditional American freedoms such as the First Amendment freedom of speech (deriving from the Enlightenment liberal strand of American identity) have clearly facilitated specifically Jewish interests in the construction of culture, interests that conflict with the possibility of constructing a cohesive society built around high-investment parenting. Given that the popular media and the current intellectual environment of universities thrive on the freedom of elites to produce socially destructive messages, the political movements attempting to restore the traditional Western cultural supports for high-investment parenting will undoubtedly be forced to restrict some traditional American freedoms (see, e.g., Bork 1996). Cultural supports for high-investment parenting act as external forces of social control that maximize high-investment parenting among all segments of the population, even those who for genetic or environmental reasons are relatively disinclined to engage in such practices (MacDonald 1997, 1998b). Without such cultural controls, it is absolutely predictable that social disorganization will increase and the society as a whole will continue to decline. Nevertheless, the continuity of peculiarly Western forms of social organization will remain a salient concern even if one ignores issues of ethnic competition entirely. I have emphasized that there is an inherent conflict between multiculturalism and Western universalism and individualism. Even were Western universalism to regain its moral imperative, whether all of humanity is willing or able to participate in this type of culture remains an open question. Universalism is a European creation, and it is unknown whether such a culture can be continued over a long period of time in a society that is not predominantly ethnically European. When not explicitly advocating multiculturalism, the rhetoric in favor of immigration has typically assumed a radical environmentalism in which all humans are portrayed as having the same potentials and as being equally moldable into functioning members of Western universalist and individualist societies. This premise is highly questionable. Indeed, one might say that the present volume in conjunction with PTSDA and SAID is testimony to the extremely ingrained anti-Western tendencies that occur among human groups. Given that a great many human cultures bear a strong resemblance to the collectivist, anti-assimilatory tendencies present in Jewish culture, it is highly likely that many of our present immigrants are similarly unable or unwilling to accept the fundamental premises of a universalistic, culturally homogeneous, individualistic society. Indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that Western tendencies toward individualism are unique and based on evolved psychological adaptations (see PTSDA, Ch. 8). This genetic perspective proposes that individualism, like many other phenotypes of interest to evolutionists (MacDonald 1991), shows genetic variation. In PTSDA (Ch. 8) I speculated that the progenitors of Western populations evolved in isolated groups with low population density. Such groups would have been common in northern areas characterized by harsh ecological conditions, such as those that occurred during the ice age (see Lenz 1931, 657). Under ecologically adverse circumstances, adaptations are directed more at coping with the physical environment than at competition with other groups (Southwood 1977, 1981). Such an environment implies less selection pressure for collectivist, ethnocentric groups as embodied by historical Judaism. Evolutionary conceptualizations of ethnocentrism emphasize the utility of ethnocentrism in group competition. Ethnocentrism would be of no importance in combating the physical environment, and such an environment would not support large groups. We have seen that Western individualism is intimately entwined with scientific thinking and social structures based on hierarchic harmony, sexual egalitarianism, and democratic and republican forms of government. These uniquely Western tendencies suggest that reciprocity is a deeply ingrained Western tendency. Western political forms from the democratic and republican traditions of ancient Greece and Rome to the hierarchic harmony of the Western Middle Ages and to modern democratic and republican governments assume the legitimacy of a pluralism of individual interests. Within these social forms is a tendency to assume the legitimacy of others' interests and perspectives in a manner that is foreign to collectivist, despotic social structures characteristic of much of the rest of the world. Another critical component of the evolutionary basis of individualism is the elaboration of the human affectional system as an individualistic pair-bonding system, the system that seemed so strange that it was theorized to be a thin veneer overlaying a deep psychopathology to a generation of Jewish intellectuals emerging from the ghetto (Cuddihy 1974, 71). This system is individualistic in the sense that it is based not on external, group-based social controls or familial dictate but, rather, on the intrinsically motivated role of romantic love in cementing reproductive relationships (see pp. 136--139). The issue is important because Western cultures are typically characterized as relatively individualistic compared to other societies (Triandis 1995), and there is reason to suppose that the affectional system is conceptually linked to individualism; that is, it is a system that tends toward nuclear rather than extended family organization. Triandis (1990) finds that individualistic societies emphasize romantic love to a greater extent than do collectivist societies, and Western cultures have indeed emphasized romantic love more than other cultures (see PTSDA, 236-245; MacDonald 1995b,c; Money 1980). This system is highly elaborated in Western cultures in both men and women, and it is psychometrically linked with empathy, altruism, and nurturance. Individuals who are very high on this system--predominantly females--are pathologically prone to altruistic, nurturant and dependent behavior (see MacDonald 1995a). On an evolutionary account, the relatively greater elaboration of this system in females is to be expected, given the greater female role in nurturance and as a discriminating mechanism in relationships of pair bonding. Such a perspective also accounts for the much-commented-on gender gap in political behavior in which females are more prone to voting for political candidates favoring liberal positions on social issues. Women more than men also endorse political stances that equalize rather than accentuate differences between individuals and groups (Pratto, Stallworth & Sidanius 1997). In ancestral environments this system was highly adaptive, resulting in a tendency toward pair bonding and high-investment parenting, as well as intrinsically motivated relationships of close friendship and trust. This system continues to be adaptive in the modern world in its role in underlying high-investment parenting, but it is easy to see that the relative hypertrophy of this system may result in maladaptive behavior if a system designed for empathy, altruism, and nurturance of family members and others in a closely related group becomes directed to the world outside the family. The implication is that Western societies are subject to invasion by non-Western cultures able to manipulate Western tendencies toward reciprocity, egalitarianism, and close affectional relationships in a manner that results in maladaptive behavior for the European-derived peoples who remain at the core of all Western societies. Because others' interests and perspectives are viewed as legitimate, Western societies have uniquely developed a highly principled moral and religious discourse, as in the arguments against slavery characteristic of the nineteenth-century abolitionists and in the contemporary discourse on animal rights. Such discourse is directed toward universal moral principles--that is, principles that would be viewed as fair for any rational, disinterested observer. Thus in his highly influential volume, Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971) argues that justice as objective morality can only occur behind a "veil of ignorance" in which the ethnic status of the contending parties is irrelevant to considerations of justice or morality. It is this intellectual tradition that has been effectively manipulated by Jewish intellectual activists, such as Israel Zangwill and Oscar Handlin, who have emphasized that in developing immigration policy Western principles of morality and fair play make it impossible to discriminate against any ethnic group or any individual. Viewed from the perspective of, say, an African native of Kenya, any policy that discriminates in favor of Northwestern Europe cannot withstand the principle that the policy be acceptable to a rational, disinterested observer. Because Zangwill and Handlin are not constrained by Western universalism in their attitudes toward their own group, however, they are able to ignore the implications of universalistic thinking for Zionism and other expressions of Jewish particularism. Because of its official policy regarding the genetic and cultural background of prospective immigrants, Israel would not be similarly subject to invasion by a foreign group strategy. Indeed, one might note that despite the fact that a prominent theme of anti-Semitism has been to stress negative personality traits of Jews and their willingness to exploit gentiles (SAID, Ch. 2), a consistent theme of Jewish intellectual activity since the Enlightenment has been to cast Jewish ethnic interests and Judaism itself as embodying a unique and irreplaceable moral vision (SAID, Chs. 6-8)--terms that emphasize the unique appeal of the rhetoric of the morality of the disinterested observer among Western audiences. The result is that whether Western individualistic societies are able to defend the legitimate interests of the European-derived peoples remains questionable. A prominent theme appearing in several places in this volume and in PTSDA (Ch. 8) and SAID (Chs. 3--5) is that individualistic societies are uniquely vulnerable to invasion by cohesive groups such as has been historically represented by Judaism. Significantly, the problem of immigration of non-European peoples is not at all confined to the United States but represents a severe and increasingly contentious problem in the entire Western world and nowhere else: Only European-derived peoples have opened their doors to the other peoples of the world and now stand in danger of losing control of territory occupied for hundreds of years. Western societies have traditions of individualistic humanism, which make immigration restriction difficult. In the nineteenth century, for example, the Supreme Court twice turned down Chinese exclusion acts on the basis that they legislated against a group, not an individual (Petersen 1955, 78). The effort to develop an intellectual basis for immigration restriction was tortuous; by 1920 it was based on the legitimacy of the ethnic interests of Northwestern Europeans and had undertones of racialist thinking. Both these ideas were difficult to reconcile with the stated political and humanitarian ideology of a republican and democratic society in which, as Jewish pro-immigration activists such as Israel Zangwill emphasized, racial or ethnic group membership had no official intellectual sanction. The replacement of these assertions of ethnic self-interest with an ideology of "assimilability" in the debate over the McCarran-Walter act was perceived by its opponents as little more than a smokescreen for "racism." At the end, this intellectual tradition collapsed largely as a result of the onslaught of the intellectual movements reviewed in this volume, and so collapsed a central pillar of the defense of the ethnic interests of European-derived peoples. The present tendencies lead one to predict that unless the ideology of individualism is abandoned not only by the multicultural minorities (who have been encouraged to pursue their group interests by a generation of American intellectuals) but also by the European-derived peoples of Europe, North America, New Zealand, and Australia, the end result will be a substantial diminution of the genetic, political, and cultural influence of these peoples. It would be an unprecedented unilateral abdication of such power and certainly an evolutionist would expect no such abdication without at least a phase of resistance by a significant segment of the population. As indicated above, European-derived peoples are expected to ultimately exhibit some of the great flexibility that Jews have shown throughout the ages in advocating particular political forms that best suit their current interests. The prediction is that segments of the European-derived peoples of the world will eventually realize that they have been ill-served and are being ill-served both by the ideology of multiculturalism and by the ideology of deethnicized individualism. If the analysis of anti-Semitism presented in SAID is correct, the expected reaction will emulate aspects of Judaism by adopting group-serving, collectivist ideologies and social organizations. The theoretically underdetermined nature of human group processes (PTSDA, Ch. 1; MacDonald 1995b) disallows detailed prediction of whether the reactive strategy will be sufficient to stabilize or reverse the present decline of European peoples in the New World and, indeed, in their ancestral homelands; whether the process will degenerate into a selfdestructive reactionary movement as occurred with the Spanish Inquisition; or whether it will initiate a moderate and permanent turning away from radical individualism toward a sustainable group strategy. What is certain is that the ancient dialectic between Judaism and the West will continue into the foreseeable future. It will be ironic that, whatever anti-Semitic rhetoric may be adopted by the leaders of these defensive movements, they will be constrained to emulate key elements of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. Such strategic mimicry will, once again, lead to a "Judaization" of Western societies not only in the sense that their social organization will become more group-oriented but also in the sense that they will be more aware of themselves as a positively evaluated ingroup and more aware of other human groups as competing, negatively evaluated outgroups. In this sense, whether the decline of the European peoples continues unabated or is arrested, it will constitute a profound impact of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy on the development of Western societies. This book is the final volume in the series on Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. A future comparative book, tentatively titled Diaspora Peoples, extends the focus to groups other than Jews and European peoples--the Romany, Assyrians, overseas Chinese, Parsis, and Sikhs, among others. It will test the extent to which the concepts and analyses employed in this series expand our understanding of group interaction, cooperation, and competition, and therefore human evolution in general.